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Abstract
In this era of international supply chains where Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) are exporting to Developed Countries (DCs), concerns 
about economic growth that is environmentally benign has meant that 
LDC factories are taking environmental upgrading measures to meet 
standards set by DC customers. This thesis looks at the applicability of 
ecological modernisation theory (EMT) to this situation by examining 
the Bangladeshi readymade garments (RMG) sector that is part of the 
global apparel value chain.
EMT suggests that economic growth can continue while providing 
environmental protection in the long run due to proactive 
environmental actions by the market actors, civil society and the nation 
state. This thesis tests the tenets of EMT by looking at the apparel value 
chain in three parts (management networks within firms, economic 
networks of the supply chain, and policy networks) and then as a whole 
(EM network). Evidence from Bangladeshi garment factories (corporate 
culture, organisational change and environmental learning) suggests 
significant problems: factories are compliant with buyer codes only on 
paper and not in reality. Firms have a mixture of proactive and reactive 
greening measures and enjoy only an indirect competitive advantage 
from greening. The absence of "win win" gains can be pinned to buyer 
behaviour along the chains, coupled with their reluctance for closer 
collaboration and weak green customer pressures for clothing sourced in 
Bangladesh. Policymaking by the state has also been problematic: issue 
cognition and conflict, closed hierarchical networks, mistrust, political 
bargaining and prioritising national economic interests hampered the 
EM vision of the modem nation state. Overall, this thesis questions the 
adequacy of EMT for investing international supply chains. EMT needs 
to reconceptualise itself with hierarchical relationship realities, LDC
3
cultural contexts, LDC growth trajectories, actor heterogeneity, "no win" 
situations, and the suitability of EM tools.
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Chapter One: Ecological Modernisation Theory and Bangladesh
1.1 Introduction:
Economic development that is environmentally and socially beneficial is at 
the forefront of contemporary development debates all over the world. This is 
especially relevant in international trade where goods manufactured in least 
developed countries (LDCs) are being exported to developed countries (DCs) 
via international supply chains. The LDC exporters, workers and 
governments are participating in this trade regime to earn foreign exchange 
and fight their way out of endemic poverty. The DC importers and 
governments are encouraging these global supply chains to stimulate their 
own economies with goods that are high quality, but produced at much 
cheaper rates than in their own home countries. At the same time, consumers, 
governments and civil society in LDCs and DCs are concerned about the 
environmental and social impacts of these supply chains in sites of production 
and consumption. This concern is visible in commodity chains for apparel 
(the garments industry), paper (the pulp and paper industry), coffee, bananas, 
chocolate (the food industry), etc. where product labelling is gaining 
prominence, starting from "fair trade" stickers on coffee packets to 
"sweatshop free" and "organic cotton" labels on clothing sold in DC shops.
Accompanying this concern for environmental and social quality is the lively 
ethical trade debate, where well organised non governmental organisations 
(NGOs) in DCs and LDCs are getting organised and bringing to light issues of 
labour rights, working conditions and environmental resource degradation in 
LDCs as a result of globalised supply chains. The NGO debates are matched 
by a marked rise in the use of company codes of conduct (CoCs) by the 
product importers (DC retailers and buyers), which set conditions and 
standards that have to be met by the suppliers before goods can be shipped.
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The policymakers in both geographical ends are also active in finding ways to 
adjust to these new non-price trade conditions.
In our contemporary lives, the question of ethical trade touches us all, 
whether we are shopping for cotton t-shirts in the West or walking to work in 
a Vietnamese factory that produces hundreds of these t-shirts in a day. What 
does ethical trade mean? What should it mean? What is our responsibility as 
the consumer? What is our responsibility as the factory manager? What are 
our expectations as workers and factory neighbours? Who has the right to 
decide these things? What are the different truths of ethical trade and whose 
voices carry the truths?
These questions remind me of the ancient Jain-Buddhist fable of the wise king 
who asked six blind courtiers to describe an elephant by touching it, the end 
result being much squabbling and determined insistence by the blind men 
that they each exclusively own the truth. The wise king then said,
O how they cling and wrangle, some who claim
For preacher and monk the honoured name!
For, quarrelling, each to his view they cling.
Such folk see only one side of a thing.1
The reality of ethical trade debaters may be like that of the blind men -  
scattered all over the globe, we are only seeing partial views of the whole 
truth due to our geographical, cultural, economic and political perspectives, 
and our whole view of ethical trade is made up of these partial truths. None 
of us are necessarily right until we consider our perceptions in the light of 
open and inclusive discourse. This thesis, in its small way, is an attempt to 
open half an eye to gauge the reality of ethical trade in supply chains.
1 For details of the fable, please see http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~rvwang/berkelev/258/parable.html. 
accessed February 14, 2008.
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The apparel supply chain is particularly vibrant with ethical trade debates, 
and my thesis looks at the Bangladeshi ready-made garments (RMG) industry 
as a case study. Bangladesh is the seventh largest apparel exporter in the 
world (MFB 2007). The factories in Dhaka and Chittagong are facing demands 
for environmental and social management according to standards set by 
apparel buyers and consumers in environmentally progressive societies that 
may not find cultural or institutional resonance in Bangladesh (Huq 2002, 
Khatun 2003, Khondker et al 2005). The firms are finding themselves in a 
situation of "institutional ambiguity" (Hajer 2004), where there is little 
experience or precedent of green production in a reactive, technocentric, 
ineffective and change resistant institutional set up among both, firms and 
regulators.
Figure 1.1: Ethical trade in supply chains and the main influences
Ethical trade along the policy networks (green policies, incentives,
institutions) -----------------------------------------------------------------------►
LDC LDC Supranational DC pressure
pressure policymakers trade policy groups
groups institutions
DC
policy
makers
LDC factory DC DC
managers — ►retailers — ► consumers
and workers /buyers
<------------------ T]le supply chain --------------►
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ethical trade along the economic and firm  networks (green signals, green 
governance, competitiveness, mind sets, factory floor practices)
The problem is very complex (figure 1.1) -  it touches upon themes such as 
changing mindsets and practices at the level of the factory floor (firm 
networks); reliance on green supply chain signals (economic networks); 
policymaking and implementation arrangements (policy networks). We also
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cannot ignore the basic principles behind the structure of the supply chain -  
constant pressures for cost reduction, on time delivery and cheap labour in a 
highly competitive international market. It is interesting then, to question 
how ethical trade pushes these factories into greening to maintain market 
share in such a complex scenario. The main research question of this thesis is 
posed as follows:
Why are export based ready made garments (RMG) suppliers in Bangladesh failing to 
undertake environmental management?
One way of looking at this problem is through the lens of ecological 
modernisation (EM) theory. The remainder of the chapter discusses the main 
tenets of EM theory and based on that discussion I explain the main variables 
that were chosen to study environmental compliance, regulation and policy 
making in the technocratic change resistant system prevalent in Bangladesh. 
The following discussion informs the thesis objectives, key hypothesis, 
research design, conceptual frameworks and the chapter sequences -  which 
are all explained towards the latter part in detail.
1.2 Ecological Modernisation Theory (EMT) and its Critics:
Ecological modernisation refers to a group of theories based on the idea that 
economic growth can continue whilst ensuring environmental protection via 
long term changes in the structures of production and consumption that 
emphasises proactive environmental management by society, market actors 
and the state. EMT arose in the 1980's as a reaction to the steady state and 
zero-growth ideologies of the 1970's, and in opposition to the Club of Rome's 
"limits to growth" argument. EMT architects (such as Huber, Janicke, 
Spaargaren, Mol, Hajer, Weale and Simmonis) postulated that economic and 
environmental goals need not be in conflict with each other, and 
environmentally proactive economic growth can only help towards
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sustainable development. Needless to say, EMT is immensely influential in 
present day discourses of development. For example, the UN WCED (1987), 
and various EU environmental action programmes, with their 
environmentally sustainable development rhetoric, designed to reorient fiscal 
and economic instruments towards technologies for resource efficiency, the 
internalisation of costs, waste minimisation strategies, longer product life 
cycles etc. are resonant of EM principles (Berger at al 2001, Mol 1995 1996
1999, Rydin 1999, Hajer 1996, Toke 2001, Pepper 1999, Reitan 1998, Young
2000, Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000, Barry and Paterson 2004, Cater and Lowe 
2000).
EMT was initially studied and empirically tested in industrialised countries in 
the mid 1990's. Since then it has broadened not only theoretically but also 
geographically to include less developed transitional countries (central and 
eastern Europe) and in non OECD countries (Canada and USA). The first 
stage heavily emphasised science and technological innovation in 
environmental modernisation. The second phase (from the late 1980's to mid 
1990's) had less emphasis on technological innovations and took a more 
balanced perspective of the comparative roles of the centralised state vis-a-vis 
market dynamics. Since the mid 1990's the third phase saw broader horizons 
in terms of geography (most significantly in Asia) and theoretical scope 
(including studies about ecologising consumption behaviour and global 
processes involving export based firms) (Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000).
EMT espouses renewed engagements with structural change and 
consequently, with modernity. EMT recognises the structural nature of 
modern ecological problems; the relationship between the environment and 
the structures of modernity need to become more benign via institutional 
change. Consequently, Spaargaren (1997:3) describes EM as "a general theory 
of environment induced social change", highlighting a view of multi­
stakeholder involvement for creating capacity and incentives, that will lead to
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a network of institutions changing over time, including such geographically 
dispersed structures as global supply chains (Young 2000). EMT does not 
oppose modernity. Instead it suggests that by rethinking the environmental 
crises, we might find the impetus for social institutions to change from a 
reactive technocentric paradigm to a more proactive prevention-based 
paradigm, which will be the basis of a new engagement with modernity (Mol 
1996). Theorists suggest, "solutions to the problems caused by modernisation, 
industrialisation, and science can only be solved through more 
modernisation, industrialisation and science" (Buttel 2000a: 62). As Mol (1996) 
states, contemporary economic practices are deeply rooted in modernity and 
it makes no sense to imagine ecological production and consumption 
divorced from state institutions and modem science and technology. He 
suggests that economic processes be re-embedded with their ecological 
impacts within the existing institutions of modernity. Therefore the two main 
assumptions of EMT are -  first, in the words of Hajer (1996: 251) that, "the 
dominant institutions indeed can leam and that their learning can produce 
meaningful change", and second, that the "win-win" goals can be attained 
through instruments of modernity.
Role of the nation-state -  EMT suggests a style of environmental 
policymaking where the regulators move away from traditional command 
and control based standard setting policy style, towards a more consensual 
policy negotiation based decentralised policy style, using market mechanisms 
to change private sector behaviour. Berger (1999) calls this partial self­
regulation with legal boundaries. This may be explained by Janicke's earlier 
work on state failure (1997), where he argued that given the different social 
spheres of development (the development of specialised knowledge and 
expertise, fast changing societies, post-modern institutions, the globalisation 
of markets) and the limitations of a state's capacity to solve societal problems, 
the state should change to more participative and inclusive forms of 
governance. Pepper (1999:6) refers to this as changing from a "curative and
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dirigiste" style towards regulation that is akin to contextual steering. EMT's 
normative side assumes a certain level of political modernisation (Janicke and 
Weidner 1995, Berger et al 2001, Sonnenfeld and Mol 2002) where citizens can 
express a preference for environmental quality and non-state actors (NGOs, 
research organisations, trade unions etc.) are given the opportunity to 
contribute towards solving environmental problems, and assume traditional 
administrative, regulatory managerial and mediating functions. EM 
imperatives on policymakers do not end at changing policy styles: they have 
to design and facilitate the use of economic instruments (such as taxes, fines, 
subsidies and tradable permits) to monetise environmental protection by 
economic actors, and encourage proactive/ preventative strategies by the 
private sector. Policymakers also have to realise the economic importance of 
strengthening green consumerism. Of course, behind these imperatives is the 
notion that multi-level stakeholders are genuinely convinced of greening and 
the distributive benefits of policy mechanisms is fair (Fisher and Freudenberg
2001). Analytically, pro-EM political modernisation can be seen in Europe 
with the trend of NGOs influencing environmental policymaking (e.g. Toke 
and Strachan 2006); increased civil society memberships in NGOs (Young 
2000); and increased use of voluntary self regulation mechanisms and eco- 
taxes for the private sector (Young 2000, Welford 2003), which means that the 
state is an important EM enabler (Berger et al 2001). The nation-state is no 
longer the only level of analysis either; supra-level regional/ international 
policymaking have become important aspects in addressing how 
environmental impacts of a region or country inform environmental 
policymaking in international supply chains and globalisation; and EM 
studies in the age of globalisation cannot help but ask how much impact local 
environmental conditions have in that context of market economy 
environmentalism (Berger et al 2001, Gibbs 1998,2003).
Role of market actors -  Economic actors are very much part of EM's vision of 
modem institutions, not only because they hold together the modern
20
phenomenon of globalised supply chains, but also because they are 
responsible for environmental degradation and remediation. Consequently, 
market actors (retailers, suppliers and consumers) "appear as actors for 
environmental reform, using mainly economic arguments and mechanisms to 
articulate environmental goals" (Berger et al 2001: 59). The normative vision 
of EM suggests that the economic actors will develop market advantage 
through the integration of anticipatory/preventative mechanisms into their 
production process. They have to recognise and internalise actual and 
anticipated costs of environmental externalities (perhaps reinforced via EM 
driven economic instruments to be designed by the state actors) in company 
strategy making, which requires motivation, management skills and 
resources. Such motivation and incentive is meant to come from the market, 
legislation, and civil society preferences for a cleaner environment. 
Analytically, EM theorists link the reducing industrial pollution levels in DCs 
to the gradually increasing greening behaviour among Western companies 
and consumers as arguments for successful EM uptake among economic 
actors (Janicke and Weidner 1995, Mol and Spaargaren 2002). The success 
indicators include numerous CSR initiatives, retailer CoCs for environmental 
management, environmental quality assurance certification schemes and the 
green technology options that can "leapfrog" to LDC economic actors. 
Collaboration between private sector actors and civil society, NGOs, etc. is 
another aspect of successful EM. Most of these actions are not borne of private 
sector altruism but are driven by legislation, civil society protests and eco- 
awareness (Williams 2001). Motivating market actors remains a key challenge 
in operationalising the normative aspects of EMT.
Role of science and technology -  Science and technology are highly valued in 
EM because of their role the refinement of production (e.g. use of green 
technology to achieve highest possible environmental standards, use of 
anticipatory mechanisms, resource use minimisation, etc.) and consumption 
(e.g. life-cycle analysis, recycling and reuse). According to Weale (1992:76),
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"Since environmental amenity is a superior good, the demand for 
pollution control is likely to increase and there is therefore a 
considerable advantage to an economy to have the technical and 
production capacity to produce low polluting goods or pollution 
control technology."
Instead of being judged for their role in creating the environmental crises, 
science and technology are highly valued in EMT for creating the basis of 
proactiveness (Blowers 1997). The normative EMT suggestions depend on the 
availability and ability of technology to deliver a win-win ecology-economy 
synergy by providing resource efficient methods of producing goods, while 
keeping costs down and profit levels up. This is especially pertinent in 
pollution intensive sectors such as paper, pulp, palm oil, etc. Another key 
challenge of EM remains the availability of expert knowledge, ease of learning 
and actual adoption of green-technology/practices at the level of non-expert 
practitioners (Sarkis 1999), especially in LDCs. Therefore, along the supply 
chain, questions arise regarding the necessary conditions behind the 
availability, quick transfer and acceptance of green technology and green 
management mechanisms.
Repeatedly we have seen that EMT is both a normative theory (that prescribes 
desirable solutions for structural change) and an analytical-descriptive theory 
(that identifies how modem societies construct the environment, and analyses 
the nature of social and policy dynamics) (Gouldson and Murphy 1997, 
Blowers 1997, Christoff 1996, Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000). On a practical level, 
these aspects often merge, and proponents have used EMT for both purposes 
-  as an analytical framework for understanding social change of modem 
structures, institutions and practices as well as for comparing the changes to 
the normative scenario (Mol 1997, Toke and Strachan 2006), which is also the 
approach taken by this thesis. This approach is useful in delineating the
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contradictions between the normative and the analytical dimensions -  it helps 
illustrate why and how a given EM situation may be only partially ecological.
Some Criticisms of EMT:
EM has elicited much criticism from various comers, foremost among them 
the Neo Marxists, radical environmentalists and post-modernists (Buttel 
2000b, Toke and Strachan 2006). Broadly, they disagree with EM's theoretical 
assumptions by saying that its technocratic solutions, economistic arguments, 
and reliance on Western dominated market systems justifies the Western style 
status quo by hindering more radical approaches to sustainable development 
(Pepper 1993, Yearley 1994, Christoff 19961997, Dobson 1990, Seippel 2000).
An important criticism comes from Christoff (1996:486) who suggests that in 
its most common forms, EM is reductive, technocratic and corporatist:
"Given this dominant emphasis on increasing the environmental 
efficiency of industrial development and resource exploitation, such 
EM remains only superficially or weakly ecological. Consideration of 
the integrity of ecosystems, and the cumulative impacts of 
industrialisation upon these, is limited and peripheral."
Christoff, along with Berger et al (2001) and Harvey (1996), criticise EM for 
giving insufficient emphasis on ecological protection. They suggest that such 
economistic discourse dresses environmentalism into the language of 
business, and gives licence for "greenwash" and "politicians' puff" (Williams 
2001:112). EM's assumptions that existing structures and relationships 
between the state and the private sector can meaningfully internalise 
ecological considerations, are seen by Neo Marxists as celebrating 
contemporary capitalism with a green paint job, a criticism that is also raised 
by different shades of the green radicals (Blowers 1997 and Hannigan 1994).
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The corporatism aspect of EM is symptomatic of a "belief system" which 
seeks to govern by injecting business-friendly environmentalism into the 
political rationalities of the state (Christoff 1996). According to Hajer 
(1996:262), the nation state has great freedom when regulating economic 
actors:
"They can either make a few aesthetic alterations but basically continue 
with business as usual, or they can use sustainable development as a 
crowbar to break with previous commitments."
However, critics do not have faith in modem corporatist alliances and say 
that EM offers no real solutions to the "self-interest of corporate power and 
sclerotic government" (Williams 2001:113). Christoff (1996) further criticises 
the state-industry nexus by saying that while the state, may support the 
market by removing barriers to trade and competition, there comes a point 
when state intervention may be in conflict with market forces.
The Neo Marxists criticise EM for favouring mainstream Western 
development discourses; when sustainability requires a more radical 
reinterpretation of development needs (going beyond well-being 
measurements of economic wealth and consumption levels) (Dobson 1990) 
and addressing inequality (Buttel 2000c). EM is based entirely on the Western 
industrial experience (Blowers 1997) and propagates Western scientific 
hegemony (Christoff 1996), a criticism that is shared by the radical greens and 
post modernists like Sachs (1993) who argue that the "green globalism" 
message is merely an effort by Western environmental establishment to evade 
the consequences of its own profligacy by imposing its agenda on the LDCs, 
while ignoring the sub national level (although international and sub-regional 
level environmental policymaking is gaining more ground recently, for 
example within EU Environmental Action Programmes (Young 2000)). These 
critics would like to see a more radical alternative reflecting regional/local
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perspectives reflecting broader cultural needs and non-anthropocentric values 
suitable for LDCs (Dobson 1990, Yearley 1994, Williams 2001).
The limited applicability of EM in LDCs is taken forwards by Christoff (1996: 
488) who says that EM "presents a unilinear path to ecological modernity", 
where EM is the next evolutionary stage in industrial transformation that has 
to happen in LDCs (Blowers 1997 calls this superindustrialisation), which 
ignores the fact that LDC cultures may require more indigenous (and perhaps 
more radical) solutions over resource intensive agricultural and industrial 
production in those countries.
EM is also criticised for its political project by Berger et al (2001): its 
technocratic neo-corporatist style favours the voices of the powerful (mainly 
politicians and industry representatives) and uses tools (such as voluntary 
agreements) that leave out large parts of the affected. EM is criticised as being 
a mere rhetorical device seeking to co-opt radical ecological dissent and 
legitimise existing power structures that deliver solutions acceptable to the 
economically empowered, when much of this wealth (and DC eco-gains 
which EM proponents highlight) has come at the cost of exporting 
environmental degradation to LDCs (Christoff 1996, Sachs 1993).
According to Pepper (1998), the EM project ignores consumer behaviour: EM 
policy discourse is inherently contradictory because it does not call to 
diminish total resource consumption along the supply chain (in fact, EM calls 
for more growth), which is one the main Marxist criticisms of EU's 
Environmental Action Programme and the Single Market policies.
Post modernists criticise EM for ignoring social justice, given the context of 
power-relations and the consequent ethical issues in favour of putting faith in 
new institutions (Hajer 1996). The power resource balances in LDC societies 
might pose unique challenges to mainstream ideas of EM, since economic
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development is often more powerfully prioritised over the green agenda (Huq 
2002) which somewhat clouds up the distributive implications of EM.
So what should be the alternative to EM theory and discourse? Is there a 
narrow reading compared to a broader interpretation? Christoff (1996) 
distinguishes between weak and strong EM to illustrate the difference 
between what currently practiced weak EM is (encapsulating the criticisms 
mentioned above) and what strong EM could be (table 1.1). Hajer (1996) 
explains the strong EM as rising from the risks created by weak EM -  a new 
reflexive EM, where people grow disenchanted with exiting projects of 
modern institutions (the practices of over production and over-consumption), 
and move to re-embed their relationships with the local ecology, privileging 
local cultures and true economic democracy.
Table 1.1: Christoffs strong and weak EM
Weak EM Strong EM
Economistic rationalities privileged Ecological rationalities privileged
Technological solutions to 
environmental problems (narrow 
changes)
Broad changes to institutional and 
economic structure of society 
incorporating ecological concerns
Instrumental focus Communicative focus
Technocratic/corporatist styles of 
policy making limited to economic 
and political elites
Open, democratic decision making 
with participation beyond state- 
business networks
Concerned with a national focus 
privileging Western countries who 
use EM to further their economic 
advantage
Concerned with broader 
development and environmental 
challenges; cross boundary focus.
Imposes a single, closed-ended, 
hegemonic framework on political 
and economic policy.
Takes a diverse, open-ended 
approach with no single view, 
acknowledging multiple EM 
possibilities for policy.
Based on: Berger et al (2001:62) and Christoff (1996)
Under strong EM, economic and political development proceeds based on 
ecologically self aware discourse, with adequate public scrutiny and 
democratic control (Williams 2001). Although Christoffs classification
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(above) shows two versions of EM, it must be mentioned that he believes that 
there is no single correct view of what EM should mean, and that policy 
discourse must be open to multiple possibilities to which EM will provide 
orientation; a perspective that greatly influenced my reading of EM.
At this point it is necessary to clarify my view of EM. EM is undoubtedly an 
important and useful theoretical framework for analysing greening related 
change (especially strategies involving significant change). However the 
tension between the normative and analytical strands of EM is problematic. 
Given that normative EM calls for wide ranging and sustained change for 
win-win gains in change resistant political-economies, it would be a naive and 
reductive reading of EM to suggest that EM is only about ecology-economy 
gains. Therefore I suggest EM as a broad social and political theory of change: 
EM prescribes modem nation-states changing their environmental 
preferences and values as a starting point; therefore the underlying issues of 
power hierarchies, power dependencies, influences and motivations driving 
the economy and society at large, form the backbone of that change, and is 
part of a reflexive and broad EMT. Also, EM can be seen as a theory of social 
learning, given that the uptake of voluntary eco-management schemes, self 
monitoring, best-practice industry standards, etc. is built upon the idea that 
environmental information will be sufficiently understood and leamt at 
various levels of society.
The radical, Neo Marxist and post modem critique has considerable purchase 
when set against the techno-corporatist EM model. In this sense the growth 
logic of capitalism needs to be challenged, if only to produce a reflexive 
response of a society-wide drive to seek new technical opportunities (Toke
2002). I would however, like to distance myself slightly from these critics, and 
perhaps rather optimistically start from envisioning EM as a dynamic process 
of socio-political change that can permeate through international networks 
towards strong integration of EM principles in the longer term.
27
While the radicals' arguments about rejecting capitalism and consumerism 
are valuable in themselves, it is also possible to argue that it understates some 
of the economic realities of underlying economic processes in the world 
economy, for example, in global supply chains where LDCs are determined to 
maintain their participation because the LDC workers want to end poverty. 
Also, neo-Marxist criticisms are extremely valuable in analysing the power 
politics in modem structures that are as complex and geographically 
dispersed as supply chains and have informed my analysis, but I would like 
to view capitalism and supply chains as more heterogeneous and complex 
entities and view ethical trade as positive influence. In the next section, I turn 
to EM and ethical trade in LDC supply chains.
1.3 EM and Ethical Trade in International Supply Chains:
China's emerging economy is a remarkable success story of continued high 
growth based on strong industrial manufacturing and exports. However, 
looking at press photographs of smog filled Chinese industrial cities like 
Chongqing, Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenyang (where, according World Bank 
(2000), 10,000 people die prematurely per year from exposure to particulates 
in the air), it is reasonable to wonder: has EM nothing to give to developing 
countries with poor environmental capacity and a hunger for growth?
EM responses in DC countries' involvement in supply chains has not been 
without problems or controversy, but the DC private sector overall has been 
investing in greening.2 Outside of DCs, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, Mexico, Indonesia and the Philippines have also made 
pollution control investments into resource intensive dirty sectors such as 
fertiliser, paper, pulp, palm oil, etc. despite being resource poor and lacking a 
serious commitment to cleaning up pollution (Huq and Wheeler 1992,
2 See Annex 1.1 for a discussion on DC responses to EM in supply chains.
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UNIDO 2002, 2003a, 2003b and 2004, Arora and Puranik 2004, Lopez et al
2004). Being part of global supply chains has helped in some cases (although 
neo Marxists would disagree) in adopting greener technology through green 
leapfrogging (Wheeler, Huq and Martin 1993, Neumayer and Perkins 2004, 
Perkins and Neumayer 2005). Pro-EM policy interventions have been crucial 
for green leapfrogging success; however, diffusion rates have varied 
considerably, and resource depletion and pollution load rises are still a 
reality. Total pollution in LDCs could still rise if industrial output grows 
faster than pollution intensity declines. Also, the transition to cleaner 
production will be harder when growth relies on exports from polluting 
sectors such as food, pulp and paper, chemicals and textiles (Hettige, Mani, 
and Wheeler 1998). In this situation, research on ethical trade in supply chains 
becomes even more important because of potential buyer demands that can 
enable what Christoff (1996) envisioned as strong EM.
Ethical trade and DC motivations -  Ethical trade, using retailer standards for 
worker welfare, social protection and environmental diligence by suppliers, 
has been of interest to academics, NGOs, consumer groups and the media for 
some time. To some, it is dressed up greenwash (Christian Aid 2005), but to 
some it symbolises a way forward with corporate citizenship, a way to 
redeem supply chains that can be exploitative of its workers and the 
ecosystem (Hughes 2005, Green et al 1998, 1996, Bowen et al 1999, Dahlsrud 
2008, Holt 2004). It is important to view modem capitalist institutions like 
global supply chains critically, and recognise different approaches to social 
accountability in supply chains, perhaps akin to what Hughes (2006) calls soft 
capitalism. Recently there has been a rise of alternative trading spaces 
(involving fair trade produce, farmers markets, etc. with strong goals of social 
justice and sustainable rural livelihoods) as forms of resistance to mainstream 
trade dominated by the financial markets and MNCs, but the mainstream 
economy is simultaneously showing signs of adopting measures for ethically
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responsible trade in supply chains.3 Why supply chains go green is an 
interesting question to ask, not only because it reveals what the most 
important and effective pressures are, but also because it helps us understand 
why certain responses and tools (proactive or reactive) are employed by 
buyers (Preuss 2005, Sharfman et al 2007). It is possible to argue that ethical 
trade motivations and tools have to do with the refabricated regions of 
regulations: buyer led governance of the supply chains has happened in the 
contested space of capitalism, globalisation, international politics, multi-scale 
institutions, and the critical search for alternatives (by academic critics, NGOs, 
activists, labour unionists etc.). The pressures and tools are also similarly 
influenced by that refabricated space, where actors are in conflict and in 
alliance; the conflicts and the alliances determine what pressures are made 
upon the retailers and the tools that retailers employ in conjunction with 
critical feedback.
The profile of ethical trading rose in the 1990s through critical attention from 
the media and organisational campaigning by civil society in DCs, who 
brought to public attention the sourcing policies of supermarkets, food and 
clothing retailers. Academics criticised the West for a consumer culture that 
kept these LDC workers below-poverty, working in chains dictated by the 
Western development model, under pressure of hegemonistic Western 
buyers, and being forced to meet standards that are borne of Western science: 
interestingly, variations of these criticisms were made by EMT critics, noted 
earlier. The popular media exposed how familiar brand names such as Nike 
and Gap were propagating "sweatshops" in their overseas factories (Hughes 
2000, Hartwick 1998, Cook 1994, 1995, Klein 2000, Jenkins et al 2002) and as 
recently as June 2008, BBC's Panorama news programme exposed labour and 
wage violations by Primark's contractors in India (BBC 2008). NGOs such as
3 Ethical trade is seen by practitioners as quite distinct from fair trade, but their interface can 
be blurry. Ethical trade includes labour rights for LDC supply chain workers, and recently 
this has included environmental responsibility as w ell, while fair trade has more distributive 
justice and development oriented goals w hile being still part of the profit-making commodity 
chains (Blowfield 1999).
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Oxfam and Christian Aid have since targeted UK supermarket chains' own- 
brand clothing imports, while Labour Behind the Label is active in monitoring 
UK clothing retailers. Hughes et al (2007) illustrates the cases of UK's Ethical 
Trade Initiative (ETI) where NGO networks and media campaigns led the 
way; and the US's Fair Labour Association (FLA) and Workers Rights 
Consortium (WRC) where consumer pressure from university clothing 
customers and the media were instrumental in creating networks of coalitions 
involving actors from LDCs (trade unions, NGOs, workers, factory owners) 
and DCs (government agencies, NGOs, consumer groups, media), pressuring 
apparel retailers to change (Oakes 2005).
These pressures have increased reputational risk to big brand retailers, who 
have become locked into sourcing from LDCs (Gereffi 1994, Klein 2000, 
Jenkins 2002, Bansal and Roth 2000, Nadvi 2008). Conventional financial logic 
dictates that risk and return go hand in hand, and along supply chains this 
meant that buyers wanted to continue operating in supply chains but with a 
focus on risk management (Hebb and Wojick 2005). Reputational capital was 
judged as being important in the long term success of retailers, and they could 
not afford to have it eroded by the operation of their supply chain firms (who 
might be operating in full compliance with their national laws) whose 
operations were inconsistent with the values and expectations of end 
consumers (Angel and Rock 2005). Due to this gap (or variation) in 
environmental/social standards along the supply chain, retailers became 
interested in seeking harmonisation of environmental standards through 
codes of conduct for suppliers. Murphy (2002) explains this in terms of "asset 
specificity": assets have high domestic specificity when their value can be 
realised in the domestic country only; therefore, when retailers have high 
multinational asset specificity, they respond to inter-country regulatory 
standards and capacity variations by enforcing codes on their suppliers, 
aimed at reducing transactions costs.
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Investors and shareholders in publicly traded companies (that tend to be the 
brand name retailers, like Gap, Nike, Tesco, etc.) were also increasingly 
demanding environmental ratings and disclosure of company operations 
(Hebb and Wojick 2005, Godfrey and Langfield-Smith 2004). Government 
pressure was another important driver, according to Berger et al (2001), while 
the least important driver was environmental or social awareness. The 
financial benefits of adopting a multi stakeholder CSR approach were the 
main reason for some (Fraser and Fraser 2007). Stakeholder and shareholder 
pressure, social contracts and social values led to CSR proactivity, and their 
findings broadly support the fact that reactive CSR was linked to pressure 
only from regulators and media. Runhaar (2006), Darnall (2008), Bayliss et al 
(1998a, 1998b) and Holt (2004), among others, have found that typically 
larger, more visible companies (especially those that have some experience 
with EMSs, and are in higher risk industrial sectors) tend to be more 
proactive, although researchers note that generalisations are difficult to make.
Governance of ethical trade in chains -  Extensive research on the global 
governance of supply chains shows the rise of private actors (publicly traded 
MNCs and NGOs), as well as regional and international actors (both public 
and private) and the decline of national level public actors (Messner 2004, 
Nadvi and Waltring 2004, Hughes 2005, Zadek 2004, Nadvi 2008); although 
that is not to say that national legislation and regulatory pressures have 
insignificant impact on how CSR standards are implemented in factories 
(Egels Zanden 2007). Retailers (and or buyers) govern the supply chains 
(structure, product design, marketing, profit distribution, etc.) and also the 
way ethical trade (standard setting, codes of conduct, monitoring and audits, 
etc.) is implemented (Nadvi 2008). Buyers in tightly controlled supply chains 
demonstrate oligoposonistic buyer power (Hughes 2006a), in terms of 
dictating pricing, delivery lead times, and strict product quality (Dolan and 
Humphrey 2004, Gereffi et al 2005). Doel (1996) and Hughes (2000) suggest 
that such power-relations not only created worsening working conditions and
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environmental degradation in the first place, but that the voluntiristic aspect 
of ethical trade regulation is structured by the same supply chain power- 
relations that favours the buyers. Jeppesen and Hansen (2004) and Hughes
(2005) have identified different kinds of governance structures for ethical 
trade, ranging from arms-length (shallow collaboration) to a more 
developmental approach (deeper communication and collaboration) in terms 
of how factory audits are conducted, how in depth the issues are investigated 
during factory visits, how personalised the approach is and the opportunities 
for designing bottom-up approaches to ethical trade implementation. 
Sometimes retailers do not collaborate beyond the first tier of suppliers: Holt 
(2004) mentions cases of retailers forming closer collaboration mainly with 
first tier suppliers, and only in few instances was green purchasing seen to 
have trickled down to second tier suppliers.
Although ethical trade operates on what Amin (2004:226) calls "microworlds 
of regulation", the hierarchy of relationships remain problematical between 
market forces, nation-states and citizens, even as they form multi-stakeholder 
alliances, exemplifying the complex nature of the ethical trade agenda. At the 
macro level, we can identify multi stakeholder initiatives (UK ETI, the Jo-In 
Code, the Dutch Fair Wear Foundation, US FLA and WRC, etc.); industry 
specific labelling initiatives (e.g. Kenya Flower Council, EU eco-labels for 
apparels (Muller 2002, EC 2007, EC 2002, EC 2003b)); and individual firm 
based minimum standards for suppliers (CoCs from Gap, Nike etc.). Such 
programmes may be linked with international initiatives such as the UN 
Global Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative, lending them greater 
legitimacy and transparency (Haddock-Fraser and Fraser 2007). 
Christopherson and Lille (2005) suggest that this private system of buyer 
codes is "non regulation" by voluntary regulation; and often gains its 
legitimacy from the DC laws and framework agreements, (e.g. the wage rate 
clause in the Jo-In code (Hughes et al 2007)) and is thus indirectly sponsored 
by DC governments. This code regime is political in its emphasis on
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"enlightened self restraint" (Chistopherson and Lille 2005: 1924) over legal 
regulation and creates an "ambiguously defined regulatory hierarchy" (ibid), 
which is specific to each sectoral supply chain. The system of codes is also 
important for instrumental reasons: Hebb and Wojick (2005) point out that in 
the absence of uniform globed governance of a sector, retailer codes continue 
to be important, although their voluntary implementation and disclosure 
levels remain debated.
LDC firms and CSR performance -Adhering to ethical standards set by DC 
retailers is an important way of LDC suppliers gaining competitive advantage 
and becoming better bargainers (Khan 2002, Abbot et al 1999). CSR type 
practices have been common in South Asia and Latin America, even though 
the term CSR has not been explicitly applied to them, and research shows that 
it is more structural than incidental (Muller and Kolk 2008; Kumar, Balsari 
and Murphy 2006; Achda 2006).
In India, corporate philanthropy has a rich and varied tradition: business 
houses such as the Indian owned Tata, Godrej, Mahindra, Bajaj, Reliance, 
Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., Maruti Udyog, Southern Petrochemicals, and 
the Birla Group have been contributing to society over decades, while 
becoming major powerhouses in the national and international business 
arena. Some of these Indian powerhouse businesses act as suppliers in 
international markets, meeting international standards in quality (Saha 2006). 
Some of them (who are as large as US and EU based MNCs operating in 
India) have been long practicing what is now recognised as a multi­
stakeholder model of CSR -  looking out for customers, employees, 
communities, etc. as well as company profits. That stakeholders hold these 
companies in high esteem (in fact, Tata reinvests 65% of its annual turnover 
into its philanthropic trusts, which is unique (Viswanath and Dadrwala 2004)) 
is not surprising, especially given that most Indians have no regular access to 
basic amenities like state sponsored education, healthcare etc. Also
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unsurprising is that Indian consumers value CSR by these large companies -  a 
2006 poll on corporate responsibility undertaken by TERI-Europe in four 
urban areas of India reveals that there is an increasing awareness of corporate 
responsibility and that a home grown agenda is evolving. 58% of consumers 
value a company's brand quality and reputation, while 32% said they 
considered environmental, labour and social issues. IT, telecom, 
pharmaceuticals and financial sector were most highly valued, while alcohol 
and tobacco were seen as least socially responsible (Saha 2006, Viswanath and 
Dardrawala 2004, Arora and Pramanik 2004, Kumar, Balsari and Murphy 
2006). The political and economic context behind the rise of Indian CSR 
practices in recent times has also benefited from what Perkins (2007) refers to 
as "cross national convergence processes", which means that increased 
international exposure at the policymaking and political level, meaningful 
engagement and interdependence, along with increased economic exposure to 
DC actors, innovations and pressures. Therefore, broader policy networks 
facilitating an LDCs representation and engagement in the spaces of 
international policy and politics of CSR are conceptually important while 
understanding LDC corporate philanthropy.
CSR among LDC SMEs that are part of the international supply chains has to 
be understood in its own context that is separate from the renowned 
powerhouses, especially the interrelationships between capital, labour and 
technology at the SME level (Dasgupta 2000). Research in Latin American 
SMEs that are part of a cross sectoral sample and Indian SMEs that supply to 
Dutch companies have shown distinct sectoral differences, however, as far as 
generalisations can be made, CSR among LDC SMEs is very different from 
that practiced in LDC larger companies. Indian SMEs were found to have a 
short term profit maximisation perspective, and tend to discount longer term 
ecological returns (Sandesara 1991).
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Studies show that many of these LDC SMEs are family owned and have very 
different stakeholders, thus SME activities and strategy making is more 
influenced by social contacts, knowledge, literacy levels, ability to manage 
change, low market awareness, values, character, attitudes and education 
level of the owner and has a large impact on SME CSR involvement 
(Dasgupta 1997, Sthuraman 1992, Muller 2006, Luken and Stares 2005, 
Dasgupta, Hettige and Wheeler 2000). Research in Nairobi and Calcutta show 
that frequently the entrepreneur of a family based SME lacks the skills for 
successful management, since training is uncommon (Patel 1987, Dasgupta 
1997, Frijns et al 1997). They also tend to be product orientated, and lack 
personnel specialised in promoting CSR (Dasgupta 2000). Interestingly, DC 
SMEs also face similar challenges.
Among the Indian firms, it was found that SMEs were normally struggling to 
survive under highly competitive supply chain pressures, and as a result, 
national legislation and buyer codes were more of a burden than to larger 
suppliers the implications were that SME managers were more anxious, but 
like their larger company colleagues, firms in LDCs must see definite increase 
in competitiveness to make them act (Halila 2007). However, for SMEs it was 
less a matter of education (or CSR learning) than an issue of basic awareness 
and changing CSR perceptions (Kumar, Balsari and Murphy 2006, UNIDO 
2003). The Latin American studies showed that a large number of SMEs were 
mostly concerned with local markets, and the SMEs that did supply 
international markets were functionally similar to the other SMEs and in 
comparison to DC SMEs, were much less developed -  lower productivity, low 
capital intensity, families in the work force, low levels of investments in 
innovation, lack of access to finance etc. -  which influenced to the extent they 
adopted CSR affiliated activities (Chappie and Moon 2005, Muller and Kolk 
2008, Vives 2006). In common with their DC colleagues, LDC suppliers are 
also driven by legislation and NGO pressure in their own countries: we have 
seen much evidence of LDC suppliers working with civil society, government
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and donor organisations in dealing innovatively with production related 
environmental impacts. LDC suppliers also participate in ethical trade due to 
concerns for their own health and safety, which improve with CSR practices 
(Saha 2006).
What is common in these research findings, is the theme that the main 
motivations for DC retailers and LDC suppliers is monetary (market share/ 
per capita incomes/ company profit levels) and regulatory, which neatly fit 
with the EMT rationale of greening motivations. There may be many 
examples of LDC CSR success stories which would reinforce optimism for EM 
in supply chains (even though Christoff (2006) might still consider it weakly 
ecological), however, there are many problems with ethical trade in the whole 
of the supply chain. In the next section, I highlight the problems most relevant 
to this thesis.
1.4 The Tools and Problems of Ethical Trade:
Literature on supply chain greening and CSR is extensive and covers a wide 
range of issues (Dahlsrud 2008), however, existing literature (descriptive or 
normative) defines CSR and greening in different ways, hinting at much 
operational uncertainty about what greening means to stakeholders and how 
they act on it (Welford and Frost 2006). The over abundance of definitions and 
highlighted dimensions can cause confusion (Dahlsrud 2008, Sarkis 1995, 
Sarkis 1999, Frier 2003) and even generate a lively debate about whose version 
is more ethical -  the corporations' or the citizens' (Rossi 2000). However, 
there are common themes within the literature; according to Dahlsrud (2008), 
the most common aspects emphasised are: the environment, contributions to 
a better society, preserving business profitability, stakeholder interaction, and 
going beyond legal obligations due to ethical considerations. Taken together, 
we get a feel for what supply chain greening is about. I agree with Sarkis 
(1999) and Shrivastava (1995) that definitions have to take a holistic
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perspective; the supply side and the demand side (Welford et al 1997). There 
is a trend among researchers recently to move away from looking at CSR 
narrowly as something DC firms have to do, in favour of looking at the 
greening of the product chains, not only because of the new global trends, but 
also because they want to bring emphasis on renegotiating the power and 
resource balances along the way to form more collaborative and 
"personalised" approaches to management (Vermeulen and Ras 2006, Hughes 
et al 2007).
In theory, comprehensive supply chain green management should begin with 
the chain leaders analysing the entire life cycle of the product, identifying the 
major environmental impacts, deciding on objectives (such as reducing raw 
materials and energy inputs, recycling and reuse of materials, etc.) based on 
criteria set either by themselves, or by existing industry wide standards by 
government agencies (e.g. EU's EcoLabel), deciding on which parts of the 
supply chain activity needs to be changed to meet which objectives (vendor 
selection, the production process, in-bound and out-bound logistics plus 
continual improvements), how these changes are to be implemented, look at 
the economics behind the reduction goals and implementation strategies vis- 
a-vis the company's overall goals, and develop systems of monitoring and 
control, sometimes involving third party auditors to gain legitimacy and 
environmental disclosure to stakeholders to gain transparency (Sarkis 1999, 
Angel 1996, Green et al 1996,1998, Seuring 2004, Canning and Hanmer-Lloyd 
2001, Mont and Bleischwitz 2007, Nash and Stoughton 1994). However, this is 
merely a simplified version of comprehensive models suggested by academic 
researchers; a CSR manager, taking the first steps from inaction to reactive 
pollution prevention strategies to proactive strategies, will have to start with 
the already known bottlenecks in chain greening, bank on cooperation with 
close inter-firm linkages and then design a strategy that works for her firm. Of 
course, who decides on which perspective to take (and implications on tools 
used and methodologies of auditing) is a contentious issue in managing
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supply chain options, a point made by Vermeuen and Ras (2006) who point to 
the power hierarchies and agenda bargaining between the "inside chain 
actors" (economic actors) and "outside chain actors" (NGOs, government 
agencies). The former group tend to depend on conservative measurable 
solutions, while the latter group have more freedom in identifying options.
Contrasting the comprehensive supply chain CSR models with the vibrant 
empirical research being done on many aspects of operational CSR 
(Nawrocka 2007, Font 2006, Seuring and Muller 2007, Preuss 2005, Andrews 
et al 2001), and despite case studies of triumphant innovation and creativity at 
work (Rondinelli 1998, Wycherley 1999), certain problematic challenges still 
exist. The main problems can be summarised as below:
Motivation -  DC retail company top management and LDC factory managers 
need to be motivated to participate in something that is not part of traditional 
business practices (Jacques 2006). Full participation requires eco-proactive 
corporate cultures so that at every step they value the environmental 
consequences of their actions as they make decisions about human resources 
and budgeting to enable greening. In the previous section it was noted how 
the actors each perceive their motivations and benefits of participating in 
CSR. It is, no doubt, a difficult quality to have running through the chain, at 
all times. Critics have variously questioned the motivations by pointing out 
the gaps between declared intentions and actual performance (e.g. the Clean 
Up Fashion 2007 review of the top UK clothing retailers' enduring 
sweatshops, CCC 1998, CCC 2005, Fleishman-Hillard 2005, MSN 2005, Oxfam 
2004a and 2004b, Sweatshopwatch 1999, Wick 2005). However, this is not 
specific only to DC retailer management. CSR studies of LDC and DC firms 
have shown that the least cited driving force towards environmental supply 
chain management is personal interest in environmental protection or social 
responsibility of as part of core business operations (Tilley 1999, Berger et al 
2001, Hahn and Scheermesser 2006, Welford 2007, Ketola 2006, Fernandez et
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al 2006, Font et al 2008). Hughes (2005) presented a case of UK food and 
clothing retailers, where a variation of commitment to ethical trade was 
shown as dependent on corporate culture, staff motivations, company 
financial health and corporate structure. Christopherson and Lille's (2005) 
study comparing WalMart and Ikea also showed how firm motivations were 
determined by cultural differences (among other factors).
Operational conflict and complexity -  One reason cited for the"start stop" 
style piecemeal CSR initiatives that do not go beyond one or two linkages in 
the supply chain (Holt 2004) is the sheer leviathan task of managing the cross­
boundary changes and negotiating conflicting interests within the same 
organisation. Sometimes these conflicts are due to regional and global cultural 
differences (Thompson 2005, Vives 2006, von Moltke 1998). Researchers have 
reiterated that implementation of greening and integration of greening 
principles at each production stage will require time (e.g. to find or design 
eco-friendly substitutes), economies of scale to materialise (e.g. enough green 
production to make it profitable), and managerial complexity resolution (e.g. 
new sector partnerships and roles being demanded, administrative and 
operational conflict and debate resolution) (Wells and Orsato 2003, Min and 
Galle 1997, Hughes 2006, Penman 1994, Sarkis 1999). These complexities are 
probably true tests of actor motivations and beliefs (UNIDO 2003), and are 
one aspect of the process that EMT altogether too briefly touches upon when 
it mentions changing institutions of modernity.
Knowledge and expertise -  Supply chain greening management and EM 
depend greatly upon science and technology, as we have seen earlier in the 
chapter. However, judging by contemporary CSR literature, there is a 
problem with not only learning scientific information (e.g. understanding the 
true environmental costs of "just in time delivery" options under TEQM 
practices, given that frequent transport runs add up fuel costs and emissions, 
Grankvist and Biel 2007) but also the supply of scientific solutions (e.g.
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finding a low-emissions alternative that is not too expensive). Then there is 
the problem of employees who are not aware of ethical trade impacts of their 
company's actions overseas. Hughes (2006) talks about new ethical 
consultancies that operate with DC retailer managers, and provide learning 
spaces where they motivate, inform and empower managers about ethical 
issues of global trade. This is a reflection that learning about ethical trade 
needs to happen at every managerial level if the message is going to pass on 
in a robust manner down the chain. This is of course also very important at 
the level of LDC factory managers and workers; Rothenberg (1999) has 
illustrated a case where low worker participation in greening was due to 
inadequate technical expertise. Another aspect of this is related directly to 
EMT -  the availability of expert advice. As Sarkis (1999) and Preuss (2005) 
suggest, some of the advisory papers used by NGOs and government 
agencies may not be available or understandable to practitioners, especially in 
SMEs.
Costs of being green -  The costs of greening have been highly contested by 
EM critics and by CSR practitioners themselves. Firstly, there is the monetary 
investment into environmental upgrading. Correctly estimating the costs is a 
problem highlighted by several researchers, who typically mention the 
burdensome and complicated cost calculation process and realistic cost 
estimation problems (Green et al 1998, Burrit 2004, Roberts 2002a). Secondly, 
the demonstrable financial benefits of greening, which are sometimes unclear 
for DC firms adapting EMSs and for LDC firms adjusting to CSR, fall far short 
of the EMT suggestions of a "win-win" outcome (KPMG 2005, UNIDO 2003, 
Welford and Frost 2006, Welford 2007, Frost and Ho 2006, Drake et al 2004). 
Findings across LDCs and DCs suggest that businesses will only act towards 
environmental supply chain management when it is in their interest to do so, 
influenced by short or long-term profits, increased efficiency, risk 
management or competitive advantage: this calls into question whether 
greening behaviour along the supply chain can be sustained over the long
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term if they are not persuaded that environmental and social ethical 
considerations will gain in importance in the future (Perez-Sanchez et al 2003, 
Hahn and Scheermesser 2006, UNIDO 2003a, UNIDO 2003b). Evidence of 
CSR managers complaining that they have resource shortages that make them 
choose between eco-management options, only to favour the most cost 
effective (Revell 2003, 2005 and 2007, Tilley 1999, Bayliss 1998, Pedersen and 
Andersen 2006, Werndle, Brown and Packer 2006, Reed 2003, Halkos and 
Evangelinous 2002, Preuss 2005, Damall et al 2008, Piotrowski and Kratz 1999, 
Roberts 2002b), suggests that the mutually beneficial relationship between 
economic and ecological issues falls short when related to practical 
experiences. As most of these studies show, environmental supply chain 
management has succeeded when it made business sense, meaning that 
potential savings or profit opportunities are obviously a driving force.
Power and governance relationship strengths -  Since supply chains are 
predicated on the notion of allocative efficiency (Khan 2002, Durieu 2003) and 
are buyer driven in structure, we cannot think about supply chain greening 
without highlighting the problems created by the inherent capitalistic power 
politics that are the bases of these relationships (Pedersen and Andersen 
2006). While the existing power relationships are pushing greening in some 
cases, these relationships are also hindering the process, especially since 
retailers' commitment/motivations are sometimes not sustained and not 
backed up by higher prices on offer to suppliers. If supply chain greening 
demands continue on the back of embedded commitment to global cost 
effective sourcing, then cost-cutting on the LDC factory floor will continue 
and greening will falter (e.g. the Wal-Mart case in Christopherson and Lille
2005), especially given that the suppliers are operating in national contexts 
where there are no equivalent greening obligations. Greening also needs 
strong long term inter-firm relationships to make it financially feasible for 
LDC factories and DC buyers to invest time and money into greening changes 
(UNIDO 2003, Arora and Puranik 2004, CREM 2003). Long term relationships
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also demonstrate inter-chain trust and reduce uncertainty pressures, and are 
positively correlated to cooperation over environmental upgrading (Sharfman 
et al 2007). However, if the supply chain has many suppliers for each buyer 
(as it does in the case of the apparel chain), then buyer relationships with the 
bottom rung SME suppliers are not close enough for inter-network 
collaboration and assistance (Holt 2004). Supply chain governance is also not 
cut out for easy advancement of EM beyond the "quick easy steps" -  research 
by Ho and Welford (2006) and Beske et al (2006) reveals the inability of many 
companies to see further than one (or at most two) levels down their supply 
chain even in sectors where the bottom of the supply chain involves resource 
intensive production in developing countries. These phases of production 
often remain untouched by the CSR initiatives of those who govern the 
supply chain. According to the authors (2006:170), "In particular, if CSR is 
driven by brand vulnerability, then it is the elimination of textile sweatshops 
that matter more than getting children out of cotton fields, for example. CSR 
managers admit that they find it difficult to do much more than deal with the 
first tier of suppliers. They recognise there may be problems further down the 
supply chain but do not have the resources to do very much in this respect." 
Furthermore, studies show that there are several problems within the 
relationships within LDC factories themselves -  there is insufficient 
cooperation when it comes to environmental management across different 
departments within the firms, and even less between different departments 
and their counterparts in other firms. The former would be necessary in 
achieving a more responsive approach to ecological modernisation through 
green management. The latter does not happen because of the highly 
competitive structure of the supply chain which means that suppliers do not 
share their experiences, and as a result, firms find is hard to create a "learning 
zone" among peers (Welford 2007).
Anonymous markets -  Vermeulen and Ras (2006) make an interesting point 
by taking forward Welford's (2003) idea of a weightless economy where
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increasingly retailers are finding overseas suppliers, thereby externalising 
environmental management responsibility of these chains; resulting in a break 
down in green purchasing monitoring where it is hard to determine both the 
green-footprint of wholesale product purchase mixes (e.g. blended cotton 
yarn or fabrics) and the identity of the original producers (Green et al 1996 
and 2003).
Green market signals -  EMT is based on the idea that consumers in capitalist 
democracies are expressing their desire for a cleaner environment by voting 
with their shopping bags and are generating a green-economy. The critical 
media exposures of retailers in the West, the rise in NGO 
memberships/subscribers (Rihoux 2000, Kronsell 2000, Rawcliffe 2000), the 
media visibility of sustainable development conferences and events etc. all 
provide evidence of the rise in post materialist values in human society that 
makes people take a holistic approach to nature and human beings. But has a 
change in material values translated to a change in buying patterns? Kessler et 
al (2003) and McWilliams and Siegel (2000) point out that despite a growth in 
green-purchasing in North America and Europe, most green-markets are 
niches. As various authors point out, greening of supply chains is only worth 
it when those products can compete in the marketplace (Min and Galle 1997).
Political and policy signals -  DC government policies (e.g. eco-labeling, 
policies promoting pollution-prevention and other EMT related discourse (EC 
2003a and 2003b)) have been supportive of green supply chain efforts; 
however, policies in DC waste management and recycling policies often 
prove to be bottlenecks (Young 2000, Kronsell 2000) and critics have pointed 
out that while the DC states have created new institutional arrangements for 
supply chain environmental upgrading, these new liaisons are strictly by- 
invitation only (Rawcliffe 2000, Toke and Strachan 2006). At the LDC level, 
the lack of government action on environmental management of industrial 
effluents is nothing new (e.g. in the case of green leapfrogging of green
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technologies imported by LDCs being hampered by weak regulatory support 
in resource intensive sectors such as steel making, paper and pulp (Wheeler et 
al 1993).
Codes and auditing tools -  CSR managers in Asia often complain about 
something that represents the most important EM tool for the supply chains -  
the CoCs. Managers have a number of different codes which they have to 
adhere depending on the number of different customers they have (Fischer et 
al 2005, Welford and Frost 2006, Hughes 2006, Fischer 2005, Nadvi 2008. 
Klooster 2006, Stringer 2006, Hebb and Wojcik 2005). Many codes have 
contradictory elements, particularly in the footwear and apparel chains. The 
auditing requirement is also problematic -  there is much debate surrounding 
auditing integrity and the extent to which suppliers are able to cheat, and how 
seriously buyers take non-compliance in audit reports while renegotiating 
future production contracts (Clean Up Fashion 2007, Hebb and Wojcik 2005, 
Matouq 2000).
1.5 Thesis Objectives and Structure:
EMT suggests that modem industrial democratic societies can continue to 
grow economically in an environmentally sustainable way if their nation-state 
and economic actors change their policymaking styles and greening 
behaviour to take advantage of scientific evidence and green technological 
opportunities. This in itself is a simplistic summary of EMT, and given the 
above discussion and criticism of EMT, I have argued for a broader 
understanding where EM goes beyond simple "win win" arguments. I view 
the economy-ecology relationship as something that can indeed be a positive 
sum game, but in a more reflexive way to include elements of social and 
political change, and social environmental learning so that EM's assumptions 
and predictions can be tested in change-resistant structures.
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Consequently, I am interested in using EM as an analytical framework for 
ethical trade in Bangladeshi RMG supply chains to see whether greening 
efforts are in line with EM, and if not, why. I will be using analytical variables 
generated from EM literature that examine the economic (costs of greening, 
green consumer signals), instrumental (tools of EM), communicative 
(environmental information, learning, cognitive complexity, and consequent 
organisational change for greening) and social political aspects (corporate 
cultures, hierarchies of power, resource dependencies, governance modes, 
collaborations, participation vs. exclusion, etc.). The objectives of this thesis 
and its possible contributions to academic understanding of EM in LDCs are 
discussed below in detail.
Why EM? At a casual glance Bangladesh does not conform to EM's 
assumptions of a modem industrial society where a preference for 
environmental quality is expressed. Bangladesh is a politically unstable LDC 
with a largely agricultural economic base, a population crisis and serious 
problems with economic infrastructure and environmental degradation that is 
only worsening its battle with poverty. One might argue that perhaps other 
theories (Global Value Chain, or industrial ecology) may have been more 
appropriate. I chose to study EM because of its strong theoretical emphasis on 
the driving forces behind greening and the ground situation in Bangladesh. 
Industrial regulation here has traditionally been heavily focused on 
technological solutions (often end-of-pipe) that are driven by government 
laws and resisted by the private sector. EMT provides an analytical edge in 
this case that is invaluable because of its emphasis on the role of technology, 
the government and the private sector in greening production.
The objective of my thesis is to ask whether EM's predictions (economic 
growth that is environmentally beneficial) will hold true here. In that sense, if 
the predictions do not hold true in the Bangladeshi case, does it prove EMT as 
being right? If that is indeed the case, then EMT will be proven correct, 
although we will have gotten a better understanding of the value of EM
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outside of the Western industrial societies it was conceived in, where its 
starting assumptions do hold true. There is plenty of EM research showing 
that EM succeeds in non Western countries, and if the Bangladeshi case is not 
one of them, then it is worth understanding why not -  is it because of 
shortcomings at the national level, or because of the supply chain structure, or 
because of a practice of weak EM, or a mixture of all?
Based on the LDC SME CSR literature reviewed here, one can make some a- 
priori assumptions of what CSR and EM would be like for Bangladeshi RMG 
(they too are mostly SMEs). At the theoretical level, I expect that the 
Bangladeshi nation-state is unable to move away from traditional command- 
and-control styles of policymaking that does not privilege peripheral voices. 
One might be more optimistic about the role of the market actors though, 
since Bangladeshi RMG companies supply to some of the most recognisable 
high quality brands and are responsive to technical and process standard 
demands. This might mean that buyers and suppliers are working in 
collaboration to implement the codes, and that environmental learning is 
happening in the supply chain. Given price competition pressures, it would 
be reasonable to assume that profits would be a higher priority than finding 
creative ways of greening; in which case one should not expect much 
difference from Christoffs weak EM (1996). At the functional level, it would 
be reasonable to expect Bangladeshi RMG companies having similar trouble 
to the LDC SMEs studied by earlier researchers -  such as low environmental 
awareness, poor knowledge, low willingness to green, correctly positioning 
CSR in the company, organising stakeholder engagement, having cost 
calculation problems, having trouble overcoming the age of the 
company/venue, juggling retailer expectations with local practices and 
cultural norms, accountability, communication, policy development, 
implementation, monitoring mechanisms, etc. We can also expect the larger 
RMG firms to differ from the SMEs. So far none of this seems unusual- so it 
seems pertinent to justify the basis of this thesis by answering three questions
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-  Why study EM for LDCs yet again? Why choose Bangladesh? Why ethical 
trade? Why supply chains?
Why EM in LDCs? There is considerable work on EM in Asia (e.g. Memon, 
Imura and Shirakawa (2006), D'Sa and Murthy (2006), Hirsch (2006), Mayer
(2006), Burke (2006) and Sonnenfeld and Mol (2006)) that covers China, India, 
Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Papua New Guinea. They have looked at one 
functional area or the other in sectors with external linkages (e.g. EM and civil 
activists, NGOs and collaborations between development partners and local 
governments, or voluntary disclosure by state owned "dirty industries"). 
However, an EM perspective on LDC supply chains has not been developed 
and remains a significant gap. I agree with Sarkis (1999), in that we need to 
study the problem of EM in supply chains as a holistic problem. This thesis 
looks at LDC supply chains as a whole (the structure, the actors, the 
relationships, the resources, the motives), starting from buyers' pressure, the 
buying mechanism, the suppliers' response, compliance implementation, 
auditing and monitoring, and LDC policy bargaining and politics. My thesis 
looks at the inter-firm (economic networks), intra-firm (management 
networks), as well as institutional political governance (policy networks) (Coe 
and Hess 2007).4 My thesis can be located as in figure 2.1.
4 Please see Chapter Seven.
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Figure 1.2: Situative context of the thesis
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The focus here is on structural and functional issues that have not been 
covered in the LDC EM literature already, such as motivation among LDC 
firms (moving beyond meso-level studies to LDC corporate cultures), 
operational conflicts (moving beyond the existing NGO literature on audit 
failings in supply chains, to what kind of operational conflicts cause these 
failings), knowledge and expertise (moving beyond studies about innovative 
policymaking arrangements in East Asia, to what kind of innovations are 
occurring (or not) on the LDC factory floors), costs (are the buyers keeping the 
LDC suppliers out of the loop of green profit making?), and power- 
hierarchies (how do lines of power and negotiation flow through the LDC and 
DC actors in a space of micro-regulation where the stronger voices are 
privileged).
Why Bangladesh? The Bangladesh apparel industry is worth studying for 
two reasons -  firstly, existing EM studies tend to cover economies that are 
well on their way to becoming industrialised (e.g. Thailand, Malaysia, etc.), 
but do not cover some of the poorest countries in the world that are starting to 
become industrialised and are in the lower rungs of the supply chain.
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Secondly, researchers in environmental policymaking or green management 
have not studied any aspect of Bangladesh, and in that respect this thesis is a 
first and adds value to existing knowledge on environmental policymaking 
and green supply chain management in Bangladesh and South Asia. As I shall 
explain in the methodology and conceptual framework chapters, this 
uniqueness is a mixed blessing.
Why ethical trade? Ethical trade is undoubtedly an important and relevant 
topic in contemporary times, but mainstream research on ethical trade focuses 
on wage rate violations, child labour, sweatshops, worker rights and auditing 
breaches. These are mostly classified under "social compliance" and "social 
welfare" issues in the buyer codes. Environmental issues and impact 
management of apparel production remains under researched by academics, 
and under emphasised by retailers and NGOs, especially from an EM 
perspective. In that sense this thesis adds significant value by looking at the 
greening issues amidst the social issues in ethical trade.5
Why supply chains? There is considerable literature on environmental 
upgrading in supply chains, however there still remain questions about the 
role of buyer standards and suppliers' management network dynamics (i.e. 
'intra firm' governance). This thesis considers those outcomes on the factory 
floor.6 Secondly, some aspects of buyer code demands have remained 
underdeveloped within wider ethical trade literature. Coe and Hess (2007) 
suggest that study of product and technical standards in supply chains has 
been neglected. My thesis takes this forward by studying the product and 
technical standards governance for the RMG chain, and situating the 
compliance governance within that.7 Thirdly, some studies by Locke and 
Roomis (2007) and Locke et al (2006) suggest that effective labour code 
governance has to be combined with improving root causes (improving
5 Please see Chapters Three, Five, Six and Seven in particular.
6 Please see Chapter Five.
7 Please see Chapter Six.
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supplier efficiency, quality etc.); but no study has been done to see if this 
would hold true in the case of eco content -  my thesis looks at that as well.8 
Fourthly, Gereffi et al (2005) in their influential study of GVCs have suggested 
that there are five forms of GVC governance. This has been variously 
challenged as being static (e.g. Coe and Hess 2007), and I take that further by 
examining what kind of chain exists for Bangladeshi RMG, and what forms of 
coordination exists for compliance within overall modes of governance (Ponte 
and Gibbon 2005).9 Fifthly, there is a gap in literature about the convergence 
of labour codes in chains (Nadvi 2008), and here I trace the convergence of 
eco-content in the apparel chain and highlight potential for greater 
codifiability along the chain.10
Research question and hypotheses -  As mentioned earlier, my main research 
question is as follows:
Why are export based, ready made garments (RMG) suppliers in Bangladesh failing to 
undertake environmental management?
Based on the earlier discussion on EM, the objectives, mechanisms and 
institutional dimensions of EM that are applicable to this thesis involve the:
— Changing role of science, technology, information and knowledge in order 
to change social and political attitudes about environmental upgrading at the 
level of firms;
— Changing role of markets, market actors and private sector initiatives in 
order to create market pressure and market opportunities for environmental 
upgrading; and
8 Please see Chapter Five and Six.
9 Please see Chapter Six.
10 Please see Chapter Five.
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-- Changing role of the state (away from command-and-control style to a 
decentralised flexible consensual proactive style), as well as changing social 
and political attitudes at the level of policymakers and stakeholders.
Each of the EM objectives for environmental upgrading in Bangladeshi RMG 
industry were tested via three corresponding hypotheses which were derived 
from an initial review of existing academic literature and policy documents 
on supply chain greening in developing countries. The hypotheses are as 
follows:
• Poor environmental upgrading in firms will be associated with factors 
internal to the firms, such as corporate culture, slow changing 
behaviour, problems with learning environmental information and will 
be linked to poor competitive advantage gains;
• The most powerful demand for environmental management on 
Bangladeshi RMG firms is originating from their buyers in global 
supply chains. However, opportunities for collaboration or assistance 
from buyers demanding these environmental upgrading initiatives 
may be low; and
• The regulators (state and non state) are not convinced of the benefits of 
compliance and do not have the capacity to design, implement and 
monitor better compliance. The exclusion of the DoE and the RMG 
firms in this policy network is likely to lead to poorly designed 
outcomes.
This thesis and EMT have three broad perspectives in common. Firstly, 
moving away from notions of environmental problems as being intrinsically 
incompatible with international trade, to seeing environmental problems as 
challenges for change resistant actors (manufacturing firms, supply chain 
actors and policy stakeholders). Secondly, giving emphasis to understanding 
the changes needed in the "core social institutions of modernity", such as
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science and technology, the processes of production and consumption, and 
the process of policymaking. Thirdly, having a vision that is distinct from post 
modernist, radical and neo Marxist interpretations of modernity and 
industrial growth in developing countries.
1.6 Conclusion:
This chapter introduced the thesis research question, objectives and 
hypotheses within the discourse of EMT. The remainder of the thesis is 
structured as follows: the next chapter formulates a conceptual framework for 
studying the problem, based on three overlapping networks -  management 
networks within RMG firms; economic networks (supply chains) surrounding 
the RMG industry; and policy networks governing the first two networks. 
Chapter Three sets up the context of the case study and describes the 
Bangladeshi garment industry's set up, strengths and weaknesses. Chapter 
Three also elaborates on the history of compliance for the garments industry, 
with specific emphasis on the tension between the social vs. eco aspects of 
compliance. The next chapter explains the methodology behind the thesis, 
including why Dhaka was chosen as thesis site; how the thesis design was 
finalised; how the respondents were chosen and interviewed; and my 
experiences of interviewing during the compliance related riots in Dhaka.
Chapters Five, Six and Seven consist of empirical findings related to each of 
the three networks. Empirical findings have been sourced from primary and 
secondary sources. Representatives from 53 garment factories (8 small, 31 
medium and 14 large) were interviewed using semi-structured 
questionnaires. Several representatives were Managing Directors who also 
gave crucial background information regarding industry management styles 
and imperatives. Representatives from 9 buying houses and 4 compliance- 
auditing companies were also interviewed using semi-structured and open 
questionnaires. 6 trade union leaders and 5 policy specialists (government
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and non-government) were interviewed as elite respondents. A total of 77 
interviews have been taken between February and June 2006.
Chapter Five tests the first hypothesis and problematises EMT on the factory 
floor through the Research Based View and asks how firms are receiving code 
and government regulation information and reacting (reactively or 
proactively). The Chapter examines whether they can indeed reach EM's "win 
win" gains or are they struggling to break even. Chapter Six tests the second 
hypothesis and takes the findings of Chapter Five further to understand why 
that has happened -  supply chain governance, problems with compliance 
monitoring and buyers' involvement, and supply chain rationales behind the 
lack of "win win" gains. Chapter Seven takes the findings of the previous two 
empirical chapters and tests the third hypothesis. Government regulators and 
multi stakeholder policy groups are examined to see where the role of the 
state and private-public partnerships is placed from an EM perspective. 
Chapter Eight draws some conclusions for ethical trade based on the 
empirical findings from the apparel sector. Chapter Nine ends the thesis by 
revisiting EMT, draws conclusions about whether or not EM can work in LDC 
supply chains, and considers broader implications for theory.
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Chapter Two: Ecological Modernisation Framework
2.1 Introduction:
As discussed in the last Chapter, this thesis examines why Bangladeshi RMG 
firms are failing to meet environmental upgrading demands and considers 
the implications for EMT in this unique situation. This chapter sets out what I 
refer to as the EM Network -  which is based on the analysis of three 
intersecting networks -  management networks (within firms), economic 
networks (global value chains for apparel exports) and policy networks (multi 
level policy makers). The EM network's interconnectivity can be seen at 
various levels. The three hypotheses presented in the last chapter are 
interactive in the sense that poor environmental upgrading capabilities within 
firms (hypothesis 1) is influenced by buyer demands and collaborative 
opportunities (hypothesis 2) and is also compounded by ineffective regulation 
and monitoring arrangements (hypothesis 3). Similarly, other causal linkages 
may be found within other variables in the hypotheses. The theme of 
interconnected influences and structures runs throughout this thesis, and 
given the internally networked capacities of firms and their embeddedness in 
external networks, the thesis gains its conceptual framework from network 
analysis literature, which focuses on the actors involved in networks, their 
inter relationships and resultant network types, with special emphasis on 
heterogeneity of the explanatory variables. Three kinds of networks form the 
conceptual framework -- the firms' internal management networks, external 
economic networks (ENs) and external policy networks (PNs). The 
interconnectedness of the hypotheses and networks is discussed at the end of 
the chapter.
The EM framework starts with how RMG firms might be structured, and their 
strengths and weaknesses for environmental upgrading. Management and 
organisational behavioural science theories are used to show how firms are
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organised as a network and what role corporate culture, ability to change, 
environmental learning and resource constraints play in a firm's 
environmental strategy. The situational context is important in understanding 
how firms are facing external upgrading imperatives, therefore relationships 
between buyers and RMG suppliers are analysed using models from 
industrial networks literature, with Global Value Chain as an example of an 
economic network for apparel trade. These relationships illustrate how 
powerful buyers in global value chains govern the value chain and how the 
demand for environmental upgrading is part of that governance structure. 
The second set of external imperatives for environmental upgrading will be 
explained through policy network analysis to highlight the relationships that 
external policy makers and regulators have with these firms and their buyers; 
and to show how state and non-state actors at the individual, micro, meso and 
macro levels use their relationships to influence and create pressure in policy - 
games related to environmental management in the RMG sector.
The chapter will end by proposing an overall conceptual framework based on 
the discussion of the three connected networks, which will be used for testing 
the hypotheses. Conceptually, all three networks share the elements of 
heterogeneous interconnectedness through relationships that change with 
strategic goal seeking behaviour. The overall conceptual framework brings 
together the notions of actors, relationships and network types to illustrate 
how resource-power dependencies, bargaining, strategic agenda making, 
embeddedness and different kinds of uncertainty play important parts in 
studying the causes behind RMG firms failing environmental upgrading 
efforts. I begin the chapter by exploring the first of the three networks, which 
examines how the internal management networks structure RMG firms and 
can determine its opportunities for environmental management.
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2.2 Analysing Environmental Upgrading in Firms:
Choosing conceptual variables for industrial greening to suit the Bangladeshi 
context is a challenging task,11 however to understand the EM suggestion of 
greening strategies leading to competitive advantage, intra-firm greening 
capabilities and strategy making was examined from the theoretical 
perspective of the resource based view (RBV) of firms, which looks at how 
firms use their internal core capabilities for environmental strategy making. 
The core capacities were expanded upon using behavioural theory to see how 
corporate culture, organisational change, and learning influence 
environmental management practices.
Recent theoretical developments have much to say about greening within the 
"span of controls" within business firms,12 and recently there has been 
interesting RBV research on environmental management within these 
management structures. RBV suggests a theory of competitive advantage 
bom of management actions and performance, based on strategic resources 
and intangible qualities within a firm that results in sustained competitive 
advantage. It assumes that the goal of all managerial strategy making is to 
allow the firm to earn economic rents or above average returns. RBV focuses 
attention on strategies for sustainable competitive advantage, and suggests 
that firm management can formulate such strategies by successfully 
identifying certain strategic resources, nurturing these internal competencies 
and applying them to an appropriate external environment, meaning that it is 
not enough to have strategic resources and a strategy for competitive 
advantage, it is also important to utilise those resources to implement the 
strategy consistently (Penrose 1959 and Wernerfelt 1995). RBV strategic 
resources include assets, capabilities and organisational processes that must 
be valuable (i.e. rent producing), non-substitutable (i.e. has to have enduring
11 Please see Annex 2.1 for details.
12 Please see Annex 2.2 for a summary of managerial control units, organic and bureaucratic firms vis- 
a-vis environmental upgrading.
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value), firm specific (i.e. not be widely distributed within an industry), tacit 
(i.e. skill based and people intensive resources, difficult to replicate since they 
are causally ambiguous) and socially complex (i.e. involving group dynamics) 
(Hart 1995, Barney 1991 and 2001, Teece 1987, Rugman and Verbeke 1998 and 
2002). Grant (1991) classified these resources as physical, human, 
organisational, technological, financial, and reputational. It may be noted that 
these categories are not necessarily exhaustive or mutually exclusive, and 
finding resources that fit the RBV definition fully can be difficult (Russo and 
Fouts 1997).
RBV also distinguishes between two types of strategic resources - tangible (e.g. 
financial reserves and physical resources such as buildings, equipment, and 
stocks of raw materials) and intangible (e.g. reputation, technology, and 
human resources -  which includes company culture, the training and 
expertise of employees, and their attitudes towards competitive challenges 
etc.) (Grant 1991, Russo and Fouts 1997, Oliver 1997, Peteraf 1993). Recent 
scholarship on RBV suggests that company reputation and knowledge pool 
are also important intangible strategic resources. Grant (1991) emphasises 
levels of durability, transparency, transferability and replicability as 
important determinants in strategy making for successful upgrading.
The RBV emphasis on strategy making implies that it is not enough to merely 
have strategic resources, it is the management's ability to identify and use 
them that results in competitive advantage compared to their competitors. 
Successful business strategists correctly judge their current resource portfolio 
and strategise on how leverage the core competencies (the basic 
informational/technological base) in the organisational networks so as to 
maintain the competitive edge from these resources (Wemerfelt 1984). 
Management capability either can be acquired or can be path dependent 
(Dierickx & Cool 1989, Oliver 1991). Grant (1991) sees this capability of 
management as another source of uniqueness in a firm, and suggests that the
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source of such distinctness is socio-cultural; specially in the case of strong 
leadership, tacit knowledge, organisational cultures, effective teamwork, etc.
The competitive advantages generated by resources vary with the stability of 
the business environment: Miller and Shamsie (1996) found that tradable, 
property-based resources conferred competitive advantage in more stable 
business environments, whereas knowledge based resources offered greater 
benefit in uncertain environments. Klassen and Whybark (1999) contend that 
generally it is the intangible resources that generate more competitive 
advantage since it is unique to each firm, while McWilliams and Siegel (2000, 
2001) suggest that the age of the industry and level of product differentiation 
also impact competitive advantage gains. Priem and Butler (2001) find that 
how knowledge management is done within a firm while strategising is an 
important indicator of how competitive advantage can be gained; Halawi, 
Aronson and McCarthy (2005) also focus on knowledge management in RBV 
as an important aspect for leveraging the value of intangible resources.
The theoretical implications of RBV for environmental management 
researchers are multifaceted, especially the linkages made between the 
strategic resources and improved economic (i.e. profit making) and 
environmental performance (i.e. pollution prevention and control), since 
effective strategy making capabilities can yield improvements and 
competitiveness gains at multiple levels. Simply put, a firm's environmental 
strategy making is directly related to the competitive advantage it enjoys and 
a firm that is well managed is also more likely to have good environmental 
performance (Hart 1995). There is much evidence of successful company 
CEOs saying that good CSR yields substantial competitive advantage (IBM 
2008), meaning that CSR is best used as a "intelligent marketing" strategy 
(DaimlerChrysler CEO quoted in World Bank 2002:2), where financially 
successful companies think of CSR not as a cost or risk mitigation strategy (i.e. 
reactive thinking) but as a strategic goal that is aligned with every aspect of
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their core business strategy, which is assumed to be their core strength (IBM 
2008).
Researchers have suggested that proactive environmental policies and skills 
are linked to better economic and environmental performance (cf. Russo and 
Fouts 1997, Shrivastava 1995a, and Hart 1995). This involves not only 
proactive strategies, but also having the capacity to implement measures to 
prevent environmental pollution (e.g. cleaner production technologies, 
cleaner raw materials, redesigning products and production to minimise 
waste and packaging, introducing recycling, etc.). Hart (1995) identified two 
key implementation strategies -  ability to undertake continuous management 
improvements, and effective stakeholder management -  as crucial for creating 
competitive advantage. Further research extended the list of strategy 
implementation options to include the allocation of physical resources, 
adoption of green technology from non-substitutable sources; as well as 
intangible resources, such as political acumen in negotiating profits with 
green-conscious customers, internal corporate culture, and inter-departmental 
coordination (Russo and Fouts 1997), which can be referred to as managing 
EM on the factory floor. To sustain proactive behaviour, a firm needs an 
internal culture where continuous performance improvement is rewarded 
(Russo and Fouts 1997) and adequate investments in human resources over 
capital assets (Hart 1995). A firm wide commitment and support from 
multiple levels of the firm is also a precondition for proactive strategy 
making, since adopting more advanced environmental strategies may be 
more costly, and not win much managerial support (Cordano and Frieze 
2000). Top level management also have to be open to strategies of investing 
tangible resources into nurturing behaviour that sustains pollution 
prevention, and this would require a firm culture where green-investments 
are well prioritised. Similar strategies are reported in the recent IBM survey of 
250 leading firms (IBM 2008). One can then argue that firms that do not have
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these strategies and competencies are likely to prefer reactive add-on 
solutions.
However, empirical results have revealed a more complex picture. Firms have 
been found to be a mixture of proactive and reactive, meaning that the 
distinction between them can be blurry in real life (Priem and Butler 2001). 
Also, the link between strategic resources and proactive behaviour is not 
always certain. Aragon-Correa (1998) found that that firms with proactive eco- 
management policies actually often combined prevention and control, 
whereas some less proactive firms were shown to be using preventative 
measures. This has two important implications for my thesis. Firstly, that 
proactive environmental policies and causally ambiguous skills are not 
always sufficient to explain proactive or reactive strategies. Secondly, 
ultimately the environmental strategy is limited by practical considerations 
such as cost and availability of eco-friendly options as strategies (as has been 
pointed out in the previous chapter as a major greening problem, despite the 
EM suggestion of cost savings and easy availability of green-technology). As 
Aragon-Correa (1998) found, proactive firms that opted for cheaper reactive 
pollution-control strategies got cost effective environmental performance (and 
market competitiveness), which would go against RBV suggestions. The 
author defended the RBV by saying that firms that have actively chosen 
reactive strategies can only see competitive gains if  prerequisite strategic 
resources (which includes tangible and intangible resources, including core, 
distinct knowledge and causally ambiguous skills) are developed as part of 
continuous broader management initiatives (such as IS09000 or any other 
quality management system). A firm that chooses to continuously improve it 
self via causally ambiguous capabilities, hones particular skills that can be 
transferred by learning, and applied to reactive measures. Consequently, firms 
that choose reactive add-on greening technology but do not transfer their 
strategic resources and skills in maintaining it will not see any competitive 
price gains from their buyers, as found by Damall (2003).
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So if some proactive-skilled firms can still reasonably make profits while 
using only reactive solutions, why choose proactivity? Empirical findings by 
Klassen and Whybark (1999) suggest that the key determinant is far more 
complex, and has to do with the individual circumstance of the firm, which is 
an interesting idea to contrast with the EM argument that the changing role of 
markets, social values, science, technology and economic instruments will 
convince firms to go green. While empirical work by Priem and Butler (2001), 
Cordano and Frieze (2000) and Arag6n-Correa (1998) suggests that economics 
(tangible resources) is a constraining factor, Klassen and Whybark (1999: 601) 
suggest that the ultimate proactive-greening strategy motivation is far more 
complex than just finances: "Because the strength, value, and competitive 
advantage of continuous improvement varies between plants within the same 
firm, the use of pollution prevention technology is also likely to vary. Thus, 
the ability to deploy pollution prevention technology might be achieved 
through multiple paths." So rather than having a set of strategic proactive 
skills, it was a firm's capacity to implement proactive management policies that 
resulted in competitive advantage from greening. Their findings were slightly 
at odds with Aragon-Correa (1998), in that they found that pollution control 
technology using firms cannot get competitive advantage. According to them, 
if firms only have the capacity to implement pollution control technologies 
(i.e. no new skills are developed, nothing is changed), then they are not going 
to gain competitive advantage, since those skills are not unique or causally 
ambiguous, or difficult to imitate. This finding is also corroborated by Russo 
and Fouts (1997), who suggest that a firm's capacity to implement reactive 
solutions would involve "add on" technology, however, if that technology 
has a source open to its competitors, then it does not qualify as a strategic 
resource.
Regardless of conflicting empirical findings, I would like to emphasise a point 
made by Klassen and Whybark (1999), that it is the capacity to recognise
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"win-win opportunities" and implement environmental proactivity, and not 
necessarily environmental policies that are left on paper that is related to 
strong economic performance and competitive advantage. This capability to 
deploy proactive technologies has to be learnt by the whole firm, since 
employees at all levels must be involved if a firm is to implement a policy of 
environmental management, etc. (Ashford 1993, Hart 1995), thereby 
necessitating the creation of socially complex and distinctive processes (such 
as involvement of all employees, cross disciplinary learning, coordination, 
and an organic flexible managerial style) (Shrivastava 1995b). This aspect of 
implementation of green-strategy making to get better prices is important for 
my thesis, given the wide scale criticism made by various trade union 
associations that the apparel industry CSR is only on paper (Christian Aid 
2005, McWilliams and Siegel 2001).13
To summarise, there is an important link between environmental capabilities 
within firms, strategy making, proactiveness or reactiveness, and competitive 
advantage. Despite proactive or reactive environmental policies, firms may 
use a combination of preventative and control tools, or simply one type. 
Regardless of the tools they pick, their action has an impact on their overall 
market competitiveness, because the same set of strategic resources yield 
competitive advantages at different levels. To gain sustained competitive 
advantage, a firm should be looking at their capabilities to implement a 
proactive policy, because capabilities that are only suited for reactive 
traditional responses to the ecological challenge will not normally result in 
sustained competitive advantage, only short term cost savings. So how do 
companies come up with their environmental strategies?
13 This criticism will be discussed more in later empirical chapters.
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a. RBV and Environmental Corporate Strategy Making:
Firms do not make environmental strategies outside of their normal 
entrepreneurial decision-making. The importance of environmental strategies 
being complimentary and consistent with overall firm strategy, in terms of 
contextual, structural, and strategic issues, is well known, as is the fact that 
this marriage is not always without conflict. Welford and Gouldson (1993) 
have suggested that such consistency is not always possible, and often 
environmental considerations are bound to be diluted in normal business 
strategy making. Keeping this tension in mind, authors such as Miles and 
Snow (1978) highlight three dimensions of environmental strategy making: 
the entrepreneurial, the engineering, and the administrative dimensions.
Strategy making in the entrepreneurial dimension relates to choices that 
business firms make about products, markets, and their competitive strategy. 
Proactive firms tend to analyse all aspects of their competitive contexts and 
remain profitable by developing new products, innovation, new kinds of 
marketing, strategic alliances, etc. These firms tend to have top management 
that is perceptive of greening signals and proactively manage EM pressures to 
gain competitive advantage. Similarly, when making environmental 
strategies, these firms consider the whole of their competitive contexts, (Hart, 
1995: 1001) and decide on environmental performance goals. Reactive firms, 
on the other hand, tend to get defensive of their economic constraints and 
goals, and are less open to modifying their standardised products and long 
time markets for environmental reasons (Starik and Rands 1995: 925).
The engineering dimension of strategy making refers directly to the role of 
science and technology in EM -  adaptation of new clean technology to save 
resource inputs and environmental damage mitigation costs -  in remaining 
competitive. Reactive firms do embrace this, as shown in the numerous 
examples of firms adopting pollution control technology to improve their cost
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savings and efficiency, but evidence also shows that proactive firms make 
more long term strategic decisions about greening that go beyond what their 
reactive competitors achieve.14 Different authors, such as Dvir et al (1993) and 
Hitt et al 2002, show that the most proactive firms are prepared to invest 
heavily in order to enhance their technological leadership. Correspondingly, 
the least proactive firms only invested in new technology when they were 
convinced of its potential benefits. The effectiveness, implications, and costs 
of green technologies are sometimes subject to doubt (Shrivastava, 1995, Hart 
1995, Gouldson and Murphy 1997), making it difficult for ecological 
modernisation inspired strategy making to become popular in less proactive 
firms.
The administrative dimension refers to the strategy making to address changes 
in the internal network relationships that manage greening actions. Miles and 
Snow (1978) call this the choice of structures and organisational processes for 
reducing uncertainty and permitting innovation. While it is generally 
acknowledged that proactive firms that are less bureaucratic change easily 
due to decentralised decision making powers; Starik and Rands (1995:921) 
suggest that top management have an important role in leading the change, to 
"empower individuals to engage in sustainability-oriented innovation" (1995: 
921) in terms of projects in all levels of the production chain.
So far according to the RBV, we can see that reactive and proactive greening 
strategy making in firms in highly competitive supply chains will have to 
begin with top management formulating a strategy to harness the market 
benefits of refining production that EM predicts. Management will focus on 
the circumstances of the firm, its tangible/intangible RBV resources, and its 
core/base competencies; and by mobilising its RBV skills, the firm can 
achieve competitive gains from greening, if it uses its unique skill and
14 It must be noted here that research by Arag6n-Correa (1998) has shown that proactive firms 
can also choose to use a mixture of proactive and control technologies as part of their 
environmental strategy.
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resource mix in its greening strategy (Mahoney and Pandian 19920. The skill 
and resource mix has to be operationalised in the administrative, engineering 
and entrepreneurial dimension of the firm, and such organisational change 
will not be without its problems, especially in competition with other tasks 
that have more direct impact on the profit line. Additionally, the firm will 
have to learn the environmental information attached to greening and change 
as an organisation; and stay within its overall aims of being competitive in the 
supply chain. To understand the role of the RBV resources, capabilities and 
competitive advantage when it comes to EM driven greening, I consider them 
in the following categories: (1) corporate culture, (2) organisational change, 
and (3) learning. These categories problematise the RBV categories of 
resources (tangible/intangible) and skills (core competencies/base 
competencies); and using literature from organisational behaviour theories 
that complement the RBV categories, I can get a more detailed understanding 
of these often overlapping categories: get a more continual categorisation of 
behavioural change in firms that allows me to study what the prevalent 
corporate culture is, how environmental learning and strategy making 
happens, how RBV resources are used, how skills change, how there are 
possible midpoints of behavioural responses and how the EM suggestions of 
scientific information, environmental learning and green values influence the 
way firms manage EM in the boardroom and on the factory floor.
Corporate culture— Each firm develops according to rules, which are made 
from cultural beliefs, norms, values, traditions, experiences, identities, 
customs, routines, conventions and rationalities that are a part of a broader 
social construct that operates within the firm networks and is propagated by 
actor network behaviour. These rationalities within firms are called corporate 
cultures (Dodge 1997, Zwetsloot 2003). They are influenced by the common 
views about environmental issues held by the staff members, starting from 
the top management who are responsible for overall goals of a company, to 
the rest of the management and workers who implement strategies. So for
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example, since the traditional view of environmental issues in Bangladesh is 
associated with natural resources problems and natural disasters (DoE, BCAS, 
UNEP 2001), it may be expected that awareness about brown environmental 
issues among Bangladeshi firms is likely to be low.
Firm employees may have low preference for environmental action generally. 
Andersson and Bateman (2000: 553) explain low environmental proactivity in 
corporate cultures by highlighting the prevalent "technocentric paradigm of 
business firms" which has institutionalised certain beliefs about hedonistic 
resource use and low environmental responsibility by firms. On the other 
hand, if a firm has strong environmental strategies, then it can be expected to 
guide the actions of staff (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991).
Organisational behaviour researchers Flannery and May (2000), Starik and 
Rands (1995) draw on Ajzen's theory of Planned Behaviour (1985, 1991) to 
understand what behavioural factors determine reactive environmental 
upgrading. Ajzen's theory is based on subjective norms of managers, which 
refers to the subjective interpretations of rules by individuals and emphasises 
individual agency (although Flannery and May 2000 suggest that subjective 
norms have a mixed impact in predicting environmental decision making in 
firms and highlight the financial aspect of environmental strategy making as 
an important factor). Important factors include, individual intentions based 
on company norms, perceived levels of personal moral obligation for 
consequences of decisions in a network, internal perceived behavioural 
control over the decision (self efficacy); as well as external contextual factors: 
behavioural control factors, ethical climate of the firm; and subjective norms 
established by influential others (network cohesion, strengths of relationships, 
etc.). Greening and Gray (1994) have developed this idea of network attitude 
formation within network constraints by suggesting that firms in highly 
institutionalised environments respond either by firm compliance directives 
from top management (coercive isomorphism), by imitating others7 responses
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(mimetic isomorphism) or by conforming to norms established by external 
pressures (normative isomorphism).
Organisational change -  RBV and EM theories both focus on implementation 
of greening strategies via sustained organisational change for gaining 
competitive advantage; and organisational theories suggest that change 
enabling greening strategy would either promote network wide continual 
changes (necessary for proactive environmental strategies) or incremental 
changes (resulting in "add on" reactive solutions). Where the changes begin 
(as in, whether employees at every level have the ability and space to identify 
operational areas that need to change for ecological modernisation) have an 
important impact on the success of the change-initiative. Halme (1997) 
suggests that such change management for environmental upgrading may be 
"top down" or "bottom up" depending on where the pressure for change is 
located (Buysse and Verbeke 2003). The top down view assumes that decisive 
power lies with top management and change is successful if initiated by them. 
It is most common in bureaucratic networks, while changes initiated from the 
bottom up are more common in organic networks, and environmental 
upgrading will be implemented with greater ease since change is quicker 
through greater interconnectivity offered in organic structures (as suggested 
by Dodge's (1997) classification of traditional centralised corporate culture vs. 
decentralised organic structure). It may therefore be assumed that organic 
structures will be more suited for proactive environmental changes.
Andersson and Bateman (2000) suggest that environmental change cannot 
occur throughout the firm if not backed up by top management, regardless of 
where change is first initiated. Therefore, the change strategy should be made 
by top management keeping in mind the employees' sense of self-efficacy, 
and external perceived behavioural control over environmental issues,
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according to Ajzen's theory (1985).15 Chapter One discussed some of the 
supply chain greening bottlenecks that arise due to these problems: top 
management commitment is truly tested by resource constraints that are 
tangible (financial resources, competing budgets, personnel etc.) and 
intangible (skill-mix, management time etc.) in nature. If top management 
cannot see immediate short term cost savings from greening then staff time 
and attention to greening becomes sacrificed if seen as taking away from 
more profit-generating activities (Cordano and Frieze 2000). However, it is 
crucial that lower management understand the value of environmental 
upgrading (especially in situations where awareness of industrial 
environmental issues is low) and are involved in planning from an early stage 
so that the best possible expertise can be gathered with respect to all aspects 
of the work flow (Halme 1997).
Learning — The last chapter discussed how environmental learning is a 
significant force in EM and ethical trade, and contributes to not only stronger 
commitment among MNC retailers, but also contributes to green strategy 
making and implementation: the ability to access and comprehend expert 
information and or manuals by upper management and the ability of the 
whole firm to learn what changes need to be made. Firms need to make room 
for technological and organisational change only if learning occurs across the 
firm's network (Freeman 1992). Corporate culture and existing paths of 
change (either top down or bottom up) impact how learning is done in a firm 
and vice versa. Environmental learning can be an iterative upward spiral 
process (starting at the individual level and moving up to the collective group 
level) and changing from tacit to explicit knowledge, involving the cognition 
of new information, unlearning of old assumptions and finally internalisation 
of the new knowledge, which will change the actors' notions of self efficacy
15See Meima and Welford (1997) for a discussion of the kind of traps top management frequently fall 
into while designing an environmental strategy. He warns against over-ambitious, over-compensating 
and over-comprehensive environmental strategies written to “sell” the idea of environmental upgrade to 
the employees, which inevitably lead to employee dissatisfaction, since it does not deliver on its 
promises.
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and perceived external behavioural control factors, and be expressed through 
decision making choices (Halme 1997). Actors' ability to comprehend the 
costs, benefits, uncertainty of returns to ecological investments, etc. influences 
the decisions that are made during environmental upgrading. If the top 
management have "expert material" that is easily available, easily 
comprehensible in terms of business rhetoric, and is financially convincing, 
then the EM agenda becomes easier to carry forwards (Andersson and 
Bateman 2000, Hughes 2006).
Different types of network learning (e.g. incremental, experimental, vicarious 
and experiential) should happen all along the firm, regardless of its position 
in the bureaucracy/adhocracy16 continuum of networks (Bierly and 
Hamalainen 1995, Guillen 2000). Learning is a continual process, and spirals 
outwards more easily in a decentralised organic firm, and less easily in 
hierarchical mechanistic networks — multiple layer hierarchy and 
bureaucratic networks are not appropriate for cross-departmental knowledge 
sharing (similar to ideas expressed by Dodge (1997)) and may result in 
resistance or reactive strategies for environmental upgrading.
A barrier to learning often stems from the nature of technical environmental 
information (e.g. detailed technical manuals such as Materials Safety Data 
Sheets). Such "expert information" may be available, but not widely available, 
or not available in a format that is understandable by people who do not have 
an academic background in sciences. If a manual is too unwieldy, then it may 
get discarded, hindering distinctive skills and capacity building for managing 
changes (Hart 1995). Greening information can also contain uncertainties 
about outcomes of green strategies, unclear time frames, unclear cost 
implications, complex technical aspects etc. which is a challenge for managers 
(Greening and Gray 1994, Gouldson and Murphy 1998, Porter and Van der
16 See Mintzberg 1983 and Halme 1997 for discussion of bureaucratic and adhocratic 
structures of firms. This is based around the notion that firms lie som ewhere between these 
two extreme forms.
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Linde 1995). Therefore, if a firm cannot overcome the information shortage 
(for example, through direct knowledge accumulation, hiring of outside 
expertise, coordination with external actors to gain guidance, learning from 
other firms, etc.) then such uneven learning may lead to the difficulties in 
successful environmental management and loss of competitive advantage, as 
predicted by RBV scholars.
b. Towards Understanding Environmental Upgrading in RMG Firms:
EM theories emphasise actual changes in firm behaviour as an important 
starting point towards ecologically benign economic growth. This focus on 
"win-win" solutions is complementary to the RBV focus on successful 
strategising to gain competitive advantage. The technological/material and 
social/cultural objectives of EMT have to be materialised by successful 
strategies drawing on the inherent strengths and weaknesses within a firm's 
network. As the discussion above has shown, these strengths and weaknesses 
occur within well-defined hierarchical relationships structured to attain the 
firms' multiple goals. The RBV predicts that a firm (organic or bureaucratic 
structured) that utilises strategies that privilege non-reproducible resources 
will lean towards proactive environmental upgrading measures, thereby 
adding to the firm's competitive advantage. Empirical findings have 
suggested that in reality the cause-effect relationships are less clear, and that 
whether a firm is proactive or reactive also depends on firm culture, financial 
resources and available technologies (Aragon-Correa and Sharma 2003). 
Depending on the kinds of capabilities and resources that are available and 
the environmental stance of top management, a firm may be more suited 
towards reactive environmental upgrading. In order to get a more textured 
understanding of the RBV variables, I have examined the mixture of resources 
and capabilities in three groups: corporate culture, organisational change and 
abilities for learning (figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1: Reactive/proactive environmental strategy making:
Corporate culture, 
environmental 
learning, ability to 
change
Reactive
firms
(Continuum)
Proactive
firms
Resources and 
capabilities: -tangible, 
intangible, valuable, barriers to 
duplication, appropriability 
-financial, technological options, 
causally ambiguous skills, core 
competencies
Environmental strategy making:
-overall firm goals -> environmental goals +competitive adv. 
-review of overall resource portfolio -> resource deployment 
strategy + continuous implementation strategy
Behavioural theories were drawn upon further, to argue that success or 
failure in environmental management in RMG firms should be analysed in 
terms of their culturally specific corporate environmental cultures, 
organisational change, and ability for learning. These variables take a deeper 
look into why firms may take a reactive stance to environmental upgrading or 
may fail and leads directly to my first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Poor environmental upgrading in firms will be associated with factors 
internal to the firms, such as corporate culture, slow changing behaviour, problems 
with learning environmental information and will be linked to poor competitive 
advantage gains.
The RMG firms' capacity for environmental upgrading cannot be studied 
fully without looking at its broader context, which is the external economic 
network, or the global value chain that it is a part of. The pressures that they 
face from their buyers are a large reason why they undertake innovative 
business strategies, environmental upgrading being one of them. Therefore I 
now turn towards external economic relationships that firms are a part of.
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2.3 Analysing Environmental Upgrading Pressures in Economic Networks:
In Chapter One we discussed the role of economic actors in enabling EMT's 
idea of economy-environment decoupling and therefore, we need a 
conceptual framework that not only sets the situative context of international 
supply chains, but also explains the chain structure, its power centres, its 
resource dependencies, its governance styles and its environmental 
upgrading opportunities (or barriers). The economic networks approach,17 
can be most useful in this case. The greening of supply chains that Bangladesh 
features in has not been researched before, hence I chose an economic 
network type that has been used to explain international supply chains, and 
the situative context-shift when supplier capacities are built up. In particular, 
the Global Value Chain (GVC) network was chosen because it has been 
already used extensively to study the labour intensive supply chains sourcing 
from LDCs and SMEs (Kaplinsky and Readman 2001), especially the apparel 
chain (Hebb and Wokick 2005). The choice of the GVC theory is even more 
appropriate given that international standards driven supplier upgrading has 
been studied using GVC analysis, although the environmental standards 
angle remains less researched. GVC theory also focuses on the buyer driven 
nature of chain governance, and especially the governance of upgrading, 
which is an important feature given that I am interested in social-political 
aspects of EM.
a. Upgrading in Economic Networks (Global Value Chains):
Industrial relations researchers have theorised on how buyer-seller triadic 
relationships function; in particular, the supplier-customer-customer (S-C-C 
triad) and the customer-supplier-supplier (C-S-S triad), explain how multiple 
buyers and sellers relate in the supply chain, and how fewer powerful buyers 
result in numerous suppliers in adjusting to demands (Hakansson and
17 Please see Annex 2.3 for details.
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Johanson 1992, Smith and Laage-Hellman 1992, Chamess et al 2003).18 The 
GVC literature places similar industrial relationships in a global setting for 
labour intensive export sectors such as footwear and garments (Humphrey 
and Schmitz 2002). The idea behind value chains is that the range of activities 
that is required to bring a product from its conception to its end use 
(including "value adding" activities such as design, production, marketing, 
distribution and support to the final consumer) is done by various firms 
located in different parts of the world, networked in a globalised economy, 
whose governance is undertaken through coordination of economic activities 
through multi actor relationships (Schmitz 2004). The institutional framework 
underpinning this theory suggests that key actors (e.g. powerful DC 
buyers/retailers) incorporate less powerful actors (e.g. numerous LDC 
suppliers) through their control of market access and resources. These power 
configurations and coordination mechanisms shape the chain, which is an 
intricate and decentralised network of numerous suppliers of varying 
capabilities. Of course, the power hierarchy has been evident in the discussion 
of ethical trade in supply chains in Chapter One.
GVCs show that participation in supply chains provide suppliers access to 
markets and opportunities to move up the chain hierarchy (i.e. upgrading) by 
using new technology, information and learning-by-doing (Gibbon 2001, 
Schmitz 1995, Gomes 2003). Cooperation opportunities and capacity building 
between buyers-suppliers can influence supplier strategies and help or hinder 
upgrading, and lead to competitive advantage, depending on sector 
characteristics. This emphasis on the bargaining powers and resource 
distribution favouring the buyers, and its influence on the strategic decisions 
made by suppliers (Humphrey and Schmitz 2000), gives a politicised context 
to the RBV lessons on suppliers' strategies for sustainable competitive 
advantage, in relation to how the firms' internal resources and capabilities are
18 Please see Annex 2.4 for a brief background on buyer and supplier power bargaining and the scope 
for supplier upgrading.
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influenced by market pressures and buyer actions. Figure 2.2 provides an 
illustration of how value is added along the apparel GVC, with important 
buyers connecting the LDC suppliers with DC consumers.
Figure 2.2: Buyer power in the apparel industry global value chain (GVC)
Raw materials End Product
Value addition by buyers, suppliers and manufacturers: Apparel 
design, product development, marketing, production and retailing.
Based on: Humphrey and Schmitz (2002)
The structure of GVCs -  The modem value chain is international in nature, 
due to differences in cost-efficiency competitive advantage of suppliers (Khan 
2002, Ponte and Gibbon 2005, Coe and Hess 2007). Characteristically, the 
retailer or buyer's company does not turn raw materials into finished 
products; they only coordinate the chain and sell the goods in markets, taking 
advantage of cheap labour and raw materials in LDCs. Gereffi (1999a: 4), who 
coined the term "value chains", explains the structure of "buyer driven" value 
chains as follows:
"Buyer driven commodity chains refer to those industries in which 
large retailers, marketers and branded manufacturers play the pivotal 
roles in setting up decentralised production networks in a variety of 
exporting countries, typically located in the third world. This pattern of 
trade led industrialisation has become common in labour intensive, 
consumer goods industries such as garments, footwear, toys, consumer
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electronics and a variety of handicrafts. Production is generally carried 
out by tired networks of third world contractors that make finished 
goods for foreign buyers. The specifications are supplied by the large 
retailers or marketers that order the goods. These companies design 
and/or market -  but do not make- the branded products they order. 
They are part of a new breed of 'manufacturers without factories' that 
separate the physical production of goods from the design and 
marketing stages of the production process."
Buyers and eco-modernisation of GVCs -  According to Gereffi (1999b), 
buyers exert their power over the value chain in three main aspects-
-Giving birth to the chain within the market (supermarkets/retailers in the 
developed countries ultimately decide what goods are to be sold. Their 
buyers liase with the LDC suppliers and place orders. This opens up the trade 
network to the suppliers and positions them in the network);
-Determining the structure of the chain (the way buyers manage the chain 
influences the number of supplying firms that are involved in it and what 
their functions are); and
-Standard setting, monitoring and control (buyers set product standards, specify 
the quality standards, create pressure for product upgrading, monitor 
supplier performance in areas such as environmental upgrading and hold the 
power to sanction or reward suppliers based on upgrading 
performance) (Dolan and Humphrey 2000).
The third function of the buyers is the most important for this thesis (and 
germane to EMT), since LDC suppliers feel the green market pressure
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through this mechanism.19 Once the environmental and other product 
standards have been set and communicated, suppliers respond by production 
upgrading,20 which involves strategy making and implementing required 
changes (and which, according to the RBV, will lead to competitive advantage 
gains if made using the unique and core capacities and resources within a 
firm, which in turn fulfils the EM prediction of green profit making).
Buyer governance in GVCs -  Production upgrading by suppliers change 
their terms of trade, and buyers respond by changing how they govern, which 
is a central part of GVC analysis. We have seen in Chapter One why buyers 
seek to regulate supplier behaviour relating to ethical trade, and GVC studies 
expand on buyers' risk minimisation behaviour: buyer governance includes 
transaction costs of monitoring and supervising, providing suppliers with 
specifications of design, branding and marketing and increasingly, non price 
factors such as quality, reliability of delivery, response times, meeting of 
international child labour and environmental standards, etc. GVC governance 
creates a certain "division of labour" that perpetuates a hierarchy. According 
to Ponte and Gibbon (2005:3), "Governance is about defining the terms of 
chain membership, incorporating/excluding other actors accordingly and 
allocating to them value-adding activities that lead agents do not wish to 
perform. 'Rules and conditions of participation' are the key operational 
mechanisms of governance. These may translate into different forms of co­
ordination that vary both along and between value chains. 
Marginalization/ exclusion and upgrading/participation are the axes along 
which resulting (re)distributional processes take place." Rules and conditions 
are needed to minimise loss risks from supply chain failure. According to 
Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005), governance of GVCs depends on
19 See Nadvi and Waltring (2004) for a discussion of a typology of standards based on field of 
application, form, coverage, key drivers, etc.
20 This is in addition to two other types of upgrading -  functional upgrading (when buyers help 
suppliers add on more functions to their repertoire, gradually becoming more capable and 
comprehensive in their product delivery) and buyer succession (when supplies gradually move up to 
supplying more sophisticated products and want to work for higher end buyers).(Gereffi 1999).
77
three main variables: complexity of information required for a transaction, 
extent to which this information can be codified, and supplier capabilities in 
relation to a transaction's requirements. These factors lead to four different 
kinds of GVC governance styles: arms length, network, quasi hierarchy and 
hierarchy.
Quasi hierarchies result when supplier competence is low, and the end 
product has to meet standards that do not apply yet in producers' own 
country, which is fairly common in footwear, horticulture, electronics and 
apparel chains. GVC studies have identified the apparel chains sourcing from 
LDCs as operating within a quasi hierarchy (Humphrey 2003, Dolan and 
Humphrey 2004). Since there are numerous "anonymous" suppliers 
(Vermeulen and Ras 2006), buyers are at high risk and as a result they specify 
products (and non price standards, i.e. social compliance) to an exact degree. 
Therefore the buyers' need to control their own vulnerability pushes the quasi 
hierarchy suppliers towards EM. An interesting question at this point is to ask 
is how chain governance impacts EM. How might ethical trade requirements 
affect buyer-supplier technical cooperation? Do standards result in tightening 
or loosening of technical ties? Do standards impact productivity gains and 
increased competitive advantage? The answer probably lies within the 
structure of the supply chain in question. In fact, Jeppesen and Hansen (2004) 
suggest that the way corporate social responsibility commitments are 
operationalised along the value chain depends on the mode of governance in 
place (which is dependent upon actor strength and vertical integration into 
the production chain). In the quasi hierarchical governance system, it would 
be then reasonable to assume that specification of quality standards and 
implementation monitoring will be done depending on the strengths of the 
suppliers (demonstrated via exchange concentration and competency) on a 
case-by-case basis (Gereffi and Memedovic 2003).
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Buyer-supplier relationship closeness and collaboration -  Recent studies in 
supply chain management suggest that despite the view of a hyper connected 
global economy, most supply chain coordination is not optimised; supply 
chains are not structured to handle quick transfer of innovation; chain 
flexibility is difficult due to short product lead times, cheaper labour 
dependence, increased product diversity, turn over demands, and penetration 
of new markets; and that despite governance strategies to manage supplier 
risk, the fragmented supply chain links are continuing as potential risk 
sources (Deloitte 2003). Some retailers are struggling with product 
engineering, sourcing, manufacturing, logistics, marketing etc. all over the 
globe, but some firms are governing the complexity by carefully 
synchronising within and across their value chains. They are attempting to 
leverage their interconnectivity strengths, visible control and technical 
monitoring, yet retain flexibility (Keesing and Lall 1992, IBM 2008). Where the 
probability and level of loss is higher than the cost of governance, quasi- 
hierarchical form of governance is adopted. Recurrent transactions requiring 
asset specific investments, either in monitoring or in cooperation in product 
definition, is suitable for these buyers and suppliers (Murphy 2002). At the 
initial stages of a supply relationship, buyers may feel the need to provide 
detailed instructions and under-take close monitoring of supplier 
performance through close collaboration. As the suppliers become more 
experienced and prove their reliability, the buyers may give more leverage to 
the suppliers on how to meet them (Humphrey 2003).
Empirical work by Schmitz (2004) showed that upgrading success should not 
be thought of as happening in the style of an "automated conveyor" where 
functional and buyer-succession style upgrading is without conflict between 
actor-interests and power bargaining, instead of collaboration and we have 
seen some of these conflicts in ethical trade in Chapter One. However, he 
refers to empirical studies in sectors such as footwear, furniture and 
electronics that suggest that while there may be problems in buyer succession
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style upgrading, there is agreement that in quasi hierarchies, buyer 
cooperation can provide ample assistance during product upgrading. This 
assistance results from the dual role of the buyers: they create the pressure but 
they also need to provide assistance so that these demands are met to 
minimise their own risks of surviving non-price competition. Much of this 
assistance takes place in the context of detailed monitoring, i.e. not just 
exposing failures but also showing how they can be overcome. It is this 
combination of high challenge and support, which propels the supplier 
forward and leads to fast environmental upgrading in processes and products 
(Schmitz 2004).
The extent of the buyers' collaboration efforts will obviously depend not only 
on the size of the buyer, the capabilities of the suppliers, but also upon the 
avenues open for collaboration (Nadvi and Kazmi 2002). GVC research shows 
that buyers create opportunities by providing information and guidance on 
the standards that are to be met, along with information on monitoring and 
control. However, this often proves an important barrier since environmental 
upgrading may be impeded particularly in the area of knowledge flow along 
the value chain -  the generation, transfer and diffusion of environmental 
knowledge leading to innovation.
It would be reasonable to question the scope for RMG buyers investing 
financially in their RMG suppliers in Bangladeshi quasi hierarchies, as a 
means of providing more substantial collaborative opportunities than 
information provision. Empirical evidence from Jeppesen and Hansen (2004) 
shows that LDC suppliers of machinery in buyer driven GVCs are achieving 
rapid environmental upgrading due to informational, financial and 
technological investment by the market leader buyers. If the buyers are 
financially able, and if the costs of such long term investment will lead to their 
long term market viability, then they will invest in environmental upgrading 
with suppliers who are chosen based on their proven capabilities.
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However, other case studies are not that optimistic. While GVC theorists 
remain optimistic about the role of buyer-seller collaboration resulting in 
closer ties, productivity gains and increased profits for the suppliers (cf. 
Humphrey and Schmitz 2002, Schmitz 2004, Gereffi 1999), empirical research 
by Quadros (2002) on the Brazilian automobile value chain suggests a 
different picture. Buyers have not made any substantial efforts to help the 
suppliers with the upgrading to conform to the quality standards nor has 
chain governance led to technical collaboration in areas such as product and 
process design. Quality standards have also not led to suppliers making 
larger profits, because certification alone is not enough to give confidence to 
customers, even though the arms-length relationship between buyers and 
suppliers has not increased. Governance remains ineffective, and upgrading 
changes are being made at costs that are higher than needs be. Overall 
Quadros (2002) concludes that while quality standards do lead to quality 
upgrading of production processes, it did not lead to closer ties, or 
improvements in supplier performance that leads to added competitive 
advantage.
Nadvi and Kazmi (2002), Nadvi and Haider (2002) have studied similar 
questions in the case of Pakistan's medical equipment producing industry, 
and have found similar results to Quadros (2002), in terms of how quality 
standards impact profitability and buyer-seller relationships. Their findings 
differed with the Brazilian case in one important aspect: while governing 
compliance among Pakistani quasi hierarchies, links with buyers become 
looser and more arms-length in nature. Buyers seem to be content with only 
demanding compliance, and have not used their power or resources to 
provide any deeper collaboration or support for local firms in implementing 
the requisite process standards. Nevertheless, practices amongst leading 
brand name buyers do appear to differ. There was no evidence that 
compliance with buyer demands led to improvements in firm performance, or
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even competitive advantage. These findings are startling, since they challenge 
the notions of win-win solutions in greening supply chains (as EMT would 
suggest) and the notion that if firms have the skills necessary for proactive 
eco-management implementation, then it would lead to competitive 
advantage gains (as RBV would suggest).
In summary, the structure of the value chain will be an important enabling 
factor, as well the sectoral characteristics of the kinds of suppliers that invest 
into environmental upgrading. Since suppliers' proven capabilities are 
associated with their investment worthiness and their bargaining power 
(based on frequency and quality of economic interactions with the buyers), it 
is a safe assumption that suppliers with some bargaining power stand a better 
chance of attracting buyer investments. Therefore, I would like to present 
buyers' efforts to help environmental upgrading as a continuum, between 
"shallow" environmental collaboration (with little transfer of resources or 
knowledge to LDC firms) and "deep" environmental collaboration -  where 
resources transferred are significant and include technological collaboration 
(similar to Jeppesen and Hansen 2004).
b. Towards Understanding Environmental Upgrading in RMG in Economic 
Networks:
EM emphasises the role of market actors and market mechanisms as 
important drivers of greening production. Environmental reform along the 
apparel supply chain under this theory will be encouraged by apparel 
customers, company shareholders, financial companies, NGOs, etc., making 
the retailers and buyers more insistent upon environmental quality, which is 
driving the RMG firms into taking steps towards ecologising production. In 
this section I examine economic networks for analysing how certain actors 
gain power in a supply chain and how their partners have to comply. The 
GVC emphasised the role of buyers in creating environmental upgrading
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pressures as well as opportunities and barriers along international supply 
chains. According to the value chain model, buyers often exercise tight control 
over the low-capacity suppliers through a quasi hierarchical structure of 
governance, where the buyers would closely monitor the results of 
environmental upgrading if the risks of non-compliance to shipment is 
considerable. In such a situation, suppliers may invest in a proactive 
environmental management strategy if they feel that it will increase their 
competitiveness with other retailers.
In summary, analysis of the buyer driven value chains for the RMG sector, 
reveals the sources of buyer pressure for environmental upgrading and 
choices for collaboration with chosen suppliers. This leads directly to my 
second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. The most powerful demand for environmental management on 
Bangladeshi RMG firms is originating from their buyers in global supply chains. 
However, opportunities for collaboration or assistance from buyers demanding these 
environmental upgrading initiatives may be low.
The success or failure in environmental upgrading among Bangladeshi RMG 
firms is incomplete without understanding the broader policy context -  the 
policies and actors that regulate how environmental standards are met in 
Bangladesh. This chapter now examines that aspect.
2.4 Analysing Environmental Upgrading Opportunities in External Policy 
Networks:
In the previous two sections of this chapter, I discussed how greening can be 
understood in factory management networks and supply chain networks, but 
greening certainly cannot be understood without the EM policy context (role 
of the state in particular), hence we need to look at variables that would help
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analyse the multi-level environmental policy making context for Bangladesh. 
Analogous to the previous two sections, it may be noted here that there is 
almost no academic literature on industrial environmental policy making in 
Bangladesh; and although there are government and donor reports on 
environmental policy, there is an absence of analysis of decision making 
styles, outputs and networks.
The process of regulation by public policy generally involves governing 
private actions through interventions designed to further public interests 
(Mitnick 1980, Smith 1997).21 The problem of what public policy is, how 
policymaking is to be done and studied have been debated extensively by 
policy scholars and political scientists over the years.22 A broad analytical 
framework is needed for this thesis that can identify the environmental 
policymaking style in Bangladesh based on identifying how certain resources 
and power dependencies have resulted in weak regulatory pressure and how 
the policy process continues while perpetuating a system of exclusion/non 
participation of actors with different access to power and resources. This view 
complements the social-political view of EM of this thesis, and also 
corresponds to the hierarchical greening in firm management networks, and 
the hierarchical power/resource dependent value chain governance of supply 
chain greening. Below I discuss the elements of policy networks that are 
relevant to this thesis.
a. Weak Environmental Pressure and Actor Participation in Policy 
Networks:
Policy networks concern the more or less long-term relationship patterns that 
exist between resource dependent actors, who use these relationships to attain 
individual goals in the policy process, using own resources and skills to
21 Smith (1997) describes regulation as best understood as midpoints between complete 
control and total uninvolvement.
22 Please see Annex 2.5 for a discussion on regulation by policy making, and policy cycles.
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bargain for policy outcomes most suited to their agenda (Klijn et al (1995), 
Dowding (1995), Smith 1997). Central to the concept is the notion of dynamic 
relationship systems, which shares attributes of complexity and adaptable 
network behaviour by actors -  who engage in strategic decision making -  
with the value chain theory discussed in the previous section.
Theorising expressions of power, resources, spaces and rules -  Klijn et al 
(1995) see networks as being born to provide contexts or spaces, called 
"arenas", within which "policy games" take place, where actors interact over 
an issue, given certain organisational arrangements which can change 
through the different phases of policy formulation to implementation. Their 
analysis begins with tracing policy games, arenas and networks. Policy games 
become complex when they occur in various arenas simultaneously (e.g. the 
child labour banning debates in DCs and LDCs). Conversely, different games 
may be played in one arena and may impact on surrounding arenas (Bueren 
et al 2003). The interlinked and overlapping of policy games and actors create 
and perpetuate a balance of resources involving power, status, legitimacy, 
knowledge, information, money, etc. (which is similar to the EM criticism of 
privileging speakers of the business language and experts as having 
discursive power at the cost of excluding radicals as non-experts, as discussed 
earlier). The distribution of resources in turn impacts the rules of game. Klijn 
and Koppenjan (2000a) define network rules as generalisable procedures, 
which are created jointly by actors to regulate separate policy games and actor 
behaviour. The rules specify what is relevant and what is not in policy games. 
Policy arenas become activated surrounding an issue or policy (e.g. 
environmental regulation for point source polluters etc.) and are located 
within a larger policy network (e.g. a policy network involving the Ministries 
of Environment, Industries, scientific research bodies and the private sector). 
The balance of resources and rules of the game impact the overall policy 
network, as well as the policy arenas within. In case a policy game stretches 
over to different policy networks, members of different networks meet in the
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same arena, where lack of a common frame of reference, work methods and 
shared values can lead to friction (e.g. the apparel chain ethical trade issue 
stakeholder discussions). Another important expression of political power 
and resources that is especially pertinent for the case of Bangladesh is the 
issue of corruption in what Khan (1998a and 1998b) terms as "patron client 
networks". He suggests that patron-client networks surrounding the 
regulator and the regulated in South Asian subcontinent (involving the 
bureaucrats, politicians and different private actors) are embedded with 
substantial political power wielded by the private-sector-actors (what he calls 
the capitalist and non-capitalist clients). Bureaucrats, the government and 
their clients are interlocked by unlawful exchanges to redistribute public 
resources or privileges as demanded by the clients, meaning that "the rights 
created or allocated by the state became locked into enmeshed networks and 
were not subsequently easy to re-allocate. This in turn resulted in structural 
sclerosis." (Khan 1998: 17). This sort of structural sclerosis in environmental 
regulation for industry licensing in Bangladesh is likely to be an important 
variable to analyse while studying the role of the state in EM.
Network structure vs. outcomes -  The role of institutional factors such as 
network structures and power relationships are, no doubt, important in 
determining the nature of the policy networks, the quality of their 
interactions, their outputs (policy suggestions) and outcomes (as measured by 
policy implementation evaluation results). However, the linkage between 
policy outcomes and network structure has been heavily debated in policy 
networks literature, in terms of whether or not it is possible to predict the 
outcomes from the prevalent structures or whether the outcomes are 
determined solely by actor agency.23 While that debate has much to contribute 
towards why environmental policymaking outcomes in Bangladesh are often 
judged to be weak and ineffective, I defer to the middle ground taken by
23 See Dowding (1995) and Rhodes and Marsh (1998) for a detailed discussion on network structure vs. 
actor driven agendas as the main factors determining the outcomes of policy networks.
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Rhodes and Marsh (1992) suggesting that both, resource-power dependencies 
and actor driven agendas contribute to network structures and policy 
outcomes. Whether a policy network is closed or open is more pertinent for 
my research question, since factors such as network power/resource 
dependencies, bargaining, network cultures, political saliency and agenda 
competition are more apposite to studying continuing policy making in a 
relatively young, protean and mutable policy network, such as the social 
compliance policy network in Bangladesh. Below I examine how these factors 
relate to weak regulatory pressure.
Network power-resource dependencies -  Policy network outcomes such as 
weak environmental compliance pressure may be determined by many 
factors, foremost amongst them is resource-power dependencies. 
Organisations depend on their comparative strengths in resources such as 
budgetary allocations, staff competence levels, strong political links to 
permanent bureaucracies, etc. to attain own goals in policy games. According 
to Klijn et al (1995), network power is determined by a combination of 
resources, which actors may mobilise or withhold, combined with their 
strategic ability to put these resources to use in an actual game. Also, the 
power of each actor depends on other's perception that the other is powerful. 
Therefore, power, like rules, is a construct of the actor's perceptions (van 
Beuren et al 2003). Benson (1980) and Rhodes and Marsh (1992) see policy 
networks being formed as a necessity for connecting separate organisations 
through their resource and power dependencies.24 Organisations set up 
control structures to coordinate activities based on these resource 
dependencies, to meet their objectives. The dominant focus here is the 
relationship between resource-power dependencies and outcomes. Rhodes 
and Marsh (1992) suggest that the motivated party is the one that stands to 
gain the most and is powerful enough to induce the other to interact. This
24 Smith (1997) however, finds this line of argument incomplete -- problematic here is to 
determine the relationship between outcomes and networks structure.
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view of policy network resource and power dependencies is interesting in the 
context of buyer-driven supply chains where economic actors have resources 
and access in an economic sense, and their collaboration with policy 
institutions can result in a powerful coalition for compliance policymaking 
infrastructure that impacts factories.
Network bargaining -  Peters (1998) emphasises bargaining as a factor behind 
policy outcomes, where organisations may be in competition with each other 
to maximise own allocation of resources and share of power, in order to 
achieve its policy output goals. He suggests that resolution of multi actor 
bargaining is best done through market-like mechanisms. As we have seen in 
the policy cycle phases, bargaining and negotiations are a crucial component 
of policy networks. The bargaining position of the actors is a result of 
resource-power dependencies, and choice of strategies (Smith 1997, Gains 
2003). Successful bargaining is important in two ways -  it is an indicator of 
the ability of an actor to act strategically in relation to their perception of other 
actors' respective resources, strengths and agendas. Secondly, successful 
bargaining changes the power-resource balance to favour the successful party, 
at the cost of other actors who were in competition with the winner -  which 
means that the more powerful actor has increased potential to fulfil their 
regulatory goals (Klijn et al 1995). In practical terms, if a government ministry 
has weak political authority and is under resourced, then these resource 
constraints will dilute its bargaining power with other government agencies 
and with the actors that it must regulate, resulting in institutional weakness 
and failed policy outcome targets (Gains 2003). This can be seen in cases 
where environmental goals are less privileged over economic imperatives in 
national policymaking.
Network cultures -  Marsh and Smith (2000) add the dimension of network 
cultures as predicting outcomes, since structural relationships define roles, 
prescribe which issues are discussed, how they are addressed, contain
organisational imperatives and contribute towards the maintenance and 
perpetuation of the network. Van Bueren et al (2003) take a wider angle and 
mention three aspects of network cultures that may result in poor policy 
outcomes, which are:
-Cognitive uncertainty (different perceptions about nature, cause, effects of 
problems, or if the causes are too numerous and difficult to pinpoint, poor 
quality of available knowledge, different perceptions about how critical an 
issue is, uncertainty about the costs, benefits and time frames of interventions 
required, etc.);
-Institutional uncertainty (lack of supportive and facilitative institutions, such 
as durable relations, rules, shared convictions, norms, values, shared 
language, cross network dialogue impairments, etc. or when decisions are 
made in different places at different levels, from local to national to global and 
therefore institutional settings for a policy network is highly fragmented); and
-Network management capacity and strategic uncertainty (lack of interventions by 
strong facilitators to achieve collaboration; inability to reach agreements 
change structure and rules of the policy game; too many actors are involved 
resulting in conflicting strategies based on individual agendas, which are in 
turn based on own perception of problems, resulting in conflicts and 
divergent strategies and unexpected outcomes)
These factors are pertinent given the problems with cognitive cohesion over 
environmental prerogatives of EM along supply chain actors, conflicting 
agendas, uncertainty over costs and greening measures, dialogue bottlenecks, 
value chain complexity, distributive justice, etc.; and result in a complex 
multi-level network culture where progress is slow.
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Political saliency and agenda competition -  Gains (2003) and Dudley (1994) 
use the term political saliency to measure the degree of involvement of a 
political body in relation to other political bodies in the same policy area. 
Although Gains' work is based on power dependency theories by Rhodes and 
Marsh, it can be applied to situations where political bargaining occurs within 
government agencies with different bargaining power. Low saliency is 
identified among government agencies that were new, small in size, had 
highly specialised functions, low contact with public and worked in 
politically un-sensitive arenas. On the other hand, high political salience is 
identified when agencies that were established, large in size, had many (and 
often conflicting) goals, they worked in closer proximity to the Ministries and 
worked on politically sensitive arenas (Dudley 1994). Low political saliency is 
also a function of how the policy issues are perceived and valued as being 
critical or politically sensitive with regards to constituents. Given the fact that 
policy issues have to compete with each other (depending on how powerful 
the actor leading the issue is), a fragmented and disputed view of the 
criticality of environmental issues vis-a-vis economic growth, in addition to 
low political saliency of environmental agencies would result in policy arenas 
led by these agencies not gaining momentum, or the agency being sidelined in 
policy discussions, which brings us to the next point.
Open vs. closed networks -  We have seen why state actors may be excluded 
from the policy core, but the network inclusiveness to non-state (i.e. 
economic) actors is important to examine, given the EM imperative of 
including supply chain actors and civil society in dialogue and 
implementation. The ability of supply chain actors and civil society actors 
(NGOs) etc. to influence policy networks depends on the closeness of existing 
relationships and policy cycle changes. Early policy networks studies focused 
on the role of private actors in influencing public policymaking with the
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American tradition of analysing "policy sub systems"25 which saw networks 
as either "open" or "closed," (or poorly to highly cohesive) in terms of their 
membership and institutional linkages. Open subsystems were seen as 
dynamic and innovative while closed subsystems were status quo oriented 
and changed incrementally. Government agencies (specially large 
bureaucratic agencies) were analysed as resisting change in closed policy 
networks and seeking stability at the expense of the others.26 This analysis 
suggests that embedded relationships between actors limit the scope for 
outside actors to penetrate or influence the policy agenda in closed 
subsystems. Networks also need to be seen in terms other than how path 
dependent and change resistant they may be; broader consultative network 
forms can be at a cost to institutional strength. Marsh and Rhodes (1998) 
distinguish between a "tight" network (which constrains the policy agenda 
and tends to result in policy continuity) and a "weak" network (where policy 
discontinuity happens due to heterogeneous relationships and uncertain 
agendas, leading to changes in both the network and the outcome.)27 Weak 
networks may be more permeable, but suffer from strategic and institutional 
uncertainty, lack supportive relationships, (which are made durable by 
institutionalised rules, shared convictions, norms, values, shared language, 
cross network dialogue, etc.) that only occur with sustained membership and 
repeated interactions (Bueren et al 2003). Whether policy networks are "open" 
or "closed", the network can only achieve continuity by adjusting to a new 
entrant and finding new foundations for collective action (Rhodes and Marsh 
(1992).
25 Please see Marsh and Rhodes (1992), Howlett (2002), Howlett and Ramesh (1995) for US style 
issue triangles.
26 Since “policy cannot be its only cause” policy actors change what they can, if  they cannot change 
what they should (Wildavsky 1979:79).
27 This feature is later built into their model of policy analysis as “issues networks” and “policy 
networks” (Rhodes and Marsh 1992).
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b. Two Complementary Models of Policy Networks:
In order to answer my research questions regarding the determinants of weak 
regulatory pressure and the scope of state/non state actors to penetrate closed 
or open subsystems, I will be looking at two complementary network models 
that build on notions of resource and power dependencies, uncertainty, 
bargaining and perception issues between state and non state actors. The 
Rhodes and Marsh model (1998) is used as a starting point to map policy 
networks along the dimensions of membership, integration, resources and 
power. Then the Howlett and Ramesh model (2003) is used to generate a 
more textured typology of networks that form during different phases of the 
policy cycle, depending on similar dimensions. In combination, they can show 
how regulators are weak implementers due to power-resource dependencies, 
low bargaining power, low political saliency and environmental policy 
networks culture, since the structural characteristics can explain the policy 
network outputs. Below is a discussion of each and what it contributes to 
Bangladeshi environmental policymaking analysis.
The Rhodes and Marsh Model (RM) (Marsh 1998; Marsh and Rhodes 1992) 
assumes that three things define a policy network -the relative stability of a 
network's membership (is membership salience dependent on the specific 
policy issue under discussion or do specific actors dominate overall); the 
network's relative insularity (is it exclusive or inclusive); and resource 
dependencies (whether actors depend heavily for resources or are most actors 
self-sufficient).
Based on these parameters, they describe policy networks as continuums 
where tightly knit policy communities are at one end, and issue networks are at 
the other end, where relationships are loose and unstable (table 2.1).
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Table2.1: Policy network continuum based on the RM model (Marsh 1998)
Dimensions Policy Community Issue Networks
1. Membership:
Number of 
participants
Limited. Participants chosen 
carefully.
Large.
Type of interest Economic/ professional Broader range
2. Integration:
Frequency of 
interactions
Frequent, high quality interactions Interactions fluctuate in 
frequency and intensity.
Continuity Membership, values and outcomes 
are persistent over time.
Fluctuates significantly.
Consensus Share ideology, basic values, policy 
preferences and acceptance of the 
outcome.
Certain degree of 
agreement but conflict is 
frequently present.
3. Resources:
Distribution of 
resources
All participants have resources and 
relationships are based around 
resource exchange and bargaining
Some actors have 
resources, but they are 
limited. Relationship is 
mainly consultative. No 
negotiation or bargaining.
Distribution of 
resources within 
participating 
organisations
Hierarchical, leaders control 
members' compliance.
Varied distribution and 
members not regulated.
4. Power: Balance of power between members 
exist, although some may dominate, 
so not everybody benefits all the 
time but all members see their 
interaction as a positive sum game, 
which insures its continuity.
Unequal power, reflecting 
unequal resources and 
access. It is usually a zero 
sum game.
The tightness or looseness is determined by relative stability, insularity and 
power-resource dependencies. Both types are "ideals" and in reality no 
network can be assumed to be exactly like these two. Policy communities are 
closer to closed networks, while issue networks are conceptually closer to 
open networks. Therefore, policy communities have more capacity than issue 
networks to control the policy discussions.28 While networks closer to the 
policy communities style have more continuity, they can be more rigid and
28 The RM model fits in well with network literature on ‘epistemic communities’, developed by Peter 
Haas (1992:3), that describes policymaking as done by networks of professionals with recognised 
expertise and competence in a particular domain. The RM model also overlaps with Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith’s (1993) advocacy coalition model, where policy changes occur through political 
networks consisting of various kinds o f policy activists, including public officials from multiple levels 
of government, who ‘share a particular belief system’.
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bureaucratic; issue networks are more open to participation by outside 
stakeholders, such as outside hegemons, business firms, etc. and are more 
liable to address a broad range of policy issues (including new issues placed 
on the table by non state actors).
Bureaucratic policy communities may be more rigid (as they are more 
dependent on formal institutionalised path dependent network rules) but are 
more stable, compared to fluid and disorganised issue networks. This model 
does not predict whether issue networks would produce weak 
implementation pressure or not, but judging from their emphasis on resource 
distribution and balance of power as factors determining policy outcomes, the 
output of the environmental regulators will be weak if they are weak power- 
resource holders and poor bargainers, regardless of whether the overall 
structure is has limited members or tight integration (Wright 1988).
The Rhodes and Marsh model outlines two possible shapes of policy 
networks, but the Howlett and Ramesh (2003) model adds value by giving us 
possible midpoints to the policy community/issue networks continuum. 
Their model suggests 8 types of policy networks that can materialise -  all 
ranging between closed and open structures -  especially during the policy 
formulation phase of the policy cycle (table 2.2).29 Since the 8 types are 
determined by the main source of bargaining power and number/nature of 
actors involved, it complements the emphasis on power/resource bargaining 
and membership integration perspective of the Rhodes and Marsh model. The 
second model opens up the typology to clientilistic policy networks, which is 
pertinent for studying the economic-state actor collaboration in EM, with 
particular emphasis on the corporatist elements of EM.
29 These network types are not exclusive to only this phase of the cycle. In fact, these networks can 
change into each other and manifest themselves at various points of the policy cycle. This is very 
important to identify empirically.
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Table2.2: policy network types according to Howlett and Ramesh (2003:130)
Policy 
formulation 
led by:
State
Agencies
One societal 
group
Two societal 
groups
Three or 
more societal 
groups
State
directed:
Bureaucratic
network
Clientelistic
network
Triadic
network
Pluralistic
network
Society
dominated:
Participatory
statist
network
Captured
network
Corporatist
network
Issue
network
Their model suggests that if policymaking is both led and directed by the 
state, then scope for voluntary participation by non-state is stakeholders low 
and the resultant policy network is bureaucratic and closed. If only one non 
state actor group manipulates by directing and leading the policy process 
then they call it a captured network. As numbers of participants increase, the 
network becomes looser and is called an issue network (similar to 
terminology used by Marsh and Rhodes). Therefore, environmental policy 
networks can be identified as ranging between these types depending on the 
numbers of stakeholders and their bargaining powers depending on 
resource/power dependencies. In a pluralistic environmental network setting, 
the policy network would be guided by the state actors, but the non actors 
would have an effective voice in steering the agenda to suit their own goals 
(Howlett and Ramesh 2003).
As discussed before, weak environmental pressure is determined by cognitive 
uncertainty, institutional uncertainty and strategic uncertainty. Now I look at 
how decision making styles emerge depending on number of participants, 
their relationship settings, policy problems, uncertainty and time. Howlett 
and Ramesh (2003) build on a model by Forester (1984)30 by suggesting that
30 H ow  policy decisions are made have been discussed extensively in political sciences, best 
known among them are the rational, incremental and garbage can models (Howlett and 
Ramesh 1995). According to Forester's m odel (1984), a policy network w ill show  rational style 
decision making if it has less members, closed settings, well defined problems, perfect 
information and infinite time (see column 2 in table above). The more the variables diverge 
from these conditions (which is often the case); decision-making w ill veer towards 
incremental (Howlett and Ramesh 1995).
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the number of actors ("agents") and their resource/power dependencies 
("settings") determine the complexity of the subsystem (similar to Rhodes 
and Marsh); while variables such as problem, information and time determine 
the severity of constraints surrounding a policy issue (table 2.3).
Table2.3: Decision making parameters in policy networks (Forester 1984 and 
Howlett and Ramesh 2003)
Variables Dimensions Determinants of Policy 
Decision Styles
Number of Agents Single vs. Multiple Determines which of the 
8 policy networks will 
emerge.
Settings (resource- 
power dependency)
Single, closed vs. 
Multiple, open
Problem Well defined vs. Vague Determines the severity 
of the constraints posed 
on policy issues.
Information Perfect vs. Contested
Time Infinite vs. Manipulated
This model is useful given the earlier discussion of network cultures and 
agenda bargaining. It recognises that the factors that increase the complexity 
of the network, also act upon factors that increase the insolvability of the issue 
at hand. Both sets of factors contribute towards the policy network outputs 
and the way decisions are implemented. They suggest that in highly complex 
networks (which can be either bureaucratic or issue network) with high 
constraints (such as cognitive, institutional weakness and strategic 
uncertainty -  Bueren et al 2003), high-risk decisions are rare and regulatory 
pressure on the regulated is weak. Even though non-state actors may find a 
place in the policy arena, policy making advances in incremental steps, 
through incremental adjustments. Further decisions are slow and are reactive 
to the evaluation of past outputs. In the opposite scenario, policymaking is 
more "rational" since uncertainty is low, more major steps are possible. If the 
constraints are low in the complex network, then adjustment strategies are 
likely, through "optimisation" where actors easily adjust to the outputs. 
Finally where constraints are high but the network is simple, low risk 
"satisfying" policy outputs are likely, resulting in reactive decision making 
(Howlett and Ramesh 2003:162). Therefore, one can argue that in a complex
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environmental policy network, if the policy constraints are high (e.g. vague 
problem definition, unclear information, contested viewpoints, low levels of 
actor interaction, low consensus, unequal power-resource dependency, low 
bargaining power, etc.) then two things may occur -  firstly, weak regulatory 
pressure from the regulator and secondly, the high probability that despite 
non state actor participation, policy agenda changes will be slow, incremental 
and risk aversive, often favouring reactive environmental strategies. Given 
the sorts of policy constraints that are typical of developing country 
environmental policy making, a complex policy network model such as this 
would be appropriate in understanding slow and reactive environmental 
outputs in Bangladesh.
c. Towards Understanding Environmental Upgrading in Bangladeshi Policy 
Networks
For the greening of production, EM requires the presence of state institutions 
with a fully functioning system of environmental monitoring and regulation 
that has experience in negotiating policymaking with stakeholders and is 
open to changing towards an approach that would involve more non-state 
actors. Policy network analysis allows us to empirically track policymaking 
by identifying a multiplicity of variables, such as numbers of actors, levels of 
integration, individual strategic agendas, resource dependencies, bargaining 
powers institutional uncertainty, cognitive problems and political saliency etc. 
that determine why EM's vision of policymaking may fail. The Howlett and 
Ramesh model in conjunction with the Rhodes and Marsh model offers a 
detailed analysis of types of networks that fall between "policy communities" 
and "issue networks" described in the latter. The Howlett and Ramesh model 
opens up variables such as open vs. closed subsystems, bureaucratic vs. issue 
networks in relation to the severity of the policy problem (which is again, 
determined by cognitive, institutional and strategic constraints) and shows us 
why the ability of a policy network to be open to new non state actors loosens
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the tight structure, but at the cost of weakening institutional set-ups and 
increases the severity of the policy problem. These bureaucratic networks can 
also be slow to respond to demands made by these actors, which may explain 
slow changes made by state actors in pluralistic networks to accommodate 
problems faced by firms doing environmental upgrading. Therefore, I argue 
that even though it may be possible for non-state actors to introduce new 
policy issues into the policy arena, there is no guarantee that policy making 
will then progress rapidly, or will result in large policy changes.
In summary, a combination of these two models can be useful in mapping the 
weakness in environmental policy implementation in Bangladesh and the 
limited scope for inclusive policymaking. This leads directly to my third 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3; The regulators (state and non state) are not convinced of the benefits of 
compliance and do not have the capacity to design, implement and monitor better 
compliance. The exclusion of the DoE and the RMG firms in this policy network is 
likely to lead to poorly designed outcomes.
2.5 The Hypotheses and Overall Conceptual Framework:
Ideally, the conceptual framework for studying supply chain greening in an 
LDC such as Bangladesh, should provide the tools for a systematic evaluation 
of the research question and hypotheses to test EMT. It should be aimed at 
analysing transformations at the micro-level (at the level of firms), meso level 
(economic networks of international supply chains), and macro level (national 
and international policy making involving not only state actors but civil 
society). Therefore, the conceptual framework should be encompassing 
institutional analysis in line with structuration theory -  a balanced position
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that calls for equal weight to be given to the influences of structure (which 
inherently includes culture) and actor agency in studying change.31
Figure 2.3: Relations between actors from the triple-network perspective
Economic
Networks
Policy Networks
Buvers/Retailers
Govt, agencies 
/ministriesEnd users auditors
Trade
associations Research
organisations
Raw mat. suDnliers
Trade unions
RMG
firms
Intl. consultants
Top mgt.
Foreign donors
Mid mgt.
Lower met.
Mgt.
Networks
NGOs
Workers
Note: Only the most important relationships have been shown.
In the present study, a theoretically informed triple network model is 
preferred which is directly related to EM. I have so far discussed three 
overlapping networks (internal management networks, economic networks 
and policy networks), including their general characteristics and useful 
theoretical frameworks to study how the networks can change as envisioned 
under EMT. Generally, EMT is about growing independence (or growing 
influence, distinction and prominence) of the ecological perspective from the 
three basic analytical spheres in modern society: political, economic and 
societal.
31 See Giddens (1984) on dichotomies between agency-structure. Also see Mol (1995) for a 
justification of this kind of analysis on EM research.
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The triple network conceptual framework can contribute by analysing the 
extent to which the EM perspective penetrates and transforms the social day- 
to-day practices predominantly governed by political, economic and societal 
perspectives. It should be kept in mind that these networks are distinguished 
in order to conceptualise different mechanisms of, and perspectives on EM in 
social-political change and economic behaviour. In reality these networks are 
highly integrated and actors overlap substantially (figure 2.3).
The main explanatory variables that flow through these three networks 
include the changeable patterns of social, political and economic 
relationships, and the mutually dependent actors who form these networks 
around various problems/issues or own agendas. They form the foundation 
for the all the three networks and are integral to the theories that I have used 
to frame the hypotheses. Their interrelationships will be examined through 
network analysis, with regards to the different conceptual variables, building 
on the theories we have used to frame the hypotheses. In table 2.4,1 revisit the 
links between the hypotheses and the theoretical frameworks.
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Table2.4: Summary of theoretical frameworks for hypotheses testing
EM pre-requisites and corresponding Hypothesis Relevant Network Analysis 
Theoretical frameworks
EM Prerequisites: Changing role of science, technology, 
information and knowledge in order to change social 
and political attitudes at the level of firms about 
environmental upgrading.
Hypothesis 1: Poor environmental upgrading in firms 
will be associated with factors internal to the firms, 
such as corporate culture, slow  changing behaviour, 
problems with learning environmental information and 
will be linked to poor competitive advantage gains
-Resource Based View and 
Organisational theory to show how  
corporate culture, organisational 
change and learning capacity 
help/hinder environmental 
upgrading strategy making within  
firms with a goal of gaining 
competitive advantage.
EM Prerequisites: Changing role of markets, market 
actors and private sector initiatives in order to create 
market pressure and market opportunities for 
environmental upgrading.
Hypothesis 2: The most powerful demand for 
environmental management on Bangladeshi RMG 
firms is originating from their buyers in globed supply 
chains. However, opportunities for collaboration or 
assistance from buyers demanding these 
environmental upgrading initiatives may be low
-Theories of triadic relationships 
and Global Value Chains to show  
how  buyers become powerful 
enough to create demand for 
environmental upgrading and how  
buyers can also provide assistance 
or create barriers to environmental 
upgrading;
EM Prerequisites: Changing role of the state (away 
from command-and-control style to a decentralised 
flexible consensual proactive style), as w ell as changing 
social and political attitudes at the level of 
policymakers and stakeholders.
Hypothesis 3: The regulators (state and non state) are 
not convinced of the benefits of compliance and do not 
have the capacity to design, implement and monitor 
better compliance. The exclusion of the DoE and the 
RMG firms in this policy network is likely to lead to 
poorly designed outcomes.
-Theories of Issue Networks vis-a- 
vis Policy Communities; State 
directed vs. Society dominated 
policy networks to show the extent 
of opportunities open to firms and 
buyers for introducing new  policy 
issues into policymaking agenda.
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The conceptual framework above is best analysed in terms of the three key 
variables that were mentioned earlier -  the actors, their relationships and the 
resultant network types -  in order to test the hypotheses empirically through 
network analysis. Below I summarise how the key variables will be analysed 
(see figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4: The three key variables within the networks
Actors:
- Identified at organisational and individual 
levels, national and global levels, sectoral and 
individual levels (as hegemons), state and 
non-state levels, at policymaking and policy 
implementation levels.
Network Types:
Identified as hierarchical vs., organic, top 
down vs. bottom up, tightly controlled quasi 
hierarchies vs. loosely structured, policy 
communities vs. issue networks.
Relationships:
-Identified between the firms' actors, between the firms 
and the economic network actors, the firms and policy 
network actors, and the economic and policy network 
actors; at global and national levels.
-Analysed in terms of actor agendas, institutional contexts, 
histories, power/resource dependencies and bargaining 
power, ability to change, embedded behaviours, ability to 
learn, cohesion, cultural norms, knowledge, uncertainty 
and perception problems.
In this model, actors are analysed at organisational levels, both locally and 
globally. For example, business firms will have to be analysed at the micro 
and macro levels -  the internal management networks within a firm will 
determine the internal resources and capacities for environmental upgrading, 
but to understand the firms' collective bargaining power in the external 
networks, I will need to identify them at the sectoral level, in relation to their
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position within the economic networks. Actors in the supply chain will have 
to be identified at the sectoral level, in terms of buyers, raw material 
suppliers, financial institutions, various trade associations, etc. Powerful 
buyers may be identified at an individual levels, as hegemons who have 
demonstrated strong demands for environmental upgrading in the supply 
chain and policy networks. Identification of actors in the policy network will 
be done similarly in terms of their roles in policymaking at the institutional 
and individual levels, as in government policymakers and agencies involved 
in implementing policies, such as the Ministry of Environment and the 
Department of Environment. Non-state actors will have to be identified from 
the supply chains and will include the firms (as a sector and also a few lead 
firms with individual bargaining power), buyers and trade associations.
Relationships between the actors have to be first identified and then analysed 
in terms of the formal roles they play as well as the informal rules that govern 
them. Within firms, hierarchical relationships will be identified according to 
the bureaucratic/organic structure of the firm. Their relationships with the 
external economic and policy actors will be identified in terms of the firms' 
agenda (profit making, regulatory compliance etc.), and institutional factors 
(sectoral culture, ways of doing business etc.).
Formal/informal and power hierarchical relationships between the firms and 
the buyers are very pertinent for this thesis because this is where the demand 
for environmental management is created and transmitted through S-S-C 
triads. These relationships change the economic networks (by adding or 
dropping firms, by making some firms powerful by providing them with 
financial assistance for upgrading, etc.) and partially determine firms' 
adjustment responses and buyer-seller collaboration outcomes.
Relationships between the firms and policy network actors are more 
numerous and complex. At the national level, these are of the regulator and
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the regulated. At the international level, these relationships occur when firms 
feel and react to regulatory pressure by global policymakers, but those 
relationships are only indirectly relevant for this thesis.
Lastly, the model will identify which kind of network is operational, taking into 
the actors and relationships contained within it, so that the network outputs 
can be better understood. The above-mentioned relationship variables will 
help determine whether the three networks are equipped to handle the EM 
challenges. Analysis of the network processes is a more complicated matter, 
and I will try to analyse whether the network decisions were arrived at 
incrementally (low risk decisions taken due to unmanageable issue complexity 
and large number of contesting actors) or rationally (high risk decisions taken 
quickly due to low uncertainty, or high solvability or lesser stakeholders).
The model will also look at the overall EM network that is the amalgamation 
of the three separate networks. This will be done in terms of its interdependence 
(functioned, power structures, knowledge structures, intertemporal, stability 
vs. development), connections/relationships (relationships based on economic 
goals vs. non economic goals; consequent actor and activity based 
connections), atmosphere (overall power/resource dependencies, mistrust, 
conflict, etc.), and network changes (changes to maximise or control access to 
resources, structuring tendencies vs. heterogenising tendencies, hierarchy 
enforcing tendencies vs. hierarchy loosening tendencies).
2.6 Conclusion:
This chapter presented the conceptual model for testing my hypotheses, 
based on the RBV, organisational behavioural theories, GVC, industrial 
relations theory, and policy networks theory. In order to test the EMT 
suggestion that greening of supply chains will happen due to green profits 
and will be aided by green market signals, a supportive policy environment
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and strong committed social-political change, I have used theories that 
complement the economic and social-political EM notions. The RBV and 
behavioural theories suggest that greening strategy making can lead to 
competitive advantage gains, but needs to be made organically in a bottom up 
structure with adequate environmental learning and green corporate culture. 
The GVC theory suggests that greening along the supply chains can be aided 
by the governance styles of the powerful buyers and their responsive 
suppliers due to the need for risk minimisation and asset specificity. The 
policy networks theory suggests that depending on network membership, 
power/resource dependencies, actor participation and actor agendas, 
environmental policymaking can rationally progress to the kind of policy 
environment that EM calls for.
The theories inform the overall conceptual framework, which has three 
networked parts (management, economic and policy), which are interactive in 
the sense that what happens in management networks, is dependent on the 
economic networks, which are in turn dependent on the policy network 
outcomes and vice versa. The overall model borrows the concept of outcome 
determining interconnectedness and interdependence from all three networks, 
particularly from the Rhodes and Marsh (1998) model, which assumes that 
actors, relationships and the network types determine the outcome by 
restricting or enabling entry, changing the network structure, changing 
balance of power and resources and the issue direction. Also emphasised is 
the temporal and continuum aspects of networks -  that every actor's behaviour 
is the result of their histories, and may fall between two possible extreme 
categories suggested by models.
In the next chapter, I introduce the contextual background that informed the 
choice and design of the conceptual framework. The Bangladeshi RMG sector 
is briefly sketched in terms of its strengths and weaknesses and what ethical 
trade, compliance and greening means to the Bangladeshi RMG sector.
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Chapter Three: The Bangladeshi Ready Made Garments (RMG) Sector and 
Ethical Trade Compliance
3.1 Introduction:
The last two chapters described the context of EM driven supply chain 
greening in LDCs, and this chapter takes that analysis forward by focusing on 
the Bangladeshi RMG sector and the apparel supply chain that it is part of. I 
begin by describing the supply chain using GVC research, which introduces 
the supply chain actors and defines their relationships regarding compliance 
governance. Then I look at the Bangladeshi RMG sector in terms of its end 
products, general role in the economy, and its recent performance problems 
that contribute to its position as a weak bargainer and supplier, with 
particular attention to characteristics that impact ethical trade performance.
Next I examine what ethical trade means in the Bangladeshi RMG sector and 
how greening is sidelined in the discourse and in practice: the meaning of 
social compliance has changed over time but the early policy network had a 
distinct core-and-periphery structure that privileged certain voices and 
agendas over others. Not only were some actors excluded over labour rights 
debates (which tended to dominate), some state actors and agendas were also 
excluded because of issue perception and low political saliency -  chief among 
them was the issue of environmental performance and agencies like the 
Department of Environment (DoE). An important new initiative in social 
compliance policy making began with the formation of the national Social 
Compliance Forum (SCF) in June 2006, and this chapter traces the policy 
background till its formation. Chapter Seven takes up the discussion again 
with the formation and function of the SCF and empirically examines how the 
SCF and DoE relate in terms of poor greening efforts and EM performance.
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3.2. Global Value Chain (GVC) in Textiles and Clothing:
The apparel sector broadly involves the processing of fibres into yarns and 
fabrics through the intermediary services of spinning, weaving and dyeing, 
until the final services of cutting, sewing and finishing turns the fabrics into 
final products (called "apparel" or "garments"), as categorised under Apparel 
and Made Up Textiles (US ITC 2004). The basic production steps are shown in 
figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Basic Apparel Production Steps (based on US ITC 2004 and US 
DoL ILAB1996)
Yams:
-Spun (cotton 
and man 
made fibres, 
wool) 
-Filament 
(silk, man 
made fibres)
-Natural
(cotton, wool, 
silk and 
ramie),
-Man Made 
(Synthetic: 
polyester, 
nylon and 
acrylic. 
Artificial: 
rayon and 
acetate)
Fibres:
-W oven
(denim, print 
cloth,
broadcloth,
sheeting)
-Knit
-N on w oven
-Industrial
Fabrics
Fabrics: Apparel and 
Made-up Textiles: 
-Apparel /RM G
(Shirts, blouses, 
etc.)
-Hom e textiles
(towels, sheets, 
etc.)
-Carpets
-Others (luggage, 
tents, bags)
The apparel GVC changes its structure and characteristics considerably 
between upstream and downstream production. The process starts by being 
capital and knowledge intensive (during yam  preparations and spinning) and 
ends with more labour intensive operations (during cutting, sewing and 
trimming) where scale of operations decline. The number of downstream 
firms is higher and their sizes also get smaller. They are typically more 
dispersed and often located in LDCs, while the upstream firms are often 
located in the newly industrialised countries (US ITC 2004, Gereffi 2001, GTO 
& PPMA2002).
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Gereffi and Memedovic (2003) view the apparel GVC as having networked 
parts -  raw material supplies, production networks (garment manufacturers 
and their subcontractors, domestic as well as overseas), export channel 
networks established by trade intermediaries, and marketing networks at the 
retail level. Figure 3.2 takes a simplified view of the interlocking networks 
highlighting the main relationships along the production process that are 
relevant for this thesis. The industry actors can be divided as follows (US DoL 
1996, Hassler 2003):
Apparel Manufacturers/Suppliers -  These firms are the primary focus of this 
thesis. They primarily design, cut and sew garments from fabric; or procure 
yam  and knit final products. Some are contractors or subcontractors, whereby 
they manufacture apparel from materials owned by other firms. Larger 
manufacturers can subcontract orders to smaller manufacturers in their home 
countries and abroad. Vertical integration can vary greatly. Some large sized 
integrated firms produce the yams, produce fabrics, sew or knit into apparel 
and also retail them (CPD 2003c).
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Figure 3.2: Basic Structure of Apparel GVC Relationships (based on Gereffi
and Memedovic 2003)
Multiple RMG Raw Material 
Suppliers
Buyers: buying houses, buying agents 
(local and foreign)
Buyers:
Apparel Importer (local ■ 
and foreign)
Foreign Apparel Firms 
(Buying, manufacturing 
and retailing)
Foreign Apparel 
Retailer
RMG Manufacturers: 
Subcontractors; locally 
owned
RMG Manufacturers: 
direct contractors; 
locally owned
RMG 
manufacturers: 
Retailers' 
subsidiary; 100% 
foreign owned
Raw material flows ....................
Purchasing relationships between buyers and suppliers «+ 
Purchasing relationships between buyers and retailers
Buying Agents/ Buying Houses/Buyers -  These firms locate, qualify and 
inspect garments made by overseas RMG firms and often monitor production 
for quality compliance. They may be independent firms servicing 
retailers/manufacturers, or may be a part of the retail company's own staff 
(US ITC 2004).
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Retailers -These firms are primary involved in selling the goods and are 
responsible for distribution, merchandising and sales to customers. 
Department stores, discount stores and mail order catalogues all fall under 
this category. In most cases, these are in DCs (GTO&PPMA 2002).
The relative ease of setting up garment manufacturing factories and the 
prevalence of DC protectionism in the form of trade quotas has led to an 
unparalleled diversity of garment manufacturers in the LDCs. Rapid 
development of backward and forward linkage helps account for the large 
number of LDC workers employed in the sector (Gereffi and Memedovic 
2003, Ahmed 2002, Quasem 2002). Table 3.1 shows the net exports for 
importing and exporting countries. The USA and EU are the main importers, 
while China, India, Taiwan, India, South Korea, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia 
and Bangladesh are the major exporters.
The most influential policy instrument that has structured the apparel GVC is 
the Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA), which regulated the apparel trade 
between 1974 and 2005. Since 80% of global apparel trade was within its 
ambit when it was phased out in 2005, its influence in shaping the apparel 
GVC has been considerable, especially in dictating the territoriality of trade 
and introducing price and non-price factors. Annex 3.1 examines the impact 
of the MFA and its phase out, with special attention to the rise of non-tariff 
demands by buyers, such as ethically traded apparel.
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Table 3.1: Net apparel exports in billion USD between 1992 and 2002
Exporters 1992 1997 2002
United States -31.778 -46.871 -68.591
European Union -12.349 -20.102 -26.645
Hong Kong, China -13.490 -22.309 -19.830
Japan -5.916 -12.204 -12.877
All Other Industrialized Countries -5.735 -7.018 -6.927
North Africa & All Other Middle East -5.642 -4.231 -4.531
Canada -3.865 -3.743 -3.731
Former Soviet Union -1.752 -2.520 -2.921
All Other Latin America & Caribbean -0.709 -4.124 -2.307
African Growth & Opportunity Act eligible -0.758 -1.042 -1.241
All Other Sub-Saharan Africa -0.682 -0.714 -1.023
Eastern Europe -0.563 -0.548 0.040
All Other North Asia -0.046 0.056 0.160
Andean Trade Preference Act 0.554 0.309 0.492
Macau, China 1.002 1.163 1.103
All Other South Asia 0.512 1.381 2.066
Mexico 0.076 3.164 3.305
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership eligible 1.164 3.780 3.660
Thailand 4.002 4.510 4.090
Bangladesh 0.703 2.102 4.174
All Other Southeast Asia 0.674 1.921 4.540
Pakistan 2.483 4.917 5.864
Indonesia 3.715 5.549 6.603
Turkey 4.493 6.859 9.389
South Korea 12.273 13.067 9.666
Taiwan 11.275 14.274 9.757
India 6.061 10.635 12.091
China 34.300 51.786 73.623
Source: ERS Bilateral Fiber and Textile Trade Database32
3.3 The Bangladesh RMG Sector:
The Bangladeshi RMG sector is the country's biggest export dollar earning 
industry and is an important step towards its industrial development from an 
agrarian base. The sector began in 1978 with just 9 factories, and by 1990 its 
exports were worth USD 0.64 billion; within a decade it was USD 4.86 billion 
in 2001 (GTO&PPMA 2003a), by December 2007, RMG exports stood at USD
9.2 billion (EPB 2007b). Despite some fluctuations, the overall sectoral growth 
has been 14.65% per year over the past decade (figure 3.3).
32 Source: http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/fibertextiletrade/ accessed on 14 February, 2006
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Figure 3.3: BD Total RMG Exports (Million USD) 
(Source: BGMEA 2006, EPB 2007a, EPB 2007b)
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Over time, the RMG sector became vital for the country's economic stability, 
as its share of total exports grew steadily (figure 3.4) with an increase in 
employed labour force. In 2004, 74.15% of the country's gross foreign 
currency income came from RMG. More than 1.5 million people were directly 
employed in this sector in 2000 and another 10 to 15 million were employed in 
sectors indirectly benefiting from it (Spinanger 2000, EPB 2007a).
Figure 3.4: RMG's Share of BD's Total Exports
(Source: BGMEA 2006)
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Bangladesh RMG's stellar performance can be traced back to three sets of 
influences: factor costs, domestic policy measures and external trade 
environment. A densely populated and capital-scarce country such as
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Bangladesh is ideal for the expansion of a labour intensive industry such as 
RMG. The production skills can be mastered easily without requiring formal 
education. The low standard of living in Bangladesh enables the wage rates to 
be kept at a level that is one of the lowest among competing countries (World 
Bank 2005, Absar 2001, Sattar and Ahmed 2004). The modest capital 
requirement enables easy entrance to the industry. Rented accommodation for 
factory sites is available, therefore negating the need for investment into 
building infrastructure. Successful entrepreneurs find it relatively easy to 
expand their operations by reinvesting profits into production capacity 
(Rahman 2002). Among the domestic policy tools that helped RMG grow, 
trade liberalisation was the most important. Given the heavily protected trade 
regime of past decades, the rapid growth of RMG would not have been 
possible without some compensating support mechanisms such as the duty 
drawback system, the bonded warehouse facility, and the introduction of the 
back-to-back letter of credit (LC) system. The removal of the protection- 
related costs enhanced the competitiveness of the sector and contains many 
opportunities for future contribution to the rapid expansion of Bangladeshi 
RMG in the post MFA era (Antoshak 2001,World Bank 2005, CPD 2003a, 
Applebaum 2004). The external trade environment's impacts has to do with 
the MFA's role in encouraging quota hopping by older RMG supplying 
countries which gave birth to the Bangladeshi industry, as discussed in Annex 
3.1. Particularly, the Bangladeshi suppliers were favoured heavily further 
through quota restrictions which meant that retailers were forced to source 
garments from Bangladesh.
End Products:
RMG exports are made up of two separate categories -  woven garments and 
knitted garments according to the GTO&PPMA (2003a) classification, 
although the World Bank (2005) classified the sector into three categories -  
woven (e.g. shirts, blouses, trousers, etc.), knitted (t-shirts etc.) and sweaters
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(wool, cotton, acrylic and other polyblend sweaters). The most important end 
products include men's and boys' shirts, ladies blouses, men's trousers, 
jackets, rompers, jogging suits, ladies gowns, skirts, pyjamas, socks, etc. In 
1991-92, 94% of total exports were of shirts, trousers/pants, knitted shirts, 
ladies blouses, children's dresses, jogging suits, jackets, baby wear, rompers 
and lingerie. The other 6% was made up of windbreakers, ladies gowns, skirts 
and pyjamas (GTO&PPMA 2003b).
The product range has shifted considerably as the sector adapted to the MFA 
quota ceilings. The woven sub sector dominated initially with a 85% export 
share in 1990, but it decreased to a 70% share in 2001, as the knitted sub sector 
became more competitive and increased export volume (GTO&PPMA 2003a). 
During the first 8 months of the fiscal year 2004-05 the share of knit increased 
further to 43% with an equivalent decrease in the share of woven (World Bank 
2005). Assuming this trend persists, the value of export of knit apparel will 
exceed that of woven, suggesting that Bangladesh's competitive advantage 
lies with the knitting sub sector (Spinanger 2000).
Industry Structure:
According to the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters 
Association (BGMEA) Members' Directory 2004-2005 (BGMEA 2005b) there 
are 4300 member firms with the following breakdown: 700 knitting factories, 
525 sweater factories, and the remaining 2275 are woven garment units. 
However, according to the World Bank (2005), a BGMEA internal survey 
found that some 1300 of these firms were closed or inactive (the so-called 
"sick firms"). On the other hand, Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and 
Exporters Association (BKMEA), lists another 860 knitwear firms, of which 
some 300 are believed to have dual membership with BGMEA, leaving 560 
units with exclusive BKMEA membership. Thus the adjusted structure with 
active firms has been summarised in table 3.2:
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Table 3.2: Structure of RMG industry (World Bank 2005).
Garment category Number of firms 
(adjusted)
% Share Employees
Woven 1673 47 836,500
Knitwear 1495 42 747,500
Sweaters 392 11 337,120
Total: 3560 100 1,921,120
The World Bank (2005) report quotes Export Promotion Bureau (EPB) data on 
RMG exports for 2004, which highlights how the industry is led by a few 
hundred firms based on export volume. Out of the 2,387 firms that were 
exporting apparel in 2004, the top 500 firms exported 74% of total garment 
exports; the top 650, up to 81%, which means the remaining 1737 firms 
contributed only 19% between themselves. That leaves some 1200 firms (out 
of 3560) that did not export at all or perhaps sub-contracted. Among these 
firms, some could be facing closure or operating on irregular orders. 
According the EPB, the bottom 200 firms whose export volume is less than 
$50,000 per year, cannot survive all year. Firms in the bottom section are the 
hardest hit by post MFA GVC restructuring and social compliance demands.
A more nuanced reading of the industry structure and bargaining advantage 
is highlighted by a 2001 Ministry of Commerce (MoC) study quoted in the 
World Bank (2005) report. The study classifies firms into 4 categories 
according to production capacity: the first group consists of about 15 large 
companies that own 220 manufacturing units, each with a minimum capacity 
of 10,000 dozens/month. These 15 firms are well integrated into the GVC -  
they source their own fabric and have direct marketing links overseas. The 
second group is largely not governed by powerful parent companies, and has 
550 manufacturing units with a production capacity of 5,000 - 10,000 dozens/ 
month. They are more dependent on intermediaries for business, rather than 
being directly in touch with retailers or buyers. They work mostly (60 %) on a 
cutting and making (CM) basis for importers or buying agents. The third 
group consists of an estimated 1993 units, with a capacity of less than 5,000 
dozens. They are financially weaker and work mostly on a sub-contracting
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basis. Finally the fourth group consists of about 200 units that are sick and not 
currently operating. These would correlate to the bottom 200 firms in the EPB 
study mentioned above.
Bangladesh's Position as a Supplier:
Under the MFA quotas, Bangladesh has been exporting clothing to the US, the 
EU and Canada. In 2001, the EU was the major importer of Bangladeshi RMG 
with 51% of the exports, followed by USA (44%) and Canada (2.5%) 
(GTO&PPMA 2003a). Figure 3.5 shows how the USA and EU continue to be 
the most powerful external influences for Bangladesh in the apparel GVC.
Figure 3.5: Major Importers of BD RMG in Million USD
(Source: BGMEA 2006)
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Globally, the EU, the USA, Japan, Canada and Mexico are the largest garment 
importers, totalling at about 88%. This market share has been relatively 
constant through the 1990s and looks to continue in the future (GTO&PPMA 
2003a).
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Figure 3.6: Growth (%) of RMG Exports to Major Importing 
Countries (FY04to FY05) (Source: BGMEA 2006)
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Given the industry structure outlined above, I now turn to specific 
characteristics that contribute to Bangladesh being a weak second tier RMG 
supplier in the GVC. These weaknesses would then help explain the barriers 
and compulsions behind social compliance upgrading.
Low value and quality -Value and volume data suggests that on average, 
Bangladeshi RMG products are 40 to 100% cheaper than the Chinese 
counterparts exporting to the EU market. In the American markets, 
Bangladeshi exports are 30 to 70% cheaper. This is due to the fact that quotas 
limited volume, not value. India and China have managed to move on to 
higher value added and better quality clothing, which Bangladesh has not 
done; therefore while it remains price competitive, its product quality and 
value addition remains low (CPD 2003c). However, production of basic items 
remains Bangladesh's competitive strength (e.g. see US ITC (2004) 
assessment), which shows no sign of changing. According to trade analysts, 
the decision and opportunity to earn higher profits by moving up the value 
ladder should be based on the profit calculus of each entrepreneur, and not on 
such concepts as "higher value addition" (US ITC 2004, World Bank 2005, 
Khaled 2004). This has considerable significance for eco and social 
compliance, as we will see in Chapter Six.
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Low skill and high vulnerability -Most of the RMG firms in Bangladesh 
offer only stitching capacities on what is known in the industry parlance as 
cutting and making (CM) or cutting, making and trimming (CMT). This 
requires the least amount of skill and makes them vulnerable to the 
vicissitudes of the market, and less able to withstand adverse shocks (World 
Bank 2005).
Low profits and low upgrading -Despite having very low labour costs, 
Bangladesh has remained price competitive by reducing profit margins; wage 
levels have gone up, but working efficiency has not. Profit margins for small 
to medium sized firms are about 5%, which is set to decrease sharply after 
2005 (Spinanger 2000). This situation will get worse as production costs rises 
to accommodate new supply chain demands, such as social compliance 
(Absar 2001).
Table 3.3: RMG exports in terms of value (thousand takas) (EPB 2006)33
Commodities April
2006
July-April 
2004-05
July-April 2005-06
Knitwear 22622785 138062355 200265916
a) T. shirt 12637938 66665344 93691527
b) Sweater 4266849 43180240 54452311
c) Others 5717998 28216771 52122078
Woven garments 20553519 177365140 216868755
a) Shirts 4860115 52332828 57176890
b) Trousers 12208882 81594427 114300614
c) Jackets 1044357 19740284 19719146
d) Others 2440165 23337601 25672105
Low prices and poor capacity -Unit price realisation analysis of Bangladeshi 
exports shows that prices realised by the Bangladeshi exporters are among the 
lowest of all importers, in many cases lower than new entrants to the 
importing markets. According to the buyers, there is a direct relationship 
between price and quality. Their perception is of Bangladeshi firms is as 
suppliers of cheap basic products, exported in bulk, without product
33 Source: EPB website data page at http://epb.gov.bd/Statistics2005-06.html. accessed July 7, 2006.
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innovation. This view is obviously hurting the leading Bangladeshi RMG 
firms because they do offer diversified products, from established market 
positions, and at superior prices (GTO&PPMA 2003a).
Weak marketing and interaction -  Bangladeshi firms' low bargaining power 
is also due to a lack of matured industrial interaction with the international 
market. Most of the companies (about 75%) are solely dependent on buying 
houses and intermediaries for orders. Only a few firms work directly with the 
retailer, offer designs changes, create new products, etc. Not surprisingly, 
most firms are pessimistic about the future since they are dependent on 
buyers sending them orders. 55% of the woven firms surveyed by 
GTO&PPMA (2003c) said that they had no idea about their future sales 
growth due to such passive marketing.
Poor management and innovation -Due to the way the RMG industry grew 
as Bangladesh's first few steps into private sector led industrialisation, the 
early companies were family owned and managed. Newer entrants 
successfully replicated this model during the RMG boom (Ahmed 2002), 
which institutionalised forms of behaviour that is heavily influenced by 
cultural templates. Company management is described as lacking proper 
technical training. There is a shortage of formal education and prior technical 
training among middle management staff. Training is typically obtained "on 
the job". Most companies are reluctant to adapt to new operating systems. 
Take up of management information systems, production planning, product 
costing systems, etc. has been very low (GTO&PPMA 2003c). Overall, we 
have a situation where majority firms are risk averse, poorly trained, passive 
actors with low interest in active marketing, have little opportunity for direct 
bargaining and have weak strategies to cope with upcoming supply chain 
challenges at the firm level.
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Bangladesh's position after the MFA phase out:
In the context of the RBV of firms, the Bangladeshi RMG sector is not 
exhibiting any of the strategic skills that would drive them to gain 
competitive advantage over their competitors, since their strong points 
(makers of cheap low cost basic clothing items) are not unique, and their 
management profile is not that of a proactive innovative entrepreneurial style. 
Interestingly, RMG strategy papers are not asking for RBV skills for survival 
in the post MFA market either. Better quality, value added, cost efficiency and 
short lead times are still the prescribed elements of a successful post MFA 
coping strategy, along with the ability to anticipate non-price demands and 
meet them without compromising cost efficiency(Quasem 2002, Quddus and 
Rashid 2000). Most Bangladeshi firms do not meet these criteria (box 3.1). The 
most often cited advantage that Bangladeshi manufacturers have of low cost 
production is insufficient since buyers will always exploit Bangladeshi firms' 
reputations for low prices and it will be harder for them to move up along the 
post MFA GVC. Other than that, there are many weaknesses within the firms 
themselves, and the government's policy framework is has been criticised for 
lacking vision and restricting the competitiveness of the industry 
(GTO&PPMA 2003e).
Box 3.1: The main threats to Post MFA competitiveness:
-Long and extended lead time delays due to heavy reliance on imported fabric 
-Local fabric suppliers produce fabric that is of costly and of inferior quality 
-Poor performance at ports and at customs 
-Competition from other countries
-Poor image of Bangladesh exporters perceived by buyers due to quality consistency
problems, delivery unreliability and low  prices
-High cost of finance availability for the industry
-Low productivity, quality inconsistency
-Limited technical and management skills at all levels
-Poor marketing skills and knowledge
-Non compliance w ith international social and labour regulations
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As Bangladesh was approaching the MFA phase out, there were a number of 
strategic advisory papers regarding management actionables, policy reform, 
institutional change, and infrastructural investments. The Ministry of 
Commerce (MoC) commissioned the "Post-MFA Development Strategy and 
Technical Assistance for the RMG Sector (GTO&PPMA)", which developed 
strategic recommendations for the Government that were finalised through a 
National Seminar in January 2003 (Stuart-Smith and Shefali 2003). The 
GTO&PPMA (2003) study, along with studies by the CPD (2003a), MFAF 
(2005), Ahmed (2002), Bhattachariya (1996), BGMEA (2005), Sattar and 
Ahmed (2004) and the World Bank general equilibrium model in its 2005 
study predicted sharp export shocks and economic welfare losses for 
Bangladesh. Over three-to-four years after the MFA phase out, the World 
Bank model predicted, the economic welfare costs could run to $370 million. 
In terms of jobs, Bangladesh could stand to lose 17 % of the current workforce 
in apparel and 5% in textiles. However, reality was not as dismal as 
predictions made by trade experts. RMG exports from Bangladesh in the post- 
MFA world did not decline; rather, data show that export growth during 
January-July 2005 was 12% (BGMEA 2006), with knit garments registering 
phenomenal growth of 31%. However, deep-rooted challenges to improving 
capacity and productivity remain for Bangladesh, and strategic options for 
coping remain a critical issue for Bangladeshi RMG (box 3.2).
While the fiscal and infrastructure challenges are interesting in themselves, 
they are only relevant to this thesis as they provide a context for the concerns 
of the industry. It is more interesting to note that major strategy papers all 
brought attention to the growing value chain pressures for social compliance.
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Box 3.2: Main World Bank (2005) recommendations for competitiveness:
Policies to enhance global competitiveness:
• Minimise anti-export bias of trade policy and remove behind-the-border constraints 
to overall export competitiveness;
• Raise RMG productivity by courting foreign direct investment (FDI).
Policies to reduce time to market:
• Reduce lead time;
• Take advantage of regional accumulation;
• Negotiate FTA with India.
Striking govemment-industry partnership to develop forward linkages:
• Product and market diversification
• Image building and brand development
• Performance rating database
• FDI or joint ventures
• Specialised units
• Human resource development
Taking advantage of external policy environment:
• seize opportunities for preferential market access.
The papers recognised that Bangladesh's failure to conform to social 
compliance (as well as other international standards of product quality) was a 
major barrier to post MFA competitiveness. In the post-MFA era, Bangladeshi 
manufacturers must be able to respond to and harmonise their views with 
buyers in order to address the challenge. While the GTO&PPMA (2003c) 
recommended adoption of SA8000 standards and the setting up of 
compliance clusters with common effluent treatment plants and legal reforms 
to safeguard labour conditions; the World Bank (2005) also made similar 
recommendations, reflecting the almost negligible social upgrading changes 
that had been made till then despite serious buyer pressure that was almost a 
decade old. Reflecting these concerns, I now focus on exactly what social 
compliance entails for Bangladeshi RMG.
3.4 Bangladesh's Early Experiences with Social Compliance:
In Chapter One I have introduced the concept of ethical trade for supply 
chains and highlighted some problems with ethical sourcing by DC retailers 
and ethical trade implementation by LDC suppliers. Although the term 
ethical trade gained visibility around the 1990's (Welford 1995, Welford 1997,
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DfID 2003), ethical trade considerations are not necessarily new in South Asia: 
Indian companies like Tata, Godrej and Birla can trace their CSR heritage back 
to decades of corporate philanthropy. However, this does not mean that there 
is consensus about what ethical trade means or entails, as we saw in Chapter 
One. To recapitulate (and without going into the different approaches to 
ethical trade), ethical trade in supply chains most commonly means that 
retailers are sourcing their products from suppliers who guarantee basic 
labour and human rights, as set out in the suppliers' national legislation 
and/or set out by international standards and retailers' specific codes of 
conduct. The most influential international ethical standards codes for the 
apparel chain (SA8000 of Social Accountability International (SAI), Base Code 
of the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), Fair Labor Association (FLA), Fair Wear 
Foundation (FWF), Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI), Worldwide 
Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP), Joint Initiative on Corporate 
Accountability and Workers' Rights (Jo-In) and the US Apparel Industry 
Partnership (AIP)(GTZ PROGRESS 2007d)), as well as the retailer-specific 
buyer codes focus on worker conditions and human rights in apparel 
supplying companies. For example, the ETI Base Code (2007) has nine main 
principles that deal with bonded labour, freedom of association, safe and 
hygienic working conditions, child labour, living wages, reasonable working 
hours, worker discrimination, and inhumane treatment of workers. The AIP 
Workplace Code of Conduct also covers these main areas (AIP1997). A World 
Bank (2003) report on company codes in the apparel industry also found that 
the key provisions emphasised were "forced labor, child labor, wages and 
benefits, hours of work, discrimination, harassment and abuse, freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, and health and safety issues" (World 
Bank 2003:12). This emphasis on worker rights is reflected in what is 
commonly understood as "social compliance" in the Bangladeshi RMG sector 
parlance.
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International NGOs such as the Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), Fair Wear, 
Ethical Trade Initiative UK, Oxfam International, Sweatshopwatch, etc. have 
been highly visible in the compliance debates in Bangladesh. Broadly 
speaking, and leaving aside the debates regarding defining NGOs or "civil 
society" (Lewis and Kanji 2009), the supra-national apparel sector NGOs 
function in intersecting networks, and are involved in drawing up policy 
guidelines, coordinating the activities of networked affiliates, disseminating 
information, undertaking solidarity action and lobbying intergovernmental 
organisations and institutions to further the interests of workers through 
decisions made at international levels. However, the reach of these non-state 
actors in Bangladesh is only as strong as their relationships with powerful 
local NGOs. This is especially true in the case of RMG labour rights (Paul- 
Majumder and Begum 2006, Buckland 2003).
At the national level, the role of civil society and or NGOs in RMG 
compliance has to be understood in the context of the capitalist, middle and 
intermediate classes in Bangladesh. Civil society and NGOs should not be 
conflated for each other, and neither should their role in monitoring the role 
of the state and capitalist classes be seen as an abstract "good thing" (Khan 
1998a and 1998b). Civil society in LDCs such as Bangladesh is likely to be 
populist opponents of the comparatively recent capitalist project in their 
societies, however, their role in demanding accountability from the private 
sector, their regulators or policymakers needs to make room for the possibility 
that the agglomeration of interest groups that comprise civil society might 
also have an interest in capitalism and can yet monitor and keep in check the 
self seeking sectors. According to Rahman (2006) and Asaduzzaman (2004), 
civil society in Bangladesh became visible as the voice of citizens7 ideology in 
political modernisation around the 1980's. The boundaries between the civil 
society and state-private sector institutions were often hard to distinguish but 
the presence of the third sector was definitive in Bangladeshi politics, 
governance, participative development, human rights, etc. However from
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within civil society itself there was criticism about their adopted formality, 
autonomy and power, as they were accused of becoming partisan in politics, 
without focus and ineffective in voicing peoples' rights to a healthy and 
equitable life. It would be reasonable to assume that voicing concerns from a 
Bangladeshi cultural context about environmental preferences was also 
similarly neglected. Consequently, according to Rahman (2006) and Rahman 
(2007), the NGO sector in Bangladesh has shifted their mode of operation 
from that of social mobilisation and activism to apolitical economistic 
development, providing poor people with access to resources or services to 
improve their condition. Reasons behind this shift include donor pressure 
and a local environment that is inimical to unpartisan political criticism or 
activism (Rahman 2006). Government discouragement and ambivalence 
within Bangladeshi elites and NGOs about political activism has also 
contributed to the co-optation of civil society and delegitimised their political 
activity. As a result there is only a faint voice demanding the cessation of 
patron-client network corruption for better environmental quality or pro-EM 
changes.
Trade unions are another powerful driver of social issues with their unique 
set up of bringing together the workers and the formal policymakers (Roberts 
2002b). The US based International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' 
Federation (ITGLWF) has been active in building a policy network of CSR 
across apparel retailers and their suppliers as well as LDC governments and 
smaller trade unions. For example, ITGLWF is affiliated with a number 
retailers who source in Bangladesh, who they have networked with a number 
of Bangladeshi trade unions, such as Bangladesh Homeworkers' Women 
Association (BHWA), Bangladesh Independent Garment Workers Union 
Federation (BIGUF), Bangladesh Jute Textile Workers Federation and 
Bangladesh Textile and Garments Workers League (BTGWL).34 The ITGLWF
34 Source: ITGLWF website at http://www.itglwf.org/pdf/05-ll-08%20- 
%20ITGLWF%20Afffliates%202.pdf. accessed July 7, 2006
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also works with the developed country retailers in translating labour concerns 
into practicable action through private sector initiatives. For example, as a 
result of ITGLWF's involvement, the Clothing Manufacturers' Association of 
the United States of America (representing RMG MNCs as employers) and 
the Amalgamated Clothing Textiles Workers' Union (representing American 
workers) signed a national branch collective agreement in 1996, which 
included a code of conduct applicable to enterprises within the US and their 
subcontractors in LDCs, which established minimum standards regarding the 
initial list of issues, which included wages, hours of work, forced labour, child 
labour, freedom of association, non-discrimination, occupational safety and 
health (US DoL ILAB 1996).
In the initial stages of social compliance policymaking, governments were 
active only while formulating, negotiating and enacting international level 
legislation with LDC governments and NGOs, but the social compliance 
policy network was changing. The US Department of Labor (US DoL) was a 
pioneer in opening the policy network to include LDC suppliers. The DoL, 
with the help of various American apparel producers' coalitions took 
numerous steps to "clean up" the sector at home and abroad. It stepped up its 
inspections along the international supply chain, which opened up the 
network to enable the western media to monitor progress and influence 
decisions at the policy level (US DoL ILAB 1996).
LDC governments remained important policy actors. They reacted 
unfavourably to concern for labour rights, as they were simultaneously 
bargaining quota benefit and duty free access to ensure the lifeline of the 
industry in their country. LDC governments such as Bangladesh saw social 
compliance as "an unequal contest of strength with the developing countries" 
(Bhattacharya 1996: 28). The motivations behind uniform and unitary labour 
standards were examined with suspicion among Bangladeshi policymakers, 
who shared the view with many LDC governments.
126
Development agencies also cautioned against the uniform and mandatory 
nature of labour demands. The 1995 World Development Report suggested 
that linking trade with labour issues raises two very important points -  the 
distinction between "basic standards" vs. "historical standards", and the cost 
implications of these linkages for the supplying countries and the labourers. 
While the LDCs could understand sanctions on violations of basic labour 
standards, they argued that interpreting evidence of such infractions opens 
up the possibility of miscarriage of justice due to cultural differences and the 
lack of clear evidence (Bhattachariya 1996).
However, to understand the scope of social compliance issues, coalitions of 
actors, their changing relationships and policymaking networks, this thesis 
will examine Bangladeshi social compliance in three phases: child labour; 
wages and worker safety; and the national Social Compliance Forum (SCF). 
This categorisation is based on a temporal progression of issues -buyer 
pressure on child labour set off the first round of compliance policymaking, 
followed by the second phase when factory fires forced regulators to 
implement worker safety and wage laws. These two phases resulted in a 
policy network with certain characteristics that not only set the context for the 
third phase (formation of the SCF) but also heavily influenced EM's chances 
of success or failure.
Phase One: Child Labour in Bangladeshi Garment Factories:
Among the apparel sector compliance issues, the most stringent requirement 
is the banning of child labour (Bhattacharya 1996). Unfortunately child labour 
has been a chronic problem in Bangladeshi factories (US DoL ILAB 1996, 
Choudhury and Hussain 2005, Haworth et al 2004, Hewett and Amin 2000).35 
Labour by children within Bangladeshi households and work units where 
many family members are involved is largely accepted as the norm, or is
35 Please see Annex 3.2 for ILO definitions of child labour.
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simply invisible. Such work is not regarded as "child labour" in the sense it is 
defined by international conventions or western morality (Wright 1997, ILO- 
IPEC-BGMEA 2004, ILO 2004, Paul-Majumder and Begum 2006, Huq 2002). 
Although various observers differed on the precise number,36 Bhattachariya 
(1996) estimated that in 1994-95, there were between 50,000-55,000 children 
working in garment factories. According to a sample survey by Chaudhuri 
and Paul-Mazumder (1991), the share of child workers between the age of 10 
and 14 years was higher among females (16%) than in males (8%). According 
to their survey, 19% of factories employed child workers (although they do 
not correlate that to factory size). About 66% of child labourers had migrated 
from the villages and 45% had never been schooled (Chaudhuri and Paul- 
Mazumder 1991).37 Bangladeshi laws, however, disallow child labour. 
Relevant laws include the Workmen's Compensation Act (1923), Employment 
of Children Act (1938), Children (Pledging of Labour) Act (1933), Payment of 
Wages Act (1936), Bengal Employment of Children Rules (1940, amended 
1976), Factories Act (1965 and 1968), Employment of Children Act (1938 and 
1974), Tea Plantations Labour Ordinance (1962), Shops and Establishments 
Act (1968, amended 1974), and the Industrial Relations Ordinance (1969).38 
These regulate wages and employment conditions, trade union and industrial 
disputes, labour administration and related matters. Among them, the 
Factories Act of 1965 explicitly prohibits the employment of children below
36 Entrepreneurs and the government agencies argued that about 2-5% of RMG workers were children, 
but NGOs, both local and international, argued it was more close to 10-20%. This became a key point 
when the government and the firms were bargaining against sanctions in the child labour policy 
negotiations, as we will see later.
37 The pattern of RMG child labour revealed two important socio-economic patterns: rural 
parents had preferred sending their daughters to work in urban factories over early marriage; 
and a large number of school dropouts suggest that these children came from the poorest of 
families, which could not afford to send the children to school. The survey also found that 
most RMG child labourers were recruited by a senior relative w ho was also an RMG 
employee. Child workers work as sew ing helpers (66%) and finishing helpers (15%), which  
were also the lowest paid jobs in the industry (Chaudhuri and Paul-Mazumder 1991).
38 Source:
http://www.bangladesh.net/article bangladesh/investment and industrv/inv 07 manpower.htm 
accessed on March 13, 2006.
128
the age of 14 in any factory (US DoL ILAB, 1996).39 However, implementation 
was weak until international pressure threatened economic sanctions on the 
RMG sector.
Pressure on Bangladeshi RMG factories began in 1992, with the introduction 
of the Child Labour Deterrence Act in the US Senate by Senator Harkin in 
response to US apparel manufacturing industry concerns over the impacts of 
cheap imports on American apparel producers. This debate became a direct 
threat to Bangladesh in 1993, when American television newsmagazine "NBC 
Dateline" broadcast a programme about child labour in Bangladeshi factories 
supplying Wal Mart. This prompted the retailer to cancel its contracts with 
the Bangladeshi firms and other US retailers began to pressurise Bangladeshi 
suppliers as well, since the Wal Mart story was affecting sales (US DoL ILAB 
1996, Armour 2003). The firms and the workers were deeply threatened and 
became united in resisting the "foreign" idea of banning child labour in all its 
forms (CPD 2003a, Wright 1997). Meanwhile in anticipation of the Harkin Bill 
being enacted, the RMG firms took drastic measures to protect themselves by 
dismissing more than 40,000 child labourers almost overnight in 1992 
(Williams 2004). Some other reports suggest over 50,000 children were made 
unemployed (DoL ILAB 2006, US DoC 2002 and 2003).
At the national level, the government started legal reforms in 1993 (via the 
National Labour Law Commission to harmonise labour laws (Wright 1997)) 
but at the international level, the government and the BGMEA defensively 
negotiated with the US Senate in the initial stages of the Harkin Bill debate. 
The government's position was that numbers were inaccurate and that these 
children were not engaged in actual factory-work.40 At the DoL's
39 This law also stipulates that workers who are above 14 years of age can only work a maximum 5- 
hour day and only between 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. The penalty for violation o f this Act (Article 44(1)) is a 
fine up to Tk 1,000 (US DoL ILAB, 1996).
40 In May 1994 the BGMEAP resident stated that only 1% of the total work force are children, 
numbering an estimated 8,000 -10,000; a figure that w as contradicted by studies by US labour
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International Child Labour Hearing, the Bangladesh representatives further 
explained that the presence of children in the factories is a consequence of the 
lack of childminders at home while the largely female workforce leave home 
for work. US DoL and State officials, AAFLI representatives, and other NGOs, 
however, contradicted these findings (US DoL ILAB 2006).41 The US senate 
stood fast in its demands, backed up by the support of the business lobby, 
international agencies, NGOs and consumer groups. Gradually the BGMEA's 
policy stance changed due to sustained pressure from external actors leading 
to further negotiations with the ILO and UNICEF, culminating in a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on August 4, 1995 requiring 
the BGMEA to remove children under 14 from more than 2,000 garment 
factories, and to place the children in educational programs (Sajhau 2000). 
However, power struggles over differing ideologies came to a head over the 
signing of the final version of the MoU. After prolonged negotiations during 
late 1994 and early 1995 between the BGMEA and the US Officials, a first draft 
of the MoU was prepared to be signed by the BGMEA, AAFLI, UNICEF, the 
Centre for Development Research Bangladesh (CDRB) and the American- 
Bangladesh Economic Forum (ABEF). At the final stage, the BGMEA refused 
to sign it, and subsequently the AAFLI and the Child Labour Coalition 
declared that they would resume campaigning to ban Bangladeshi RMG 
imports to the USA. The BGMEA General Member firms objected to the 
clause enabling NGOs to inspect factories for underage workers. Although 
the BGMEA eventually retuned to the policy discussions, they made it clear 
that it would prefer to work with the ILO and UNICEF, rather than the 
international and national NGOs. The AAFLI subsequently issued a press 
release rejecting BGMEA's claims that "protectionism" is the underlying 
motivation for US NGOs being involved in the RMG sector and not in 
informal sectors where child labour was more common. In May 1995, the
research organisations, such as the Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI) as w ell as 
independent sample surveys (e.g. Chaudhuri and Paul Mazumder 1991).
41Source: http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/iclp/sweat/bangIadesh.htrn. accessed on March 16, 
2006
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BGMEA, US Embassy, the ILO and the UNICEF drafted a revised MoU. 
Finally on August 4,1995, the BGMEA signed the MoU to formally eliminate 
all child labour from Bangladeshi RMG factories by October 31, 1995 
(Bhattacharya 1996, ILO BGMEA 2003a, 2003b, Wright 2003).
The chief output of the MOU was the BGMEA/ILO/UNICEF Child Labour 
project - a world-first in which an entire industry pledged to free its 
workplace of child labour (ILO 2005, Jenkins et al 2002).42 Network 
relationships at the national level solidified with programme design and 
implementation. The early interactions during the MoU signing set the initial 
"rules of the game" and it impacted how the successive ILO-IPEC-BGMEA 
projects were conceived and implemented.43 According to the ILO evaluation 
of the comprehensive Phase III project in 2004 (ILO-IPEC-BGMEA 2004), the 
project design and commissioning stages were problematic due to lack of 
BGMEA capacity and promised funding; also, communications during project 
negotiations was fragmented and heavily bottlenecked, causing delays that 
were remedied by last minute shifts to project goals that affected project 
effectiveness. The Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) left the project in the 
middle of this period and the BGMEA could not replace the CTA or provide 
alternative management support for 11 months, causing further delays and 
loss of focus in the project. Lack of coordination and commitment within 
BGMEA project staff in charge of implementation was cited several times in 
the ILO evaluation report. For example, the MOU Steering Committee did not 
meet during the second MOU and did not provide any management to the 
BGMEA projects, resulting in poor coordination, and the BGMEA did not 
provide any explanation as to why. Poor BGMEA capacity for enforcement 
was to be addressed through ongoing capacity building for BGMEA staff
42 Source: http://mvw.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/about/factsheet/facts01.htm accessed on 
October 2005.
43 In July 1995 BGMEA, UNICEF and ILO signed a MoU, which was the beginning of a series of 
collaborative projects to remove and rehabilitate child workers in the garment industry. A second MOU 
was signed in July 2000 and ILO/IPEC implemented 3 projects that contributed to the fulfilment of the 
MoU’s objectives.
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involved in the ILO-IPEC-BGMEA projects, but according to the final 
evaluation report:
"Little was done during BGMEA Phase III to develop BGMEA7s 
capacity to manage the monitoring system and BGMEA were reluctant 
to take on the responsibility.... The future of child labour monitoring in 
the majority of BGMEA factories is uncertain after January 2004.... The 
child labour monitoring system is not yet sustainable without ILOrs 
support. The sustainability of the skill training is in the trainees. Many 
of them are using the skills learnt and will continue to benefit from 
their training with no further input from the projects.77 (ILO-IPEC- 
BGMEA 2004: vi).
The BGMEA was (and continues to be) the lead agency for child labour, and 
the ILO project evaluation reports cited them as being ineffective, 
unconvinced of social issues, non-committal and unreliable. Since every 
network is as strong as its weakest link, it seems reasonable to wonder how 
sustainable the social compliance network would be once the donor projects 
are over or if unforeseen market shocks were to hit the garments sector 
requiring creative and credible policy alternatives at short notice.
Phase Two: Worker Safety and Wages in Bangladeshi Garment Factories:
Bangladeshi national legislation extensively covers the conditions of 
employment, payment of wages, legal settlements of disputes and conditions 
of redressing of worker complaints (such as the Shops and Establishments Act 
1965, the Employers7 Liability Act 1938, the Employment of Labour (Standing 
Orders) Act 1965, Payment of Wages (Amendment) Act, 1980 etc.). The most 
cited laws governing the RMG workers, management and owners are covered
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specifically by the Factories Act (1965) and the Factories Rules (1979).44 By law 
all factories have to meet these requirements, based on number of workers 
employed and the kind of production they are engaged in. According to the 
Factories Act, garment factories are required to act on worker health, hygiene, 
fire safety, worker welfare, working hours, special leave categories, and make 
special provisions for accidents and operation of dangerous machinery. Even 
though the laws exist, there is no clear indication of which laws supersede 
other pieces of legislation in the matters of compliance, and within the space 
of such ambiguity, laws are flouted regularly (Word Bank 2005).
After the child labour issue, the biggest RMG compliance issue has been 
worker safety, especially fire safety. There is an undisputed understanding 
among the RMG trade associations, NGOs, trade unions and government 
agencies that RMG is one of the more unsafe sectors in Bangladesh. According 
to the Bangladesh Occupational Safety Health and Environment Foundation 
(OSHE)45 the RMG industry is the most hazardous sector for workers by far 
(table 3.4).
Table 3.4: Workplace Mortality in 2004/2005 in Bangladeshi Industries
Sector 2005 2004
RMG 120 25
Construction 80 69
Transport 14 6
Ship Breaking 11 8
Rice Mill 9 6
Source: OSHE 2006
OSHE's findings are based on an audit of the country's 16 leading 
newspapers, and while there is a possibility that the actual figures are higher, 
the numbers are indicative of the kind of mortality risks the workers face. It is
44 Annex 5.2 and Chapter Five discusses how  these laws pertain to factory environmental 
compliance.
45 The Bangladesh OSHE Foundation is and NGO and research body, part o f the Asian Network for the 
Rights of Occupational Accident Victims (ANROAV), coordinated by Asian Monitoring Resource 
Centre (AMRC).
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also indicative of how the understanding of compliance issues changed from 
the early days of child labour to worker safety inside the factories (Daily Star 
2006a). Box 3.3 highlights some of the landmark fire accidents in the sector, 
while Annex 3.3 features more details.
Box 3.3: Factory fire and stampede related deaths in Bangladesh RMG
2000 -  Globe Knitting factory fire, 12 dead
2000 -  Choudhury factory fire, 48 dead
2001 -  factory fire, 24 dead
2004 -  Misco Supermarket factory fire, 9 dead, 50 injured in stampedes
2005 -  Specturm factory fire, 62 dead
2006 -  KTS factory fire, 61 dead
2006 -  Phoenix factory collapse, 22 dead
Fire accidents cost lives and caused injuries; it also caused property damage 
and hurt the sectors' reputation among buyers. International media and 
NGOs became active with local NGOs in protesting for safer factories in 2000. 
The chief onus fell on the BGMEA (because of the ILO-IPEC-BGMEA 
programme) to lead this new issue. They began conducting fire safety drills 
and workplace safety awareness campaigns since the establishment of the 
BGMEA Compliance Cell in 2001, despite the institutional and issue 
commitment problems with the Cell. Outside of the workplace safety 
initiatives for the BGMEA member factories, the Cell organised courses for 
own staff and invited buyers to train BGMEA officials on code requirements 
and began auditing factories in 2003. However, until September 2004, only 56 
factories had been visited. BGMEA's Safety Measures Cell organised training 
courses in fire fighting with 13,805 participants of 999 garment factories in 
Dhaka and Chittagong from 1997 to 2004 (BGMEA 2004). After the KTS 
factory fire in 2006 (which had 61 mortalities), the BGMEA undertook a crash 
programme on fire safety and made new rules for all members (box 3.4). 
However, up to date data on their progress is not available from the BGMEA 
Information Cell.
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Box 3.4: Post KTS fire policy action and programme (Jabbar 2006)
New Regulations: All garment factories are to have two fire staircases and gates of each 
stairway are kept open during working hours. If any exit to the main stairway is 
found closed during inspection, they w ill be fined. A third time default will lead to 
the cancellation of BGMEA membership and the factory w ill lose its export licence.
New Measures: BGMEA launches its crash programme in A pril 2006:
-conduct fire drills in all the garments units;
-check if gates are open or locked during working hours;
-check whether exits are clear or not;
-check whether adequate fire equipments are in place in the RMG units;
-check whether fire safety teams are in place in the RMG units.
Such recurring accidents tell the story of continued weaknesses relating to 
structural problems: overburdened and weak regulatory network, low civil 
society protest for worker safety, poor understanding of a complex issue, 
change resistant modes of non-compliant behaviour among private sector 
actors, unsupportive infrastructure, and corruption: in March 2006, Mr. 
Abdus Salam Murshedi, acting president of BGMEA, said in a newspaper 
interview (Daily Star 2006b), that the main problem of monitoring compliance 
lies with the growth pattern of the RMG industry. Most factories are situated 
in commercial buildings that are not built to house factories, and 
consequently they are in violation of industrial safety guidelines. They 
frequently have electrical wiring that are overloaded, creating dangerous fire 
hazards. While the newer medium and large factories are housed in purpose 
built factories, away from residential areas, the smaller factories (who are 
large in number and financially vulnerable) continue to operate in unsafe 
buildings and have significant problems in making compliance upgrading 
investments, and tend to avoid compliance by negotiation and bargaining 
with regulators. (In Chapter Five we will see how these rented-premises are 
causing bottlenecks in environmental compliance implementation.)
Institutional weakness among regulators other than the BGMEA is also 
responsible for this situation: the Department of Inspection (Dol) is 
responsible for the implementation of the Factories Act 1965, covering aspects 
such as occupational health, safety and working conditions; and the
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Department of Labour (DoL) is responsible for ensuring compliance with the 
provisions of labour law relating to labour welfare, trade unionism and 
industrial relations. However, the level of enforcement of the Factories Act 
and labour laws in any industrial sector is widely believed to be not at all 
satisfactory (Bailey 2000). In a newspaper interview in March 2006, Dr. 
Mohammad Serajuddin, Chief Inspector of Factories, Dol, blamed weak staff 
capacity for RMG compliance monitoring failures by Dol (Daily Star 2006c). 
According to him, 20 inspectors are responsible for inspecting about 50,000 
registered factories in the country, 4 of whom are working at the head office, 6 
at Dhaka divisional office (which has about 15,000 registered factories) and 
the rest are at Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi divisional offices. The Dol 
does not inspect numerous of small, unregistered factories in various sectors 
at all. Another agency held responsible for worker safety problems is RAJUK 
(Rajdhani Unnayan Kartripakkha, a statutory agency responsible for urban 
development planning in Dhaka), whose failure to check illegal construction 
by RMG factory owners was the main reason cited in the cases of the 
Spectrum (2005) and Phoenix building collapses (2006) (Bangladesh Today 
2006).
Alongside child labour and fire safety, another critical RMG compliance issue 
is working wage. Despite existing laws and regulations applicable to the RMG 
sector (although Bangladeshi minimum wage scales have remained 
unadjusted with inflation rates for decades), poor working wages, forced 
overtime, non-payment of wages, illegal termination, lack of trade unionism 
etc. are long running problems caused by a similar set of causes behind the 
worker safety issue. Ethical trade activists, DoL, BGMEA, BKMEA and the 
ILO have been negotiating better working conditions but worker 
dissatisfaction due to wage disputes in individual factories occurred 
frequently, regardless of factory size. In mid 2006, the issue came to a head, 
following just a few weeks on from a series of major factory fires and 
collapses (the KTS factory fire killed 61 workers, and the Phoenix factory
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collapse killed 22 workers). Long running wage disputes in one factory led to 
worker unrest on May 20th, which led to a month of agitation and street riots 
by garment workers and trade unions. The issue became front page news as 
riots resulted in street barricades, civilian property damage, worker injuries, 
worker deaths, looted and torched factories. The damage to the sectors' image 
in front of foreign buyers was considerable.46
The BGMEA as well as affected factory owners expressed their dissatisfaction 
at how quickly worker frustration with wages had turned into mass factory 
lynching (often affecting factories with no wage problems), instead of 
peaceful dialogue or non-violent protests (Daily Star 2006d). However, at the 
official levels, the narrative turned towards denial of responsibility and 
blaming outsiders, even a foreign conspiracy (Holiday 2006), similar to the 
official rhetoric during child labour debates. Given this atmosphere of 
mistrust and conspiracy theories, the social compliance policymaking 
network was, perhaps, at its most volatile. After the riots a multi stakeholder 
"Minimum Wage Board" was formed in June 2006, headed by the Ministry of 
Labour and Employment, to deal exclusively with reviewing current 
legislation and updating minimum wage scales (New Age 2006a). At this 
point, a divide between the trade unions operating in the RMG factories 
became evident. At the national level, trade unions were unhappy with their 
representation in the wage commission and resorted to fresh street agitation. 
The policy process went ahead without them, and there were allegations by 
excluded unions that the unions participating in the compliance meetings 
were invited because of their membership alliances with the political party in 
government (ibid.). Meanwhile the RMG sector continued to battle with 
various other debilitating issues such as power shortages, port strikes, port 
closures and political instability that resulted in back-to-back general strikes 
in 2006.
46 Please see Annex 3.4 for wage riot details.
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Phase One and Two of Social Compliance and Ecological Modernisation:
At this point, it would be useful to analyse the nature of actors, relationships 
and networks surrounding social compliance, since it is the same set of actors, 
codes, quality standards etc. that provide the space for EM imperatives in the 
Bangladeshi RMG sector. According to the policy network typology discussed 
in Chapter Two, the policy network in Phase One (early 19990's onwards) and 
Two (early 2000's onwards) can be summarised as below:
Table 3.5: Early Social Compliance Policy Network Characteristics
Dimensions Characteristics Similarities
Membership Membership was fairly limited to actors w ho are politically, 
legally or economically powerful. Participants are chosen 
carefully.
Policy
community
Integration Infrequent, irregular interactions surrounding the crisis of 
the day; interactions fluctuated in quality and intensity. 
Membership and agendas were stable; outcomes were stable 
in the sense of chronic underperformance. Ideology, basic 
values, policy preferences and acceptance of outcomes were 
frequently in conflict.
Issue
networks/
policy
community
mixture
Resources Participants had marked differences in their resources. Core 
relationships were based on resource exchange, w ith much 
bargaining. Actors without resources were in consultative 
roles only. Resource and power leaders controlled direction 
of bargaining and compliance by members.
Issue
networks/
policy
community
mixture
Power Balance of power among actors existed in the core; but 
between the core and periphery members the balance was 
more distinct and their interaction was seen as a zero sum  
game.
Issue
networks/
policy
community
mixture
Based on: R lodes and Marsh Model 1998
Leading the network -  A bureaucratic and rigid network is not beyond 
changing, but requires leadership by a strong resource rich actor. In this 
empirical case, strong external actors led the network change to begin with 
(US Senate, American retailers, NGOs, ILO, UNICEF, etc.), with structural 
support provided by the government, which is similar to a clientilistic 
network.47 Despite the network being led by resource and political power rich 
actors (and the low complexity of the network, since the overall number of
47 See Howlett and Ramesh (1995) in Chapter Two.
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actors was quite small), the bureaucratic network was ultimately dependent 
on formal institutional path dependent rules and norms, which explains the 
difficulties faced by the child labour banning projects, that were distinguished 
by the lack of commitment, skills and funds. During the second phase the 
network continued to be clientilistic, but this time led by the Bangladeshi non­
state actors, BGMEA. The main source of authoritative/bargaining power was 
held by the BGMEA at this time, since they had past experience from phase 
one. They successfully bargained for their agenda and excluded the trade 
unions and NGOs that they disfavoured. They also brought their institutional 
weaknesses highlighted in phase one, in dealing with worker safety and wage 
dispute settlement.
Decision making in the network -  Given that the complexity of the network 
changed from phase one to two (medium to high level, as member numbers 
and complexity of settings increased), and that the constraints also increased 
(cognitive contestations, institutional weaknesses, strategic uncertainty, vague 
issue definition, time constraints, issue competition with more dire sectoral 
needs, etc.), rational, high risk decisions were rare; decisions were reactive, 
and made incrementally; network hierarchy was unchallenged by decision 
styles; and there was a demonstrated tendency to reinforce the status quo. 
Compliance related decision making only happened after problem 
identification and damage caused (loss of lives, worker injuries, factories 
burnt, stocks looted, etc.), and a loosely structured issue driven policy 
network formed which then quickly ran out of steam, rather than forming a 
stable network as a reflection of maturing policy dialogue (as we will see in 
Chapters Five and Seven, the reactive policy style and weak regulatory 
pressure is creating significant environmental upgrading bottlenecks).
Core vs. periphery -  The phase one and two network had a marked core and 
periphery, which had important political implications in the next phase of 
policymaking, the SCF. Legally empowered and resource rich state actors
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(such as various powerful ministries and their departments) and the trade 
associations (who have direct contact with the factories) have been at the 
forefront and core of compliance policymaking. The second group in the core 
were participants who were invited to join. Their voices were privileged as 
having expertise necessary for the projects led by the government agencies 
and trade associations. They included the comparatively more powerful trade 
unions (with clear affiliations to political parties in government), better 
funded NGOs, technical experts, brand name buyers, certifiers, active RMG 
factories and often in the coordinating and funding role, donor agencies (such 
as DfID and SEDF (Fox and Prescott 2004)).48 At the periphery, were 
politically insignificant trade unions, critical NGOs, ignored government 
agencies (DoE), large number of non compliant RMG factories and their 
customers (buying houses and buyers who were uninterested or incapable of 
participating in any policy discussion for compliance (figure 3.7).
Figure 3.7: Social Compliance Policy Actors -  core and periphery
PERIPHERY
CORE
NGOs Experts
Certifiers
Active buyers
Active RMG Firms
Trade Associations
Powerful Trade Unions
Marginal
Trade
Unions
Development Agencies
Non
Participating
Buyers
Active Government Ministries 
and Departments
Non Participating 
RMG Firms Non participating 
NGOs
PERIPHERY Marginal
government
agencies
Potential for EM in the early days - For EM to succeed, the compliance 
network should be a midpoint between an issue network and a policy 
community (Rhodes and Marsh 1998), and should also be pluralistic (Howlett 
and Ramesh 2003), instead of the clientilistic, closed structured and
48 Please see Annex 3.2.
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bureaucratic networks (that is structured like a policy community but 
functions like an issue network most of the time) that are preferred in 
Bangladesh. The policy momentum is often lost in the midst of bigger 
challenges and threats to the sector and the economy (e.g. port strikes, 
political violence, general financial and economic infrastructure problems, 
energy crisis, competition from China, etc.). It is not reflective of changing 
attitudes or mindsets through ethical considerations or market pressure, 
which is an EM requirement that is at odds with predominant and embedded 
Bangladeshi political and working culture.
Social compliance vs. environmental upgrading -  It would be appropriate to 
question where "greening" fits in with what is implied by ethical trade in the 
case of Bangladesh, considering that the absence of greening rhetoric might 
mean that the supply chain led greening has not begun in Bangladesh at all. 
However, as marginalised ecological issues are in the ethical trade rhetoric as 
applied to the Bangladeshi garment factories, it would be incorrect to analyse 
the situation assuming an absence of greening imperatives (figure 3.8).
Figure 3.8: Environmental issues in RMG social compliance 
RMG Social compliance: buyer codes, third party standards, national legislation
Issues as identified by codes etc.: 
-environmental health and safety 
(cleanliness, waste disposal, 
ventilation, dust and fumes, 
drinking water, latrines, fire 
safety, machine safety, electrical 
hazards)
-environmental management 
plans
-effluent treatment plants 
-environmental clearance 
certificate (DoE)
RMG social issues:
ILO core labour
standards, employment
conditions, ___ _
occupational _
health and f  environ / environ-
safety, I mental
other aspects V issues
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The greening issues as conceptualised by the buyer codes (e.g. Gap, Nike, 
Marks and Spencers), and high profile third party certificates for ethical trade 
at best focus on waste management, effluents treatment, and occupational 
health and safety (although SAI, ETI, FLA, FWF, and Jo-In mention 
environmental considerations only indirectly, according to the review by GTZ 
PROGRESS 2007c). Bangladeshi national legislation (Bangladesh Labour Law 
2006 and the Environment Conservation Rules 1997) together cover waste 
treatment aspects (although leading brand name buyer codes do not cover 
these issues). Taken together, the requirements in Bangladesh do not fulfill 
the broad ecological concerns as envisioned by Christoffs (1996) version of 
strong EM, and in fact, it falls short of mainstream EM, which calls for 
proactive refinement of production, reduction of inputs, recycling and reuse, 
etc. What the codes and national legislation call for can be broadly 
summarised in the figure above (and is discussed in detail in Chapter Five 
and in Annex 5.1 and 5.2).
Further, the weak ecological issues in ethical trade are eclipsed by emphasis 
given to social issues: emphasis and importance given to worker rights, 
wages, and safety are much more specific and often go beyond what is 
legislated; in comparison, environmental issues are vaguely defined (often 
packed under "environmental health") and defer to the environmental 
legislation in the suppliers home country. The compliance network becomes 
active after a shock (e.g. Harkins Bill, media expose, factory fires, worker 
deaths due to factory collapses, street riots over wages, etc.) and since 
ecological issues have not resulted in similar shocks, greening issues do not as 
yet pose a reputational risk to retailers or suppliers, and remain in the 
periphery of the policy arena. Meanwhile, the compliance network focuses 
mainly on social issues since the problems are comparatively identifiable and 
a threat to on-time shipment, as opposed to ecological problems.
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In phase one and two of the compliance network we have seen how the 
network has a distinct core-and-periphery design in terms of participants and 
agendas. The same design also excluded ecological issues: the DoE was 
noticeable in its absence in any project to do with environmental quality in the 
RMG factories, except for briefly in August 2005, when TV coverage of DoE 
inspections of RMG factories caused the BGMEA to plead reputational 
damage of the RMG industry, and the DoE agreed to stop TV coverage. 
Following that, the government decided to formulate a committee, Committee 
for Eco Compliance of RMG Factories, comprised of government and non­
government representatives, to oversee environmental compliance in the 
apparel industry, which would involve the regularisation of the DoE EC 
system. The committee was to be comprised of representatives from the 
BGMEA, BKMEA, Bangladesh Textile Mills Association (BTMA), and 
Bangladesh Terry Towel and Linen Manufacturers and Exporters' Association 
(BTTLMEA), headed by Director General of the DoE. The committee was to 
be funded by the DoE with the goal of setting up ETPs in factories over two 
years. The State Minister for Environment and Forest was to supervise the 
entire project. In September 2005, the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI), 
University of Leeds (UK), BTMA and BGMEA co-organised a seminar on, 
"Supporting improved effluent treatment and dye practices in the textile 
sector in Bangladesh" (New Nation 2005). However, none of their policy 
recommendations were taken up at the programme level and the DoE led 
committee also never materialised. A new phase of compliance policymaking 
began with the formation of the SCF, and Chapter Seven empirically explores 
policymaking support to greening RM factories in line with EMT.
3.5 Conclusion:
This chapter has covered much ground in terms of the nature of the apparel 
supply chain, the vulnerable place of the Bangladeshi RMG sector, and its 
early experiences with ethical trade issues. Although the Bangladeshi social
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compliance network is over 15 years old, the range of issues addressed is still 
focused on social issues, and not enough attention is given to the issues of 
greening, because of the nature of compliance demands, compliance discourse 
and the exclusion of the environmental agencies in compliance demands. The 
multi stakeholder approach so far is riddled with bottlenecks, along with 
more predictable problems such as low institutional capacity and 
commitment to social compliance. The resultant policy network on social 
compliance contains the rules and capacities that influence EM requirements, 
and it is interesting to ask whether these institutions of modernity have the 
capacity to break free from behavioural norms to make EM a reality. After 
setting the context for the thesis, the next thesis chapter explains the 
methodology that was used to collect data to examine the validity of the 
hypotheses and robustness of network analysis presented in Chapter Two.
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Chapter Four: Research Methodology
4.1 Introduction:
This chapter sets out my empirical research methodology, which was 
designed to identify the key variables (the actors, relationships and networks 
in relation to Bangladeshi RMG firms' environmental upgrading efforts), and 
test the theoretical framework in an empirical situation. I discuss the sampling 
strategy, interviews and the main types of secondary data resources that were 
useful and why. Finally, I discuss my experiences carrying out this work, and 
offer observations relevant to others conducting similar research.
4.2 Research Design and Setting:
In this thesis, I test EMT as it applies to LDCs such as Bangladesh by deriving 
three propositions, which were expressed via three hypotheses. In order to 
test the hypotheses, I adopted a mixed inductive-deductive methodology. I 
collected primary and secondary data in order to first identify the three key 
variables -  the actors, relationships and policy network types (i.e. the 
"outcomes") -  and then I looked for explanations in the inherent power 
resource dependencies, strategic decision making, bargaining positions and 
network changes. Then I generalised those findings to infer general principles 
about EM in Bangladesh in general. I used a mixture of secondary and 
primary sources of data, details of which are in section 4.3.
Setting:
In Chapter One I discussed the value of studying EMT in Bangladesh from a 
theoretical perspective. Setting the thesis in Bangladesh adds significant value 
to our knowledge on EMT, ethical trade, CSR, value chains and Bangladeshi 
green policy dynamics because hardly any academic research has been done
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on social compliance in Bangladeshi RMG factories, or on environmental 
policymaking for industries, or on greening problems in any Bangladeshi 
industrial sector.
As a resident of Dhaka and a long time observer of environmental policy for 
urban industrial neighbourhoods in Dhaka, I was interested in how 
environmental policy for apparel manufacturing was apparently lacking any 
relevance to modem day market realities. The size of the industry was 
expanding rapidly at the time, and presumably, so was its ecological impact 
on the environs of Dhaka and beyond. I was personally interested in the scope 
of environmental management systems for Bangladesh, and the RMG sector 
was an obvious point of interest given the other quality standards they had 
adopted. My network of contacts and knowledge of local policy makers put 
me in an advantageous position to study this particular subject,49 so 
researching in Dhaka was an obvious personal choice. Outside of these 
parochial benefits, Dhaka was a good choice because not only are majority of 
RMG factories situated in Dhaka, it is also the centre of almost all policy­
making on environmental regulation in Bangladesh.
When I started my research, there were news reports that the government 
was forming a committee to address RMG wastewater pollution and install 
combined ETPS, which was the first initiative ever of its kind at the time 
(successive governments and their ministries had failed repeatedly to move 
beyond policy discussions with donors and factory owners to resolve the 
severe pollution caused by the leather industry due to political and legal 
problems over land acquisition and compensation issues, among other 
complexities). However, the committee was short lived and nothing has come 
of it so far, but the inaction itself has yielded much material for enquiry and 
analysis. Lastly, Dhaka is also home to the head offices of the RMG buying 
houses, foreign retailers offices, various trade associations, trade unions,
49 This is discussed later in section 4.5.
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various government agencies, auditors, donor agencies and consultants 
working in this topic. These actors are not only the main powerhouses, they 
are also my primary sources of data.
Research Design:
The cost of travel to and from Dhaka meant that my research had to be 
phased and sequenced. On one trip I field-tested the questionnaires for the 
RMG firms. The main fieldwork was conducted in Dhaka between February 
2006 and July 2006. My research design had to change quite dramatically as 
some unforeseen accidents happened in the RMG sector.50 New actors became 
active which added data sources. Interview lengths also increased because 
interviewees suddenly had a lot of opinions worth expressing.
I wanted my research design to yield lessons for EMT refinement, and so I 
chose a descriptive case study research design that allowed me to dig deeper, 
using primary data to analyse and draw lessons about the applicability of 
EMT in Bangladesh. I also decided to track-back the past decisions and events 
that led to the current state of affairs, which made my research partly 
retrospective in nature. To ensure there were no significant gaps in the 
historical record, I spent much time and effort going through newspaper 
archives for news items on past decisions taken on RMG compliance 
initiatives. The online archives of the Daily Star and New Age Bangladesh 
newspapers were particularly invaluable in this case.51
Every researcher has to keep in mind the principles of triangulation (Gaskell 
2002). Triangulation refers to the use of a combination of research 
methodologies to study one phenomenon. By combining multiple theories, 
data collection methods and materials, researchers attempt to "cross check"
50 Details are discussed in Chapter Seven.
51 The quality of internet websites hosted in Bangladesh varies greatly. These two newspapers were 
outstanding in that their archives were “found” online everyday.
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their findings so that their empirical findings do not have intrinsic biases and 
the problems that come from single method, single-observer, single-theory 
studies, specially case studies (Yin 1989). There are different kinds of 
triangulation, but I have gone for mixed method triangulation for my thesis. 
Firstly, I used multiple data sources (both for primary and secondary data) 
and secondly, I used quantitative and qualitative measurements to measure 
some of the same variables (even though overall my research is qualitative). 
In crafting my research design, I also needed to keep in mind issues related to 
internal validity, external validity, construct reliability, and reliability of my 
data (Yin, 1989). Internal validity relates to a researcher's own ability to 
accurately establish a causal link between two "outputs". No pattern- 
matching framework has been developed in the case of EM, so I had to be 
careful when making the assertion that EM has failed or succeeded in 
Bangladesh. External validity focuses on the generalisability of the results to 
other situations. Given that each country has unique cultural, social and 
political systems of institutional policy making, results from Bangladesh may 
be cautiously applied to other developing countries. Construct validity relates 
to the breadth and depth of the research design -  whether data gaps exist or 
not. For my thesis, this meant that I had to be careful in including the diverse 
range of actors who had input in policy-making or environmental upgrading 
at the level of RMG firms. In depth interviews with elite respondents were 
very useful in overcoming construction validity problems, since certain kinds 
of information was only known to a handful of elite interviewees. Finally, 
reliability refers to the replicability of the findings by another researcher, 
following the exact same research design and sampling strategy. While it is 
unlikely that any research involving so many face-to-face interviews will 
yield exactly same results, I have tried to minimise replicability problems by 
updating my research design on a regular basis and keep records of design 
changes.
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4.3 Data Collection from Primary and Secondary Sources:
Secondary Data:
Data on the RMG sector's economic characteristics are widely available from 
the BGMEA, EPB, MoC, and policy research organisations. There have been 
several studies about the working conditions in RMG factories by NGOs such 
as Oxfam (GB), Verite (USA), trade associations (BGMEA and BKMEA), 
policy research organisations (CPD) and international donor agencies (ILO, 
GTZ, SeDF and UNICEF) focusing on gender issues in the RMG work force, 
labour working conditions and child labour. Some studies mention buyer 
requirements for environmental certification or EMSs, but no mention is made 
of the environmental impacts or emissions standards, etc. WTO regulations 
on environmental standards for Bangladeshi trade have tended to focus only 
on the Agreement on Agriculture and the frozen fisheries sector (CPD 2003c). 
Data on RMG industries' environmental performance is non existent.
However, the two and only sources of information on environmental 
requirements are the Government Gazette Publications related to 
environmental quality in all factories, and the RMG buyer codes. Much 
information was already gathered from the buyers in my early Dhaka trips, 
however, as codes tend to be revised, I maintained contact with the buyers 
and kept on collecting updated versions. Further secondary sources of data 
became evident research progressed and includes reports by research 
organisations, such as Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies (BCAS) and 
CPD.
Primary Data:
My main data source was face-to-face interviews. Interviews can be simply 
conversations with a purpose of collecting information about a specific topic,
149
issue or event. Interviews are often seen as extensions of conversations 
between two parties. Kvale (1996) defines interviews as professional 
conversations. Conversation is a basic mode of human interaction and the 
research interview is based on the conversations we have in daily life. He 
further defines its purpose as obtaining descriptions of the life world of the 
interviewee with respect to interpreting the meaning of the described 
phenomena. According to Gaskell (2002) qualitative interviews are useful for 
mapping and understanding the respondents' accounts of reality. The 
qualitative interview provides the basic data for the development of 
understanding of the relations between social actors and their life experiences. 
The objective is a close understanding of the beliefs; attitudes, values and 
motivations in relation to the behaviours of people in particular social 
contexts. Therefore interviews were judged to be the most appropriate 
research tool for my thesis.
Different kinds of interviews are used in social sciences depending on the 
nature of the topic, nature of the respondent, time and other resources. 
Interviews can be done in groups (focus groups) or face to face (individual 
interviews). Face to face individual interviews can be narrative (where the 
subject narrates his/her experiences) or episodic (where the respondents are 
interviews about a specific event) (Kvale 1996). Given the cultural mindsets 
of the potential interviewees and their time constraints, I chose face-to-face 
episodic interviews.
Structured and semi structured interviews can be useful for data gathering in 
an interpersonal situation, where knowledge evolves through dialogue. 
Gaskell (2002) distinguishes between the different points of formality in the 
continuum of rigidity of structures that interviews can have. Interviews can 
be "structured", having a structured questionnaire that the interviewer goes 
through with the interviewee. One or two topics are covered in great detail 
here. The "semi structured" interview is more informal and has more open-
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ended questions. Ordering of questions is less important here and the 
interviewer is free to follow the narrative arc of the respondent, instead of 
following the predetermined schedule, as is the case with structured 
interviews (Gaskell 2002). I used a mixture of structured and semi-structured 
interviews. RMG factory management were given semi-structured interviews, 
while elite interviews were open structured.
At this point I would like to mention a few things about respondent bias. 
Respondent bias occurs when respondents answer questions in the way they 
think the questioner wants them to answer rather than according to their true 
beliefs. The significance of this bias is great in the case of this thesis where the 
issue of socially responsible economic growth has moralistic overtones over 
issues such as employee well being and environmental quality vis-a-vis need 
for profit making. I attempted to overcome respondent bias by carefully 
wording my questions that did not have "leading questions" (e.g. "Do you 
not think that environmental upgrading should be the choice of every moral 
person?") and instead has "value neutral questions" (e.g. "Do you believe that 
buyer pressure for environmental upgrading is inadequate, adequate or more 
than adequate?"). I have also avoided asking "double barrelled questions" 
where it is unclear which variable I am seeking their opinion on. I also 
avoided using double-negatives, since most interviews were done under time 
constraints and simpler questions are easier for comprehension.
Another aspect of respondent bias was manifest through the reluctance of 
interviewees to ultimately take part in the research despite prior agreement, 
and also in the tendency to give answers that were politically correct yet 
obviously false. In the first instance, I tried my best to pursue the respondents 
for interviews by reassuring them that I was a neutral observer and that I was 
not affiliated to any government body, foreign NGO or foreign buyer. Verbal 
reassurances about the confidentiality of the research outputs were 
appreciated. At this juncture, my nationality, ethnicity, cultural similarities
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and linguistic abilities were advantageous. In the second instance, respondent 
bias was more difficult to deal with. RMG factory management and buyers 
were eager to give answers that they thought would sound right rather than 
what the reality may have been. I sought to overcome this problem by 
interviewing actors who could tell the story from the other perspective, such 
as trade union leaders.
Self selection bias is another aspect of respondent selection that I had to keep 
in mind while designing my research. Self selection bias refers to distortions 
in empirical findings due to the particular characteristics of respondents who 
chose to participate. Self selection bias was corrected for in two ways. Firstly, 
the respondents were not offered any incentives for participating, and 
secondly by use of the random sampling method. Although RMG factories 
and buyers who were more proactive were relatively more eager to being 
interviewed, I was careful to include respondents who were less proactive as 
well, since their lack of experience in upgrading was a valuable insight into 
why RMG firms are unable or unwilling.
Respondent bias resulted in the blanket anonymisation of all RMG, buyers 
and trade union interviewees (even those who did not wish to be anonymous) 
post-fieldwork, since the political sensitivity of social compliance had reached 
high levels during and since my fieldwork. In January 2008, Labour Behind 
the Label reported that Mr. Mehdi Hassan, a labour rights researcher, was 
detained in Dhaka under emergency laws for conducting research for the 
Workers Rights Consortium. This is in the background of emergency rule in 
Bangladesh, where, according to Labour Behind the Label, social activists are 
going into hiding following a crackdown on local and foreign activists and 
researchers who are seen as international conspirators and anti-national 
forces. According to their website,
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"Unruly workers, 'outsiders', unionists and rights activist all have been 
blamed to the extent that an 'international conspiracy' has been 
'discovered' as the cause of the prolonged unrest. Even the deaths of 
workers on duty get lost in this deliberate construction of reasoning... 
Against this backdrop, the arrest of Mr. Hassan and the implication of 
others have the potential to escalate a situation that would seriously 
damage the operation of the garment industry."52
In consideration of the safety of my interviewees, I have anonymised names 
in all chapters.53
Number of Interviews and Sampling:
There is typically a trade-off between quality and quantity of interviews, and 
the nature of the hypothesis and resources like time and money constraints 
also determine how many interviews are taken (Gaskell 2002). Below I 
highlight the sampling strategy for each type of respondent.
I. The RMG firms:
Source:
The primary respondents for this thesis were from RMG firms. In total, 53 
RMG respondents were interviewed. Only top and middle management were 
interviewed for three reasons -  they were the natural first point of contact for 
non-business related queries in firms; they were the most knowledgeable
52 Source: Labour Behind the Label website at:
http://www.labourbehindthelabel.org/campaigns/urgent/bangladesh/90-bangladeshcrackdown/229- 
bangladesh-risk. accessed March 12, 2008
53 Mehdi Hassan was subsequently released in early February 2008 by the special intelligence forces 
after buyers from Wal-Mart, Tesco, M&S, H&M, Inditex, Next, Nike, Levi Strauss, Gap, Walt Disney 
company, Jones Apparel, Tchibo and Carrefour sent a letter to the government, according to the 
Accountablity website:
http://www.accountabilitv21 .net/blogs.aspx?id=l 830&blogid=42. accessed July 11,2008.
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about environmental upgrading problems (specially when it comes to long­
term issues) since they deal with buyers and regulators; and access to lower 
management and workers is severely limited due to lack of research 
permission and or time constraints of potential interviewees.
RMG Firms Sampling:
A simple random sampling of RMG firms was done from the BGMEA 
Directory of RMG firms (2005-2006) (BGMEA 2005b), which is the only 
comprehensive database of RMG firms in Bangladesh. It may have been more 
useful to classify firms according to stratified sampling principles (sort them 
into groups based on company size or production type or buyers serviced for 
example and then do a proportionate allocation in samples). However, that 
was not possible because the BGMEA directory lists companies alphabetically 
-  there is no publicly available list of firms sorted according to type of 
production (knitwear/woven/1 shirts etc.) or size (by machines, employees or 
net exports). In fact, the information that the Directory has on the 
alphabetically listed companies' size, age or production is frequently incorrect 
or found to be out of date during empirical enquiry. Therefore the basic 
conditions for grouping members of the population into relatively 
homogenous subgroups before sampling did not arise for my thesis.
Firms were manually selected at random from the BGMEA Directory, giving 
each firm an equal probability of being included in the sample, with an equal 
probability of being small/medium/large, etc. The BGMEA have no data on 
compliance statuses (or DoE certification) of factories in the Directory. The 
DoE has records of all industrial facilities that have been granted 
Environmental Clearances, however, such records are not accessible for 
research purposes. Therefore the random sampling from the Directory had an 
equal probability of generating compliant/non compliant/ certified/non
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certified factories. Majority of the listed 3,600 factories were in Dhaka, and all 
sampled firms were physically accessible for interviewing during fieldwork.
Firm types based on production type- During my initial fieldwork, I realised 
that a classification of firm according to production type (since that would 
determine upgrading requirements) would be highly relevant for my research 
question based on the input that I received from initial RMG contacts. 
Therefore, I have classified RMG firms as follows:
-Type A: Firms that outsource their washing to independent washing plants, 
or only do "cutting and manufacturing" which does not require washing, 
making them "dry factories" in effect. They are not exempt from 
environmental upgrading, but are exempt from having ETPs;
-Type B: Firms that have their own washing units but only do detergent 
washes, for which the buyers do not require wastewater treatment. These 
firms are overlooked by buyers or regulators because detergent effluent of 
any quantity is not judged worthy of impact mediation; and 
-Type C: Firms that have their own washing units and do chemical washes 
and or dye their textiles, for which the buyers require ETPs and 
environmental management plans.
Based on my initial fieldwork, I realised that majority of the RMG firms fall 
under types A and B. This is not related to company size, since large firms 
may also outsource part or all of their washing, and many medium or small 
factories do chemical washes. The BGMEA directory does not distinguish 
between dry or wet process firms. Therefore, I classified respondents as type 
A and B firms by asking them about their washing facilities. As expected, the 
random sample from the BGMEA directory yielded mostly type A and B 
firms, since type C firms are relatively few.
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Environmental requirements and performance of the factories, as we will see 
in Chapter Five especially, did not fall into any pattern that could be linked to 
their type A /B /C  status.54 Empirically it was more interesting to study type C 
firms that do chemical washes. These firms tend to be fewer in number and 
produce high value added specialised products. Sampling of these firms was 
done on word-of-mouth basis from RMG sector contacts, since simple random 
sampling was not yielding enough data points of this type. Once contacted, I 
persuaded these firms to give me in depth interviews. These in-depth face-to- 
face interviews yielded rich specialised knowledge on actual problems with 
higher end environmental upgrading.
Firm types based on factory size - RMG firms can be classified as small, 
medium or large based on many different parameters, such as number of 
machines, number of workers, total export value, etc. Currently there exists 
no official method of categorisation based on these parameters and no 
organisation seems to agree on how many firms fit in where; in fact, lack of 
official, up-to-date, and reliable statistical data is a severe problem while 
studying the RMG sector, as has been pointed out in various research papers, 
most notably the World Bank 2005 paper.
To begin with, the total number of factories is widely disputed, since the trade 
associations (BGMEA and BKMEA) do not maintain updated databases that 
distinguish between operational and "extinct" firms. Some firms maintain 
registration, despite not being operational; some firms register as a new 
member to use tax benefits given to startups, when actually only importing 
machinery for the parent firm. Additionally, most firms (both knitwear and 
woven) are registered with both BKMEA and BGMEA, but some knitwear 
firms are only registered with BKMEA. However, the BGMEA members' 
directory is still the most comprehensive database since most RMG firms are 
registered with them. The BGMEA is responsible for providing RMG related
54 See Chapter Five more details on this aspect.
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data (although export volume data is maintained by the EPB), however, they 
do not publish data on factory sizes based on number of workers, export 
volume or number of machines. While data on RMG firms according to 
product category is available courtesy of the World Bank (2005) report, I was 
more interested in correlating the environmental upgrading efforts of firms 
with that of their size. To that end, I have used the size classification 
published by the ILO-DWPP (2005a and 2006b) reports, which cites a 2004 
internal report from the BGMEA to the MoC, which sets the total number of 
RMG firms at 3,986 and classifies RMG firms according to number of workers, 
which is presented in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 Characteristics of sampled RMG firms
Firm Size (according to number of workers)
Number of workers 
in firms
Size distribution in 
Sample (%)
Size distribution according to DWPP 2004 
data55 (%)
Small (0-199) 15 29
Medium (200-399) 58 38
Large (400+) 26 32
Firm Type (according to product category)
Knitwear 29% 53%
Woven 71% 47%
Level of Integration into GVC (according to order types)
Distribution in Sample 
(%)
Distribution according to DW PP/Gherzi 
2003 data56 (%)
Direct orders only 73% 30%
Subcontracts only 7% 20%
Both types 7% 50%
Kind of Production among sampled firm s
A: Dry process (cutting and sew ing only) 77%
B: Wet process (detergent wash only) 13%
C: Wet process (detergent and chemical wash) 9%
In this sample, 14 firms (26%) are large companies, while 32% of total firms 
are large in the industry. These firms are the most experienced in compliance, 
they also tend to be most proactive about the future, more integrated into the
55 This is the most recent classification of RMG firms according to number of staff, as specified in the 
ILO 2005 project “Decent Work Pilot Programme” (DWPP) briefing note, “Enhancing employment 
and Global Competitiveness Through Decent Work: post MFA Challenges and Opportunities”. The 
BGMEA information cell provided confirmation of this data being the most recent.
56 This is according to the above quoted DWPP paper, which in turn quotes the Gherzi & PPMA (2003) 
report on the Bangladeshi garments industry, as referenced in the bibliography.
157
apparel value chain, better bargainers with their buyers, better funded 
towards environmental upgrading, more involved with trade association 
level policymaking and most importantly for research purposes, the most 
proactive about being interviewed.
31 firms in this sample (58%) are medium sized (to compare, 38% of RMG 
firms overall are this size). This segment is important because the future of the 
industry has fallen to the medium sized majority to make or break the sector. 
Their compliance experiences range from hostile to reluctant participants. 
They are still dependent on middle agents for getting orders and as a result, 
do not always feel the pressure for environmental upgrading, although child 
labour experiences made them sceptical of non price buyer requirements. 
They are typically poor bargainers and are not vocal at the level of trade 
associations.
Out of 53, 8 firms in the sample (15%) are small sized (to compare, 29% of 
Bangladeshi RMG firms are small, although there is some dispute about this 
since many small firms are extinct in reality, or are seasonally in operation, 
yet still registered, which inflates their total number.) This segment is not 
represented as much as I would have liked, however, it was difficult 
arranging interviews when most of the randomly selected small firms had 
shut down. However, these interviews yielded important perspectives: they 
face the greatest and the least problems with environmental upgrading -  they 
are primarily concerned about staying afloat, and consequently being 
environmentally complaint is a low priority.
RMG Interviews:
Most factory managers do not speak English fluently; hence the interviews 
were taken in Bangla. I used semi-structured interviews (with "prompts" and 
some closed ended questions). Due to other demands on their time, I tried to
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limit the interview to 30 minutes, however they frequently ran to an hour or 
even longer. Please see Annex 4.3 and 4.4 for the questionnaires. RMG 
respondents are referenced in empirical chapters by their serial number as Rl, 
R2 etc.
II. The Buyers, Trade Association Officials, Trade Unions, Auditors, 
Consultants, Donors, and Government Officials:
Source:
The random sample of buyers was generated by manually selecting names 
from the EPB's "List of Buyers and Buying Agents"57 which has over 600 
listed companies. Similar to the RMG sampling, interviewees were chosen by 
"blind picking" of alphabetised names. The EPB list is not comprehensive, or 
fully accurate, and random sampling yielded many buying houses that are no 
longer trading.
Trade associations (BGMEA and BKMEA) are important political actors in 
RMG policymaking, as are the large number of government ministries 
involved in RMG compliance. Trade unions recently went underground once 
police backlash began against them after 2006 riots. They became a valuable 
source of information for my thesis. Auditors, donors and foreign consultants 
were also interviewed for their perspective from inside the policymaking and 
implementation circle. Interviewees from these groups were selected on the 
basis of personal contacts.
Sampling:
57 The list is available online at:
http://www.epb.gov.bd/PDF/CMC/List o f Buyers and Buying Agents.doc. last accessed on 
December 12, 2006.
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Sampling in the each case consisted of those people who were willing to be 
interviewed and it was impossible to have a true random sample. 
Opportunity samples of this kind are acceptable as long as the make up of the 
sample is clearly stated and the limitations of the data are realised (Bell 1993).
There are different kinds of buyers/buying houses in Bangladesh depending 
on relationship with end retailer in DC countries.58 Interviewees from buyer 
offices were selected on the basis of their experiences with compliance 
demand and monitoring in their supplier factory, as a result I got a mix of 
people who do audits themselves, and management who review auditor 
findings. See Table 4.2 for a list of buyers interviewed and Annex 4.8 for the 
questionnaire.
Table 4.2: List of interviewed buyers
Anonymised
Name
Type Years of 
Business in 
Bangladesh
Sources 
clothing for 
end country
L Trading company that works for foreign 
retailers without direct representation in 
Bangladesh.
10 to 15 years EU and USA
C Buying house that services hypermarts and 
department stores
4 years Only EU
F Buying house 5 years Only USA
H Brand name buyer, own label 10 years EU and USA
M Brand name buyer, own label 4 years Only EU
G Brand name buyer, own label 8 years EU and USA
I Buying house 10 years EU and USA
KAP Buying house 20 years Only EU
K Buying house, own labels 14 years Only EU
Compliance auditors were also interviewed from three of the four auditing 
companies that operate commercially in Bangladesh. The fourth audit team is 
part of a research organisation that is undertaking a compliance audit pilot 
programme and were kind enough to allow me access to their audit visits. 
These interviewees are as follows.
58 See Chapter Three and Six for details.
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Table 4.3: List of interviewed auditors
Name Interviewee Certifications Offered
M oody International Aslam Khan, auditor WRAP, IS08000
Systain International Karl Borgschulze, general 
manager
WRAP
Interteck Labtest (ITS Labtest 
Bangladesh Ltd.)
Md. Arif Uz Zaman, manager 
CSR
WRAP, IS08000
Bangladesh Centre for 
Advanced Studies (BCAS)
Shahsun Nahar, Research 
officer and Mahbub A. 
Mahmood, Project Manager
Kardst Quelle 3P Project
Please see Annex 4.2 for auditor questionnaires. I also interviewed 
representatives of trade unions that are active in Bangladeshi garment 
factories. The trade unions are as follows.
Table 4.4: List of interviewed trade union representatives
Name Interviewee Type of Organisation
Sommilito Garments Sromik 
Federation (Awaj Foundation);
Anonymous Registered trade union, m edium  
sized
INCIDIN Bangladesh Anonymous Registered trade union and NGO, 
large sized
Bangladesh Independent Garments 
Workers Union Federation (BIGUF)
Anonymous Registered trade union and NGO, 
large sized
Bangladesh Centre for Workers 
Solidarity (BCWS)
Anonymous Registered trade union, small sized
National Garments Workers 
Federation Bangladesh
Anonymous Registered trade union, small sized
Sromik Nirapotta Forum Anonymous Registered NGO for labour rights
Please see Annex 4.11 and 4.9 for trade union questionnaires. In depth face-to- 
face elite interviews were taken with policymakers, foreign consultants and 
donor representatives as follows:
Table 4.5: List of elite interviewees
Name and Designation Organisation
Mohammad Reazuddin, Director, Technical Department 
(Industrial Licensing)
DoE
Ghulam Hussain, Joint Secretary, and former Head of the 
national Social Compliance Forum
Ministry of Commerce (MoC) 
Social Compliance Forum (SCF)
Lutfor Rahman, Second Vice President BGMEA
Alan Roberts, Head MFA Forum (MFAF)
Indranil Chakraborty, Social Development Adviser Department for International 
Developm ent (DfID)
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Please see Annex 4.1,4.5,4.6,4.7 and 4.10 for questionnaires.
Interviews:
While some contacts had agreed to be interviewed before my fieldwork 
started, the final list of interviewees was vastly different, since many more 
actors were interviewed than initially thought was necessary. Elite 
respondents were interviewed using the semi-structured method, using more 
open-ended questions. These interviews ran for much longer than 30 minutes, 
depending on the number of open-ended questions. These interviews were 
mainly conducted in Bangla.
Formalities of Interviewing:
Verbal consent was taken from interviewees before interviews were 
conducted, and they were reassured that the data was to be used solely for 
research purposes. Kvale (1996) recommends that the respondent be briefed 
and debriefed at the beginning and the ending of the interview. Accordingly, 
I provided the interviewees with the context of the interviews, and a cover 
letter explaining the broad research aims. Whenever possible, interviews were 
recorded with the permission of the interviewee. This helped in verifying the 
responses, although using a semi-structured interview where the responses 
have been circled by the interviewer was very useful in verification and 
analysis of the data. Prompts listed under the questions were used as sub 
headings and provided structure to note taking. Whenever possible, 
interview statements and specially quotes were verified with the respondent 
(Bell 1993).
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4.4 Transcribing, Coding and Analysis:
This thesis aims to create new understanding of a situation by exploring and 
interpreting complex data from interviews, observations, field notes, policy 
documents or news reports. Methods for analysing data were determined 
when data collection instruments were being chosen to enable smooth 
analysis. Methods commonly used in the social sciences involve examining 
text (primary and secondary data) and recording growing understanding 
through making annotations or memos, coding and reviewing coded material 
by topic, rigorously searching for patterns, building theories or explanations 
and grounding them in the data, displaying models and producing a final 
thesis (Gaskell 2002).
Since the interviews were conducted in Bangla, I translated the interview 
transcripts into English. After translation, coding and analysis was done 
broadly according to content analysis principles guiding the following steps:
1. Choosing the level of analysis.
2. Deciding how many concepts to code for.
3. Deciding whether to code for existence or frequency of a concept.
4. Deciding on how to distinguish among concepts.
5. Developing rules for coding texts.
6. Deciding what to do with "irrelevant" information.
7. Coding the texts.
8. Analysing the results.
(Bell 1993, Gaskell 2000 and Kvale 1996).
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4.5 Limitations:
I have previous experience of conducting interviews in Bangladeshi garment 
factories outside of this thesis, and had sufficient knowledge of practical field 
conditions. In addition I field tested my questionnaires, etc.59 However, I 
would like to say a few things about my research limitations that readers and 
future researchers might find useful:
Reflexivity, positionality, power relations and fieldwork -  Research for this 
thesis was undertaken in my hometown of Dhaka, and I was very much at 
home in the kind of urban spaces that the factories and offices were situated 
in. Furthermore, due to my previous degree and employment, I was already 
familiar with the institutional politics and social contexts that impacted the 
research process. From the perspective of a Dhakaiya60 female academic 
undertaking research in Dhaka, I would like to mention a few things about 
how my fieldwork was produced in what Sultana (2007:375) refers to as 
"negotiated spaces and practices of reflexivity that is critical about issues of 
positionality and power relations in multiple scales". No ethical research 
should be exempt from considering its origins, politics, commitments and 
impacts along axes of differences and similarities between the researcher and 
the subject (Nagar 2002). During my fieldwork I was fully aware of the 
reflexive aspects of my endeavour: reflection on self, process and 
voice/representation. I critically examined the dynamics of interviewee access 
and relational markers (educational background, class markers) that impacted 
the often unspoken power differences that preconditioned the research 
process (politics of knowledge production in long-established categories and 
narratives among my interviewees and myself) (Hardy et al 2001, Alvesson 
and Skoldberg, 2000). Being reflexive from the start to finish allowed me to
59 This was done using RMG contacts in my family who patiently allowed me to try questionnaire 
designs. They were not interviewed for the thesis, and they helped gather addresses etc.
60 Dhakaiya technically refers to the people of Old Dhaka, but is broadly used in the sense of having 
family that go back generations in Dhaka.
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maintain ethical commitments and be clear about where to situate the 
knowledge created and the research process.
Although ethnically I had much in common with my interviewees, I felt like 
the "other" due to my class privileges (e.g. material and educational markers) 
during my interactions, and had to constantly negotiate the various 
locationalities and subjectivities of my position. This was particularly felt 
during my interviews with trade union workers who I felt apart from ("How 
do you expect to understand us factory workers when you look like the 
factory owners?"). The other side of our class difference was that some 
unionists immediately placed me in a location of respect, since working class 
Dhakaites are conditioned to be deferential to educated elites. Some RMG 
managers and policymakers also granted me access because of class 
commonalities, and spoke to me with class politics intact.
Another set of dynamics concerned insider-outsider roles and politics of 
representation, across borders of common ethnicity (Mullings 1999). During 
the early days of my fieldwork, interviewees gave frank opinions, but after 
the wage riots in June 2006, the dynamics changed and my role as a 
compliance researcher was seen as a problem. Factory managers plainly told 
me that they did not want to talk to me since I am from a UK university, the 
unsaid implication being that they did not trust organisations from the EU 
(e.g. Oxfam, Clean Clothes Campaign, etc.). My outsider status was made 
clearer when one factory manager told me that the BGMEA had sent out a 
circular asking factories not talk to compliance researchers from foreign 
NGOs, since the researchers were campaigning to smear the sectors7 image 
abroad. I believe that the riots and the consequent politicisation of the debate 
contributed to significant research problems of respondent bias. I cannot 
naively assume that over time as the controversy lessened, and over 
continued interaction with the actors, the insider-outsider borders 
disappeared. However, some respondents saw the riots as an occasion to talk
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frankly and perhaps justify their position as non-compliant organisations, 
changing my locationality to that of a sympathetic Bangladeshi who can 
understand their situation better than westerner ("You are a Bangladeshi, you 
will understand what is what, let me tell you how things really are"). My 
ability to speak the local dialect of Bengali and hold long conversations about 
local issues helped negotiate tension and I got access when a non Bangladeshi 
researcher would have had difficulty. My insider position was also felt during 
frank discussions about compliance, where rather xenophobic and 
nationalistic comments were made. A non Bangladeshi would probably not 
be privy to such frankness. Overall, my insider-outsider status was a mixed 
blessing, and in my mind it was a constant question of negotiating my 
different locationalities and personal political positionalities to build 
interviewer-interviewee rapport without compromising the ethical research 
lessons taught in the classroom. I must also mention that the ever nebulous 
interviewer-interviewee positionality, subjectivity and power-relations 
changed over time: during the post riot crackdown on trade unionists, one 
important source called me to say that our phone calls are likely being 
recorded and that for the sake of her safety I should not call her again. For 
her, being in contact with a compliance researcher from the UK was a 
dangerous thing, whereas in the early days she was an open and eager 
participant.
In a patriarchal society like Bangladesh, a female researcher cannot escape 
"othering" due to gender politics (Nagar 2002). In my case I was not 
unprepared for these attitudes and faced much condescension and 
patronising behaviour from factory personnel and elite respondents. These 
biases were reflected in their answers to me, as they were on topics women 
are not supposed to understand, and they were more interested in social 
discourse. In one particular instance, a technical expert promised me data in 
exchange for socialising; feeling uncomfortable (there are boundaries to 
interviewee-empathy building), I brought a chaperone to our next meeting,
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and he summarily denied me access to data. How far a researcher will go for 
interviews in a male dominated society was also tested during the wage riots, 
when I had to drop interviews for fear of being harassed by the Special Forces 
policemen. The knowledge thus produced in this thesis should be therefore 
understood in the context of the inter-subjectiveness of participants (myself 
included) and the positionality of that time and space.
Time constraints -  Time constraints during the fieldwork period may have 
contributed to some limitations in this study. I had planned on participating 
in a seminar to present my thesis findings to some major groups of 
interviewees (mainly donor agencies and the trade association members, since 
these were the groups who expressed most interest in my findings), but 
limited time in Dhaka meant that I could not do so. I believe that my thesis 
would have benefited enormously from their input. I also would have liked to 
collect data (follow up interviews) a year after the main policy initiatives had 
been implemented, but due to practical considerations of a research deadlines, 
this was not possible. However, this might be an interesting follow-up study.
Choice of theoretical framework and research focus -  While EMT is 
personally very interesting to me, it may have been ambitious to try to fit it 
into a LDC context without having the benefit of a larger sample of data- 
points, in order to test the theory in more than one industrial sector. No 
attempt was made to contrast the EM attempts of the RMG industry with any 
other sector in Bangladesh, even though more polluting sectors may have 
more experiences regarding greening. Also, no efforts have been made to 
contrast the RMG factories within and outside the Export Processing Zones. 
The Bangladeshi RMG sector was also not contrasted with neighbouring 
India, Pakistan or Sri Lanka, where the EM issues may also yield interesting 
results and lessons from a South Asian perspective. A longer-term study may 
indeed find it fruitful to explore these possibilities.
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Choice of research design -  As explained earlier, I had decided on relying on 
face to face interviews because of the social norms in Bangladesh, where 
questionnaires received by post would be summarily be dismissed or ignored. 
However, interviewing had its own limitations, which I have discussed 
earlier; and I have taken best possible care to address problems of random 
selection, validity, respondent bias, interviewee bias and self selection bias 
(section 4.2 and 4.3), but one cannot be totally sure that all errors have been 
corrected for by research design.
Sample taking and data collection -  I faced some problems with sampling of 
RMG firms, as discussed earlier in section 4.3, and much of it was outside of 
the realm of my control. However, if I had to do this study again, I would 
spend more time and cost towards selecting a much larger sample (of about 
400 firms) and would collect interview data with a team of researchers in 
collaboration with audit firms or research organisations. A larger number of 
samples would have made the findings more generalisable, and it would have 
been useful to have a few in-depth case studies of firms who were laggards 
and leaders in social compliance. However, I am satisfied with the sampling 
of all other interview groups. There were some data collection problems, as 
discussed in earlier, but additionally, my efforts to collect policy documents 
and evaluation reports (secondary data) were unusually frustrating not only 
because the reports were simply unavailable from the start, but some papers 
were made unavailable to me because I informed them of my research topic, 
which was perceived as sensitive. I believe that given enough time and social 
networking I could have accessed more relevant material for my thesis.
Measurement of variables -  Since my thesis looks at internal firm skills and 
policy maker behaviour, much of it cannot be quantified or measured 
quantitatively. However, I have tried to ensure reliability and validity of my 
findings by triangulation (section 4.2) and have attempted to maximise data 
validity, and reliability, to the best of my capabilities.
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4.6 Conclusion:
This chapter explained how the theoretical framework of Chapter Two was 
tested empirically and presented a justification of the research design. It also 
described the process of interviewee selection, explained why and how 
interviews were undertaken with state and non-state participants, and how 
the results were analysed using content analysis principles, as well as some 
limitations of the research design and lessons for future researchers. In the 
following chapter I present my empirical findings by testing the first of three 
hypotheses.
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Chapter Five: Eco-Compliance Upgrading and Bangladeshi RMG Firms
5.1 Introduction:
In Chapter Three we saw how eco-compliance requirements in the apparel 
value chain are close to what Christoff (1996) called weak EM. This chapter 
develops that thought empirically by examining how factory managers 
operationalise those requirements across entrepreneurial, engineering and 
administrative dimensions (Miles and Snow 1978), which involve not only 
technological/material changes, but also social/cultural changes. For EM to 
work, managers would need to strategise for profit generating eco-proactive 
measures (and not just reactive end-of-pipe ETPs). This would need to be 
driven by EM principles of "scientific information" and EM enabling 
management systems. I begin by testing the hypothesis that:
Poor environmental upgrading in firms will be associated with factors internal to the 
firms, such as corporate culture, slow changing behaviour, problems with learning 
environmental information, and will be linked to poor competitive advantage gains.
This chapter problematises EM on the factory floor through the RBV, which 
suggests that a firm's proactive/reactive environmental compliance 
behaviour is associated with its strategic and core resources (which are unique to 
the firm, and are often knowledge based, socially complex, and causally 
ambiguous), and that whether a firm can achieve competitive advantage from 
greening behaviour or not depends on its strategy making (that can be either 
proactive or reactive, utilising the firm's unique strategic skills, and tangible 
and non tangible resources) which should include not only the ability to spot 
"win-win" opportunities (to be provided by changing market signals) but also 
on the ability to continuously implement the strategies. An important RBV 
suggestion for this thesis is that a firm that uses only non-RBV skills for 
greening tends to have reactive strategies. Since non-RBV skills are the
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opposite of strategic and core resources, they are also held by competing 
firms, and therefore cannot lead to competitive advantage.
I begin with briefly summarising the main environmental impacts of RMG 
production and then talk about the environmental demands of compliance, 
since the demands are what drive the proactive vs. reactive strategies. I divide 
the demands into two parts - the buyer and third party codes, and national 
legislation. In Chapter Three I talked briefly about how environmental issues 
are crowded out by the social/labour/worker rights issues, and in this 
chapter I bring out the marginalised issues of environmental issues in codes 
and laws.
Then I look at the RMG responses (environmental clearances, third party 
certification, environmental management systems, effluent treatment plants, 
etc.) and examine how the proactive/reactive strategies corresponded to the 
elusive "win win" gains. The lack of environmental upgrading success is 
further examined at the level of the boardroom and the factory floor. Before 
that, a brief summary of my findings is presented in table 5.1.61
61 Some of the information in Table 5.1 has already been presented in Chapter Four. It is repeated here 
for providing context.
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Table 5.1: Characteristics of Sampled RMG Firms
Firm Size (according to number of workers)
Number of workers 
in firms
Size distribution in 
Sample (%)
Size distribution according to DWPP 2004 
data62 (%)
Small (0-199) 15 29
Medium (200-399) 58 38
Large (400+) 26 32
Firm Type (according to product category)
Knitwear 29% 53%
Woven 71% 47%
Level o f Integration into GVC (according to order types)
Distribution in Sample 
(%)
Distribution according to DW PP/Gherzi 
2003 data63 (%)
Direct orders only 73% 30%
Subcontracts only 7% 20%
Both types 7% 50%
Production type
A: Dry process (cutting and sewing only) 77%
B: Wet process (detergent w ash only) 13%
C: Wet process (detergent and chemical wash) 9%
Overview of Environmental Performance, selected target indicators
Large% Medium% Small % Total %
DoE Certification 100.0 100.0 37.5 84.9
WRAP Certification 50.0 29.0 25.0 32.1
SA8000 Certification 21.4 0.0 0.0 5.7
IS09000 Certification64 21.4 32.3 0.0 24.5
OKOTEX Certification 0.0 3.2 0.0 1.9
ETPs 3.0 16.1 0.0 15.1
Environmental Management 
Systems (EMSs) 21.4 35.5 0.0 26.4
Own Environmental Policies 21.4 0.0 0.0 5.7
Environmental benefits from  
compliance 100.0 90.3 50.0 81.1
Increased orders from compliance 
upgrading 57.1 48.4 0.0 43.4
Selected descriptive data for all 53 factories is presented in Annex 5.1. Overall, 
it is difficult to draw general conclusions about factory types (factory size -  
small, medium, large; product type -  denim, woven, knit; or production style 
-  wet or dry, type A /B/C; buyers serviced -  EU or US) and eco-performance.
62 This is the most recent classification of RMG firms according to number of staff, as specified in the 
ILO 2005 project “Decent Work Pilot Programme” (DWPP) briefing note, “Enhancing employment 
and Global Competitiveness Through Decent Work: post MFA Challenges and 
Opportunities”(Choudhury and Hussain 2005). The BGMEA information cell provided confirmation of 
this data being the most recent.
63 This is according to the above quoted DWPP paper, which in turn quotes the Gherzi & PPMA (2003) 
report on the Bangladeshi garments industry, as referenced in the bibliography.
64 SA8000 and ISO 9000 are quality assurance management standards and have no eco-components. 
These are included here to show factories’ comparative interest in being certified.
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There are large, financially stable, denim weaving factories that do not have 
ETPs (e.g. Ha-Meen Group Ltd.); then there are large woven factories that do 
(e.g. Opex Group). Regardless of size or financial stability, some factories' 
need for ETPs is ambiguous: many factories do not do their own washing 
(they subcontract to "washing plants") or they subcontract on an irregular 
basis or they subcontract for one of their factories but not the others. Their 
eco-performance also cannot be tied to the buyers they work for either: 
factories typically work for a mixture of US and EU buyers since factory 
owners are risk averse to international economy fluctuations.
5.2 Environmental Impacts of RMG:
A 2007 study of the RMG sector's eco-efficiency needs by GTZ-PROGRESS 
summarised the energy demands of the RMG processes and eco-impacts 
(table 5.2).
Table 5.2: Major energy consuming equipments in RMG___________________
Process Application Equipment Eco-impacts
Compaction Machine Calendars, Motors Electricity, Steam, Compressed Air
Dryer Machine Motors, Heaters Electricity, Gas, Compressed Air
Dyeing Machine Motors, Agitators Electricity, Steam
Electricity Generation Gas Engine Gen Sets Electricity, Gas
Air Compressor Motors Electricity, Water
Water supply, distribution Pumps, Motors Electricity
Steam Generation, 
distribution
Motors, Burners Electricity, Compressed Air
Ironing Electric- Steam Irons Electricity, Gas
Lighting Bulbs, Fluorescent Tubes Electricity
Sewing Sewing Machines Electricity
General Ventilation, 
Air conditioning
Fans, Air conditioners 
etc.
Electricity
Source: GTZ PROGRESS 2007c:16
In addition, the report also identified that RMG production consumes large 
amounts of water (steam production for boilers, especially in dyeing 
segments, washing garments, steam production to run irons, equipment 
cooling, space cleaning, etc.), natural gas (fuel for the boilers, power 
generators, garment dryers, stenter machines, etc.) and chemicals (dyes
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containing caustic soda, sodium chloride, sodium carbonate, sodium 
sulphide, sodium hydrosulphite, hydrochloric acid, other acids, alkali and 
salts).65 Buyers have banned some dyes, as they are known to release amines 
during processing, which are potentially carcinogenic. Without going into 
details of the chemical processes involved, it is easy to say that the RMG 
production process (for knitwear, sweaters and woven) has ample 
opportunities for proactive and reactive eco-management; particularly in 
areas of increasing recycling (solid wastes sold off/recycled), using 
renewables (renewable energy such as solar panels for indoor lighting, since 
heavier load renewable energy options in Bangladesh are nascent), treatment 
of toxins (using ETPs consistently), reducing energy use (better use of 
machines, heat conservation, improving processes towards less energy 
consuming alternatives like cold pad batch dyeing, modernisation of 
hardware, steam pipes, steam traps, condensate recovery, etc.).
5.3 Buyer Codes and Environmental Strategies:
CSR research has consistently shown that CSR means different things along 
the supply chain (Welford, Chan and Man 2007) and therefore a critical 
analysis of apparel codes was undertaken. The buyer codes included: Adidas- 
Salomon AG, Gap Inc., Hennes & Mauritz AB (H&M), Levi Strauss & Co., Liz 
Claiborne Inc., Marks & Spencer (M&S), Nike Inc., Phillips-Van Heusen 
Corporation, Reebok International Ltd., Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Fruit Of The 
Loom, Sara Lee Corporation, Caters' Corporation, Jones Apparel Group Inc., 
JC Penney Inc., VF Corporation, Wamaco Group, Gear For Sports Ltd., and 
Sears Roebuck and Company. In addition to these retailers, key third party 
international codes were reviewed: Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), Ethical 
Trading Initiative (ETI), Fair Labor Association (FLA), Social Accountability
65 The study did not measure any eco-impacts using water or air quality standards.
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International (SA8000), and World Responsible Apparel Production 
(WRAP).66
Literature on convergence of code content in chains is extensive (e.g. Nadvi 
2004) but not much was known about the convergence of apparel chain codes' 
eco-content. Despite the existence of common codes (Jo-In and WRAP), there 
is a contestation of standards as they tend to cover similar themes but add to 
the overall complexity of monitoring and emphases.67
Detailed cross comparison of code content is presented in Annex 5.2, 
however, eco-content is more pronounced in company codes that source 
denim and footwear -  two of the lines that are generally acknowledged as 
being the more polluting within the RMG product range.68 For example, Levis 
Strauss and Co. included eco-provisions in their supplier codes as early as 
1991 and was the first company to implement global effluent guidelines for 
their denim suppliers in 1995. Unfortunately for EMT, the majority of codes 
are less articulate or specific about environmental concerns: they usually pack 
greening into "environmental health and hazard reduction" issues and do not 
say anything explicitly about a specific "environmental policy" for the 
suppliers, a phased time frame for implementation (which directly 
encourages one-time reactive strategies), recycling-reuse-reduce principles, 
proactive waste management, or hazardous emissions.
66 Please see bibliography for details of the codes reviewed.
67 Chapter Six and Seven examine this in more detail.
68 No studies have been done on the pollution loads across the Bangladeshi RMG product line to date.
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Table 5.3: Environmental content in buyer and third party codes
Aspects Third party standards Brand leader buyers N on brand 
buyers
General 
Environmental 
Policy within the 
Codes?
Low stringency; mainly 
emphasis on occupational 
health and safety.
Low stringency; mainly 
emphasis on occupational 
health and safety, 
OSHA69 codes. Some 
have specific 
requirements.
Vaguely
defined.
Most do not 
mention the 
environment 
at all.
Emphasis on 
national regulatory 
standards?
Yes, often does not go 
beyond it.
Yes, sometimes goes 
beyond it.
Some do.
Timeframe for
becoming
compliant?
None. None. None.
Focus on raw 
materials used?
None. Few, but m ostly none. None.
Focus on hazardous 
emissions:
None. Few. None.
Focus on waste 
management:
Yes, but non-specific on 
operations.
Some do, but for high 
value added lines only. 
Marked preference for 
reactive strategies.
None.
Some brand buyers that are under media scrutiny and reputational risk 
pressures, emphasise eco-proactiveness but that is coupled with a preference 
for control technologies, like ETPs. Another shortcoming is that they concede 
to national legislation in environmental controls, which is a serious weakness 
given that governance by codes was born because of the weak environmental 
performance capacity and weak LDC regulations in the first place.
Regardless of the code shortcomings, their importance in strategy making is 
beyond question. In this survey, 28% of all interviewed firms were IS09000 
certified, 32% had WRAP, and 5% had SA8000. These were all large and 
medium sized firms, meaning that small firms are either less pressured or 
unable to go beyond minimal efforts. Interestingly, IS014000 and UN Global 
Compact are not popular in the RMG sector: none of the interviewed auditors
69 US Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) supply chain standards are popular 
among US listed companies like Nike, etc.
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have audited for these standards, and according to the UNGC website, no 
Bangladeshi RMG firm is participating in its programme. 70
5.4 National Laws and Environmental Strategies:
The environmental aspects of Bangladeshi RMG factories are covered by the 
National Factories Act (1965) and Factories Rules (1979) which cover 
environmental quality in and around the factory building (that are 
emphasised by the codes as "health and safety"); the Bangladesh 
Environmental Conservation Act (ECA 1995); the Bangladesh Environmental 
Conservation Rules (ECR 1997) and the DoE's EIA Guidelines for Industries 
(1997) (Saifullah 2005a, 2005b and 2005c, SEDF 2001). The last three set the 
regulatory requirements for Environmental Clearances (ECs) based on 
environmental impacts (such as liquid emissions and waste disposal), aspects 
that are emphasised by some larger buyers (please see Annex 5.2).
The EIA Guidelines (1997) are intended to give RMG entrepreneurs a sense of 
what environmental impacts may potentially arise during the design, 
construction, operation and emergency situations; and how identified impacts 
are to be quantified and mitigated. The Guidelines are vague about proactive 
measures, and leans towards prioritising economic growth over greening: it 
recommends "Competent design to minimise/offset adverse effects based on 
realistic operations assumptions" (DoE 1997: 72), and in particular, measures 
such as reducing effluent water to DoE (1997) standards, discharging to 
municipal sewers, or joint disposal with other industries, in order to achieve 
"economy of scale plus better environmental protection" (DoE 1997: 73) and 
simplified monitoring. The document does mention proactive strategy 
making:
70 Source: UNGC website at:
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html. accessed on July 17, 2008.
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Along with the mitigation measures, suitable project modifications 
may also be considered to minimise the severity of impacts and to 
reduce cost of mitigative measures. This can be achieved by providing 
some engineering controls. A few of these are mentioned below: siting, 
buffer zones, lay out designs, resource substitutions, resource 
minimisation, process or storage modifications, dust control, assess 
control, labelling, temperature control, monitoring of hazardous gases, 
shut down; and secondary containments. (DoE 1997:17).
Along the pipe measures are not explained clearly anywhere in the document, 
while ETPs are emphasised in line with the ECR making them mandatory. 
Also, proactive managerial options (e.g. modifying lay out design, recycling, 
reusing, reducing, etc.) are never linked to environmental damage avoidance 
or to cost savings. Therefore, if RMG firms took their environmental strategy 
cues only from national legislation, then they would be left with 
predominantly reactive end of pipe strategies.
Overall, the codes and national legislation are creating incentives for a 
mixture of proactive and reactive strategies: buyer codes usually pack 
environmental issues with "health and safety" and require on-going changes 
in areas of worker health and safety, the idea being to prevent environmental 
degradation, accidents or injuries within the factory premises. Therefore, codes 
are resulting in proactive strategies when legal liability is directly provable, 
but not in the case of effluent management or air pollution, where there is the 
possibility of passing on environmental responsibility to the community.
5.5 Environmental Upgrading Strategies on the Factory Floor:
The discussion so far shows that the environmental upgrading demands are 
not very ambitious from a strong EM perspective; it has the hallmark of a 
corporatist model of EM where greening incentives are diluted to the benefit
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of the private sector, at the cost of ecological protection. In the absence of 
strong and specific greening requirements from buyers that supersede 
national legal requirements (as happened with wage rates, working hours, 
chid labour, etc.), RMG firms have evolved a strategy of loophole hunting and 
reluctance to go beyond making minimum effort which further weakens the 
EM goals, as we shall see below.
Environmental Clearance Certificates (ECCs):
According to the ECA and ECR, RMG factories are Orange B type, and are 
thus required to submit Initial Environmental Examination/Environmental 
Management Plan reports along with layout plans for an ETP, with fees, to 
obtain an ECC.71 The DoE does not distinguish between RMG process types 
(e.g. denim factory vs. a "fabric stitching only" factory). The financial cost of 
certification is dependent on total capital investment of the firm (table 5.4).
Table 5.4: Cost of DoE ECC (Source: DoE 1997)
Capital Investment into Industrial Unit ECC Fees Payable to DoE
Tk. 100,000-5,00,000 Tk. 1,500
Tk. 5,00,000 -10,00,000 Tk. 3,000
Tk. 10,00,000 - 50,00,000 Tk. 5,000
Tk. 50,00,000 -10,000,000 Tk. 10,000
Tk. 10,000,000 - 2,00,000,000 Tk. 25,000
Tk. 2,00,000,000 - 5,00,000,000 Tk. 50,000
Above Tk. 5,00,000,000 Tk. 1,00,000
Note: renewal fees are 25% of ECC fees.
However, certification costs also include arranging the IEE, EMP, ETP plans, 
emergency relocation plans, etc., which costs money and management time 
(other requirements such as project feasibility report and no objection 
certificate from local authorities are also required by the BGMEA for trade 
registration, so do not cause additional pressure on the firms). The 
preparation of the IEE, EMP, ETP design and emergency relocation plans 
require specialist professional input (hiring outside consultants), the costs of
71 Details are given in Annex 5.2
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which are to be counted towards becoming environmentally compliant. The 
maintenance of the EMP is a continual process and requires the training of 
upper and middle management (as well as workers) to realise its intended 
benefits -  this requires staff commitment and tangible and non tangible 
resources.
The rate of compliance with DoE certification was quite high (84% of all firms 
said they were compliant). The most cited reason for investing tangible and 
non-tangible resources into certification, was to get a gas connection (79% of 
all firms); the second most cited being threat of failing a DoE audit (39% of all 
firms). Buyer motivation was the third most popular reason (18%) but all of 
these were medium and large sized firms that work for higher end buyers, 
which would explain the breakdown in supply chain pressure among the 
lower rung suppliers. Only 3 firms (all large, but none of them involved in 
denim manufacturing) said that they sought certification due to ecological 
concerns. Interestingly, DoE audit failing was cited most by medium and 
large factories; one manager of a large factory said that they did not need to 
wait for buyers to ask for ECC, as a high profile operation, they were fully 
aware of legal responsibilities and had all applicable government certificates. 
Another manager simply said,
Our company does not wait to be told to be compliant.72
So, is the ECC as unproblematic as that? It would seem far from it: the biggest 
barrier is meeting the costs of the legally mandatory ETPs. It is safe to assume 
that individual ETPs, regardless of factory size or production type, present a 
major cost barrier for RMG firms, when compared to the option of 
government run common ETPs where factories share running costs. Most 
RMG factories do not have ETPs. Since they are operational with gas 
connectivity and trade licenses (for which they require ECCs), it is safe to
72 R12
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assume that it is possible to ignore aspects of the certificate. This reveals that 
unrealistic policymaking resulted in such high cost barriers, that RMG firms 
began finding ways of bypassing it.
The RMG firms have found other ways of achieving "cheap and quick" 
compliance: the issuing process of ECCs has an element of "grand fathering" 
built into it. Since ECCs were guaranteed for all pre-existing (and new Green 
category) industrial units, it creates a legal loophole that allows RMG firms 
that were opening up new factories to get low cost ECs by showing pre-1997 
registration dates. According to my interviewees, this is fairly common. 
Furthermore, the ECR has a built in discretionary element which allows for 
more short cuts. According to the DoE (1997: 26):
(4) For industrial units and projects falling in the Orange -  A, Orange - 
B and Red categories, firstly a Location Clearance Certificate and 
thereafter an Environmental Clearance Certificate shall be issued: 
Provided that the Director General may, without issuing a Location 
Clearance Certificate at the first instance, directly issue Environmental 
Clearance Certificate if he, on the application of an industrial unit or 
project, considers it appropriate to issue such certificate to the 
industrial unit or project.
Although the certification process was a pale version of what it ought to be by 
law, the firms still had great difficulty in getting a certificate. All firms faced 
certification problems. 51% thought DoE was generally an unhelpful and 
inept organisation, but the biggest problem cited was the need to pay bribes 
to get anything done -  79% of firms admit to having given bribes for 
certification. Firms are concerned about being fined by the DoE for not having 
a certificate or for non renewal because fines are seen as an avenue for bribe 
seeking, and so they prefer paying a fixed amount for certification and avoid 
fines. One respondent said,
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We pay baksheesh73 to government officers, and that is not a problem. But 
what is a problem is that the DoE baksheesh is for no use. I f you don't give 
baksheesh then there is even more suffering.74
Repeatedly respondents expressed their frustration at the ECC as being 
paperwork that can be annually used to exert more baksheesh, with no 
service given to the factory in exchange. While most companies seemed to be 
resigned to the system of paying bribes to grease certification processes, some 
respondents were less tolerant.
The second biggest problem was the certification process itself. 37% of firms 
found the process to be too bureaucratic. The third biggest problem cited was 
the inability of the DoE staff to advise on environmental assessments, etc. 
Since "paper compliance" is so cumbersome, RMG firms are reluctant to go 
any deeper: none of the DoE certified firms had submitted the mandatory IEE, 
which is the first step towards getting certified, and only 14 firms had home 
made EMSs, which is also mandatory.
Minimal efforts are enough, especially since regulatory oversight is 
nonexistent: 40% of the certified firms said that the DoE never came round to 
inspect their premises, even though an inspection or two is mandatory before 
certification, according to the interview with the head of the Technical 
Department of the DoE. When asked about what the inspections entailed, the 
60% of firms whose factories had been physically inspected by the DoE, said 
that the DoE inspectors wanted to walk around the factory with accompanied 
by factory staff; some firms thought that inspections were a good opportunity 
for maintaining cordial company relations with the regulators. These 
inspections are never unannounced, so the factory is always prepared and
73 Baksheesh denotes a gratuity or a tip, but in this case it is more substantial than a tip.
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alert. Some respondents said that inspections tend to be preceding religious 
holidays, and sometime involve the factories paying informal "fees" to the 
inspector. This reveals a high degree of agency capture, where the regulator is 
happy to not ask for too many changes or find fault, while rushing through 
with paperwork. Most firms seem to accept this as part of the cultural norm of 
doing business around religious holidays.
The DoE certificate has to be renewed annually, with the EMSs updated. 84% 
of the firms said that they apply for certificate renewal every year, while the 
rest said that certification was a "one time thing". Therefore, it is possible to 
recycle their first DoE certification during renewing their trade licence every 
year with the BGMEA. A few respondents said that it is possible to show DoE 
certification obtained for one factory site when getting a gas connection for a 
second factory, or a second trade licence, which points to how easily 
authorities turn a blind eye to environmental certification irregularities.
RMG firms that did go beyond minimal paperwork revealed a disconnect 
between their greening strategies and the DoE. In this survey, firms with ETPs 
and EMSs said that although they had mentioned ETPs/EMSs in their ECC 
application, their decision to have ETPs/EMSs was mainly because of buyer 
requirements, and not driven by national legislation requirements. While this 
statistic underlies what we already saw -  that DoE certification is not strictly 
followed -  it also points to the fragmented nature of environmental 
upgrading that is likely happening outside of an integrated framework that is 
supported by the nation-state, in line with EM prescriptions. Currently, 
upgrading problems will remain the lone responsibility of the firm, which 
increases the risk of upgrading initiatives slowing down or halting.
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Environmental Management Systems (EMSs):
EMSs can be a good indicator of proactiveness within firms (that can lead to 
competitive advantage, according to RBV), and are mandatory for ECC. Since 
84.9% of the interviewed RMG firms had DoE certification, it was interesting 
to ask whether the EMSs were fulfilling their potential for proactive strategy 
making. However, most ECC firms did not know what an EMS was. Only 14 
out of the 53 said they had operational EMSs -  11 medium, 3 large firms and 
none of them in the denim sector.
Designing an EMS requires expert input, however, none of the 14 firms have 
employed outside experts in designing the EMS; instead only their top 
management were responsible for designing it. They did not receive any help 
or information on it from the DoE, peers or buyer manuals. Top management 
possibly created homemade EMSs to speed up the buyer audit qualification 
process, save on consultant fees, time and costs of genuinely changing to eco- 
friendly practices. In that case, these firms are either unaware of the benefits 
of having an EMS, or they are actively looking to avoid proactive greening 
strategy making.75
So what does the state of EMSs tell us about the RBV skills or green profits? 
Given the home-made EMSs, one cannot reasonably expect displays of RBV 
skills. None of the 14 firms could cite examples of strategies that have been 
implemented as a by-product of their EMSs. Most of them agreed that 
keeping EMSs ongoing was troublesome -  it was difficult to monitor, too time 
consuming and often forgotten under the pressures of running a business. 
Predictably, running the EMSs has not been profitable: none advertised their 
EMSs as a selling point when attracting new buyers; and 11 out of the 14 
respondents said that the financial benefits (in terms of cost savings from
75 None of the 14 firms agreed to show their EMSs.
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EMSs) were unclear. This is hardly surprising, since the cost-savings to be 
made from a proper EMS were probably not evident in these cases.
Environmental Health Measures:
Under threat of failing buyer audits, firms of all sizes have designed and 
implemented a number of on-going preventative strategies (albeit, 
performing only moderately well at it, and only being proactive on-site, 
where legal accountability encourages a precautionary approach). These are:
Cleanliness -  This involves managerial and operational changes to ensure 
that factory floors are swept every day of considerable amounts of fabric 
wastes. This involves low financial investment, however, according to Ms. 
Shamsun Nahar of Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies (BCAS), who is 
undertaking a compliance training programme in 15 RMG factories, everyday 
things such as cleanliness and "keeping the factory floor in presentable 
conditions" are the hardest for the factories to maintain. One manager gave 
the perspective from the other side,
Tell me what to do? These buyers keep harassing us for so many things, and 
there are so many things I have to keep my eyes on, that the rules for floor 
sweeping and drain cleaning seem like extra harassment. I f  I follow what the 
buyer says then the whole floor has to be swept every two hours. I f  I do that 
then the floor will be full of cleaners and not workers.76
Disposal of wastes and effluents -  Solid waste disposal is not a problem in 
factories, according to the auditors, since waste is sold off as "factory jute" to 
traders who recycle the material. In fact the trade in factory jute is fairly 
lucrative, and factory jute trading rights are sometimes part of wage 
negotiations with labourers. Liquid wastes are mostly disposed without much
76 R36
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attention to its environmental impact. According to a CEO the problem of 
effluents is only partially addressed:
The water pollution from garments industry is a lot worse than you think. 
You should take a walk around this neighbourhood [where there are many 
washing plants] and look at the drains. Its hard to breathe. Many factories do 
not do their own washing and rely on washing houses that are not covered by 
buyer audits. The DoE or the BGMEA are not focusing on the washing 
houses, even though they [the washing units] live off the garments industry.77
Therefore, it is possible for RMG factories to pass off their responsibilities of 
water pollution to washing units and pass on the costs of environmental 
pollution to the community, since the washing units directly dispose 
untreated wastewater to public waterways.
Ventilation and temperature -  Considering that most factories are situated in 
buildings not purpose built for accommodating manufacturing units, 
installing ventilation fans pose financial and infrastructural challenges for 
older and smaller factories. It may be noted here that auditors do not check air 
quality for particulate matter or temperature during audits.
Dust and fume — The cutting and sewing of fabrics produces "fabric dust" 
inside factories. Such indoor air pollution is causing respiratory illnesses 
among workers, as reported in the 2006 Fair Wear Foundation Study78 on 
Bangladeshi RMG factories. Codes single out "dust control" requirements and 
require the installation, operation and maintenance of exhaust fans, which 
involves financial investment as well as management commitment. In some 
cases, buyers ask that workers wear masks. Auditors interviewed said that
77 R47
78 Available online: http://w\vw.fairvvear.nl/tmp/Backeround%20studv%20Final%202006.pdf. accessed 
on October 1, 2007.
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masks were rarely worn. RMG firm management confirmed this when asked 
if their employees wore dust masks.79
Chemical hazards -  Certain RMG processes require toxic chemicals (such as 
chemical dyes and treating agents for cloths), which necessitate careful 
storage and handling. Consequently buyer codes insist upon materials safety 
data sheets (MSDS) which require trained personnel to identify and label the 
chemicals correctly, along with information on how to store it, where to store 
it, expiry dates, and what to do in case of emergencies. This requires 
investment into management training to run a MSDS system, which is 
inspected by the buyer or the compliance auditors. According to the auditors, 
MSDS are almost always not up to date, but more seriously, often chemicals 
are stored incorrectly, creating fire hazards.
Drinking water -  The provision of safe and clean drinking water has become 
one of the more contested areas of compliance, since brand name buyers are 
dissatisfied with the potability of Bangladeshi tap water and insist on 
suppliers providing the workers with mineral water in the factories -  a 
practice which is absent in other industrial sectors in Bangladesh. Factories 
are responding by having contracts with mineral water companies who stock 
water coolers on factory floor. However, there are questions whether these 
coolers are regularly filled with mineral water or not, and whether mineral 
water is really as safe from contaminants as it should be and if not, then 
whether providing mineral water is beneficial to worker health.80
Latrines and urinals -  Buyer codes insist on latrines facilities in proportion to 
worker numbers, something that is also covered by national legislation and 
often flouted. This is a major challenge because most factory buildings were 
not built following the Factory Act specifications, or are situated in buildings
79 This aspect it covered later in this chapter under the sections on Learning and Organisational change.
80 Please see Khan (1992) for a discussion on naturally occurring arsenic levels in Bangladesh’s bottled 
mineral water.
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that were not purpose built for RMG factories, as a result they do not have 
enough latrines for hundreds of workers. Firms supplying to larger brands 
are either taking this aspect into consideration when constructing new 
factories, or investing in re-constructing their venues -  sometimes at 
considerable additional cost -  and introducing management changes such as 
appointing a person in charge of toilets, hiring cleaners for cleaning all the 
toilets every two hours and maintaining a logbook which is managed by the 
factory compliance-in-charge. Compliant factories now need to employ male 
and female staff solely in-charge of cleaning male and female toilets, therefore 
driving up compliance costs. Performance audits in 2004 by the Fair Labor 
Association (FLA)81 of large suppliers under contract with Puma and Reebok 
found that toilets were uniformly unsanitary and insufficient in numbers. The 
auditors I interviewed corroborated this. The RMG firms that were 
interviewed also mentioned the requirement of toilets and upkeep of facilities 
as unrealistic demands given the significant costs and management 
challenges. One CEO said,
In our new factory we have enough latrines, as requested by Levis and 
Wrangler. Now days we have fitted our floors with mineral water coolers. We 
let workers take bottles of mineral water home. I don't see any difference in the 
health of the factory workers now versus workers in the old factory. What is 
the difference when they share toilets at home and drink tap water?82
Another owner said,
In this factory we have been asked to provide toilet tissue in every bathroom. I 
tried explaining to the buyer that we are Muslims [meaning that workers use
81 Source: FLA website online reports at http://www.fairlabor.org/all/transparencv/charts2004.html. 
accessed August 23, 2006.
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wet latrines, not tissue]. But they don't want to understand. I am not happy 
about spending money for no good reason like this.83
Equipment maintenance -  Management is required to conduct regular 
machine safety and maintenance checks and maintain logbooks submittable 
to auditors. Of particular interest are the needle guards in the over-locking 
machines and the pulley guards. According to the interviewed auditors and 
factory management, these guards are frequently inoperable or left unused, 
reflecting management lapses. Some buyer codes require the use of personal 
protective equipment (PPE) by workers, such as steel gloves, aprons, hair 
nets, overalls, dust masks, etc. Concerned factory owners said they were 
reluctant to invest in PPE since they believe their workers will not use them 
regularly, given the heat and humidity of Dhaka's urban areas that make the 
thought of wearing overalls, aprons and masks rather unattractive. One RMG 
manager said that they bought PPE but not in enough numbers since they do 
not insist that their workers wear it (with the assumption that the discomfort 
or cultural strangeness will make PPEs unpopular) and only use them during 
audits. Therefore, even though these RMG firms may have proactive 
strategies (i.e. preventing harm, reducing risks), their implementation is 
irregular.
Overall, the firms are taking some proactive strategies but are still faring 
poorly: tangible resource constraints (such as cost problems of infrastructural 
shortcomings) and intangible resource constraints (such as management 
skills, etc.). Proactive strategies were also being hampered due to a lack of 
strategy making towards human capital building (e.g. training staff members 
to handle MSDS requirements, etc.) or using any unique skills (RBV skills).
83 R23
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Third party certification (WRAP etc.):
Third party certification (TPC) is seen as a significant badge of achievement 
among RMG peers and buyers, and it was interesting to see which firms 
strategise for such certification, using what skills, and why. In my sample, 34 
firms had TPCs that had environmental requirements built into it. All of these 
firms were large and medium sized. A denim factory in my sample did not 
have any TPCs, but their parent company did. Out of the 34, 3 firms had 
multiple certifications. WRAP is the most popular, followed by IS09000. Only 
3 firms had SA8000 certification, and only 1 had the most environmentally 
demanding OKOTEX certification. None had IS014000 certification. WRAP is 
approved by the members of the American Apparel and Footwear 
Association (AAFA), and is accepted by around 700 apparel-sourcing 
companies, which, according to RMG interviews, is the main motivation for 
getting certified.
Firms that did not have TPCs mentioned cost as an entry barrier, and TPC 
holding firms also believe that is the case: 21 out of 34 TPC factories felt that 
the cost was prohibitive. Cost estimates given were sketchy, since many 
respondents did not have accurate data at hand, but generally, it was revealed 
that WRAP certification can cost about USD 750-1500, while SA8000 costs 
about USD 8000,84 overall the costs were thought to have been significant.
These firms actively advertised their TPC status to buyers (a stark contrast to 
their DoE certification); 16 out of 34 said that they advertise it through their 
company portfolios. 12 firms said that buyers directly asked them to get 
certified in order to maintain order share, and an equal number said that they 
did it without being asked to, but in consideration to maintaining market 
competitiveness.
84 Certification costs vary depending on which level of certification is applied for, the size o f the 
company, and number of field audits needed, etc.
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So did the credibility translate into competitive advantage? The respondents 
did not cite a direct rise in cost savings, but they mentioned indirect benefits 
such as attracting better buyers, continued orders from existing buyers, more 
confidence in negotiating with buyers on price issues, and getting larger 
volume orders. Rarely did the RMG firms say that these certifications led to 
higher prices per piece, but it led to being allowed into the "big league", as 
one manager put it,
Getting certified helped us. We started working with better brands, but only 
in one case we got better CM, since Dockers pays more if  the factory has 
WRAP certification. That certification was a good idea? For sure.85
Several RMG factories said that these certifications were something to be 
proud of, since it shows that theirs are some of the most well managed and 
ethically conscious firms in Bangladesh. A compliance manager said,
We gained moral satisfaction and a better confidence in negotiating with 
buyers by getting certified (by third parties).86
Several interviewed factories said that they had started the WRAP 
certification process but then abandoned it. One manager said that it was too 
cumbersome and demanding, especially since the repeat audit team visits 
meant that it could not be handled in the same way as the Do ECC. Costs of 
certification were seen as exceeding the tentative budget this company had. 
The manager said WRAP certification cannot be done with bribes, which is 
why his factory eventually backed out. Another firm said that they had gotten 
the papers for it during a season of low orders, but then they got a large 
contract from a (non brand) buyer, and decided it was not worth it. So, getting
85 R5
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TPCs is related not only to the business cycle, but also relational to the other 
certification systems applicable to the factories.
The strategic and operational requirements of TPC schemes and high-end 
buyers codes are similar; only that TPCs like WRAP involve more paperwork 
at managerial levels. According to a WRAP certified RMG manager, they 
have to read the handbook, do a self assessment of compliance performance 
related to WRAP and applicable legal requirements, and then prepare 
paperwork stating they accept the WRAP principles, do a breakdown analysis 
of shortcomings and formally write a strategy paper on corrective actions. 
Then the WRAP auditors check the factory and typically give them more 
corrections, and the management documents the changes made, and then are 
finally certified. WRAP basically forces the company to be more organised 
and manage compliance better, although WRAP does not require any 
additional operational measures, such as creating inter-firm networks for peer 
learning or alliances with NGOs, etc.87 So why did these TPCs result in 
competitive advantage? The answer may lie in the "blanket brand value" of 
TPCs among buyers, and in the fact that RMG firms that sink high costs into 
TPC mobilise more of their staff time and effort into continued 
implementation to ensure continued returns from investment.
Effluent treatment plants (ETPs):
RBV suggests that reactive strategies such as ETPs cannot yield competitive 
advantage, but my findings are not so straightforward. 8 firms in this sample 
had ETPs, 3 were large companies and 5 were medium sized. One of the 
companies with an ETP was in operation for 14 years before installing an ETP. 
When asked about why it took them so long, the respondent replied that the 
requirement for ETPs is fairly recent (ECA of 1998) and additionally, they had
87 The auditing integrity has been questioned and is covered at length in the next chapter, 
which calls to question whether WRAP certified firms are indeed performing better on 
compliance.
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to wait till they could afford to invest in it. Two other firms went into 
production with ETPs, but in both these cases, the firm was an extension of an 
existing parent company that was financially strong and had long market 
experience in RMG, and could afford to make a new fully compliant "full 
service" factory.
Interestingly enough, the denim RMG factories relationship with ETPs is 
unclear: most of the denim factories are part of large and well established 
RMG companies (several of them are in fact part of different multi-sector 
conglomerates, for example Shanta Denim Ltd. is part of the Shanta Group 
that also owns two international private schools, a real estate company, one of 
the largest private hospitals in Bangladesh, in addition to several large RMG 
factories). Most of the parent companies have other (and typically older and 
well established) non-denim RMG factories and "washing plants" which are 
presumably used for non-denim products as well. Some, not all, such parent 
companies have ETPs (e.g. Jamuna Apparels Ltd, Partex Denim Ltd. and 
Shanta Denim Ltd.). However it is never entirely clear whether the ETP is 
connected to the washing plant or the denim factory. Yet on paper the denim 
factory is linked to an ETP.
Regardless of product type, the main reason cited for not installing ETPs was 
the cost. ETPs require a large cash investment as well as factory space, both of 
which are prohibitive for most companies, but especially for factories in 
rented premises that may not get permission to install an ETP from the 
landlord. Depending on the money spent on land that is needed, plus the 
machinery and the engineering costs, firms in my survey stated that the 
cheapest ETP set up costs were between USD 500 to a mid range of USD 
200,000 to a higher figure of USD 450,000. The recurring cost of keeping the 
ETPs running was also cited as a barrier.88
88 Ahmed et al (2002), Clemett (2003a and 2003b) mention similar difficulty of calculating ETP cost 
estimates for Bangladeshi textiles.
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ETPs being uncommon among RMG firms, the firms that were planning for 
ETPs could not learn from their peers, as they had done with other 
compliance measures (e.g. lighting, ventilation, chemicals handling, etc.), so 
there was little word of mouth experience to start with. Only one factory said 
that they turned to the DoE for guidance, the others said that the DoE was not 
involved at all, instead all outside help was in the form of engineering 
consultants.
Whether a firm has an ETP or not is not always dependent on factory size or 
supply chain integration, since many medium sized factories had ETPs, while 
many large well-integrated factories did not. The most cited reason for 
installing the ETPs was buyer request and broader market competitiveness. 
Buyers had not guaranteed future orders if ETPs were installed, but the firms 
were large enough to be competing for the best orders, and thought it 
financially worthwhile to invest in ETPs without guaranteed orders. 
Although the respondents said that they felt it gave them a slight market edge 
over their non-ETP competitors, post installation they could not directly link 
increased orders to environmental upgrading, although having ETPs enabled 
them to enter an elite group of high end suppliers, which TPCs alone could 
not achieve. Non ETP firms were not convinced of ETP led competitive 
advantages, and held the view that ETPs are only for the large firms who can 
afford to run it while winning out chiefly on price factors, not greening 
strategies.
In the Bangladeshi RMG case, the RBV prediction of reactive technologies 
(plus non-unique skills and resources) creating no competitive advantage did 
not hold true. Firms who are financially strong and have much experience in 
other proactive strategies install ETPs, and enjoy (albeit slight) competitive 
advantage. A possible RBV explanation might be that ETPs have such huge 
"entry barriers" (in terms of tangible and intangible resource problems) that it
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can be called a strategic resource, thereby creating imitation barriers and 
giving the ETP owning firms some competitive advantage, even though ETPs 
in themselves are a reactive solution.
5.6 Understanding the Barriers to Upgrading:
Earlier in the chapter we saw how the greening pressures were calling for a 
weak corporatist version of EM. In the last section we saw how the firms were 
further diluting the weak EM requirements. There were no scientific- 
technological breakthrough in innovative greening adoption, no 
revolutionary management paradigm shift that brought in social change, no 
demonstratable cost savings (not even the low hanging fruit), and no 
straightforward competitive advantage gains. Firms were overall reluctant 
participants, sometimes apathetic, sometimes long term strategists who chose 
reactive strategies when they could. Whether firms earned competitive 
advantage or not was irrelevant to the lack of RBV skills. In this section of the 
chapter, I take a more nuanced and balanced view of why easy solutions do 
not seem to work, by looking at management structures, skills and capacities 
to see where greening strategies (proactive and reactive) go wrong.
The management structure of Bangladeshi garments factories has not been 
written about by management researchers; however, field interviews with 
factory personnel, trade unions leaders, auditors and factory auditing visits 
gave me a sense of Bangladeshi RMG firms as being top management 
dominated in terms of organisational goal setting and managing change. 
When the sector began in the mid 1980's, Bangladesh was mainly an agrarian 
country, with a small industrial manufacturing base. The garments boom was 
fuelled by low capital investment requirements, which was an invitation for a 
generation of first time entrepreneurs to start small firms with family loans. 
From the very beginning the entrepreneurs were working under tremendous 
pressure to keep costs down in a family business. Most ran tight ships where
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the top management made all the financial and operational decisions, and 
only hired management to supervise the workers. Over the years, the number 
of firms and range of apparel produced grew and changed; more 
sophisticated management was needed which was met with a larger resource 
pool of people with work experience in the sector. Many ex-managers took 
small loans and started their own factories. According to a CEO of one of the 
first RMG companies,
The private sector culture finally begun to take shape in Bangladesh in the 
middle of the 1980's. The garment industry today is still based on old 
philosophies, and is run by top management who make all the decisions and 
spend the money. A  lot of people working in the garments offices are not from 
management schools, so the top management makes the decisions. There are no 
Bangladeshi garment firm that has shareholders and the "corporate set up" in 
the western sense in entirely missing.89
Below (figure 5.1) I present an organogram representing a typical middle 
sized woven factory, based on interviews with 7 RMG Managing Directors 
(MD). Top management is comprised of the MD and the directors, the 
accounts and finance officers, the commercial department (in charge of 
shipment clearing, L /C  issuance, etc.), the merchandising section (in charge of 
processing buyer orders, sample making and approval etc.). The MD and 
directors make the strategic financial decisions, and gradually firms are hiring 
professionally qualified people for the accounts, finance and commercial 
departments.90
89 Rl
90 This is supported by recent trend of business schools opening up in Dhaka.
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Figure5.1: Organogram of a typical mid sized woven factory
Workers: Cutting, Sewing, and Finishing 
Section
Lower Mgt.: Quality Control 
Officers (QCs)
General Manager
Accounts and 
Finances
Merchandising
Department
Commercial
Department
Top Mgt: Managing Director and Board of Directors
Middle Mgt.: Quality control in-charge, Cutting section in­
charge, Sewing in-charge, and Finishing in-charge.
The middle managers are in charge of the processing sections -  cutting, 
sewing and finishing, respectively. The person in charge of the quality control 
section is also middle management, and is responsible for picking out faulty 
products from the cutting, sewing and finishing sections and has the power to 
send a batch of products back for corrections. Middle managers are often do 
not hold any formal degrees and most of their qualification is on-the-job- 
learning. Frequently they are former factory workers.
The third layer of management is the lower management officers who work as 
"line QCs" -  they are in charge of inspecting the process of cutting, sewing 
and finishing, and report to the middle management QC. Frequently, line- 
QCs also have no formal education.
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Feedback on strategy is only solicited from middle management on 
production issues. Top management decides irregular issues, such as 
compliance, specially if there is cost involved. Decision making is mostly 
done on the basis of best available information and best economic rationality. 
Reorganising of work roles and functions happens as dictated by top 
management, who realign roles and responsibilities according to the 
task/need at hand. Middle management has very limited leverage in deciding 
who takes on new tasks.
Factories thrive on a fast paced production cycle and seem well equipped to 
deal with last minute changes to orders placed by a buyer. According to the 
RBV, learning and organisational changes are likely to be top-down and time 
dependent in these sorts of set ups. The monetary resources for 
environmental upgrading are tightly controlled by the top management. 
According to a factory MD:
We have a tendency of holding tight reins of the money, and when it comes to 
compliance expenses, factory people might misspend the money if we don't 
keep a strict eye on it, often these expenses don't have receipts.91
Greening strategy making and responsibilities lie squarely with top 
management in my sample of firms: All the initiatives/decisions about 
upgrading were taken by the top management, with the middle management 
only involved during implementation. The firms did not formally ask the 
opinions of workers while designing compliance initiatives. Also, only 2 firms 
had designated compliance managers. Most firms said that the role of 
managing compliance was spread across the departments and tasks were 
given on an ad hoc basis. Therefore, the core of the network regarding 
environmental compliance is very much biased towards top and middle 
management and leaves the workers in the periphery. Next I examine in
91 R22
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detail the barriers that the firms' culture and organisational capabilities pose, 
making them not only reluctant actors, but also poorly equipped to become 
proactive actors.
Corporate Culture as a Barrier:
Environmental awareness -  Interviewees from RMG firms were asked how 
they felt about environmental issues in industrial production in Bangladesh. 
Their attention had to be drawn to "brown issues" since they automatically 
associated environmental problems with natural disasters (floods and 
tornadoes) and the arsenic problem in Bangladesh.92 Respondents mentioned 
deteriorating environmental quality in their urban neighbourhoods, and even 
climate change. One respondent said,
A  few years back there were news stories about the contamination of the river 
by the Ghorashal (fertiliser) factory. Closer to my home in Dhanmondi is 
Hazaribagh. Water there is contaminated by mercury. The soil is also polluted. 
Bangladesh needs to implement stricter laws to control this kind of pollution, 
and improve waste disposal.93
The most polluting sectors were perceived to be tanneries, fertilizer factories 
and textile mills (all were in the news for effluent related accidents). 58% of 
the respondents said that they felt environmental problems stemming from 
industries were of moderate importance, while 24% felt that they were 
insignificant. 16% said that these issues were critical. Their responses 
indicated that EM thinking was not prevalent. Respondents from large and 
medium firms tended to think environmental pollution as critical to 
moderately important, while smaller firm representatives tended to think of 
"brown issues" as not important. Overall, environmental awareness is low
92 The attention given to natural disasters and natural resource degradation is perhaps unsurprising, 
judging by the tone and content of DoE publications on Bangladeshi environmental problems, e.g.
DoE, BCAS, UNEP 2001.
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about "brown issues" and RMG is not thought of as a polluting industry in 
comparison to other sectors, perhaps because there have been no 
environmental accidents in the sector, or perhaps because it typically does not 
generate point sources of pollution (since liquid wastes are released via 
municipal sewerage systems and is not visible to the naked eye as coming 
from a RMG factory).
Preference for compliance action -  RMG managers were asked how they saw 
social compliance pressures in general. Most firms (58%) agreed that 
compliance is an important issue and that it was fair that they were being 
asked to address it. 18% agreed that (0% large, but 22% of medium and 25% of 
small firms) that compliance was an unfair burden; and 7% (0% large, but 6% 
of medium firms and 25% of small firms) agreed that compliance standards 
were unfair because they were not sensitive to the Bangladeshi context in 
mind. Interviewees were asked whether they felt compliance is positively 
linked to competitive advantage: 32% thought in future it will lead to better 
quality of orders; however, 49% said they were sceptical. Large firms seemed 
most positive about compliance issues leading to financial benefits; medium 
and small sized firms were less so. Although respondents were referring to 
compliance as it mostly relates to social issues, their responses are indicative 
of their concerns about competitive advantage gains via non-price factor 
investment. This might explain the reluctance in allocating resources for eco- 
compliance as well, particularly in light of their low environmental 
awareness.
Behavioural factors at the individual level -  Interviewees were asked about 
their own sense of eco-responsibility as top management. Once again, most 
respondents stated that they did not think RMG was a polluting sector, but 
56% said that they were influenced by the environmental attitudes of peers, 
20% said they were partially influenced, and 23% said they were not 
influenced at all. Overall, their individual sense of responsibility seemed low
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-  only 32% (57% of large firms, 29% of medium firms and 0% of small firms) 
believed that their decisions made an impact on the firm's environmental 
performance, while the rest thought ultimately they had no impact. This 
shows low ownership of greening considerations, and that perhaps EM's 
prediction of a change in values has not come true.
Organisational Change as a Barrier:
Change resistant bureaucratic organisations -  EM literature suggests that 
market signal and eco-values driven changes in firms happen in an organic 
fashion, with cross-departmental resource and knowledge sharing. RBV 
literature suggests that proper management (i.e. strategising and 
implementing change) is a critical strategic resource (RBV skill) that involves 
entrepreneurial innovation, strong leadership, effective teamwork, etc. My 
findings show that the RMG sector is not suitable for EM style changes; and 
RBV skills of strong eco-teamwork are absent from it. 88% of the firms said 
that only top management is involved in compliance strategy making and 
management. 11% said that top and middle management were jointly 
responsible. None of the firms mentioned involving lower management or 
consulting workers, although feedback from worker-training seminars on 
compliance is used for designing further training. The fact that upgrading 
strategy making is done only on a "top down" basis was also highlighted by 
the trade union leaders that I spoke to. They complained that the workers 
were expected to change their behaviour without being consulted at the 
strategy design stage.94 The problem of such compartmentalised hierarchical 
behaviour can be explained by the prevalent management structures in the 
sector.
Top management attention and commitment -  EM benefits have to be clear 
to the top management if the strategy is to be properly implemented.
94 Further details in Chapter Six.
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Previously we saw how RMG managers are not convinced of the financial 
benefits of compliance, much less from greening. Consequently, top 
management do not pay much attention to greening, especially since their 
time and attention is taken up by production aspects that have direct financial 
impacts.
Greening problems at the top level have many reasons: 60% firms cited 
management capabilities as the main problem, while the rest cited 
cognitive/learning problems as the biggest barrier. Medium and large 
factories mostly felt held back by management time constraints, smaller firms 
cited lack of financial resources (87% of small firms) as the biggest barrier to 
compliance strategy making.
Top management are also closed to compliance implementation complaints 
from lower rungs of the company: 60% managers said that workers have 
never complained about compliance measures, but such views are more 
telling of indifference towards employee concerns, rather than a sign of 
upgrading changes going smoothly all along the firm. In the earlier sections of 
this chapter we saw how factory workers did not want to wear PPEs or keep 
factory floors clear of fire hazards. Given this, it is reasonable to expect that 
top management are aware of problems or complaints coming from workers 
about the measures being undertaken in response to greening strategies. 
However, 57% of large, 70% of medium and 25% of small firms said they 
faced no problems or got no comments from the workers regarding the 
changes they would need to comply with. If top management does not take 
worker feedback into their greening strategy making, then it will most likely 
remain faulty and weak.
Some firms stated that compliance did not involve the workers, assuming 
they meant that change instructions would be handed to them and be
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expected to be followed without any problems, or that it is not expected that 
workers might want to say anything. One manager said,
Workers aren't required to understand about social compliance measures.95 
Another said,
Workers had no comment. WRAP is a management issue.96
This seems surprising, not only in light of my own findings, but also based on 
the enormous amount of literature available cataloguing the workers' 
complaints about compliance implementation by management. Earlier I 
mentioned how the BCAS audit team found that workers had trouble 
accepting dust masks. This latter view is corroborated by my observations 
made during factory visits with compliance auditors in Dhaka. The workers 
did not speak up when urged to by the audit team, who were in the presence 
of the top management representatives. At the same time, the workers had 
visibly not been following the safety training instructions given to them 
earlier. This silence of workers and lower level management or "no problems 
mentioned" statement, which is reported by top management interviewees, is 
indicative of many things. There is a definite problem in the way the top 
management are communicating their greening strategy to the lower 
management and floor workers. Either the environmental upgrading changes 
explained to them were in name only because it was not seen as a high 
importance issue, so there really was not much to change at the factory floor 
level (meaning the compliance is really only for paper purposes); or that 
workers are unable/unwilling to communicate with the top management 
about compliance issues. Top management has no mechanism for 
listening/registering worker issues, which means that the application of
95 R51
96 O / l  <
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compliance is going on in an environment where communication is only one 
way, so change is likely to stop abruptly and win-win benefits are likely to 
dry out fast.
Lower management/worker understanding and awareness -  Firms that did 
report problems or simply change related feedback had surprising things to 
say. Some managers were sensitive about the issue of change problems, for 
example, a compliance manager from a large factory explained cultural 
locationalities behind compliance,
Most of the workers in my factory have come from the villages. Some came a 
year ago, some have just come this month. They are still adjusting to working 
in a factory. Factories are new to them; they are learning about machines and 
production details, they are under so much pressure. I can't expect them to 
overnight understand why boxes have to be stacked in lines like that and why 
they must only eat lunch in the cafeteria. Only recently they used to have 
lunch sitting together in the open in their village. Marks and Spencer's 
cancelled some orders because they found turmeric stains in some shirts. How 
do you explain that? I can't expect workers to understand that. I can only ask 
them to wash their hands twice after lunch. I can't go further, neither can they 
understand further.97
Some managers were very one sided about the cause of change problems, for 
example,
We faced some problems while explaining changes to workers. They don't 
understand that these changes are for their own good. They keep violating the 
rules.98
97 R12
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Some managers pointed to the difficulties of changing behaviour, for 
example,
The workers did complain about the compliance measures. We asked them to 
wear dust masks, but they said that it's hard to breathe, and they don't wear 
them. 99
Several managers (of all factory sizes) said that the workers were happy with 
the suggested changes, for example,
We've had no complaints. Workers are in fact very happy to be working in a 
factory that is safe for their health, where they are looked after.100
Learning Problems as a Barrier:
EM's view of science and technology translates to the availability of 
information on IEE and EIA, ETP design, implementing EMSs etc. 
Management comprehension of eco-friendly technology alternatives, 
recycling and reuse options, etc. are also relevant to EM learning. Was there a 
dearth of reliable information? How did top management go about getting 
eco-information? How did they help employees learn? Did they get the 
necessary training and improve management skills for greening?
Knowledge sources -  Most firms said that their primary source of 
information for compliance upgrading was buyers (68%), followed by in 
house knowledge (40%) and peer groups (22%). This is interesting because the 
primary sources of information seem to be non-state sources. Information 
and instructions are gathered from the buyers' codes, as well as from "word 
of mouth" from other firms facing similar challenges, as well as mined from 
the work experience of own staff. The fourth most relied upon source was
99 R35
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"outside consultants" such as engineers (20%). BGMEA was the second least 
favoured source, which is unusual because BGMEA has put in considerable 
efforts in disseminating compliance information. None of the firms said they 
got any information from the DoE; the state seemed to be failing to provide 
firms with greening knowledge.
Large firms tended to rely the most on "in house knowledge" (64%), rather 
than the overall favourite, "buyers" (57%), perhaps reflecting on the larger 
skills base their management would have compared to smaller firms. Of all 
the other categories, large firms also tended to rely the most on outside 
consultants. Medium sized firms relied most on buyers (67%), followed by in 
house knowledge (35%). Small firms said that they relied the most on the 
buyers (75%) as a primary source of information. This pattern is interesting 
because it shows how dependent the firms are on the buyers for information 
and how large and medium firms are more reliant on their own resources for 
getting information about compliance requirements.
Methods of information dissemination—Firms of all sizes said that they 
used middle management run seminars to train workers about compliance 
requirements. The frequency of follow up workshops varied greatly between 
firms. Follow up workshops indicate continuing learning, which is important 
given the high worker turn over rates, and also for sustaining EM. The 
second most favoured method was the training of trainers, where outsiders 
(such as BGMEA or the fire services staff) would come to the premises and 
train middle management, who would in turn train the workers through 
seminars. The third most popular method was the use of notice boards to 
display the list of regulations to be followed. Given the low literacy levels 
among the workers, the efficiency of notice boards may be questioned, but 
they are commonly a prerequisite to getting certified by auditors or BGMEA's 
safety cell. Usually firms use a combination of these methods. Large and 
medium sized firms said that they most commonly use seminars and trainer
206
training, which is more demanding on management resources. Small firms 
said they relied on trainer training and notice boards.
Learning problems -  EM emphasises changing mindsets towards ecologising 
of behaviour, but leaves the area of learning relatively underdeveloped, 
without which information/arguments will not be processed. When asked 
about the low literacy levels hampering compliance training, all firms 
maintained that it was not a hindrance. An important imperative for 
continual learning would be linking the financial necessity of compliance with 
continued implementation of compliance measures. Overall, 77% of the firms 
interviewed said that they explained the link between passing compliance 
audits and getting more orders. However, while 100% large firms said that 
they did this, 83% of medium firms and only 12% of small firms said they did 
this.
The firms were asked if they continued with their compliance training on a 
regular basis: overall only 56% firms said that they re-designed training 
material to reflect lessons learnt or updated CoC requirements. Large and 
medium firms fared better at this (at 64% and 67%), while none of the small 
firms said that they were continuing with a programme of regular training 
and monitoring, meaning that learning of such non price issues were ad-hoc 
and not sustained.
5.7 Disconnect Between Buyer and RMG Management Views of Skills as 
Compliance Barriers:
The RBV suggests that skills mix determines a firm's competitiveness. While it 
is difficult to exactly identify these skills, certain internal skill weaknesses in 
the RMG sector have become evident so far. To get a better view into these 
shortcomings, I interviewed buyers on their views on the structural 
characteristics of a compliance-proactive firm.
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Firm Structure and Corporate Culture:
Buyers emphasised firm structure over firm size or firm age as a factor 
influencing proactiveness in strategy making. According to the representative 
from H:
Firm structure is very important in the sense that a well organised company is 
more likely to have good policies and also the related organisation to have good 
implementation of those policies.
Buyers' views in this regard tend to match the RBV, that a well managed firm 
that is mindful of remaining competitive in the market is also mindful of 
making profits from proactive greening. Buyers unanimously complained 
about the lack of middle management in most factories as a compliance 
barrier because a top management heavy approach is slow to change. They 
also mentioned that RMG firms suffer from a lack of human resources -  RMG 
firms are typically short of staff who can be given compliance monitoring 
responsibilities. An old firm with good management structure that has a solid 
middle management and environmentally aware culture will do much better 
than a new firm with bad management and ignorant culture, according to the 
buyer from G,
Unsurprisingly, most buyers said that top management attitude is holding 
back the sector in becoming compliant. According to the buyer from G:
Attitude of the top person is the main thing. I f  there is no vision at the top 
level then there is little buyers can do to pressure from outside.
Within the RMG firms, the biggest point of weakness is that in-house attitude 
is not proactive towards any kind of management, as a result there is no
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incentive for the nurturing of proactive green skills or attitudes, since skills in 
a particular area are a part and parcel of the broader attitudes of the company. 
According to the representative from L,
They don't have the "can do'' spirit. Every little change is because of many 
many nudging. They don't have that hunger to do better than last year. Also, 
strong mid management culture is missing in Bangladesh.
Some buyers thought that newer firms were more conscious of compliance as 
a marketing tool. The buyer from F said that new firms are more interested in 
social compliance because they have entered a crowded market and are 
looking for good orders to set them in the market. However, M took a broader 
outlook by saying,
We work with manageable sized firms so that we can see what changes are 
happening to make compliance work. I f  a factory is too large then it's hard to 
manage. I f  it's very old then the set up is too hard to change, changing 
infrastructure is always difficult, always. Good compliance is related to no 
shared premises, no multi-storeyed factories, no supermarkets.
The buyers linked poor management skill with not only troubled 
implementation of compliance, but also poor conceptualising of it. The buyer 
from L said:
Management mentality is very important don't you think? How they 
understand compliance is important. Secondly, very often they have improper 
knowledge about their local laws. Thirdly, ability for long-term thinking is 
important. They tend to think about compliance only during buyer's visit. 
This won't do. Fourthly, they need in house compliance -  self-improvement, 
the ability to change ones own employees is needed. One example I can give 
you is of "line marking" of factory floors. It's often not followed even though 
the marks are made on the floor.
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According to buyers, the most important thing holding back a proactive 
corporate culture is the lack of awareness and understanding by top 
management. The firms do not understand the arguments for compliance, or 
the non-financial benefits of compliance. Many factories are unable to think of 
compliance as anything beyond a cost burden. One reason behind their 
unawareness, according to the buyers, is how "sheltered" they are, being 
passive players in the apparel supply chain. The firms do not have direct 
access to buyers, therefore, firms do not have any awareness or they do not 
know who to learn proactively from. The buyer from K emphasised the need 
to create awareness and explain the supply chain to them, because left to 
themselves, they are reluctant to learn about the larger picture.
The buyer from M took a more cost based view of profitable corporate 
culture:
Corporate culture is important but you have to understand, price is still the 
main reason for businesses. There is little incentive to get social compliance 
done. In this case, good corporate culture can help. It comes from good 
international exposure, they have to have seen the world abroad, that is the 
starting point. Willingness to invest is another point. They need that 
mentality you know, to invest in something, and to do something right.
Some Bangladeshi buyers are more sceptical of the factory management or 
hopes of a green corporate culture. The buyer from F said,
They don't have a corporate culture in the way you are talking. As for their 
ability to change and learn -  you can yourself see the newspapers and answer 
your own question -  do you see them changing and learning?
Cost, Uncertainty and Confusion as Barriers:
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Buyers disagreed with the garments firms when it came to the role of cost, 
uncertainty, and confusion over multiple codes as barriers to compliance.
Most of the buyers thought that cost was not a good enough excuse. Although 
the buyer from F sympathised with the factories somewhat by saying,
They will always complain about cost. They are in this for profit, so the bottom 
line always matters. I f they think there is confusion and uncertainty about 
compliance then they need better training and teaching methods. They need to 
become familiar with the concepts of compliance.
The buyers thought that confusion and uncertainty ought not to be a barrier 
but in their experience, it was. Given the fact that most of the compliance code 
content is already covered by local laws and that so many codes are asking for 
the same minimum things, buyers do not see why confusion should be an 
issue. They also do not see why firms should feel hampered by uncertainly of 
outcomes when buyers are more than happy to provide guidance and 
information on compliance.
According to the buyer from L:
I don't see why confusion would be a problem when 90% of these issues are 
covered by local laws. I f  firms say that they don't know enough about 
compliance then we are willing to teach them, give guidance, but in my 
experience, the same issues are failed again and again. Then you know that 
this is just bad mentality among the factory management. As for compliance 
cost burden, I don't agree. We don't see cost as a compliance hurdle. We 
explain clearly that we are not asking for a rise in costs. We ask firms to follow 
the local laws. So why are you saying that we are asking factories to raise 
costs?
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What the buyers do point to is management inactivity. Despite enough 
guidance being available to them, the management do not take the time to 
carefully go over the requirements or learn from their peers. This attitude 
slows progress. According to the K representative:
There a harrier because of a lack of information. What to do, how to do it and 
why to do it — they are a mystery to the factory management. I f  we bring a 
new product to the factory, they ask us for institutional support. They ask, 
"What is an auditor" etc., it slows things down. Later on, they ask us "Now 
what to do?" However if  the management is proactive, then with help and 
guidance they can learn faster.
Another buyer pointed out to the past history of the industry as a reason why 
such attitudes have become the norm. According to M,
Cost is not the main thing. Lack of knowledge is the main problem. They don't 
know what to do. Past buyers have not educated them. The earlier buyers had 
the "We want cheap garments only" attitude. They didn't talk beyond price 
issues.
Other Change Barriers:
K highlighted the historical image problem of the sector as a change barrier:
The image of Bangladeshi garment factories is that they give buyers profit 
cheaply. Cheap production is not socially compliant production. So it blocks 
progress.
As long as Bangladeshi garments factories do not move up to higher value 
added production and prove themselves to be proactive thinkers, their image
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will not change in the eyes of buyers. As long as that does not happen, they 
will not be able to ask for higher CM to offset some of the costs of compliance, 
but that same proactive good-management skills and competencies that is 
needed to make that shift is the same set of skills that is needed for good 
compliance behaviour. One cannot happen without the other.
M highlighted the "blame someone else culture" as a factor that is holding 
firms back. According to that buyer,
Weak infrastructure, exposure to global supply chain is less, they always 
blame lack of education for everything, and they have a bad mentality of 
blaming everybody else.
5.8 Conclusion:
This chapter took forward the issue of weak EM style eco-pressures on the 
firms, to show how the factories have strategised and implemented an even 
paler version of EM. The hypothesis that the Bangladeshi RMG firms will be 
unable to achieve successful environmental upgrading via proactive greening 
strategy making and find competitiveness (thus achieving EM's "win win" 
solution) has been proven mostly correct. However, environmental upgrading 
strategy making and compliance-skills barriers were more complicated than 
originally thought.
Compliance strategies were determined by CoC and regulatory requirements 
-  both sources prescribe a mixture of reactive and proactive strategies. No one 
firm was purely proactive or reactive, unlike the binary categorisation of 
strategy in RBV. Firms adopted some proactive strategies; but not when it is 
possible for them to pass on the legal responsibility and all costs on to broader 
society. Therefore, cost transferability is an important determinant behind 
reactive-proactive strategy making.
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Key findings of this chapter did not corroborate the RBV: reactive ETPs 
provided (although indirect) competitive advantage because the ETP costs are 
so high that they act as an entry barrier to competitors, despite RBV claims 
otherwise. Secondly, on-going proactive changes (in the case of 
environmental health and hazards mitigation) did not lead to competitive 
advantage, because all firms were doing it, so as per RBV, it did not yield any 
competitive edge. EMSs ought to have yielded some market advantage, but 
did not, because they were home-made; and also because they were not 
implemented. TPCs yielded some competitive advantage, either because of 
buyer perception of TCPs as effective badges, or because these firms were, in 
fact, some of the better-managed firms who had used their RBV skills for a 
well managed compliance system. The use of RBV skills in strategy making 
was also shown to be related to the business cycle, meaning that if enough 
orders existed that did not need the development of strategies in line with 
RBV, then firms preferred not to exercise RBV skills.
The interviewed RMG firms reveal two kinds of performance -compliance on 
paper, and compliance on the factory floor, the latter being much more 
problematic and different than what is presented on paper. Broadly, all 
factories are non-compliant on the factory floor to different degrees, and this 
is primarily due to unambiguous shortcomings -  financial, infrastructural and 
human resource shortages are the biggest barriers, especially for ETPs and 
TPCs. Compliance and its seriousness as a barrier is related to its relationship 
to the financial health of the firm. A firm that is successfully managed and is 
therefore profitable will find it easier to make strategic management decisions 
to become proactive in compliance, fulfilling the RBV prediction. Of course, 
compliance barriers are also linked to shortcomings of intangible resources. 
Buyers mentioned that certain distinctive and core capabilities and attitudes 
are missing. Lack of "environmental awareness" in RMG corporate culture, 
low top management commitment to greening production and the inability of
214
management to adequately implement behavioural change and 
environmental learning among workers are major human resources barriers. 
It may be noted that these same firms display excellent management skills 
and proactivity when it comes to upholding product quality; therefore, it may 
be argued that compliance-management is not one of their distinctive and 
core capabilities, and that skills do not transfer from sector to sector (as in 
from the production side to eco-management side).
Overall, the Bangladeshi RMG firms are indeed struggling to achieve the 
"win win" gains of EM; some kinds of compliance strategies yield indirect 
competitive edge, but generally a eco-compliance strategy (reactive and 
proactive mixed) is needed for continued market access. Bigger sized firms 
have more of what RBV calls core skills and competencies (not to mention 
financial resources) invest in strategies that yielded indirect competitive 
advantage (ETPs and TPCs), regardless of whether it was reactive or 
proactive. At several points in this chapter, we have seen how buyers and 
auditors influence the factory floor outcomes; this is because the factories, 
buyers and auditors cannot be understood without their positioning in the 
supply chain. In the next chapter, I will look at how EMT applies to economic 
actors, their governance relationships and networks.
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Chapter Six: Eco-Compliance Upgrading and Economic Networks of 
Bangladeshi RMG Firms
6.1 Introduction:
Chapter Five showed how the RMG firms were responding to weak EM 
requirements by further diluting them. The state of compliance on the factory 
floor was quite different from compliance on paperwork. RMG firms were using 
their skills and competencies (unique or not), and strategies (proactive or 
reactive), while keeping an eye on overall competitive gains. In this chapter I 
analyse two important aspects of that process -  market gains (competitive 
advantage or higher prices) and strategy monitoring (audits) which involve 
actors from wider economic networks (buyers, auditors, etc.). Ethical trade 
NGOs have campaigned about the auditing process, and we have heard from the 
RMG firms how buyers were not rewarding them with green profit possibilities. 
Somewhere within the buyer-supplier-auditor relationship, the promise of EM is 
lost.
In this chapter I explore three things: firstly, how supply chain governance 
happens with regards Bangladeshi RMG suppliers; secondly, what are the 
monitoring and governance problems from the buyers' side; and thirdly, how 
does supply chain management explain the lack of green profits? Together, these 
questions test the second hypothesis in this thesis:
The most powerful demand for environmental management on Bangladeshi RMG firms 
is originating from their buyers in global supply chains. However, opportunities for 
collaboration or assistance from buyers demanding these environmental upgrading 
initiatives may be low.
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GVC literature has covered much ground in researching how buyer driven 
supply chains help LDC firms upgrade (production, process and functional 
upgrading) by insertion into the chains. Buyer-supplier governance relationships 
may be arms-length or closer, depending on the nature of the sector (maturity, 
location), innovation points, buyer capacity and supplier worthiness in quasi 
hierarchies. Studies of the Vietnamese and Indian RMG sector, the Pakistani 
surgical instruments sector, Sinos Valley footwear sector, Brazilian horticultural 
chains and various Latin American apparel sectors suggest that the buyer- 
supplier governance relationship can have positive impacts on upgrading 
(Gereffi 1999); but others show that one must not take such "benign escalator" 
style upgrading assistance for granted, and that depending on various factors, 
upgrading can be hindered (Lee et al 2004, Nadvi 1999, Nadvi et al 2003, Nadvi 
and Kazmi 2002, Nadvi and Thobum 2003, Nadvi and Haider 2002, Giuliani, 
Pietrobelli and Rabellotti 2005, Bazan and Navas-Aleman 2004, Rabellotti 2004, 
Bair and Gereffi 2001 and 2003, Gomes 2003, Nadvi and Waltring 2002, Quadros 
2002 and 2004, Knorringa 1999). To test my hypothesis, I am interested in 
locating weak collaboration (e.g. only provision of basic upgrading guidelines, 
cursory attention paid to audits) and strong collaboration (e.g. provision of 
technological assistance) as a feature of intra-firm and inter-firm governance in 
the chain. I begin by examining the governance style for Bangladeshi RMG in 
terms of frameworks suggested in GVC literature and find a complex and 
changing scenario. Then I locate the actors and governance relationships for price 
factors (these are the primary relationships as they relate to quality and technical 
standards) and non-price factors (social compliance) within the broader 
economic networks, since the primary relationships provide important rules of 
governing CSR as well. I argue that weak collaboration has resulted in continued 
compliance failure and ethical trade lapses in the RMG supply chain, that the 
compliance improvement behaviour is not tied to any broader moves for 
improvement, and that time-bounded modes of operation is significantly
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hindering any improvements. (The interviewed buyers are referred to by their 
anonymising codes as explained in Chapter Four: L, C, F, H, M, G, I, KAP, and 
K).
6.2 The Broader Economic Network of Supplier and Buyers:
The Bangladeshi RMG sector growth has followed a pattern similar to those of 
other second tier producer countries (Ramaswamy and Gereffi 2000). It began as 
a simple assembly oriented captive model of apparel manufacturing, specialising 
in low input prices and cheap labour (which did not give them a unique 
competitive edge as per RBV predictions). The number of firms was small and 
only a handful of buyers were placing orders for low value added basic apparel 
items. Gradually the economic network grew, and created new opportunities for 
entrepreneurs (Chapter Three). Some factories successfully upgraded their 
production and moved towards higher value added products (having undergone 
process and product upgrading), although many are still making basic low cost 
products. A handful of the largest factories have become vertically integrated 
and have expanded into producing yam and textile.101 Literature covered in 
Chapter Three suggests that post-MFA Bangladeshi RMG is halfway between the 
captive and the relational model, since the large and medium sized firms have 
upgraded production from basic cutting and sewing to higher value full package 
production, while smaller firms continue basic production.
Buyers are driving and governing the RMG supply chain in Bangladesh by 
means of a buyers7 hierarchy. The brand name buyers (such as Nike, Reebok, 
Adidas, Marks and Spencer7s, Hennes and Mauritz, Gap, etc.) are most powerful. 
Their orders are for more specialised products and yield more profit for the
101 While it would be useful to have official data on how many firms transitioned, accurate data on 
Bangladeshi firms and statistically robust studies are scarce.
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suppliers. They tend to have local offices and place direct orders (i.e. no 
subcontracting allowed), therefore have a more "hands on" form of governance. 
They can do spot inspections of factories, etc. Another buyer type is the non-brand 
name buyers (sometimes called "importers" in the business), who are often as 
large as the brand buyers (in terms of total turnover), but they supply to large 
retail chains, sometimes outside of their company. These include CarreFour, 
Karstadt Quelle, Vendex/KBB, Metro, Migros, Otto, Sears, etc. Their orders are 
also specialised and yield high profits for suppliers. Since they have their own 
offices in Bangladesh, their governance is as close as brand buyers. There are, of 
course, smaller non-brand buyers with the same kind of links to retailers, who place 
orders for less specialised clothes (i.e. bulk and basic items, like plain t shirts) and 
consequently work with smaller suppliers and offer lower profit. Another kind 
of buyer is the "buying house". A buying house represents many different retailers 
and is as powerful as the clients it represents. E.g. Li and Fung, VF Asia, PF 
Clipper Concept, Seidensticker, and New Wave are internationally placed 
buying houses that represent brands like Levis etc. These powerful buying 
houses operate much like the big brand name buyers, and prefer close 
monitoring when it comes to product quality and manufacturing details. Then 
there are a large number of buying houses that represent smaller brands or 
retailers. These are less powerful, and are relaxed about governance: their orders 
have narrow profit margins and often deal with surplus "stock lots". In these 
cases the buying houses do not have to specify any production details, and they 
only negotiate the prices of finished products.102
102 While it would be useful to have data on the relative size and numbers of these categories of buyers in 
Bangladesh, no such survey has been done. Interviews with RMG personnel did not yield conclusive 
estimates either.
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6.3 Governance of Product Quality (Price Factors):
The nature of governance between Bangladeshi suppliers and their different 
buyers over product manufacturing (design, raw materials, technical details, etc. 
that impact the final product price) is a complex phenomenon that has evolved 
over decades of buyers negotiating risk minimisation with their suppliers of 
different capacities, and is not as static as that suggested by Gereffi et al (2005). 
My findings are somewhat similar to Ponte and Gibbon (2005) where they say 
that a chain can have different forms of coordination in segments, but within one 
form of governance. That is certainly true in Bangladeshi RMG, as I will show 
below.
Buyers said that there is a marked difference in their relationships with 
Bangladeshi suppliers, depending on the buyers' risk minimisation strategy, 
which in turn, depends on the nature of the buyer, the quality of the product, 
and the capability of the supplier. The more the buyer values the multi-national 
working relationships, the more they act on protecting their investment. This is 
reflected in the degree of monitoring buyers do and the degree of flexibility the 
suppliers have in deciding on production matters, such as sourcing raw materials 
(deciding on quality suitability, country of origin, etc.). According to the 
representative from a major buying house L,
Our business is to make sure we get the best product at the most competitive 
rates. Every buyer will tell you the same thing. How we interact with the factories 
depends on these two things. We monitor as closely as is required to make sure the 
quality goods are delivered on time, at the agreed prices. Our head office has clear 
policies about this. We are hired because of our understanding of the sector and 
what aspects of production are important and critical to on time shipment. You 
can call it governing if you like, but this is only daily business for us.
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Irrespective of how complex (or high value added) the order is, buyers of all 
sizes (brand or non brand) try to minimise costs and non-shipment risks by 
preferring to work with RMG firms who have a proven track record of 
performing under pressure, have the minimum production capacity required for 
a particular product line, are financially and managerially equipped to upgrade 
production capacity to include newer technology and can be trusted to reliably 
monitor own production quality at the minimum levels. In response to this kind 
of governance preference by the buyers, RMG suppliers are motivated to invest 
in production upgrading by installing expensive specialised machinery to make 
customer specific goods, such as denim cutting machines, CAD CAM enabled 
sewing and embroidery machines, etc. in order to make higher profit margin 
products for the smaller number of big brand buyers.103 Therefore, as buyers 
strive to protect their multi-national asset specificity, they also try to lower 
transaction and monitoring costs of governance; simultaneously, suppliers' asset 
specificity, management sophistication and technical capabilities (e.g. use of 
CAD CAM machines) increase in a bid to continue being part of the value chain.
Lower value added segment and close governance -  How buyers deal with 
factories is influenced by product characteristics and supplier capabilities. 
Smaller and some medium sized firms that manufacture low value added 
products, using generic machines, tend to have multiple buyers. These suppliers 
are typically passive actors with low bargaining power, as they are heavily 
reliant on buyers coming to them with design details and orders, and they have 
no contact with overseas end users or even buyer head quarters. Buyers (in 
particular, KAP, G, I, and F) indicated that their interactions with this segment of 
the chain involved detailed instructions on product quality, production and
103 CAD CAM refers to “computer assisted design” and “computer assisted manufacturing”, and are types 
of software used with higher end cutting, embroidery and sewing machines.
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monitoring. They are at a close-governance state which is similar to the situation 
described in the Gereffi, Humphreys and Sturgeon (2005) model as captive 
networks. Here buyers take responsibility for supplying all inputs used by local 
contractors -  where to source the fabrics, yams and accessories, how "cutting 
and making" is to be done, etc. As these suppliers have low capacity in terms of 
financial investment into non asset specific machines and management skills, 
(which the RBV theorists would suggest as being non-competitive, and which 
GVC researchers characterise as "low road" suppliers locked into captive 
networks), buyers minimise transaction and monitoring costs by only giving 
them low value added (basic quality, low risk) orders.
Higher value added segment and arms-length governance— In contrast, some 
of larger and medium Bangladeshi RMG firms are evolving towards higher 
value added products. These are the financially well-off firms with highly skilled 
and experienced production management teams that manage higher end apparel 
manufacturing machines. These firms are much more active in searching for 
higher profit orders. They are interested in "full package production", which 
requires them to develop their capabilities and claim more autonomy -  the 
capability to interpret designs, make samples, source the needed inputs, monitor 
product quality, meet the buyer's price, and guarantee on-time delivery. These 
suppliers tend to work with the more powerful buyers (brand, non-brand or 
large buying houses). They sometimes liaise directly with the buyers' head 
quarters and undertake international travel to attend trade shows etc. They are 
building personal relationships and participating in intense interactions is 
required for exchanging tacit information with their buyers. Some are becoming 
vertically integrated in production. This changes the structure of the supply 
chain by increasing backwards linkage, compared to contributions made by 
simple assembly. This is close to the relational model, as described in Gereffi, 
Humphreys and Sturgeon (2005). Buyers (in particular M, G, L) said that their
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interactions with these firms are different (since the firms are more capable, 
proactive and better bargainers) but are no less intensive, since higher quality (or 
specialised) products require close monitoring of quality assurance, which is 
typically done by the buyer. For example, one buyer said that imported denim 
material for jeans is expensive enough to warrant close "over the shoulder 
driving" by the buyer's office. My findings are different from that of Ponte and 
Gibbon (2005) in one aspect -  Bangladeshi RMG buyers did shift emphasis from 
direct monitoring, but did not make demands for less tangible properties of 
quality, such as compatibility of vision or "internalising buyers' work culture".
Production and process upgrading governance—Production upgrading (making 
better quality higher value added products) and process upgrading (improving 
the process of manufacturing an management skills) are important determinants 
of price-factors (i.e. influencing the per piece price suppliers get) and non-price 
factors (social and environmental compliance). While the buyers are happy to 
work with proactive and capable firms who can achieve production and process 
upgrading that relates to price-factors,104 none of the interviewed buyers were 
interested in collaborating for process or product upgrading, regardless of how 
close or arms-length their relationship was in matters such as product design, 
raw materials sourcing decisions etc. This was true of buyers of all sizes. The 
main driver of process, product and functional upgrading when it comes to 
price-factors, has been always supplier motivation -  improved supplier 
competence and the need to stay afloat in the post MFA market. According a 
medium sized buyer C, production upgrading is not the buyers concern,
Why are you confusing production improvements with buyer dealings in
factories? Factories have improved over time because of their own compulsions. It
104 E.g. invest in CAD CAMs to reduce manufacturing costs, specialised machines for fabric end 
cutting, hydraulic die cutting, specialised buttons etc.
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is something that factories have thought out for themselves. This has nothing to 
do with buyers suggesting ways for better manufacturing. Why should they?
The interviewee from L explained it in terms of sector development history,
In the early days, Bangladeshi garment factories got a head start because of 
Korean firms investing in this country to set up factories to be run by locals. Do 
you know what happened then? The people trained up by Daewoo left to start 
their own factories. That was the last I heard of foreigners investing foreign 
dollars into Bangladeshi garments. Of course we now have foreign firms 
operating their own factories here. Like you have the example of Youngone and a 
few others. But that is not the same as what you are looking for. We will not pay 
for their CAD CAM machines. That is their responsibility.
At the early stages of the sector, foreign RMG manufacturers did invest 
financially in factories and management skills training, but since that 
arrangement did not work out; there is reluctance among buyers to go beyond 
providing manuals and advice (except in 100% foreign owned factories). Some 
thought that production upgrading should happen via indirect encouragement 
and mentoring from buyers, via shallow-collaboration, with buyers providing 
cues for technical upgrading, and the bulk of transactions were production 
quality related.
One buyer representative said that his company was extremely encouraging of 
the changes they have seen over time, and said that they have thorough checking 
systems in place and make repeated visits to the suppliers' premises to answer 
questions and undertake inspections of newer systems or machines. They were 
generally impressed with the performance of Bangladeshi firms, but none have 
invested technically or financially for suppliers' production upgrading. Buyers
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also found the suppliers to be able to handle challenges themselves. Another 
factor was the huge number of factories who already had the skills and capacity 
needed for low value added clothing, which meant that for a lot of firms, 
upgrading was not an imminent requirement. Another buyer said that he felt 
there would be no point to collaborating because his company could not offer the 
same investment opportunity to all his suppliers. They also mentioned that 
financial investment with suppliers would complicate their dealings with 
suppliers, which is a transactions cost barrier. So the buyers (regardless of their 
size or country of origin) have more or less continued to closely monitor product 
quality, but have contained their involvement to shallow collaboration in a quasi 
hierarchy, which was adequate in terms of risk management, and created some 
definite productive gains for suppliers (easily seen by the increasing RMG 
exports).
6.4 Governance of Compliance (Non Price Factors):
The main types of buyers governance along the higher and lower value added 
spectrum of the apparel supply chain (i.e. arms-length and close governance, 
respectively) is related to factors discussed above. It is interesting to ask how 
these relationships and organisational linkages influence environmental 
compliance on the factory floor. In the last chapter we saw how compliance on 
paper is different from compliance in reality, so how do the buyer-supplier 
relationships over green compliance influence the outcomes? Have the 
compliance demands brought buyers and factories closer, or has an arms-length 
approached evolved? Do buyers govern "social" compliance differently from 
"green" compliance? Do buyers feel the need to collaborate with suppliers to 
achieve standards set by buyers themselves? Do suppliers have the space to 
negotiate and bargain for better prices on the back of compliance levels or green 
performance?
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Compliance auditing (social and environmental) is part of the larger buying 
process, and in theory, passing the audit is mandatory before orders are placed. 
The buying process is not a linear set of transactions and it varies greatly 
depending on product type and the buyers' work practices. The buying process 
begins when the buyers' merchandiser contacts the factory with design details. 
The Merchandising Section of the factory meets internally to go through the 
order details and then the Sample Section manufactures samples and submits 
them to the buyer for approval. If the buyers are satisfied with the product 
sample, then they set up an initial audit of the RMG factory. The aim of the audit 
is to see whether the factory has the technical and managerial capacity to carry 
out the production order. If the buyers are satisfied with the physical set up of 
the factory (whether they have enough "machine lines", enough workers, etc.) 
then they start negotiating with the top management regarding price per piece 
(CM), quality of raw materials, supply timings (called "lead time"), and other 
supply logistics. The outputs at this stage are the buyers' initial approval based 
on the negotiated targets for the quantity to be supplied, quality of raw materials, 
price and delivery dates. The buyers' local representative passes on the initial 
audit results to their head quarters to get final approval. In some cases, buyers 
specify that the imported yams/threads have to be Azo dye free in which case 
that is negotiated with the Merchandising Section. Higher end suppliers have the 
capacity to source organic fabrics etc. Environmental considerations at this point 
can increase the CM, but this is not part of the overall profit margin negotiations.
Compliance auditing begins after the initial audit is approved. Compliance 
auditing has two main components -  the first involves a desk review of all 
compliance related licensing documents ("compliance on paper"), and the 
second involves a physical examination of factory premises. If the buyer has a 
relaxed attitude towards compliance then the audit only extends to checking
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submitted paperwork, and production can start then. This kind of buyer-supplier 
relationship perpetuates the "compliance on paper" situation.
However, some buyers require a factory inspection, to check if physical and 
operational aspects that relate to the environmental quality of the factory which 
are particular to the retailer/buyer, are in order (such as number of toilets in the 
factory, number of spittoons to be kept on each floor, the need for ETPs etc.). If 
the auditing is done by the buyers7 own staff then the audit does not cost the 
RMG supplier, however the supplier pays the cost of TPC, and buyers naturally 
prefer TPC because of own cost minimisation considerations. TPC costs depend 
on how many factory visits are required and on the size of premises.105 After the 
desk review and factory inspection, the auditor and upper management meet 
and the supplier is asked to submit a corrective action plan (CAP) with a time 
frame for making implementing compliance changes. The auditor submits their 
findings to the buyers (and if applicable, to the buyers7 overseas headquarters). If 
the CAP is approved by the buyers, then suppliers get final approval to go ahead 
with production while making CAP changes. However, if there is no compliance 
auditor sign off or approval, no L/C will be opened for that order, and no order 
will be placed.106 Therefore, the social compliance audits take place after CMs are 
set, and do not influence the profit to be made in that particular transaction. 
Additionally, the audit has to be cleared under extremely time pressured 
conditions: if lead time is not met, the order might need to be exported by air 
(instead of being shipped), which compromises profits made on that order.
GVC studies have variously shown that depending on a multitude of factors, 
buyer-supplier relations can become tighter (i.e. better collaboration leading to
105 Please see Chapter Five on TPC
106 L/C refers to “letters of credit”. In the RMG business, the L/C is a letter from an importer/buyers’ bank 
informing an exporter that they will be paid for a shipment upon presentation of the specified 
documentation and is payable upon the presentation of specific documents.
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productivity gains and higher profits from upgrading). I argue below that the 
Bangladeshi RMG case is less optimistic. There have been no productivity gains; 
profit gains are unclear; and the ties have not become closer, there is simply an 
additional layer of ties. Overall the system is geared to the benefit of the supply 
chain drivers: buyers' monitoring costs are low, demands are codified and 
transferred at low costs, TPCs are rising, and transaction complexity of supplier 
monitoring for compliance is falling.
a. Compliance on Paper vs. Substantive Compliance:
How buyers govern code implementation is a complex phenomenon. Their 
approach varies from close monitoring to arms-length to complete overlooking 
of loopholes.
Brand name vs. buying houses -  The buyers (regardless of size or country of 
origin), stated that a desk review of compliance documents is mandatory. The 
bigger brand name buyers (M, G, and H) said that they were fully aware of the 
DoE requirements and checked for it during their compliance desk audit. The 
picture is different for buying houses since they work for various retailers. 
According to the them (F, C and I), they will ask for environmental 
documentation as required by the end retailer, which means that green issues are 
mostly not part of the standard requirements. This is a significant loophole in 
ethical sourcing practices along the value chain. Brand name buyers agreed with 
the trade union leaders that buying houses that are not checking for 
environmental documentation or asking for environmental changes are creating 
the first loophole for ethical sourcing identified in this thesis. A trade union 
leader from one of the largest federations said,
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Social compliance checking is something that the big label buyers do, and you 
think that is enough, but we are concerned about the buying houses. They 
regularly do not ask for any social compliance or worker health issues, and there 
are many factories where the conditions are inhuman and unhealthy. Even if these 
factories have some sort of compliance for a big label buyer they used to work for, 
they don't keep up with the maintenance once the order has been exported. Their 
compliance is dependent on which buyer is asking for what kind of compliance.
It may be noted that while there is no reliable estimate of what percentage of 
orders supplied by Bangladeshi RMG factories are for end-retailers who are 
flexible about checking DoE clearance, it is safe to assume that a large portion of 
trade is for such non-branded buyers. So buyer pressure in this case is 
significantly absent for the EM of the apparel chain.
Reputational risk and collaboration -  How in depth the buyers go while 
monitoring compliance is directly revealing of how seriously they view non 
compliance related risks to their reputation, which corresponds with the GVC 
suggestion that buyers' main motivations in a quasi hierarchy chain is to 
minimise risks of production failure. In this regard, the buyer interviews 
revealed two extremes. On the one hand are the EU based brand name buyers, 
(M and H) that enjoy a high profile in the west for being ethically conscious. 
They are in practice more thorough than most about compliance auditing. 
According to M's compliance manager,
Firstly we do a preliminary visit to look at technical aspects, to get a first 
impression, you know and see the basics they offer. We look at the factory's work 
experience, get their feedback on how they will handle our standards, and then 
judgement is made on whether we go ahead or not. Then the garment factory is 
told to write an action plan with a timeline in it for correcting any compliance
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issue that we may have found. The action plan has to strike the right balance; it 
can't be too long or too unrealistic. The range of topics in the corrective action 
plans includes technical issues, compliance, quality assurance, etc. the initial 
audit results in the CAP, which has to go through the factory process and discuss 
how the ETP will be installed, or how it is already there. After this self audit the 
factory must acknowledge or accept the [company name] environmental 
conditionality. The frequency of testing water quality is not part of our audit that 
has to be done as frequently as national law demands. Our audit checks if the 
national laws are met or not.
M is exceptional in that they have a social environmental compliance guideline 
made for Bangladeshi RMG factories. The handbook is made available to each of 
their suppliers before they are vetted for supply contracts. Other big brand name 
buyers from America have a similar step-by-step process. According to one such 
buyer from G,
We check for the production capacity, the factory set up and compliance. There are 
two kinds of audits. The principle is the smell test -  we go and visit the factory 
and get a sense of how things seem. First audit is the technical audit, we check the 
machines, working systems etc, and this takes 1 to 2 visits to find out. Second is 
the compliance audit, where we check if the factory is compliant or not, this takes 
about 3 to 4 visits. For environmental compliance, we are very strict. ETPs is our 
main concern, where we give most importance. Any factory doing a wet process 
must have an ETP. I f a pre-approved factory wants to do wet process products for 
us, they have to install ETP within an agreed deadline, then reapply for 
compliance audit. We go to the DoE and independent auditors for testing ETP 
water quality as part of our monitoring. We help the factories by suggesting labs 
for water testing. There are a few good ones.
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Interestingly, buyer-supplier relations in this case get closer when supplier 
capacity is higher than most others in the market, instead of an arms-length 
pattern.
At the other end of the spectrum, are EU buying houses that work on bulk 
orders, frequently for mail order companies resulting in them having less of an 
active consumer-retailer interface. One interviewee from buying house C said,
For most cases, we audit the product through our sampling programme. The 
garment factory makes the sample, we send it to our foreign buyers, if they 
approve then we place the order.
Clearly, compliance audit is not a high priority for this mail order company. I 
interviewed a buyer from C, a large buying house that was in the news when one 
of their contracting factories collapsed and burnt down in 2006. They even 
collaborated with EU NGOs in ensuring compensation for injured workers. 
However, despite their brush with international media, their approach to 
compliance did not get any more stringent -  reputation risk is different for 
buying houses, since to an extent they are "faceless" to the western consumer. 
The C interviewee said that their main consideration is with the quality of the 
production samples submitted. They have an exceptionally "no fuss" attitude to 
compliance, except for when they place orders for brand labels such as Levis 
(when they require ETP owning, TPCed suppliers). While this is not common 
procedure among all buying houses, such no-fuss buyers also operate very large 
successful businesses in Bangladesh.
Lead time -  Lead time refers to the supply time schedule that suppliers and 
buyers have to maintain to the satisfaction of the end retailer. Considering the 
increases in the number of "clothing seasons" in a year (in some cases retailers
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change shelf stock once a week for high trend youth segments of the market) 
suppliers are under tremendous pressure to meet delivery deadlines, sometimes 
having to opt for own-pocket air-freight delivery, which leaves them with no 
profits or even huge losses. Bangladeshi firms have no choice given that Latin 
American competitors enjoy less lead time problems as they are geographically 
closer to the end market. Lead time pressures seriously impact compliance, 
especially around issues of worker overtime hours and wages. While US buyers 
(especially Wal Mart and Target) are more concerned about labour overtime 
transgressions in their codes, they are also putting huge pressures on shortening 
lead-time, which leads to workers complaining about long 20 hour workdays, 
not being paid adequately for overtime, being physically abused for making 
mistakes on the factory floor, or even being punished by their quality control 
supervisors for complaining of illness. Ethical trade NGOs have long fought for 
these overtime violations.
Lead time pressures also mean that compliance steps are rushed through or 
simply overlooked. According to the buyer from C,
No this is not a major issue. You must realise something, we work in an office 
with a lot of production deadlines. Do you think we have time to get into every 
production line compliance problem? Do you think we can ask for all these past 
history details of what compliance has failed? Do you think we have the time or 
the manpower? We are busy with production and shipment. This is not our 
headache. Shipping on time is a headache worth having. However, compliance is 
an HR issue, so they will highlight to our RMG suppliers if  there is an issue.
As an adjustment, the buyers and the auditors give a "sign off" when a CAP is 
only agreed and not implemented. According to the buyers, the CAP 
implantation time depends on the kind of changes needed, as well as how that
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fits into the date of final delivery. Typically, if there is a construction issue, then 
they get a few months, but if it is a smaller change, like buying fire extinguishers, 
then they get a few weeks. However, for smaller buying houses like F, CAP time 
depends only on delivery date,
Once the auditor has been asked to audit and has given their findings, the time 
given to the firms for changing, adjusting etc. depends on the final shipment date.
K gives time frames depending on how urgent the issue is. According to them,
It depends on the amount of correction needed, if it relates to worker health and 
safety, then we ask for immediate changes and expect it to be done by 7 to 14 days. 
If its infrastructure changes, then we give them more time.
Therefore, it is common practice for suppliers to be auditor certified in paper 
while undertaking compliance changes, which allows them to rush through with 
production deadlines. Under these rules of the game, we find the second loophole 
where ethical sourcing is compromised along the supply chain. It is not 
uncommon for garment factories to have accidents that reveal them to having 
been noncompliant while making clothes for recognisable labels, because they 
were officially undergoing the process of making compliance changes when the 
accident happened. Green compliance measures are most likely as rushed 
through with social compliance measures, perpetuating the "compliance on 
paper" and "compliance on the floor" divide.
Zero-tolerance and non-cooperation -  I asked the interviewees if they would 
discontinue working with a supplier if a third party revealed the factory to be 
non-compliant. Generally, buyers (brand name or not) do not discontinue 
working with a factory over non compliance, unless a zero tolerance issue has
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been triggered. Most buyers said that they will black list a firm if they find child 
labour or forced labour. According to K, they will not work with a factory that 
will not cooperate with social compliance. According to US buyer, G,
Cutting off working relationship is a serious matter. I suppose it depends on the 
issue. I f factories are violating over time rules very much, then we give a warning 
but if this continues over a period of time then we will not work with them again. 
I f we detect child labour, then we immediately deactivate relationships.
Smaller buyers like C have a more relaxed attitude. They said,
I f something happens then we will finish working the season with them and then 
not give any more orders.
KAP had a more helpful attitude than the others. According to their 
representative,
There must be efforts on their part to improve. Why should we leave them like 
that? Its not a solution. Best to stay and help them improve.
Since green issues are not on the zero tolerance list, it can be safely assumed that 
suppliers being judged environmentally non compliant will not have their orders 
threatened either.
Reauditing -  Reauditing helps avoid accidents and keeps continuous 
environmental upgrading in check, and is an important tool for long term EM 
success. In theory, buyers are supposed to periodically examine CAPs and match 
it to actual performance, before making further CAP changes if needed. 
However, according to the trade union interviewees, reauditing is never done in 
the Bangladeshi RMG sector. My interviews with buyers did not exactly match
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the trade unions' view: buyers were found to be inconsistent regarding reaudits, 
but their behaviour could not be matched to their size, or country of origin. Non­
brand buyers (KAP and C) said that they never reaudit. Buying houses have a 
more mixed picture: F said that they only do reaudits when they place orders for 
certain big retailers, such as Wal Mart, and that reaudits were never on the same 
scale as initial compliance audits. However, most buying houses do not have any 
system in place for reaudits. Brand buyers (M, G, H) and some of the largest non 
brand buyers (L, K) do reaudits, and they are sometimes unannounced (needless 
to say, trade union interviewees disagree with this assertion). L's reaudit 
happens after 3-4 months of CAP approval; K's reaudit happens after 2-3 years. 
Buyers said that reaudits happened in the presence of top management and that 
factories usually passed without problems. The representative from L said:
They often pass [re audit] inspections. We have a "three strikes and you are out" 
rule for factory compliance. However before the final suspension, we may give a 
conditional approval, there may be a grace period.
Therefore, the large number of non-reauditing buyers, as well as the non 
regularised and half-stringent system of reauditing among some buyers is the 
third ethical trade loophole that this thesis identifies. This loophole is allowing 
factories to continue production while being only compliant on paper.
Auditing integrity -  Some apparel suppliers said in their interviews that they 
have been audited multiple times in a year, and sometimes by the same auditing 
company on behalf of different buyers. While RMG firms maintain that multiple 
audits divert management time and resources, and disrupt workflow, trade 
union representatives challenged this view by arguing that the potential benefits 
outweighed the actual costs. However, they were also sceptical of the integrity of 
the auditing process, suggesting that several loopholes exist within the auditing
235
system and that multiple auditing may not be pinpointing them, since it is 
merely "more of the same". Their scepticism is in part due to how the 
compliance auditing mechanism is placed within the larger scheme of things -  
meaning the buying process and the loopholes that I have mentioned already in 
this chapter. Often compliance auditing is hurried to its detriment. One RMG 
manager said,
I f there is time pressure then auditors look the other way, we also look the other 
way and they only inspect "paper complianceSometimes the order is so short 
that we would not have had time to make all the changes to be compliant for that 
buyer. Its an unspoken understanding.107
Time shortage is not the only problem. Another RMG manager who has an ETP 
said that they cannot afford the running costs of chemicals and only nm  the ETP 
on buyer audit days (which are pre-announced). He also said that most auditors 
are not technically trained to detect ETP under-performance and that it was a 
matter of "managing the audit tour" of the ETP.108 This view was corroborated 
by other non ETP RMG factories, when I asked them about their own eco- 
responsibility. It is therefore possible to pass for being ecologically responsible 
due to the faulty audit process.
Trade unionists are vocal critics of the auditing process. According to them, the 
main objective is passing the audit, rather than addressing the substantive issues 
with serious commitment; none of the interviewed trade unionists thought that 
the RMG firms were perhaps short of intangible causally ambiguous skills for 
compliance strategy making (as RBV would suggest), and took a more 
operational and instrumental view of the problem. The trade unionists blame
107 R3
108 Personal communication with interviewee.
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both the factory owners and the buyers -  the garments factories have to pay for 
the audit, which means that buyers feel that they have done enough by 
providing codes to be followed; they are not fulfilling any supply chain 
responsibilities.
Discussions with trade union workers brought to light the fact that the buyer - 
factory worker relationships is predominantly ignored in the current quasi 
hierarchy governance scheme, regardless of whether arms length or close. This is 
discernable through the fact that the workers are not shown the codes, and audit 
(and reaudit) findings are not shared with them. According to trade union 
leaders, this is lending an air of secrecy to the auditing process and making the 
workers mistrust the audit results. According to a trade unionist,
The buyers say in seminars that social compliance is going to happen all over the 
garments industry. But they make no noise about having a more coordinated 
mechanism for compliance auditing that involves input from the workers about 
how compliance is actually done. Compliance auditing cannot be truthful if it is 
done by a few factory visits in a few hours time.
In her experience, auditors from buyers offices or third party offices only liase 
with the top management and keep workers at a distance -  the mechanisms for 
worker complaints and worker designed training programmes are almost always 
absent. Her colleague said,
Buyers only talk to people wearing the pressed clothes. They prioritise auditing 
papers over our workers. We are being kept marginalised. We have no access to 
the audit reports and we cannot influence the re auditing results either. 
Compliance is just eyewash, it is controlled by big business. Stakeholders were not
\
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involved in writing the buyers' codes. Where were these code written and for 
whose benefit?
This gap in the hierarchy is an extension of the one-way communication pattern 
that we saw in the last chapter between the workers and the factory management 
when it came to workers' feedback on compliance implementation.
Multiple codes vs. multiple realities -  Multiple codes mean multiple 
confusions; suppliers and trade union interviewees allege that buyers make 
contextually and culturally insensitive demands in their codes, which are often in 
conflict with each other as well. Depending on factory size and production 
characteristics, a supplier might need to comply with more than a dozen 
codes/standards in a 6-month frame, which adds an extra layer of complexity 
that perpetuates compliance reluctance. This also creates a burden on 
management time and resources to be spent on passing multiple audits, and 
RMG managers complained about loss of productivity.
Some EU brands (e.g. Karstadt Quelle, Vendex/KBB, Metro, Migros and Otto) 
use EU common codes (e.g. the Brussels based Business Social Compliance 
Initiative (BSCI) code). Other brand buyers have their own codes. Earlier we 
have seen that multiple-retailer driven buying houses use different codes for 
different orders on the same factory. Then we have buying houses like L, which 
audits factories using the retailers' code as well as their own code. While the 
basics of the codes are the same (i.e. focus on the ILO conventions on child 
labour, worker rights, etc.) codes on occupational health can vary greatly (e.g. 
what kind of floor paint to be used on the factory floor, how high can boxes be 
stacked, etc.). One RMG manager said,
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One buyer came to my factory and said that they want no lights in the store room 
where we keep the cloth because it's afire hazard. No electrical lights are allowed, 
but battery operated lamps are fine. Now, around the same time we got an order 
from another buyer who wants all areas to be very well lit, they even gave us 
lighting units to abide by. This is obviously applicable to the cloth storeroom as 
well. Now are we going to give up orders because of this nonsense? We had to 
negotiate with the auditors because the buyers were not listening to any of it.109
Many RMG factory managers thought that buyers' expectations were unrealistic 
especially for factories in rented accommodation that cannot be easily amended 
to the satisfaction of multiple buyers. Ironically, factories that do not have their 
own premises tend to have multiple buyers who give them short term orders, 
where there is no opportunity for buyer-supplier relationships to strengthen 
towards even weak collaboration. This situation was becoming unsolvable given 
the multiplicity of codes to be followed, not to mention the new buyers that were 
entering Bangladesh. Suppliers also talked about a clash of expectations and 
attitudes towards fruitful responsibility. According to the Compliance Manager 
at one of Bangladesh's largest factories,
It's a little bit pointless for buyers to worry about the risk of drinking water pipes 
being too closely laid to the toilet pipes in my new factory, and asking me to 
change the plumbing design by breaking the walls again, delaying my production 
dates, costing me additional money installing new pipes, when no one can 
guarantee what quality drinking water the workers will drink once they go home. 
The Bangladeshi garments factories are not dormitory style, where the factory 
owner guarantees quality living conditions in the dormitories built to house the 
workers. Factories like that exist in the Middle East where the workers are 
imported from overseas. Buyers go there and pay high rates for clothing, which
109 R8
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pays for running costs of the dormitory. There it makes sense to spend money on 
reinstalling water pipes. Today if I make my factory with pipes laid in one way, 
what guarantee do I have that tomorrow somebody wont want the pipes to be laid 
in another way?110
Another RMG CEO said,
Now there is a new demand, based on the C-TPAT, which is a counter terrorism 
measure for garments exports. They want me to make changes, some of which is to 
my factory infrastructure, which will then contravene the other fire hazards 
regulations. Now it is up to me to find out a middle ground solution to 
operational problems.111
While buyers recognise the conundrum this creates, they do not get involved and 
maintain an arms length position, leaving it up to the RMG firm management to 
come to a compromise on compliance actions. This often involves bribery, while 
buyers look the other way.
When asked about the multiple code confusion issue, the interviewed buyers 
said that most of the clauses in their codes are national legislation supported and 
hence there was no space for factories to say that the codes created confusion. A 
few buyers (C, I and F) said that this was not their problem. This suggests that 
buyers tend not to get involved with ironing out conflicting compliance details. 
Suppliers are left to either work out a compromise with the audit official or 
schedule different audits on different days that allow the factory to show the 
auditor what they need to see. There is a strict arms length relationship here: a
communication break-down, a formal dismissal of practical issues, and no room 
for negotiations.
Weak auditing of subcontracting factories -  When factories are (of all sizes) 
overbooked and cannot deliver orders on time, rather than cancelling the order 
with their buyers, they subcontract on a short-term sport order basis with 
factories that have free capacity at that point. Subcontracted orders usually do 
not make profits for the main supplier and firms that survive mainly on 
subcontracted orders tend not to be profitable overall since profits are very slim. 
Since subcontracting happens only under tough time constraints, compliance 
auditing can get overlooked in these cases, presenting an important loophole in 
apparel value chain greening.
Compliance during subcontracting is linked to the kind of buyers whose orders it 
is. Brand name buyers (G, M and H) have explicitly said that they do not allow 
subcontracting and only give direct orders to factories that have enough capacity 
to avoid subcontracting because of social compliance reasons. According to a 
brand name buyer, G,
We know our supplying factories inside and out We are in constant contact 
about how much capacity they have and how much future load they have. We 
check all these things before we place orders because we don't want overtime 
issues. Keeping track of production capacity means that we automatically have the 
information for knowing when somebody is at risk of doing subcontracts of our 
orders. I f we feel that our suppliers are unable to handle the load, we give them 
less orders, but we don't want overtime irregularities and subcontracting.
US buyers are very strict and prefer immediate deactivation if illegal 
subcontracting is found. Some of the large buying houses said that they allowed
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subcontracting and had a system in place for such situations. The representative 
from L said that the standard market rule is for RMG companies to notify their 
buyers when they are approaching full capacity before subcontracting. Then 
buyers will either furnish the firms with a list of factories pre-approved for 
subcontracting, or the buyers will initiate fresh compliance auditing for the 
subcontractor. In such cases, compliance auditors are sent to the factory on a 
priority basis.
According to the representative from C, subcontracting approvals are only given 
if the workload is light. They can do compliance evaluations exclusively in the 
beginning of the working season -  which begs the question what will happen if 
subcontracting evaluation needs arise mid season. Also, it is questionable how 
thoroughly buyers do a compliance check (which would take at least a few 
working days) before subcontracting factories get approval to go into 
production.
Interviews with apparel suppliers reveal that subcontracts are rarely monitored 
for social compliance. According to a manager,
Some buyers are not as strict as others, or if we are behind schedule by a little on 
compliance, they are willing to look the other way until we finish our 
improvements. I f we have to give subcontracts out, buyers should be looking at 
the compliance in those factories as well, but they don't and we also don't ask 
questions, we get the work done.112
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Another factory manager said,
We work with Walmart, they have it in their contract that we are not allowed to 
subcontract their orders. Local buying houses give subcontracts to smaller firms. 
They don't have social compliance codes, and they don't do audits either.113
However, one representative from C said about subcontractor compliance 
auditing,
This rarely happens in reality. I f an order reaches sub-contracting situation we 
are already under a lot of time pressure to finish the production. We often look the 
other way. Everybody does, but they don't want to.
Therefore subcontracting suppliers are overlooked by buyers of all sizes. This is 
the fourth loophole that was identified during my research where ethical trade 
was being compromised in the Bangladeshi apparel chain.
b. Compliance vs. Financial Rewards:
In Chapter Five, the RMG interviewees stated how they could at best see indirect 
competitive advantage from environmental upgrading, so why are the buyers 
keeping an arms length distance from this problem?
Price negotiations vs. compliance negotiations -  One explanation is in the price 
negotiations that determine the CM for a particular order, and its distance from 
compliance negotiations (social and environmental issues). According to one 
RMG CEO,
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Buyers audit teams are typically from their compliance unit. They don't do CM 
calculations. They are not involved with their marketing division, and are 
unaware of what the order situation is. The first step is for my factory to pass the 
compliance audit. The buyer negotiates prices etc. only after that, but it has 
nothing to do with how much it has cost me to become compliant. That is not 
reflected in the CM being offered to me. My competitor probably gets the same 
CM for the same item, even though their compliance costs less.114
This buying process disconnect happens because the price of the order is set 
during the initial assessment (which is based on product quality, product price 
offered by the supplier, factory set up and managerial capability), the satisfaction 
of which is followed by any compliance negotiations. Environmental 
management literature suggests that environmental management costs are 
dependent on the firm that is undertaking it, meaning that an older factory will 
need to make more expensive changes, compared to a factory that is 
incorporating eco-friendliness in its initial design. Price and contract negotiations 
between RMG buyers and suppliers do not seem to acknowledge that 
suggestion. There is no mechanism for revisiting the CM based on the 
compliance costs of the supplier, regardless of how expensive the compliance 
costs are on the factory.
Quality and relationship longevity -  The second explanation is the higher 
preference given by buyers to product quality. Buyers that were interviewed 
were not altogether unaware of the fact that CM negotiations at the current time 
were not giving any space for negotiating higher prices based on the suppliers7 
compliance costs. Buyers are well aware of suppliers7 demands for higher prices 
but maintain that higher prices will need to correspond to better quality. 
According to F,
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The merchandiser has to come hack from the factory with a good price offer. It is 
ultimately the merchandiser's decision. Price is the main thing for buyers. If a 
factory is managed well and have good compliance, then obviously their profit 
making will be higher. We are not going to give higher prices directly because of 
compliance.
According to C,
If a supplier perform good [sic] on our code of conduct issues they have an 
advantage but there is also other issues like quality, lead time and so on that they 
are also measured against.
I asked a large EU buyer how this might change and he said,
As long as my company strategy is based on quality, price and lead time, I have 
no choice. I don't know, maybe our (HQ based) Compliance Director needs to 
fight it out with the Sourcing Director.115
So what happens to EM in this situation? Firms have no space to bargain for 
higher prices based on compliance cost calculations. Suppliers have to wait for 
future negotiations with the same buyer to push for a higher price. However, if 
the nature of the order is such that there is no chance of a sustained working 
relationship (i.e. low chances of increasing supplier's bargaining strength), then 
the supplier might not want to invest substantially into the CAP. In some cases, 
even in longer term buyer-supplier negotiations, bargaining for higher prices to 
reflect compliance investments may not happen. According to one manager of a 
denim firm that has an ETP,
115 Personal communication with the buyer from K.
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Buyers don't give us any credit for having long-term relationships. They don't 
categorise their suppliers in terms of proactive or regressive firms. They have no 
list of preferred suppliers, no gold stars. We have been doing environmental 
compliance for 6 years and they still don't give us any cost benefits.116
GVC studies in RMG have shown similarly that ultimately buyers are more 
concerned about product quality than compliance, and that in itself is not 
surprising, but what is interesting is the stalemate situation that flies in the face 
of EMT: after getting the order, the factory is left hoping for better prices next 
round to offset past compliance costs. Both EMT and GVC have no way of 
explaining how upgrading is to happen in this kind of "chicken or egg" situation 
that will not change without the whole supply chain power structures changing.
Past behaviour -  Interviewed buyers (regardless of size) maintain that even if 
they increase prices because of compliance, there is still no guarantee that the 
factories will become compliant, instead of investing the profits into factory 
expansion. Such scepticism was also shared by some RMG managers themselves 
and trade union workers, with reference to the high growth rates in the sector 
and continuing compliance accidents. One buyer explained this scepticism by 
pointing the larger profitable factories that have had compliance related 
problems, sometimes costing worker lives. This is also supported by Chapter 
Five findings on corporate culture and low preference for proactive compliance 
strategy making. Overall, the buyers' view is that a compliant factory is a better 
managed factory and those superior management skills will lead to a host of RBV 
driven management innovations and successful strategies that will collectively 
lead to higher profits. This would be perfect for a sector that is equipped with 
RBV skills; unfortunately the Bangladeshi RMG sector is not.
1,6 R8
246
c. Green Signal Myth vs. Reality:
Eco-content in codes is akin to weak EM, as we saw earlier. Is buyers' pressure 
for as stringent as it can get? In particular, since the banning of child labour owed 
much to considerable buyers' pressure it is perhaps surprising that when it 
comes to environmental compliance, the green signal is weak, which is 
discordant with the messages disseminating from the ethical trade movement 
that says that DC green consumerism is rising.
High end apparel, profits and Bangladesh -  Firstly, strong green signals are tied 
to high-end consumer preference for ethically traded clothing (no sweatshop 
labour, recycled fibre and organic content, etc.). The buyers unanimously said 
that they were mainly motivated by improving their image in front of their 
consumers/shareholders via ethical trade and CSR. This is especially true of 
brand name buyers with a visible media image of being ethical. According to a 
leading UK retailer,
We are more concerned about the benefits resulting from [company name] good 
image. The culture and thinking of UK customers is so high that its very 
important to us. As a result the customers are doing good things for the 
Bangladeshi suppliers.
According to their yearly sustainability reports, their ethical product lines are 
showing healthy profits year on year. However, green consumer signals are not 
translating to profits in the same way for all retailers, such as K, whose 
representative said,
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Our company's image? Yes. Our profit levels? Not so much. Consumers in 
Europe want socially compliant goods, of course, but they don't want to pay 
increased prices for it. There is no EU wide market study on apparel compliance 
that I can refer you to, our marketing department did a study of our customer 
base and this is their finding.
K is a leading multi billion dollar German company with retail stores, speciality 
stores and a EU wide mail order catalogue business. They have much experience 
in environmentally sustainable sourcing and their CSR policy emphasises 
sustainable forestry and climate change. The K representative in Bangladesh saw 
suppliers' social compliance fall within the greater momentum of K's 
sustainability policies. According to him, such matters do not have a momentum 
of their own, and the greatest challenge remains that of convincing the consumer 
that her purchasing decision can make a real contribution. The K representative 
was aware of certain segments of European consumers who are willing to pay for 
ethically traded apparel, but maintained that "green clothing" is a niche market. 
Another European buyer, KAP, broadly agreed regarding profitability of green 
consumerism in both EU and USA.
Buying houses have a more complex relationship with green profits: unlike 
buyers who source for their own companies, buying houses are one step 
removed from the end customers and hence view their profitability vis-a-vis 
social and eco-compliance as mainly hinging upon risk management. They are 
concerned about their profit levels which is contingent upon the profit levels of 
the end retailers. Whether or not their suppliers are compliant influences risk of 
non shipment, which is the responsibility of the buying house. Therefore buying 
houses are concerned with compliance as long as it minimises risk and 
streamlines production. The interviewee from L said that they want to protect 
their business reputation as a reliable and ethically conscious buying house in the
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eyes of their customers, so they insist on a mixture - national laws, their own 
codes and retailers7 additional demands. However, L is a rare example of a pro- 
EM buying house.
Buyers like K are sceptical of green consumerism as driving compliance in 
Bangladesh. For their Bangladeshi operations, the main concern of buyers 
(regardless of size or supply chain position) is to avoid large-scale accidents in 
factories supplying to them, in the manner of the Spectrum factory disaster. They 
do not source high end apparel lines from Bangladesh and so the green market 
signal from consumers is not as strong as it could be for all buyers who source 
clothes from Bangladesh. It would be logical to argue that as long as Bangladesh 
is part of the value chain on the basis of cheap labour and low value addition, the 
green signal will continue to be weak, regardless of how much EM is happening 
in other parts of the apparel chain.
Green code content -  The second aspect of weak green signals can be seen in the 
message that is given to the RMG suppliers from the buyers with regards to what 
is actually acceptable in the name of compliance. As it is eco-content is very weak 
on paper, and many buyers are not strict about eco-compliance in practice: it is 
reasonable to assume that this discrepancy in the messages is not helping an 
industry wide compliance drive to happen when many factories are happy to 
survive without taking orders from compliance-demanding buyers. This remains 
another serious loophole in the compliance scenario. I asked the buyers what 
they thought of this. According to L:
Maybe their profit levels are lower so they can't afford to be so strict about who 
they source from. Those buying houses with a larger profit margin can afford to be 
picky.
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However, other buyers refused to comment on their colleagues' behaviour.
d. Risk Minimisation Threshold and Shallow Collaboration:
Finally, EM along the Bangladeshi apparel GVC is faltering due to the buyers' 
risk minimisation strategy and consequent approach to supplier-buyer 
collaboration. Deeper collaboration had the potential to make the RMG more 
proactive in their attitudes and strategies based on closer (and adequate) 
compliance monitoring and audits by buyers (e.g. child labour), closer technical 
help (e.g. production details) or financial help (e.g. in foreign owned factories).
Interestingly, it is impossible to distinguish between governance of social issues 
from green issues: according to the interviewed auditors, a compliance review 
looks at all "non price" issues together and auditors do not distinguish between 
social and environmental issues in the CAP, or at any follow up stage. The 
buyers also considered social and environmental issues together while 
discussing compliance monitoring. The lack of differentiation is not only 
conceptual, it is also operational: most buyers govern occupational health and 
safety measures within the same set of transactions with their suppliers as child 
labour or worker rights. The buyers in my sample that requested ETPs also 
closely monitored the CAP audits, but that is also matched by their close 
monitoring of social "zero tolerance" issues such as child labour.
In this chapter we have seen that buyers use a mixture of arms-length and close- 
govemance when it comes to dealing with production monitoring, depending on 
whether it is high end production or low-capacity first time contractors (close 
governance) or lower value added production or repeat contractor (arms length 
standardised governance measures). However, in the case of CSR, buyers are 
satisfied with an arms length approach, compared to a closer relationship of tighter
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production monitoring when it comes to specifying other parameters -  such as 
design details, sourcing of raw materials, sample approval, shipping dates, etc. -  
that have a more direct impact on profit levels for buyers and retailers.
The main explanation for this is risk minimisation. If risks from non-compliance 
with quality assurance measures is considerable for buyers (and threatens stock 
market share prices, profit margins and market reputation, as happened with 
child labour allegations) then sufficient market-survival pressures can convince 
buyers to engage in policy networks, contribute funding, and engage multi 
stakeholder institutions to address the problem. However, in a situation where 
the process already in-place for governing the standards and codes is accepted as 
being adequate to meet any legal claims, or to prevent any loss of retailers' 
reputation due to non-compliant suppliers, then the pressures/incentives for 
closer governance is less. This is not encouraging news for EM, since the risk 
threshold has never been crossed by green issues in the apparel GVC.
The RMG buyers in Bangladesh prefer only shallow collaboration for CSR, 
especially information provision (by means of compliance code documents, 
booklets, website references etc.), rather than case by case technical or financial 
collaboration. In fact, none of the RMG firm representatives could recall instances 
of technical or financial collaboration, although technical and financial 
collaborations are common within factories owned by the buyers' parent 
company. Although those companies demonstrate the benefits of buyer 
investments for compliance, it has not inspired other buyers to similarly invest 
into their top tier of suppliers. According to the buyer from L:
The hundred percent Korean owned factories run by Youngone are a different
story. Their vision is different. They came to Bangladesh in 1979 and have made
16 factories here, each factory is purpose built, and compliance spending is part of
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setting up costs for Youngone. Their business model is an inspiration, as you say, 
but you have to realise, it's a different business model. We cannot invest with 
money or procure exhaust fans or machines for compliance in my client factories. 
They ask for help all the time. But not financial, technical, yes. I f a firm has good 
production skills, good quality machines, then we give guidance on compliance. 
Our suppliers have access to our own technical people, the LNF technical 
department is there to help.
Brand name US buyers and large EU buyers (some of them are brand name) are 
leaders in knowledge sharing. They understand that knowledge and skills for 
compliance are intangible intuitive values that have to be nurtured, especially in 
a cut-throat business environment. According to the K buyer,
If its got to do with quality standards, then we give them books, manuals, things 
to read. But firms learn by doing. So regular workshops on product quality and 
compliance are being done by K where factory management has to demonstrate 
learning. I f there is no awareness in a firm management about compliance, and if 
you give them a book, then there will be no effect.
Not all buyers were so progressive as to hold workshops with the first tier 
managers in factories on compliance. Some buying house interviewees said that 
they were unaware of other buyers conducting seminars or giving guidance on 
compliance. All (but one) buyer said that they had not collaborated with 
suppliers on compliance and that they have no immediate plans to do so.
I had asked the RMG suppliers if they had ever asked buyers for any financial 
assistance for compliance upgrading. They were unanimous in saying that it is 
not a possibility and it would be unprecedented. One supplier connected it to 
personal pride,
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We shouldn't expect help from buyers for compliance. We are doing it for 
ourselves, for our country, not for the buyer. We are not beggars. It would be like 
taking charity from masters. I f they invested in garment firms, the owners would 
steal that money. It would be welcome if buyers gave up higher CM orders if we 
became compliant, but that is not a realistic thing to wish for. There are no such 
guarantees in such a competitive global market.117
A manager from one of the oldest RMG firms said that keeping collaboration 
expectations low has to do with Bangladesh's overall position in the apparel 
value chain,
We don't expect buyers to invest or assist us in any meaningful way. I f they feel 
that Bangladeshi firms are asking for investment, they will quickly go elsewhere; 
like Sri Lanka or India.118
The buyers broadly agreed with the RMG firms on this and eco-compliance is no 
exception. However, buyers might invest in socially beneficial projects of their 
own, as highlighted by one RMG CEO,
I haven't heard of buyers doing that, although some buyers are philanthropic and 
invest because of that. The real reason is perhaps they get tax benefits if they 
invest in the host community etc. For example, Marks and Spencer started a 
special school for handicapped garment workers. We send people there and after 
they graduate, we employ them. If you can play your cards rights, the buyers 
might match your investment in social causes.119
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Most suppliers are not as savvy as this CEO: most have not demanded any closer 
collaboration other than information, because the market is highly competitive 
already and the Bangladeshi product range is generally not specialised enough to 
prevent orders moving to competing countries. This shallow collaboration shows 
that earlier GVC research results that buyers engage in deep collaboration 
(technical and financial) are not borne out in Bangladesh. Until structural 
characteristics and market requirements (and product portfolio for Bangladeshi 
factories) change, deeper collaboration will be unlikely.
6.5 Conclusion:
It is a reasonable assumption that since buyers are leading the drive for social- 
environmental compliance, and that since compliance strengthens buyers' risk 
portfolio, buyers would to want to collaborate closely with their favoured 
suppliers to help them achieve the compliance codes. However, my empirical 
findings have proven to be more complicated than that and demonstrated that 
EM principles do not fully apply to the Bangladeshi case due to the nature of the 
network and the rules of the game within the "cheap clothing" supply chain 
structure.
The Bangladeshi RMG industry is caught halfway between a captive-model and a 
relational model of production governance, where buyers decide on modes of 
governing depending on how sophisticated the supplier was -  some have an 
arms length approach to governance (when supplier is making low quality basic 
products that do not need intensive production monitoring), and some have 
more intensive governance (when the supplier is making high end products that 
are high value added enough to merit close monitoring). However, when it 
comes to CSR, most buyers favour an arms-length arrangement. Buyers are only
254
close with their suppliers with respect to CSR when expensive orders are 
involved (e.g. denim factories).
The buyers are choosing to remain uninvolved in solving problems that could be 
overcome through communication and negotiation. The buying process is 
riddled with loopholes that allow for overlooking substantial compliance 
improvements to be made to meet the buyer codes. This buyer attitude is 
perpetuating a system of bribery and falsified audit documents. The custodians 
of the system are looking the other way as lead-time driven orders are rushed 
through. Additionally -  the weak green signal from end users in developed 
countries, the often confusing code content, multiple codes, a flawed compliance 
auditing system, a non participatory stakeholder system of auditing, overlooked 
subcontractors, etc. -  that are at the heart of why buyers and compliance auditors 
are not being able to deliver what the buyer codes promise.
Overall, buyers have set in place a system where their monitoring and 
transactions costs are low (shallow collaboration and reliance on superficial 
auditing systems, reliance on TPCs, rare reauditing, etc.), and they have no huge 
risks to reputation (since most clothes from Bangladesh are not sold in niche 
markets). Meanwhile, the GVC and EMT suggestions of better economic network 
collaboration leading to easier quality upgrading, productivity gains and higher 
profits for the suppliers have not materialised. RMG factory interviewees could 
not identify direct production gains (or even profits) from buyers' shallow 
collaboration and in fact, have repeatedly stated how productivity is being 
hampered due to conflicting code requirements. The rigidity of the buyers and 
the supply chain structures (where the suppliers are highly substitutable and 
greatly outnumber the buyers) has meant that profit gains are due to product 
quality and price, and not due to greening. Both EMT and GVC have no 
solutions for such bottlenecks and stalemates.
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In the broader sense, the hypothesis in this chapter is correct, that buyers are not 
interested in deeper, meaningful collaboration when it comes to compliance 
upgrading. The issue lies in how social and eco-compliance auditing is placed 
within the buying process and in the way the auditing is done. The existing 
"rules of the game" is supporting the continuation of this situation. Given this, it 
is pertinent to ask how things can possibly change; and for that we should look 
towards a bigger network where the power hierarchies might be addressed to 
change through public policy on compliance, which is the subject of the next 
chapter.
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Chapter Seven: Eco-Compliance Upgrading in Policy Networks 
Surrounding Bangladeshi RMG Firms
7.1 Introduction:
In a democratic political system, EMT succeeds via a state regulated market 
economy that receives policy level support and guidance to green production 
chains via social and political changes in market incentives and attitudes. EM 
therefore assumes that the state agencies are not only themselves convinced of 
ecological goals (i.e. attitudes among policy makers will become 
environmentally proactive), but they will have efficient institutions to engage 
in mature dialogue with stakeholders (e.g. private sector, civil society) for 
designing, implementing and monitoring policy and economic incentives for 
greening. Analytically it may be argued that the EM prerogatives for 
policymakers is fairly demanding even in Western democracies, where 
environmental policymaking institutions are better equipped than in a 
country like Bangladesh, where industrial environmental policymaking 
priorities are fairly low. So how does EM fit in with the Bangladeshi political 
culture and policymaking structure?
As noted in Chapters Three, Five and Six, Bangladeshi compliance regulators 
have not performed well in line with EMT. In this chapter I examine why and 
how this happened to test my third and final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The regulators (state and non state) are not convinced of the benefits of 
compliance and do not have the capacity to design, implement and monitor better 
compliance. The exclusion of the DoE and the RMG firms in this policy network is 
likely to lead to poorly designed outcomes.
In order to understand the policy network changes for EM, I will be referring 
to the variables explored in my review of policy network literature in Chapter
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Two. The analytical lens of this chapter is wider than before -  it includes the 
RMG factories, buyers, trade unions leaders, auditors, etc. from the last two 
chapters, but the unit of analysis is now the compliance policy network as a 
whole, which includes many new actors (state and non-state) as well as old 
(from the early days of compliance); together they are involved in realising 
the non price demands in buyer codes. I refer to it as the "compliance 
network". I begin with the formation of the SCF, which is the most recent 
attempt in Bangladesh to regulate compliance issues in the RMG sector.120 In 
line with Chapter Three, I refer to this as Phase Three of EM imperatives 
(figure 7.1).
Figure 7.1: EM imperatives for the Bangladeshi RMG sector
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7.2 Phase Three: the National Social Compliance Forum for Bangladeshi 
RMG:
By mid-2006, Bangladesh had reached a gridlock on compliance. General 
strikes were called, factories were looted, people were killed, activists 
arrested, factory owners and trade associations on the defensive, government 
agencies and buyers extremely worried. The donor community came forward 
to mediate in this time of crises. The new initiative on compliance policy 
making began on June 27-28th 2006, when the MFA Forum121 and the UNDP
120 Earlier two phases were discussed in Chapter Three.
121 MFAF are a UK based initiative comprising o f apparel brand buyers, retailers, international 
organisations, donors, trade unions and NGOs.
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jointly held a conference in Dhaka titled, "Forum on the Future: an 
Internationally Competitive Textile and Garment Industry" (FFF I), that launched a 
project to identify a road map to a profitable and socially responsible 
garment industry (MFAF 2006e). At the first conference, the main policy 
challenges were iterated as follows:
— Compliance with international labour standards and national labour 
legislation is key to market maintenance. The main problem areas are freedom 
of association and collective bargaining, employment contracts, living wage, 
reasonable working hours, weekly holidays and health and safety measures, 
including fire safety;
—Ignorance of international labour standards, national labour law and 
industrial CSR best practice is a major barrier to progress at all levels;
—The multiplicity of demands from different retailers compounds the 
confusion and creates hesitancy among firms;
—The paucity of capacity in the enforcement agencies is a further cause for 
concern; and
—The reluctance of stakeholders in accepting responsibility is stagnating the 
policy arena. There needs to be an end to denying responsibility, and 
deadlock creation through waiting for others' initiatives (MFAF 2005a).
Policy discussions at this point linked compliance with market 
competitiveness (MFAF 2005b and 2005c), which is encouraging from an EM 
point of view if greening is viewed together with "social" issues, and not 
delineated as a clear priority area. The FFF I also highlighted problems within 
the existing issue network: understanding the relevant issues, poor 
institutional capacity and weak network structure with low built-in 
accountability. There was an emphasis that the ad-hoc policy making style of 
the past would need to be replaced with a more rational system with less 
information gaps to facilitate informed decision making (Jabbar 2006).
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Shortly following the FFF I, a Social Compliance Forum (SCF) was formed to 
review policies, ascertain necessary reforms, expand the compliance policy 
network by appointing "focal point officers" at relevant ministries or agencies 
and to create stakeholder teams to monitor factory floor compliance (MFAF 
2005d). A senior level government official, Mr. Ghulam Hossain, Joint 
Secretary, Ministry of Commerce (MoC) was appointed as member-secretary 
and SCF Chair.
Given the MoCs influence on the RMG sector over price-factors, their lead in 
the SCF was intended to give a strong message that compliance monitoring 
would be more stringent than before. A change of hands was expected to 
provide new momentum, according to Mr. Ghulam Hossain,
The SCF structure is unusual in that it is headed by a government agency, 
and not lead by donors or the BGMEA, this time we have taken the lead. This 
was done deliberately to demonstrate government commitment to compliance, 
and provide stronger bureaucratic backing to any SCF programme. This will 
only succeed if  other government departments lend full cooperation. In the 
past they have been reluctant in the taking responsibility.
The SCF design had the legal, political and operational potential to address 
the core vs. periphery design of the earlier compliance network, and had the 
scope for broadening the compliance agenda to include greening, facilitate 
clearer understanding of greening apropos to the Bangladeshi context vis-a- 
vis buyer expectations, and change outdated eco-legislation and 
implementation arrangements. The MoC being in charge also created 
potential for the compliance network to change from the earlier clientilistic 
structure.122
122 Chapter Three details the earlier problems with the BGMEA leading the compliance network in 
Phase One and Two.
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The SCF included representatives from ministries of Home, Labour, Jute & 
Textiles, Works, EPB, BGMEA, BKMEA, NGOs, development partners, and 
buyers. Two issue based Taskforces and a Compliance Monitoring Cell 
(CMC) were set up (figure 7.2). RMG firms were to implement compliance 
requirements based on their own best-informed strategies based upon 
existing laws (with or without loopholes). The two task forces were 
responsible for physical audits. They report to the CMC, which is headed by 
the EPB. The EPB CMC reports directly to the SCF (headed by the MoC) and 
results are to be shared between working group members (MFAF 2006a).
Figure 7.2: Institutional components of the SCF
Multi Stakeholder Working 
Groups
Occupational 
Safety Taskforce
Lead: Ministry of 
Works
Labour Welfare Taskforce
Lead: Ministry Of Labour and 
Employment
Compliance Monitoring Cell
Lead: Textiles dept, Export 
Promotion Bureau
Social Compliance Forum (SCF) 
Lead: Ministry of Commerce
Source: MFAF 2006f.
The Labour Taskforce focuses on the high risk issues, which were the most 
persistent and high-risk social issues (e.g. child labour resurgence, working 
hours, maternity benefits, regularisation of the worker appointment system, 
freedom of association and collective bargaining rights of workers, etc.). 
Similarly, the Occupational Safety Taskforce is constituted of the Department 
of Fire Service and Civil Defence, RAJUK, Ministry of Environment and 
Forest (MoEF, represented by the DoE) and the Department of the Chief 
Inspector for Factories and Establishment.123 They were to audit for fire safety, 
building safety and worker security, including, and rather optimistically from
123 See Annex 7.1 for SCF details.
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an EM point of view -  working environment and environmental aspects of 
RMG (EPB 2006b). However even at this point, eco-issues were not given 
separate consideration in policy dialogue.
Initially, the SCF took a supply chain perspective which was encouraging for 
the ideas of an EM network by establishing a Buyers Group to regularise code 
content and establish a common code. The Group was also going to set up a 
process for improving the link between compliance and purchasing practices 
(MFAF 2006b and 2006c). The Group included buyer representatives from 
Asda, Carrefour, The Co-op, Cotton Group, Gap Inc., H&M, Inditex, Karstadt 
Quelle, Levi's, Marks & Spencer, Nike, Tesco, and Walmart. The ITGLWF, 
Oxfam International, ETI (UK), Social Accountability International, and the 
Fair Labour Association are also part of this Working Group. Secondly, the 
SCF formulated the Joint Initiative on Corporate Accountability and Workers' 
Rights (Jo-In code), in November 2005 that is a common code to be adopted 
by the buyers placing their orders in Bangladesh (MFAF 2006d).
However, it was not long before the old problems of sidelining greening, 
network exclusivity and weak policy outputs reared their heads. During the 
project negotiations in January 2006, for example, it was revealed that the two 
task forces had drafted worker safety and labour standards without any 
participation from the trade unions or civil society (MFAF 2006e). The SCF 
Chair explained that civil society representation had not been resolved due to 
an absence of a unified self-nominated trade union and NGO actors who 
would participate (MFAF 2006f). The agendas of the trade unionists and 
NGOs were heavily questioned by the task forces. Conflict over actor agendas 
also became apparent along the lines of Bangladeshi and non-Bangladeshi 
(MFAF, the donors, the buyers). By the end of July 2006, the MoC called the 
first meeting of the SCF, where the MFAF was not invited but was able to 
participate only through lobbying by the BGMEA and UNDP. No trade 
unions or NGOs were invited (ibid).
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The BGMEA remained politically powerful and their old reluctance to take 
compliance responsibility and preference for blaming "foreign forces" reared 
its head, similar to the ILO child labour negotiations. At the August 2006 SCF 
meeting, the BGMEA called for a level playing field when it came to non 
Bangladeshi compliance demands across the supply chain (MFAF 2006f). An 
example of anti-Bangladeshi bias was cited through the uneven attention 
given to the Bangladeshi owned Spectrum factory accident versus the sacking 
of 500 Bangladeshi workers overnight by Taiwanese employers.
At the operational level, updating of compliance laws saw some progress 
with the MFAF pushing for the common Jo-In code. By the end of the SCF 
meetings in September 2006, the Jo-In code concept paper was agreed in 
principle by all stakeholders, with the implementation to be negotiated in 
Dhaka. The concept note focused on three key areas for policy making which 
represented a broadening focus on implementation etc., but a narrowing 
focus on eco-issues. Following on, the SC met in Dhaka to formulate a plan 
for mobilising resources and institutionalising mandates behind the three key 
areas for social compliance. Among the core SCF members (broadly the 
steering committee (SC) members), the problem of wavering commitment to 
the SCF goals became apparent at this stage, echoing their pre-SCF behaviour 
patterns. It was brought to the attention of the SC that government agencies 
were not according a high enough priority to their SCF work after the initial 
agreement of the early days. They were not following up on their tasks, 
agreeing to release matching funds, or even attending meetings -  collectively 
it may be taken to mean that non-price issues were not of high priority for the 
government agencies. Network interactions were becoming bottlenecked and 
a core vs. periphery structure began to emerge, along with a shift in network 
leadership.
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At this stage, the donors and the MFAF staff were unofficially leading the SC, 
instead of the MoC. Only the MFAF staff met with the Buyers Group; the SC 
general members did not regularly meet or exchange input with the buyers. 
This was reflective of the network tensions along the lines of Bangladeshi 
national interests vs. foreign values especially surrounding the buying 
practices. The BGMEA and BKMEA expressed the view to the SC that the 
concerns of the RMG factory owners regarding the changes they expect from 
the buyers were not being reflected in the policy discussions. Discussions 
reached a critical point when trade associations threatened to withdraw from 
the SCF. Implementation of the Jo In code was another contentious issue: the 
trade associations disagreed with the SC general members over the freedom 
of association, subcontracting arrangements, wages, and hours of work 
requirements.124 The trade unions were not asked for input over the Jo-In 
issue, firmly placing them in the network periphery. The trade associations 
instead pushed for the new Bangladesh Labour Code 2006 to replace the Jo-In 
code; a move that ultimately succeeded. The task of getting the Buyers Group 
to retain interest in the SCF was continuing to be a challenge: their lack of 
response and participation in meetings pointed to their level of commitment, 
and allowed the BGMEA and BKMEA to steer the agenda.
The acceptance of the Bangladesh Labour Law 2006 over the Jo-In code had 
no impact on EM: since the Jo-In code focused on workplace standards that 
were judged to be high priority in the industry, and did not include 
environmental issues even by way of referring to national legislation. The 
Labour Law 2006 was similar in scope.
124 The trade associations were defensive because the political volatility of these issues was impacting 
the member factories who voted for the associations’ Board of Directors. Trade associations 
traditionally discourage trade unionism in Bangladeshi factories. Workers are not allowed to form 
unions inside EPZs and in under other conditions. Trade associations are also reluctant to handle 
compliance of subcontracting factories due to operational complexity o f tracing firms who sometimes 
do not declare subcontracted income. Lastly, wages and acceptable work hours were already political 
high risk issues from Phase Two of compliance policymaking.
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After October 2006, progress on the compliance programme became very 
slow due to broader political instability and violence that made Bangladesh 
come to a standstill in winter 2006. Bangladesh went under a Caretaker 
Government and a State of Emergency was declared in December 2006 that 
continues at the time of writing this Chapter.125 During the early days of the 
Emergency, compliance policymaking came to a halt, since all government 
ministries were headed by non-regular acting chiefs, and there was no system 
in place to continue policymaking. In fact, the GTZ PROGRESS team said that 
project outputs scheduled for early 2007 donor meetings were pushed back to 
June 2007, depending on elections.126 It may be noted that as of July 20th 2008, 
the Caretaker Government of Bangladesh has not set any dates for the next 
general elections.
In April 2007, the MFAF met in Toronto. The SC of the SCF was renamed as 
the Multistakeholder Forum Bangladesh (MFB) with the BGMEA and 
BKMEA officially in the lead. In May 2007 a new compliance project was 
announced by the BGMEA/ BKMEA for the RMG sector based on the 
different compliance levels of their member factories.127 The new programme 
concentrates on supporting the government (awareness raising, advocacy and 
monitoring), strengthening stakeholders (workers, managers and buyers), and 
strengthening third parties (BGMEA, BKMEA, NGOs and trade unions) (MFB 
2007). The BGMEA/BKMEA formally circulated the log-frame and questions 
were raised again about the non participation of trade unions and NGOs at 
this stage, especially in the ongoing programme of implementing minimum 
wage (also headed by the BGMEA). The stakeholder meeting reviewed the 
progress made since the Toronto meeting, and concerns were raised 
regarding living wages, right for collective bargaining, freedom of association 
and working hours by the non-Bangladeshi members. The MFAF members
125 The caretaker Government Regime lasted for 2 years and ended with the general elections in 
December 2008. This thesis was submitted for examinations prior to that.
126 Personal communication with GTZ officials.
127 Source: the Daily Star, available online:
http://www.thedailvstar.net/2007/05/09/d70509050158.htm. accessed on July 20, 2008.
265
(ETI and GTZ) felt that living wage had to be addressed, but the Bangladeshi 
members insisted that the new Labour Law 2006 covered minimum wages 
adequately and that living wages were off the table for discussion (MFAF 
2007). The trade associations were emphasising market conditions for 
compliance, while the MFAF were emphasising improved working conditions 
and legal trade union activities in factories. The BKMEA president said that 
downward pressures on prices had made compliance impossible and that 
compliance pressures are unjustified unless falling prices are not arrested 
(Daily Star 2008). His argument neatly tied the price factors as subsidising, in 
a sense, with the non price factors, as highlighted clearly in Chapter Six.
Given these policy negotiations, the network in place is not adequately 
equipped to deal with the realities and problems delineated in Chapters Five 
and Six, summarised by figure 7.3 below.
Figure 7.3: EM realities for the Bangladeshi RMG sector
The SCF took on the familiar core vs. periphery structure: excluding NGOs, 
trade unions and government agencies with low political saliency; continued 
marginalisation of greening issues, unchanging attitudes to social issues (lack 
of commitment, coordination, cognition and cooperation); dispute over the
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specific legal and programme level changes; and the inability (or 
unwillingness) to expand the policy network for a discussion without 
suspicion and blame. The Phase Three policy network was very similar to the 
Phase One and Two networks: business lobby led policy community that 
operated like a mixture of an issue network and a policy community; the 
bureaucratic network was ultimately dependent on formal institutional path 
dependent rules and norms.128 The kind of social-political changes that EM 
assumes of the policymakers, economic actors and broader society did not 
materialise here.
What was the fate of policy driven greening? It would be interesting to 
analyse the DoE vis-a-vis the SCF through the lenses of EM. The DoE were 
invited to the SCF meetings, but were absent in all dialogue. Environmental 
issues were addressed as a part of the Occupational Safety Taskforce, but 
were absent in the Steering Committee discussions. What are the factors that 
make the DoE such a weak (and ignored) state agency for leading EM of the 
RMG sector? Does the SCF fare any better as a regulator, assuming they 
overcome their present bottlenecks and carry on? The next section attempts to 
understand these two sets of questions.
7.3 Determinants of Weak Ecological Modernisation Capacity:
a. Uneven power-resource dependency and institutional problems:
Implementing EM is a political project (Berger et al 2001) and analysing the 
success or failure of EM needs to take into account the power-resource 
dependencies that have determined the poor state of environmental 
compliance vis-a-vis social compliance. The DoE's place in the political 
hierarchy of regulation is fairly weak: when an agency is resource dependent 
on others, it consequently has less power to bargain for its own agenda, and
128 See Table 3.5 for details on the Phase One and Two network characteristics.
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when the environmental agency is weak, it sends out a weak message about 
the seriousness of compliance.
-Department of Environment (DoE):
The DoE is a relatively new government agency, set up in 1989 after the 
reorganisation of the Department of Pollution Control under the MoEF. The 
DoE has a head office in Dhaka and six divisional offices located in Dhaka, 
Chittagong, Khulna, Bogra, Barisal and Sylhet. The DoE has been 
implementing the ECR (1997) and is focused on green issues -  environmental 
sustainability programmes for natural resource use and protection of the 
natural environment. Other projects include climate change, air quality 
improvement, refrigerant recycling, coastal biodiversity management, 
monitoring cross boundary pollution, phasing out Persistent Organic 
Pollutants. On the urban side, the DoE has successfully banned polyethylene 
shopping bags in Dhaka in 2002. The DoE also banned three wheelers (with 
two stroke engines) in Dhaka in January 2003. While granting industry 
licenses is part of their core functions, they do not have any ongoing projects 
for improving industrial compliance. Environmental regulation of the toxic 
industrial pollutants discharged into Dhaka's rivers and especially the 
Hazaribagh tannery area remain key failures for DoE. According to the IWM 
2007 report, rapid expansion of industrial processing and manufacturing 
activities in the Dhaka watershed over the last 15 years has left the rivers dead 
(extremely high BOD and COD values in rivers), leading to existing water 
treatment plants being rendered useless and a growing dependence on 
groundwater for Dhaka's citizens, not to mention lost earnings and human 
suffering from waterborne illnesses. Controlling industrial pollution is, of 
course, not only DoE's responsibility -  there are additional complexities such 
as unplanned industrialisation, heterogeneity in industrial clusters, and a 
powerful industrial lobby.
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The DoE is not one of the better-funded government agencies, 129 and is 
heavily dependent on outside funding which weakens their position and 
agenda when faced with competing government agencies and donor agencies. 
Currently, 12 of its 13 projects are funded by donors, such as the UNDP, 
CIDA and World Bank (DoE 2006). The relationship between the DoE and the 
donors is not without conflicting interests and power-bargaining either. 
According to Mr. Mohammad Reazuddin, Director (Technical Department 
head) of the DoE,
There is a problem in the donors perception about environmental problems in 
Bangladesh. They decide what to fund. They think they know too much since 
they give the money and push the agenda. We do not agree with them on their 
agendas, what areas to fund or how things should be done. But we cannot do 
without donor guidance either.
There have been several donor driven projects (specifically under the UNDP's 
Sustainable Environmental Management Project and the CIDA's Bangladesh 
Environmental Management Project) on building DoE capacity that includes a 
revision of environmental legislation applicable to industries, engendering 
improvements in the regulatory framework at the national and regional levels 
and providing technical assistance to the DoE for the development of EC 
skills and the management of environmental safeguarding of industrial 
development. The DoE's problem is not a lack of donor funds or capacity 
building initiatives -  the problem is overcoming institutional inertia 
regarding weak management capacity, low technological skills and low 
policymaking proactivity in non-donor driven areas. This has serious EM 
implications. E.g. the DoE uses the same EIA criteria/guidelines for the textile 
and RMG sectors, despite marked differences in pollution generation patterns 
and loads. The DoE has also not changed ECR requirements of mandatory
129 According to the Government of Bangladesh Budget 2006/07, the MoEF received BDT 185 crores 
(approximately), whereas the higher budget ministries were Finance (14301 crore BDT), Internal 
Resources Division (42299 crore BDT), Economic Relations Division (12128 crore BDT), Defence 
(694 crore BDT) (MoF 2006).
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ETPs regardless of blatant non-compliance by industries and technical 
recommendations made by foreign research bodies, such as the Stockholm 
Environment Institute (SEI) and University of Leeds. This proclivity towards 
adapting ill-fitting policy is out of line with EM requirements.
Mr. Reazuddin pointed out that DoE's reluctance to deal with ecologising 
economic growth is not DoE's unique problem. According to him:
Our projects require co-operation from a large number of government offices 
and NGO and private stakeholders. There are many levels of government and 
various departments with separate areas of responsibility. We don't hold 
jurisdiction over everything environmental. So we are dependent upon them 
very much to get results. To get co-operation, each project team has to develop 
capacity within DoE, and also within our stakeholders. We have to train and 
motivate inside and outside. But co-ordination and consultation with 
stakeholders can be difficult. Training components in projects often only have 
provisions for DoE staff training, leaving outside the awareness and skill 
building in other government ministries. Infrastructure for communications is 
poor. Many stakeholders do not have access to email and staff turn over rates 
is a problem.
He pointed to the overall situation: rapid expansion of the industrial base is 
not the problem; the lack of management of such growth is the problem. 
Other factors highlighted by the DoE Technical Director included: 
institutional failures by multiple agencies, lack of coordination or a shared 
vision over priorities, lack of communication or dialogue, lack of interest by 
industries towards volunteering for compliance without regulatory pressure, 
weak monitoring procedures by DoE, absence of land use guidelines for siting 
of industrial units, perfunctory attitudes about greening at the national level, 
overall eco-apathy, etc. The Dhaka City Corporation was also singled out for 
failing to look after industrial pollution, as were other government agencies
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such as the RAJUK (they have no environmental guidelines for designated 
industrial zones), Board of Investments (they provide permits for service 
provision before El As), local government units/ pouroshobhas (they approve 
siting of industries without considering environmental impacts), the Industry 
ministry and the Bangladesh Small and Cottage Industries Corporation (low 
eco-priorities and awareness). This is keeping not only EM's agenda in the 
backburner; it is also not helping the DoE's agenda in front of powerful 
competing ministries unless wider change towards EM happens initiated by 
other ministries. According to Mr. Reazuddin:
That is true for every country. You cannot blame Bangladesh. Other 
ministries are not as open to recognising environmental problems. Everyone 
has their own policy agenda. They are not ready for it. We are in competition 
with them.
So what is the scope for the DoE in providing cross-ministerial guidance on 
ecologically benign growth? Mr. Reazuddin expressed his scepticism about 
the benefits of having a permanent cross ministerial environmental focus 
group comprising of Joint Secretary level bureaucrats who will be trained on 
project EIA etc., along with their regular duties. He thought such an 
arrangement would not be viable or sustainable, preferring a needs-based 
approach,
Cross ministerial working groups are need based. I f  they are needed then they 
will be formed. Sometimes issues are identified by the MoEF, then moderation 
is done by us. Often other ministries take the lead.
This fits in well with the existing culture of policymaking in Bangladesh 
where efforts are issue based and piecemeal.
271
Another factor weakening the DoE's position is the shortage of technically 
skilled and experienced staff who are capable of designing and executing a 
combination of sanction-based and compliance based approaches for 
pollution control. According to Mr. Reazuddin,
For an organisation like the DoE, the staff members would require 
considerable training in environmental issues as well as environmental 
management. Staff training is an ongoing issue, there is not enough of it but it 
is not a barrier exactly.
However, the interviews in Chapter Five adequately highlighted the skills 
gap within the DoE for effective and efficient regulation: there are limitations 
in knowledge of alternative modes of regulation, attitudinal barriers to 
change and a perception that a confrontational approach is the most effective 
with industries. It was felt that the DoE needs to strengthen their ability 
absorb new approaches and technologies so that they have the ability to 
collaborate with factory owners, industrial associations, etc. The lack of 
environmental training among the technical core staff (most of who are 
recruited at the cadre level and not based on their educational/technical 
background) is rendering the DoE "toothless", as one anonymous DoE official 
called it. The inability to interface with industries were demonstrated during 
negotiations surrounding the 2005 Committee for Eco Compliance of RMG 
Factories. As discussed before, it was a short-lived dialogue, which was 
characterised by pressure from the BGMEA against the DoE fulfilling its legal 
mandate. According to Mr. Reazuddin, attitudinal change is a matter of time,
You cannot expect things to happen overnight, the committee is still being 
formalised. The technical barrier is huge. No one is ready mentally for national 
level compliance. So far the committee has DoE, the BGMEA and the BCCI. 
ETPs for RMG factories is part of existing policy. However we need to enforce 
it. Basically it is seen by everyone as a trade barrier. Media pressure is
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awakening the RMG, that compliance is a good thing. Eventually they will see 
ETPs differently. There is reluctance on their part, we need time for that to 
change. Government wanted a solution to water pollution and we at the DOE 
provided a solution.
When asked about the DoE's involvement in the SCF, he said he was aware 
that the DoE was a part of the Task Forces but that no one from the 
Government had sent what he called proper invitations, and hence DoE is not 
actively involved in the policy making or project implementation. When 
asked about DoE participation in the Occupational Safety Task Force under 
the Compliance Monitoring Cell, Mr. Reazuddin said that the DoE will not 
get involved in the CMC's compliance drive:
No we are not (involved in the BGMEA/CMC compliance drive). Fire safety 
is a social issue.
Even at the DoE then, there was clearly no recognition that ethical trade 
compliance in RMG includes eco-compliance issues, which highlights the 
difference between the DOE's agenda and the EM agenda.
The DoE's weaknesses and skill-gaps are complimented by the reluctance 
among private sector actors in engaging with them, as we saw in earlier 
chapters. Many managers have said they have no wish for better or more 
engagements with the DoE. One RMG CEO said,
DoE's cooperation with RMG factories is not a high priority for any one. They 
should focus on more pressing problems, such as water quality. Why don't 
they concentrate on improving the water quality in the rivers? What private 
sector dialogue are you talking about? DoE's dialogue with RMG factories 
will help no one. The DoE is doing their job quickly after getting their bribes, 
it's a system that works. We pay the bribe for getting technical help. I f  you
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remove it, the whole process will only get longer, which will cause more 
bottlenecks.130
Another manager took a sympathetic view,
Sometimes genuinely concerned officials come to visit our factory. Not 
everybody at the DoE is about taking bribes. I f  they do ask for bribes, I don't 
blame them. Look at how much they are paid. They have families, children, fees 
to pay. Some ask for indirect bribes, some ask directly. They have set up a nice 
system where we have to make cash payment and somebody from the DoE will 
contact a consultant on our behalf and get the required reports written and 
submitted to the DoE. We are certified that way. It's a procedural issue. We 
need to have 13 certificates in order to get a trade licence, this is one of 
them.131
The RMG factories seemed reluctant to turn to the DoE for compliance issues, 
and in fact, would rather the DoE did not participate at all. When asked what 
would be their message to the DoE, one manager said,
I would like to tell the DoE that for the sake of God do not take uninformed 
decisions. Leave us alone.132
One manager was especially sceptical of DoE's role. He was experienced in 
running an ETP in his factory and liased with foreign donors regarding 
technical requirements of ETPs and environmental management for his 
factories. In these repeated interactions he has never approached the DoE. In 
his experience, the DoE does not have up to date technical capacity to deal 
with the fast changing chemical needs of the higher end RMG factories, such 
as the one he runs. His factory does "wet processing" which involves:
130 R8
131 T>1 A
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garment wash/power rinse, silicon wash, enzyme wash, enzyme stone wash, 
stone wash, bleach wash, chemical stone wash, double ice wash, destroy 
wash, micro-sanded green wash, retro- reactive and tie dye. His wet process 
machines are from China and Singapore and were imported at considerable 
cost. He does not believe that the DoE technical staff have any understanding 
of these machines. He was reluctant to involve poorly trained staff in the 
running of important expensive machinery. In the future he envisions an 
expanding range of production including more complex washes in the sector. 
According to him,
The DoE is working in a policing role; they are not in the advisory role. They 
don't have the whole picture. I f  they tried to get into advisory role, what will 
happen? All the factories will have to shut down while they study the 
situation and make up their minds about what advice to give. Such interaction 
is not wanted. It's a bad choice.... There is no point to it (DoE dialogue with 
other ministries regarding environmental policymaking in a coordinated 
form). They have to sort out issues of self-capacity. No point talking to 
somebody who has no idea about the whole issues.133
The medium and smaller sized factory managers were unconcerned about 
DoE participation or had no opinion on the need for such dialogue on 
environmental technical advice. This seemed to indicate the low importance 
of the agency in the eyes of its regulated factories, or even a degree of agency 
capture of a powerless regulator. When asked about the DoE's image problem 
with the RMG factory owners, Mr. Reazuddin said,
We inform them (RMG factories that apply for environmental clearances) of 
DoE policy and rules when they come to us. Water standards are given. We 
don't give them technical help. We tell them to go to consultants for that. We 
help motivate and educate. I know what the popular perception is among
133 R32
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garment firms about the DoE, that it is a den of briber]/; that our inspectors 
are millionaires, that they throw down money and we give them a certificate, 
that anybody can get a certificate. But what they don't know is that we also 
decline a lot of certificates. Any factory that is on rented property with no 
stairs will not get a DoE certificate.
However, during my fieldwork, I visited many DoE certified factories on 
rented property. In fact, ownership of premises is not mentioned in the ECR 
as a precondition for getting a licence.
-Social Compliance Forum (SCF):
Power resource dependency and institutional weaknesses are also present 
within the SCF, but along different dimensions than that of the DoE. Here the 
skill-gaps, attitudinal bottlenecks and power dynamics are more complex, 
since it is a collection of state and non-state actors who already have a shared 
history of sharing resources and power over policymaking before the SCF was 
formed. However, here as well, EM is a political project, to be understood in 
terms of individual power hierarchies and agendas.
Each organisation also has a history of institutional problems (weak capacity, 
corruption, low commitment, etc.), as evidenced during the fire safety and 
wage negotiations.134 There were certain "rules of the game" that were also 
imported into the SCF, as seen earlier in this chapter. This combined history 
of shortcomings and network culture has influenced the direction of policy 
change in the SCF. That in itself is not surprising; what is interesting however 
is the participants' views on power-bargaining.
Theorising power in the SCF is difficult: it seems to be drawn along the lines 
of legal power, but the real battle was between two different types of market
134 See Annex 3.4 for background.
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power (the MFAF and the trade associations). The most powerful actors were 
the donors (initiative funders), the MFAF (strategic secretariat, liaising 
between buyers and the Bangladeshi actors), and the government ministries 
(legal powers to enable cross ministerial working groups to work together). 
The BGMEA and BKMEA ultimately proved to be powerful because of their 
working relationship base with the sector that went beyond compliance. As a 
result, the compliance network remained clientilistic and corporatist.
Among SCF participants, there was a general appreciation of MFAF's role in 
managing and coordinating the different interests of the Forum. Much of the 
coordination had to happen while Dhaka was beset by the worst political 
unrest since independence, which made it hard to move the agenda forward. 
In some senses, it was beneficial to have a non-Bangladeshi organisation in 
the moderating and coordinating role -  given its impartial third party status, 
free of past history of resource dependencies, negotiations and agenda 
bargaining with the Bangladeshi actors. There was recognition among the 
participants that the steering role success came from the powerful backing the 
MFAF received from the donors as well as the Buyers Group and the MoC.
However, some scepticism was expressed regarding the longevity of network 
that emerged, especially due to the marked unevenness in power-balance. 
According to one trade union activist who was heavily involved,
Few of the buyers are behind this. That in itself is not enough. I don't feel that 
the MFAF will be strong enough to take a leadership role.
An anonymous participant from a donor agency said,
The people behind the MFAF are thinking too much of their role. For this to 
work in Dhaka we have to begin with an agreement of the need for the Jo-In 
codes, that is more backed up by the local agencies and more garment buyers.
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This person further said,
The trade unions that come to these meetings are totally bhua135 -  they come 
and look gravely insulted during the negotiations and yet don't have any 
credibility to bring to the table. They don't represent the workers. Most of 
them are former thugs hired by the factory owners themselves to quell factory 
disputes. Now they have become respected trade union representatives as soon 
as foreigners called the meetings. They are all politically backed and 
nominated. Nothing to do with workers. Talk to them and you will see they are 
busy attending seminars in Thailand and London. They won't bring any 
useful discussion points on social compliance but are busy giving interviews.
Power wielded by the Buyers Group was sometimes thought to have been 
one sided. According to the buyer from L,
There is very little engagement between buyers at the national level. The few 
major brands that have a large stake in this are pushing the Jo-In code. They 
are typically already very experienced in corporate responsibility, so they can 
give inputs, other brands are not as involved.
Several times there was conflict over power sharing along nationalistic lines. 
The Bangladeshi actors resisted the foreign sourced Jo-In code as not being 
suited to the Bangladeshi context. I asked the head of the SCF how the 
government ministries negotiate setting policy goals and implementation 
mechanisms better suited to the Bangladeshi local situation, when the popular 
perception is that an unpopular agenda is being forced by non Bangladeshis. 
Mr. Ghulam Hossain said,
135 “Bhua” in Bangla means “impostors”.
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Very congenial atmosphere. They are our development partners and this is a 
fully joint collaborative initiative.
However, on condition of anonymity, a high-ranking SCF official from a Task 
Force ministry said,
There are many things that you will not hear about the closed door 
negotiations that happened yesterday. Behind closed doors I can speak to the 
MFAF people freely. I told them this won't go far. They have no idea what 
they are expecting and what is reality. They think throwing money is enough.
The conflict of financial muscle and local knowledge was also mentioned by a 
few trade unions and NGOs; incidentally they were excluded from the 
steering committee.
Although greening issues was left off the SCF agenda, the SCF is perhaps 
better suited to enable RMG eco-compliance over the DoE because unlike the 
latter, it does not have funding problems or low bargaining power vis-&-vis 
RMG firms or other ministries. However, both the SCF and DoE have 
different institutional issues, corruption allegations and commitment 
problems. Plus, they are both seen as pushing non-price factor compliance 
that is against national industrial growth goals. The resistance to "anti- 
Bangladeshi" ethical trade demands (and by extension greening demands) 
does not fit in with the EM assumptions of changing social and political 
attitudes and greening values.
b. Cognitive, institutional and strategic uncertainty:
EMT suggests that a clear understanding of eco-profits will translate into 
committed action towards changing institutional set ups and policy outputs 
(design of economic incentives for greening, for example). Cognitive,
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institutional and strategic certainty is tied to clear green signals, availability of 
market incentives and the knowledge of what the regulated need. In the 
following section we will see that without these certainties, regulating for EM 
failed.
-Department of Environment (DoE):
It is not a matter of cognitive uncertainty for the DoE, since there have been 
many technical assistance projects and studies done on the environmental 
impacts of the textile and RMG sector, most notably by the SEI, the University 
of Leeds, and GTZ. Not only are DoE officials unconvinced by the expert 
information and technical recommendations, neither are the other 
stakeholders or factory neighbours. The undeterminable and unwritten rules 
of environmental politics are potentially also a major contributor behind 
DoE's inaction on industries: the most glaring case involving the Hazaribagh 
tannery cluster that is being slowly relocated upstream of the Buriganga river 
(to the EPZ in Savar) due to unchecked pollution dumping (chromium, 
sulphur, manganese, lead and chemical dyes) at the present site having 
contaminated the land and the aquifer to practically irreparable levels (IWM 
2007). DoE's inaction in the comparatively less polluting RMG sector is 
perhaps less surprising.
It is perhaps more a problem of institutional and strategic uncertainty, made 
worse by institutional weaknesses. In Chapter Five, we saw that the DoE is 
not doing enough to despite acknowledgement within the institution that the 
eco-certification procedure is flawed. Judging by the quickly shelved 
discussions on Eco Compliance of RMG firms, DoE has considerable 
problems overcoming its institutional and strategic inertia and reluctance to 
actively promote its own legal mandate. However, the extent of these 
problems affecting its weak powers as a regulator is hard to analyse since 
they have been so little involved in the RMG greening policy core.
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-Social Compliance Forum:
Earlier we have seen the lack of agreement over cognitive certainty regarding 
eco-compliance among RMG firms and even buyers. Whether there is 
comprehension among policymakers about what is an acceptable solution for 
greening these factories is hard to gauge given the absence of eco-issues in 
compliance. Since there was no corum either over the social issues, it may be 
reasonable to expect a lack of consensus over greening given past network 
history. If greening has to happen it will need to be executed within this same 
compliance network. In the months following the formation of the SCF and 
Task Forces, some old institutional, strategic and commitment uncertainties 
have made their presence felt. In order to get a deeper understanding of the 
kinds of uncertainty facing the SCF, I spoke to a range of SCF participants, 
both from the core and the periphery.
According to Mr. Ghulam Hussain, who was the Head of the SCF at the time, 
the problem of uncertainty is more complicated than mere institutional 
uncertainty or strategic confusion or wavering commitment. He suggests that 
these aspects cannot be understood without understanding skills and 
communication problems within the policy hierarchy. He said,
There are three main problems. Firstly there is the issue of having the technical 
capacity to run a industry wide compliance programme. It should be the full 
time jobs of qualified people who have enough training, currently we don't 
have that. The second problem is with my own staff. They don't understand 
the intricacies of the compliance issues. Garments production is not a simple 
thing and compliance cuts very deep. Not many people understand that. This 
level of ignorance is particularly bad because it doesn't motivate people while 
taking on the additional job of monitoring compliance. Thirdly, we need
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training officers, who are themselves thoroughly knowledgeable of the problem 
and have the skills for teaching others. Right now the way things are, you can 
expect a 6 month delay because of no training officers. We are trying to get 
trainers who are qualified but this will take time. We also need training among 
my department staff on how to handle the MFAF people. They work 
differently and want things that my department staff does not know how to 
give them. There are too many strong agendas at clash sometimes.
The SCF is aiming to reduce the uncertainty and confusion by pooling 
together a group of experts to the best of its ability. According to Mr. Ghulam 
Hussain,
This time the government is involved in a direct way in monitoring the 
compliance audit progress. We never did that before. This reflects the 
government's seriousness at high levels. This is an opportunity to address 
weaknesses such as government commitment, accountability and 
transparency. This is the chance to prove that the government cares about 
compliance. The technical leadership is in BGMEAs hands. The bottom line is 
this -  compliance has to be lead by experts -  doesn't matter i f  it is government 
or not. We want the job to be well done.
Given past social compliance enforcement experiences, they have gone for the 
"best possible fit" solution in terms of legal reach and access to RMG factories 
that are provided by the trade associations.
The "best possible fit" is still beset with problems. During the London 
meeting of the SCF, I asked BGMEA representative Mr. Lutfur Rahman about 
the weaknesses that the BGMEA is addressing within itself to better lead the 
technical aspects of compliance regulation as a part of the SCF. He said,
We can't say we have failed. I f you say that we failed then how can we have 
achieved so many things? You have visited Bangladesh over the years. You
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have seen the conditions 10 years ago and then you can see things now. 2005 
to 2006 has seen tremendous improvements. In 1995 child labour was a major 
threat and the ILO and BGMEA acted together in a project. How can you 
compare Bangladeshi RMG sector with other countries and say that the 
BGMEA has failed? There are fires in hotels too. We are dealing with factories 
in rented venues here. Eventually they will shift to commercially fit  buildings.
This reluctance to accept responsibility for institutional weaknesses and 
regulatory failure is part of a blame shifting culture, which is prevalent in 
actors forming the SCF's core. However, all actors do not share the blame- 
shifting attitude. According to Mr. Ghulam Hussain,
Law enforcement has not been perfect, I agree. We are a developing country. 
Many things about social compliance are covered in national laws. We need an 
SCF working group on law harmonisation. Why have we allowed the 
garments factory accidents to happen? There is a serious capacity problem. 
There is a problem with implementing the written word. We don't have the 
capacity to even understand the issues and the magnitude of non compliance. 
We don't have that mentality yet.
Given the unchanging low-commitment attitudes of the BGMEA officials 
(which was also widely criticised by the ILO evaluation reports of the joint 
ILO-BGMEA project that set up the BGMEA7s Social Compliance Cell), and 
the legally contested participation of trade unions in the SCF, should the 
government take a more direct role in implementation monitoring, rather 
than leave it to the "best possible fit" actors? Mr. Hussain said that it is a 
matter of network functionality rather than issue commitment,
The government has serious capacity problems when it comes to monitoring. 
We have no choice but to leave monitoring to non government organisations. 
We can only facilitate and give official backing.
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Therefore, the government ministries can only leave actual implementation to 
"best fit" actors whose institutional strengths and commitment have been 
questioned heavily in the past.
The commitment of the non Bangladeshi actors was important in overcoming 
strategic uncertainty. I asked the MFAF head Mr. Alan Roberts about the 
gradual build up of pressure from the non Bangladeshi players in the 
compliance network. He said,
Twenty five years ago when the apparel supply chain started, working 
standards were very poor. Buyers have gradually built up pressure on their 
suppliers. Meanwhile at the corporate level CSR practices are rising. Buyers 
may have taken advantage of low standards in the past; however it is now the 
buyers who are giving the opportunity to the suppliers to get better.
Buyers are pushing for social compliance in the absence of home grown 
pressure, and that is remarkable indeed. However, strategic uncertainty 
among the buyers as a whole is still a problem, since the MFAF Buyers Group 
only includes the proactive big brand names, and not the buying houses 
operating in Bangladesh (in Chapter Six we have seen the loophole created by 
the buying houses' differing compliance demands), therefore overall 
commitment towards compliance from the periphery buyers remains to be 
tested.
Strategic and institutional uncertainty among the trade unions has been a big 
barrier in implementing the SCF agenda, as has been reiterated repeatedly in 
the SCF meetings in Dhaka. According to a senior labour leader and secretary 
of a national labour union, the trade unions could not get strategically 
organised because of security problems. It may be mentioned that in April 
2006, he was stabbed in connection with his role in mediating the labour 
dispute with the government and the RMG factories (New Age 2006b). Trade
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union representatives interviewed by me have repeatedly said they feel 
persecuted by higher authorities and the powerful business lobby. Allegations 
of death threats for trade unions labour leaders are fairly well known. 
According to one high profile union leader, during the wage riots in June 
2006, her office was surrounded by the paramilitary police forces, who 
physically stopped her colleagues from going to any labour meetings; one 
colleague died in police action, and another colleague was detained without 
any warrant. Such intimidation results in the weakening of strategic 
participation of smaller trade unions. According to a member of INCIDIN, a 
labour rights research group, strategic uncertainty of trade unions is directly 
linked to the legal status of the unions in RMG factories,
The civil society view of the garment supply chain is different from that held 
by the people inside it. CSR has to be an equally shared global perception. We 
need labour rights outside of the garment factories in the EPZ. I f  the majority 
of the factories had allowed trade unions then there wouldn't be street riots 
and so much uncertainty about how to usefully channel the force of the trade 
unions.
Therefore, the issue of strategic and institutional uncertainty of trade union 
participation and effectiveness in compliance monitoring can be tied back to 
their legal status and broader legitimacy in the broader policy network.
c. Intractability of the problem:
The intractability of the social compliance problem has certainly resulted in 
low regulatory pressure on the RMG firms, as evident from the quotes from 
Mr. Ghulam Hussain about how staff in government departments do not 
adequately understand the complexity of garments production and 
consequently they do not understand the complexity of the problem. In 
Chapter Five and Six, the complex and cross cutting the range of buyer
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demands were noted. The complexity of the problem is made worse by the 
involvement of a multitude of stakeholders who do not see eye to eye 
(increasing the complexity of the network and resulting in risk averse, 
reactive and slow decision making at the policy level), yet whose sustained 
cooperation is necessary. The intractability of the problem remains 
unresolved because social compliance is not a "deal breaker" in terms of the 
factories getting more orders from buyers, as buyers and RMG managers 
explained in Chapter Five and Six. Greening is even less of a deal-breaker, but 
no less complicated.
However, that is not to say that the problem cannot be solved. In Chapter Five 
we saw how the firms were handling environmental compliance without 
involving the DoE too much. The RMG factories, asked about issue 
intractability, said that they recognised that the problems have to be solved by 
first changing the policies, but that they never banded together strongly 
enough to push for the changes from the DoE.136 Therefore, the DoE remains 
without any pressure from the private sector to solve their problems.
7.4 Determinants and Consequences of Low Actor Participation on 
Policymaking:
Network analysis literature and EMT both greatly emphasise the peripheral 
actors in policymaking. However, my findings suggest that while non- 
inclusive policy dialogue hampered greening, participation of actors in the 
periphery is not as simple as that. There are two sorts of actors in the 
periphery -  those who were in the periphery despite trying to be part of the 
process (such as trade unions) and those actors who simply did not wish to 
participate, even though they are impacted by the policymaking (e.g. RMG 
firms themselves). They are major actors who have not accessed the 
policymaking -  what is the consequence of keeping them voiceless? Why
136 This is related to RMG apathy for greening, as discussed later.
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were some actors simply not interested? Either way, non-participation has 
impacted the outcomes. Below I examine the nature of non participation as it 
relates to network characteristics.
a. Involuntary non-participation:
In Phase One, Two and Three, the network was a tightly knit policy 
community with powerful core members steering the agenda, while ignoring 
the periphery actors who felt sidelined. Such exclusion of participation 
indubitably results in policy outputs that are perhaps less well thought out or 
even less acceptable to those who are sidelined at the policymaking stage and 
yet the sidelined actors are expected to work with the outputs at the 
implementation stage. Repeatedly peripheral members mentioned agenda 
hijacking and questioned whether compliance meant for the buyers or the 
workers.
Interviewed trade unionists have expressed their scepticism at being sidelined 
to the benefit of those who are part of "the compliance system", meaning 
actors who ask for compliance (buyers) and those who check compliance (the 
auditors and trade associations). These trade unionists regularly participate 
with foreign labour NGOs (such as the Clean Clothes Campaign, Make Trade 
Fair Alliance, and the Maquita Solidarity Network). Despite their SCF 
participation being promoted by the MFAF, they were having difficulty 
getting involved in closed-door policy meetings because powerful 
Bangladeshi actors were questioning their legal legitimacy and political 
affiliations before refusing to negotiate with them, while the political 
affiliations of the powerful Bangladeshi actors remained unquestioned. 
Political affiliation became an important tool for sidelining organisations 
given the political instability Bangladesh was going through that allowed 
trade unions affiliated to the opposition parties to be summarily excluded. 
Some were also kept out because they were judged to have been
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institutionally weak (in terms of funding, expertise and human resources). 
Similar criteria were used to sideline the DoE as well, which had the 
immediate impact of green issues being absent from what could have been the 
first ever opportunity of integrating greening requirements into a cross 
ministerial network of compliance implementation and monitoring.
b. Voluntary non-participation:
The lack of interest among RMG firms in compliance dialogue is an 
interesting phenomenon in the context of network analysis and EMT. Neither 
mentions anything about actors who are impacted by outputs and yet are 
apathetic to the process. However, EMT would suggest that changing of 
mindsets among economic actors has not happened fully in this case. Can this 
be a lost opportunity, or has this made no impact? Why such apathy?
The complexity and intractability of the issue has contributed to the lack of 
mature understanding and rhetoric about compliance. During the 2006 wage 
riots and SCF meetings, there have been public allegations of foreign 
conspiracies of ethical trade and speculation about the hidden political 
agendas behind the wage riots by the Bangladeshi trade associations and 
certain government officials. At the second Forum For the Future meeting Mr. 
Alan Roberts, head of the MFAF said in his speech,
The Spectrum disaster was an important catalyst and we have made 
remarkable steps since then. However, now is not the time to become 
complacent. China is a looming threat to the Bangladeshi garments industry. 
It is time to get it right. It is time for streamlining the institutions and better 
coordination of external and internal assistance. Above all, it is time for 
mature understanding and mature dialogue on social compliance. It is time for 
taking control and taking action, for institutional memory, for demonstrating 
determined mature commitment.
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The fact that BGMEA staff were publicly making statements about 
compliance being an anti-Bangladesh conspiracy and a trade barrier, has 
acted as a disincentive for the average RMG factory to participate in the policy 
network because this sort of nationalist rhetoric colours the compliance issue 
as being something that needs to be resisted, or even ignored. As it is, social 
compliance had initial problems of gaining acceptance among the RMG 
factory management and workers. There was reluctance to accept 
responsibility, reluctance to understand what social compliance meant, and 
greater reluctance to make changes, as discussed in Chapter Five.
Secondly, the issue was never a long-term threat to the health of the RMG 
sector. Its criticality waxed and waned, never gathering enough momentum. 
The current policy initiatives were only jumpstarted after the tragic accidents 
in 2006, the fatalities of which caused the policy network to form. Nothing 
concrete was happening before that. RMG factories are used to the past 
history of start-stop measures over the last decade and have gotten 
complacent about inaction and non-participation. Greening is even lesser of a 
threat.
Thirdly, as Chapter Six showed, compliance is not the ultimate criterion for 
the buyers in placing orders in practice. The non-criticality of the issue helped 
bury it in the agendas of the RMG managements' list of high priority tasks. 
Policymaking and implementation in the more critical areas (such as lead time 
maintenance, raw material procurement, transport strikes, Chittagong port 
work stoppage, government tax regulations, finance problems, recession, 
tsunamis, etc.) were moving much faster and yielding more frequent outputs 
and problem solutions. The RMG firms were more directly involved in those 
policy issues.
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Fourthly, there is little trust of other actors involved in social compliance 
(including eco-compliance, especially the DoE). The garment factories have 
misgivings about not only government agencies (where allegations of 
corruption and bribe giving are fairly common and publicly admitted to), but 
they are also sceptical of the intentions behind NGOs and trade unions. In 
fact, RMG firms were firm in their standpoint that NGO inspection of factory 
premises would be a deal breaker during the child labour banning 
negotiations. The most important factor, perhaps, behind the RMG's 
voluntary non-participation, is their views of the trade associations. The role 
of the BGMEA as an able representative at the policy level is not contested 
among the majority of the RMG factories that were interviewed (55% of the 
total sample, most of them medium sized firms). Most of the garment firms 
interviewed saw BGMEA as doing enough on compliance; they were aware of 
the BGMEA's crash programme on fire safety and child labour; and majority 
did not feel that there needs to be more avenues for the firms to directly 
access the policymaking. This is perhaps, more an indication of the firms' very 
low ownership of the policymaking process, rather than a comment on the 
effectiveness of the BGMEA. A few said that they would prefer if they had 
direct access to the Ministry of Commerce, but in the absence of such 
channels, they were content with the BGMEA as the network leader. A few 
RMG factories also said that they preferred BGMEA take the lead because 
they did not trust NGOs getting involved.
Some were critical of BGMEA's effectiveness in the SCF, given its previous 
foot dragging on other compliance issues. For example, the buyer from L said,
BGMEA should immediately sort out the wage issues rather than have long 
meetings. It is shameful that workers had to demonstrate like this, people died, 
factories humt. BGMEA should have prevented this disaster. Now they want 
to write a common code, hut we need action now.
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Another buyer, K, has been working with the BGMEA intensively in 
formulating the Jo-In common code for Bangladeshi garments factories, and 
the K buyers are aware of BGMEA's successes and strengths. They said,
Normally we would expect BGMEA to be the leader in ethical trade since 
BGMEA gives trade licenses to export Our company has been in dialogue 
with BGMEA. They need to pressurise for compliance control and they need a 
fitter support system from other organisations. It is a matter of BGMEA 
image. They have the force to do it. They need to pull up their socks. They need 
more public accountability.
The other buyers (mainly non branded smaller buying houses) were unsure 
about whether the BGMEA should be the lead in specific matters relating to 
compliance. This shows that the BGMEA is the only option for an industry 
that does not trust non state actors (e.g. NGOs, trade unions) or state actors 
(e.g. the DoE). Such allegations of rent seeking behaviour by state actors are 
also keeping the RMG firms away from active participation.
Fifthly, and perhaps because of these factors, the RMG firms have not been 
invited directly in the SCF talks, further isolating them from participating in 
policy dialogue. Time constraints on the RMG factory management is also a 
factor in them not being interested in actively following policy making in this 
arena.
Finally, sometimes the issue is "too overwhelming" to solve for the RMG 
factories. According to Mr. Ghulam Hossain of the SCF,
Lack of understanding and awareness are problems. Garment firms aren't 
coming forwards to the ministry with their problems. But it's more than that. 
The BGMEA is trying its best to what it can. I f  you are non compliant, then
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this is a big challenge to come to the BGMEA's table, but if you are close to 
compliance, then the new demands are not such big problems.
So perhaps, non participation also has to do with individual factory's past 
experience with compliance success. Therefore, its not that the firms cannot 
access the policy-making arena, it is more the case that they are not convinced 
of the benefits vis-a-vis the costs. Also, they do not have enough "issue 
ownership" to participate, and consequently are making do with their 
representation via the trade associations, as faulty as it may be.
7.5 Conclusion:
This chapter aimed to find out if environmental regulation in Bangladesh is 
equipped to deal with EM principles. The answers were much more 
complicated and surprising than originally assumed, but overall revealed that 
the Bangladeshi environmental regulatory set-up is not equipped to meet the 
prerequisites set by even weak EM.
The scope for EM to succeed at the policy level was scant at the very 
beginning (Phase One and Two, as discussed in Chapter Three). The 
formation of the SCF was hopeful for the cause of EM because of the freshly 
constituted network of compliance actors that had adequate power: legal, 
financial and political. Eco-issues were included at the early days (in the task 
forces). However, the SCF (and the subsequent MFB) interactions gave us 
important lessons about power and EM: the historical power-resource 
hierarchy that was in place from the first day became more pronounced. The 
historical behavioural patterns, rules and mentalities kept EM out of the 
agenda -  the buyers did not push for greening, nor did the DoE and neither 
did the private sector or civil society recognise the "win win" gains of 
ecologising that was lost. The hierarchy dictated the policy core and the 
periphery. As the core became stronger, the size of the network began to
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shrink, both in terms of the number of agencies involved in the task forces set 
up for doing crash programmes, and also in terms of the agencies/ actors 
involved in further policy making in the steering committees. The lead also 
changed, as it turned into a clientilistic group where one group of actors (the 
MFAF/buyers) held the navigational reins. Gradually power transferred to 
the BGMEA, turning it into a corporatist-clientilistic network. EM was and 
continues to be hidden from view.
The reasons behind DoE's failures to drive EM in the RMG sector and the 
factors behind the marginalisation of EM in the SCF/MFB had some 
similarities: power-resource hierarchy disfavouring environmental issues 
over economic growth priorities, institutional uncertainty, strategic 
uncertainty, and cognitive uncertainty. There were four interesting 
phenomenon worth noting in the case of DoE and the SCF/MFB- network 
behaviour is marked by long institutional histories of embedded rules and 
mentalities that resist EM/pro-compliance change. Secondly, non 
participation is more complex than simple exclusion-inclusion politics -  
sometimes actors had the platform for influencing policy agendas, but they 
chose not to participate (garment factories); some self elected to stay away 
(the DoE); and some were excluded due to political mistrust (certain trade 
unions and NGOs). Thirdly, network power issues were ultimately settled 
between the two factions that both had financial power, but of different kinds 
(powerful buyers who controlled market access vs. powerful trade 
associations that represented the factories and had political and legal backing 
of Bangladeshi actors). Fourthly, "market image" was a big factor behind 
holding back EM -  the RMG firms see the DoE as corrupt, technically 
deficient, and overall ineffective. They have no wish to collaborate with the 
DoE. The DoE also commanded very little attention from other compliance 
stakeholders. As the BGMEA had performed well in other RMG issues, they 
had more faith in the BGMEA despite its long and well documented history of 
compliance implementation failures. The trade associations and NGOs were
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historically and universally viewed with suspicion -  not for corruption or 
inefficiency -  but for their agendas that were sometimes seen to be politically 
coloured rather than humanistic.
Overall, I can argue that my hypothesis is mostly correct. Greening failures 
have happened on the factory floor and in the supply chains, but the policy 
network has also contributed to the case by not rectifying the problems in the 
other two arenas. In fact, we can see a clear disconnect between the policy 
issues being discussed and the practical problems found in Chapters Five and 
Six. The policymakers, regardless of their status in the core or in the 
periphery, did not change their mindsets (priorities, attitudes, commitment, 
acknowledgement of responsibility, etc.) about compliance (be it greening or 
social), and did not recognise the importance of designing new policy tools to 
enable the RMG sector champion CSR, especially since Bangladeshi RMG 
caters to the "cheap and basic" garment items that look set to continue. The 
firms face comparatively little pressure from the regulators, but the lack of an 
open policy network is not the biggest hindrance to the participation of the 
DoE and the RMG firms in environmental compliance -  it is more to do with 
issue apathy (towards social and ecological issues), institutional weaknesses, 
cognitive and strategic uncertainty, a trenchant power-resource hierarchy 
unfavourable to ecological and social investments, coupled with the 
substantial price factor challenges faced by the sector that impact its survival 
directly.
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Chapter Eight: Ethical Trade Conclusions
8.1 Introduction:
The aim of this thesis was to examine the applicability of EMT in supply 
chains involving LDC firms, who are making green management responses 
that adhere to certain social and environmental standards of their consumers 
in DCs, as part of greater ethical trade concerns. In the preceding chapters, I 
presented empirical evidence from the Bangladeshi RMG sector, using the 
perspective of three networks discussed in Chapter Two -  management 
networks (top, middle, lower management and workers), economic networks 
(supply chains) and policy networks (issue networks/policy communities). In 
this chapter, I analyse my findings in terms of the Bangladeshi EM network as 
a whole, made up of all these intersecting and interdependent networks, and 
delineate some characteristics of the actors, relationships and changing 
networks. I conclude that ethical trade has faltered because its tools are not 
suited to the network characteristics and LDC realities highlighted in this 
thesis. The problems of ethical trade implementation may be seen as failings 
of EM as well, and the implications of this are discussed in the next chapter.
8.2 Moving From Three Networks to One:
As presented in Chapter One, the main research question for this thesis was:
Why are export based ready made garments (RMG) suppliers in Bangladesh failing to 
undertake environmental management?
The relevant EM objectives import for the research question were identified as 
the:
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• Changing role of science, technology, information and knowledge, 
attitudes and organisations;
• Changing role of markets, market actors and private sector initiatives; 
and
• Changing role of the state (away from command-and-control style to a 
decentralised flexible consensual proactive style).
Each of the EM objectives was tested via three hypotheses corresponding to 
three networks that are interlinked within a larger EM network. The 
hypotheses were as follows:
• Poor environmental upgrading in firms will be associated with factors 
internal to the firms, such as corporate culture, slow changing 
behaviour, problems with learning environmental information and will 
be linked to poor competitive advantage gains;
• The most powerful demand for environmental management on 
Bangladeshi RMG firms is originating from their buyers in global 
supply chains. However, opportunities for collaboration or assistance 
from buyers demanding these environmental upgrading initiatives 
may be low; and
• The regulators (state and non state) are not convinced of the benefits of 
compliance and do not have the capacity to design, implement and 
monitor better compliance. The exclusion of the DoE and the RMG 
firms in this policy network is likely to lead to poorly designed 
outcomes.
In Chapter Two, the interacting and interdependent networks of EM was 
presented as follows:
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Figure 8.1: Actors in the Bangladeshi RMG EM network
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Networks Workers
Note: Only the most important relationships have been shown.
While the three networks had a great many features in common (such as the 
main explanatory variables that weave through the networks - social, political 
and economic relationships, mutually dependent actors etc.), their 
commonality and frequent overlapping in Chapters Five, Six and Seven can 
be used to argue that perhaps the analytical division between the three 
networks is rather forced, and that EM needs to be studied across the whole 
network to get a sense of how changes in one impacts others. In this chapter, I 
would like to present the results as one network, to get a better sense of the 
synergies and the cross network implications for greening of the RMG sector 
and for EMT.
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Figure 8.2: Functional Interdependence in the Bangladeshi RMG EM Network
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Certain things should be kept in mind when thinking about EM as one large 
network. Many different frameworks have been used to study the workings 
of EM principles, and taking a network approach to it shares with other 
approaches a belief that the existence of relationships, many of them stable 
and durable, provides a compelling reason for researching inter- 
organisational relationships (that help or hinder greening). Where it differs 
from previous studies is in its scope -  it is concerned with understanding the 
totality of relationships among firms, buyers and policy makers, as they are 
engaged in manufacturing, exporting and ecologising in what might be 
described as a production system. The network approach that I take involves 
a new way of visualising complex interacting industrial and policy networks 
in modern economies, and it borrows heavily from management theories, 
industrial organisation theories, industrial network theories, global value
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chain theories and policy network theories. It looks at the nature of the 
network as a result of the basic actor characteristics and tools, and at how the 
networks constrain but also offer opportunities, reduce uncertainty, provide 
coordination, and control. The EM network is not structured atomistically, 
like free markets, or like centrally controlled economies. Indeed, it would be 
difficult to imagine a network that is so free that it contains no inertia, or any 
constraints. Similarly the EM network in Bangladesh is not a fixed hierarchy: 
so fixed and immutable that some change is not possible, even though change 
resistance is a significant feature. The network covers a wide spectrum of 
actors, resources and relationships that need to be studied as relevant, and it 
may be criticised as being faulty because of that. While the broad scope of 
such analysis is a strength, it is also a weakness. Setting the boundaries of 
such large networks is problematic for analysis and in policy network studies, 
the boundaries have varied depending on the purposes for which the 
boundary is drawn. The focus of the research ultimately is the EM of the 
network and not the firm or the supply chain or the policy network, although 
they are important parts of it. There is also a trade off in terms of detail 
captured vs. inclusion of a large network of actors, and an EM network can 
seem too simplistic and accessible. However, I would argue that the simplicity 
is more apparent than real (as we shall see in the rest of this chapter) because 
the sets of relationships it describes are theoretically very complex, especially 
when inter-network dynamics are considered. The main relationships types 
and their tendencies are discussed below.
Interdependence of the three networks -  In the empirical chapters we have 
seen that the actors (figure 8.1) are functionally related (figure 8.2) and also 
share a network of resources (financial, knowledge based, and legal), which 
they use for a network of activities, based on their individual goals. Goal 
oriented strategy making and actor actions influenced the actions of others, 
creating a change in the balance of resources (profit vs. loss), ultimately
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influencing a pattern that set the network direction. The most distinguished 
forces identifiable in this case were:
Functional interdependence: Actors, activities and resources in all three 
networks together formed a system where a complex and interactive list of 
demands and agendas were met by using the heterogeneous resources that 
the actors brought to the network space for negotiation. Functional 
interdependence is based on the end goals of the actors (e.g. profit making, 
compliance, regulation) and result in governance forms best suited to end 
goal realisation (e.g. collaboration or arms length) involving the network of 
actors.
Power structure interdependence: Repeatedly we have seen how the resource- 
power dependencies within the networks predicted the outcome of 
compliance initiatives. Change was handled on the basis of which actor can 
control activities and resources, and determined how new actions were 
carried out (or not) and by whom. For example, the trade associations 
ultimately triumphed in bargaining to not only exclude actors that they did 
not welcome in the policy making phase, but they also protected their 
members' weaknesses by pushing through weaker policy targets. So what 
made actors powerful? For RMG firms and buyers, it was the access to DC 
markets, access to resources, considerable market share, good market 
reputation, etc. For government agencies and trade associations it was legal 
power, access to financial resources, access to foreign donors, etc. For trade 
unions and NGOs, bargaining power came from their affiliations with 
international NGOs and linkages (albeit clandestine) with the workers. Their 
bargaining power was lessened due to their lack of political allegiances, as 
perceived by the politically powerful.
Knowledge structure: The knowledge and shared experience of the actors, as 
well as their access routes to other actors (that helps them gain new
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knowledge and re-strategise) influenced the way they decided to set goals 
and use their resources (for which there are always many competing uses) or 
the way they decided to bargain. For example, smaller RMG firms that had no 
contact with end consumers or larger buyers tended not to have greening 
strategies, whereas larger suppliers who were "in the know" were more 
proactive and better bargainers, resulting in (indirect) competitive advantage. 
The DoE could not use their knowledge or experience because of their 
marginalisation via the power structures in the network.
Inter-temporal dependence: The EM network was a product of its history in 
terms of institutional memories, investments in relationships, knowledge, 
routines, etc., that can collectively be called "network cultures" or "rules of 
the game". We have repeatedly seen the influence of institutionalised network 
cultures, norms and "rules of the game" that acted against the ecologising of 
the sector. For example, RMG managers held on to established hierarchies of 
operation by not involving workers or lower management in designing 
compliance initiatives; trade associations repeatedly denied any wrong doing 
or responsibility in non-compliance by its members; buyers repeatedly 
refused to negotiate with suppliers regarding compliance implementation and 
cost problems; the government agencies remained riddled with capacity and 
corruption problems. The history of such behaviour is difficult to erase and 
influenced the network outputs.
The last point about historically institutionalised "network rules and 
rationalities," suggests that stability and development within the network are 
closely related. Development in certain areas depended upon the existing 
stability in others so that some part can change, and vice versa, for example 
the case of the SCF, where development of a new policy initiative on 
compliance depended upon exiting relationships and capacities for carrying 
out policy directives. Development of activities, therefore, can be a means to 
secure stability in the power structure and enable collaboration over
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resources. Stability and change in the network not only co-exist but also 
actually depend on each other.
The connections within the network -  In industrial network studies, two 
exchange relations are considered connected to the extent that exchange in the 
first relation is contingent, positively or negatively, upon exchange in the 
other relationship. This idea is also apparent in the case of the Bangladeshi 
EM network. Connections exist within the networks because a desired 
activity/goal (e.g. the realisation of contracts between RMG firms and their 
buyers) will require resources from all linked actors, directly and indirectly. 
These resources include access to customers or suppliers, as well as flows of 
goods, services, information etc. Every activity/goal involved a transfer of 
resources, sometimes yielding a mixture of positive and negative outcomes 
for the actors. There are two major types of connections that I found in the 
network:
Activity based connections: These are the connections that realise the raison 
d'etre of the network, and tend to be the oldest. These connections arise from 
structural dependencies between different activities; the structural 
dependencies are of course, linked to the complimentary goals of the actors 
(e.g. profit making, compliance sign-off, DoE certification etc.). These 
connections cannot be easily discontinued (e.g. buyers cancel orders only 
when "zero tolerance" issues are flagged). These relationships stabilise and 
reinforce the network by the frequency of interactions; "rules of the game" are 
set up around these connections.
Actor based connections: These are the new connections that are established in 
the network due to an actor's subjective acting or "will", such as when the 
buyers put up codes that result in suppliers' new relationships with auditors, 
or when the BGMEA liases with a the fire department to hold compliance 
training among firms. These new connections provide for "new networking"
302
and enable change. These are not as old as the activity based connections, and 
often have to make space for themselves within activity-based connections; 
the latter creates stability while actor based connection causes network 
development.
The atmosphere of the network and power relations -  Network atmosphere 
depended on many variables, such as the power and resource dependencies, 
conflict vs. cooperation, closeness or distance of the relationships, and the 
mutual expectations of actors about their own allegiances. The overall 
atmosphere of the network is too complex to be described in one sentence. 
There seemed to be a mutual expectation of non-cooperation when it came to 
greening (whereas product quality related matters enjoyed better 
coordination and cooperation); there was also much conflict and reluctant 
cooperation in activity based connections. However, what is interesting is, 
"access to resources" was the most important attribute in overcoming 
network atmosphere problems. Financial and legal resources, or access to 
actors whose resources can be accessed via collaboration helped sustain 
network conflicts and contested bargaining, but not always to the end of EM 
goals.
Different kinds of changes in the relationships -  The EM network is 
interesting because it is a "living" network with a structure that continuously 
changes; it is never at a complete equilibrium, or at an optimal design. 
However, the changes are not always random. Two main change enabling 
motivations can be identified in the Bangladeshi EM network: the first was 
actors acting to combine and recombine activities to maximise resources (e.g. 
firms getting TPC for (indirect) competitive advantage, buyers enforcing 
codes to secure compliance risks, etc.). The second involved actors trying to 
control resources (e.g. SCF's compliance strategy making, factories undertaking 
fire safety training etc.). Most changes are driven by either of these two causes 
(if not a mix of both). Actors trying to maximise their resources are not hard to
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identify in the network, especially if one views profits as a resource. In this 
process of maximising resources, there are two generally opposite tendencies 
that are significant for the study. One is the tendency to stick to the existing 
ways of doing things. This may be called "structuring" since it reinforces the 
existing structure. This would involve non-RBV skills, copying compliance 
strategies from peers, regulators refusing to update legislative requirements, 
etc. The second tendency is to find new ways of combining activities and 
resources. This tendency fits in well with actor-based connections and 
increases the heterogeneity of the network, and may be called 
"heterogenising".
In the same way it is possible to recognise two tendencies for controlling 
resources and power, which is something that has been pointed out in 
industrial networks literature by Hakansson (1992). One is the tendency for 
greater control by fewer and fewer actors, similar to the idea of "structuring", 
where actors do not want to change or allow new actors into the hierarchy; 
this may be called "hierarchisation". The most obvious example of this was in 
the formation of the core and periphery during phase one, two and three of 
compliance policymaking. The second and opposite tendency is when the 
control of the same resource or activity is diminished. This occurs 
comparatively less frequently, and may be called "extrication".137 An example 
of this was in the third phase of compliance policymaking, which had a multi 
stakeholder design, allowing previously excluded actors access to 
opportunities.
The overall network atmosphere is distinguished by tendencies to maximise 
resources and control; more structuring behaviour than heterognising and 
more hierarchisation over extrication. It is obvious that these tendencies are 
not conducive for EM: for EM to succeed, the network needs more 
heterogenising and extrication behaviour, so that new ideas, new voices, new
137 The terms “hierarchisation” and “extrication” are adapted from Hakansson (1992).
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rationalities and new tools can flourish within open networks. EM needs actor 
based connections to bargain a space for themselves within activity-based 
dominating connections. This can only happen over time, given the right set 
of economic relationships that reward behaviour that complements resource 
maximisation tendencies.
8.3 EM and Ethical Trade Outcomes in the Apparel Supply Chain:
Some of these tendencies and characteristics were hinted at in Chapter One 
(section 1.4), when we discussed the most commonly cited problems of ethical 
trade along supply chains of varying sectors, which included: greening 
motivation, operational conflicts with economic goals, environmental 
knowledge and expertise, prohibitive costs, power and governance methods, 
anonymous markets, poor green market signals, political and policy signals, 
inadequate codes and auditing tools.
Figure 8.3: EM Barriers in Supply Chain Ethical Trade
ToolsRelationships Structural Issues
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-Low risk threshold 
-Compliance vs. lead time 
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My empirical findings have demonstrated all these problems cited in the 
literature reviewed in section 1.4, but this study has gone deeper than 
operational level problems by analysing their interconnectedness/cross 
influences. In the next section, I present my findings in terms of EM outcome 
barriers (figure 8.3).
a. Relationship Barriers:
Change resistant, hierarchical and closed networks -EMT tells us that actors 
need to change at various levels; this includes state agencies moving away 
from closed hierarchical regulatory systems to a more open multi stakeholder 
system of consultative policymaking. EMT also assumes that relevant 
stakeholders who are aware of the problem of environmental regulation will 
be interested in participating with the state actors. CSR literature similarly 
calls for business firms to rethink their business strategy to integrate new CSR 
goals and take a multi-stakeholder approach to strategy making and 
implementation of greening. Ethical trade proponents have also called for a 
more inclusive policy space and private sector dialogue where perspectives of 
non-financial stakeholders (workers, NGOs, trade unionists, citizens etc.) are 
heard and taken into account.
However, my thesis findings show that while there certainly were movements 
towards changing the hierarchical network, the more the things changed, the 
more they stayed the same. Hierarchisation and structuration tendencies 
dominate in the network, and the dominating rationalities prioritise economic 
growth over ethical trade or CSR. The policy network has grown in size but 
the core remains "by invitation only" and is a closed network, where we can 
clearly see hierarchisation by action-based connections. Given its current 
state, the core of the network is halfway between the Policy Communities and 
Issue Networks as identified by Rhodes and Marsh (1998). The number of 
participants has grown, but the participants are chosen keeping in mind
306
participant strength and common political alliances, and consequently do not 
represent a wider spectrum of interests. At the core, interactions were 
frequent with easily identifiable policy outcomes. Contrary to the Policy 
Community model though, the consensus in the core is not shared. Ideologies, 
values, policy preferences and acceptance of viable policy options are 
contested, resulting in the network operating like an Issue Network.
Hierarchisation and structuration in the green strategy making and 
organisational behaviour was obvious in RMG firms. Motivation for greening 
was not organic, hence power and resources were not easily diverted for non­
price issues especially since the raison d'etre of the firms were competing for 
the resources. The overwhelming majority of the firms began and ended their 
green strategy making with the top management. This is risky because then 
the top management's commitment/environmental responsibility holds 
greening as hostage. Compliance planning did not involve workers, and in 
most cases did not involve cognitive feedback loops. Top management has no 
mechanism for listening/registering worker issues, so change is likely to stop 
abruptly and win-win benefits are likely to dry out fast, effectively snapping 
the link between continued economic growth and ecological safeguarding.
The reasons behind the closed nature of the network is because of the 
interdependencies highlighted in the previous section -  functional 
interdependence (which determined the governance structures that were 
fairly rigid), power/resource interdependence (which determined the agenda 
for inclusion/exclusion based on actor strategies for controlling resources and 
power), and inter-temporal dependence (which determined the influence of 
years of "rules of the game" or "network habits" had on the stability and 
change in the network). Even if there was movement towards greening the 
supply chain, years of institutionalised rules have triumphed over EM.
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b. Tools as a Barrier:
Market based approaches -  The empirical chapters did not mention any state 
action regarding the use of economic instruments, simply because economic 
instruments have rarely been used, if ever, in Bangladesh for environmental 
gains. There has never been any pressure from the civil society NGOs or 
research bodies on economic instruments. One possible reason is the lack of 
knowledge among the DoE on how to design and implement economic 
incentives for industrial greening. Economic actors (who might benefit from 
eco-taxes etc.) have always stayed away from environmental policy because 
their main preoccupation was economic activities and they saw no role for 
themselves in green matters. The still considerable involvement of the state in 
economic developments and decision-making hinders the incorporation of 
environmental dynamics and actors in the economic reform process (although 
the opposite does not happen).
Green technology -  Green technology has remained totally unexploited in 
the case of Bangladeshi RMG; waste minimisation, use of less chemically 
damaging washing processes, chemical rinses, colour dyes, etc. are not used. 
In fact, end-of-pipe solutions have not caught on either. The sources of green 
pressure (codes and legislation) are a step behind in what Christoff (1996) 
would call weak EM. Although the Factories Act vaguely mentions proper 
waste and effluent disposal, the later legislation does not go beyond reactive 
prescriptions for liquid wastes. The DoE is remarkably silent in proposing 
greener technological alternatives to this sector. Even though ETPs were rare, 
only large and medium sized firms installed them. Since the DoE does not 
inspect the ETP water quality on a regular basis, the firms often save on costs 
by not running the ETPs on non-audit days. Overall, green technology, as one 
of EM's biggest tools has not impacted the Bangladeshi RMG.
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Environmental management plans (EMPs) -  Environmental management 
systems (EMSs) (or, EMPs) are an important tool in EM because it involves 
firms making voluntary decisions to improve their environmental 
performance based on the unique cost-benefits ratios in each factory. This 
involves actor-based connections and RBV skills. Most RMG firms in this 
survey had environmental certification from the DoE, which makes it 
mandatory for the firms to have EMPs. However, most firms admitted to not 
having an operational EMS. The firms that did have EMSs were not 
necessarily fairing any better: none had employed outside experts in 
designing the EMS, only their top management. The middle or lower 
management were not consulted, nor did they involve the DoE or use buyer 
manuals as guidelines. Therefore, the prevalence of DoE certification is not an 
indication that EMSs are being used, or that production is going on with day- 
to-day concern for the consequent environmental impact. Unsurprisingly, 
none of the firms could identify any cost savings from doing EMSs. Similar to 
green technology, this EM tool has also failed.
Government certification -  Government certification is an important starting 
point in EM, and is especially significant in LDCs where the dominant mode 
of regulation is state led. Despite most Bangladeshi RMG firms being officially 
compliant, there is a large gap between the environmental compliance "on 
paper" and on the factory floor. Most have taken the shortest possible route to 
compliance and freely admit to having paid bribes at some stage of their 
government certification. The quality of the certification is further 
compromised by the fact that firms -of all sizes -  said that they did not 
submit any environmental evaluation documents with their application. Firms 
who had EMSs and/or ETPs maintain that DoE certification was not 
necessarily connected to these efforts. The firms see the DoE certification 
process as more of an opportunity to maintain cordial relations with the 
government agency. Therefore, the lack of government capacity and
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institutional corruption has led to a strategy of loophole finding among RMG 
firms, instead of a proactive greening strategy.
Codes content -  The buyer codes are indubitably one of the most powerful 
EM tools for the Bangladeshi RMG supply chain. The codes, unfortunately, 
are a flawed tool at various levels: firstly, most of the codes are vague about 
environmental requirements and often pack environmental factors in with 
"environmental health and safety". Most codes ask for on-going measures 
and emphasise workplace accident prevention, so in that sense they are 
asking for proactive strategy making. However, only the big brand buyers 
mention solid waste or effluents, and ask only for reactive solutions (ETPs). 
Secondly, most codes require suppliers to meet national environmental 
standards and do not go beyond that. Given the state of government 
certification we saw in this thesis, that is an important flaw. This flaw is also 
curious, given that weak environmental regulation in LDCs is one major 
reason why these codes were constructed in the first place. Thirdly, the sheer 
number of codes and their typologies creates confusion among suppliers, and 
hinders compliance learning. It also creates productivity blockages (instead of 
the productivity gains seen in GVC studies). Codes have also resulted in more 
loophole hunting by the RMG firms. Many RMG factory managers thought 
that buyers' expectations were unrealistic and not fitting Bangladeshi culture 
or economic realities. Buyers, however refuse to see this as a problem, and 
suggest that since most of the code clauses are supported by the extensive 
(and rarely followed) national legislation, the codes did not add confusion. 
Consequently, suppliers are left to either work out a compromise with the 
audit official or schedule different audits on different days that allows the 
factory to show the auditor what they need to see.
Auditing integrity— The actual auditing process is another area where EM 
has fallen short: RMG management admitted to "showing the auditor what 
they needed to see" in the face of time pressure and conflicting multiple code
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requirements. Interviewed trade unionists were very critical of how the 
compliance auditing mechanism is placed within the larger scheme of the 
buying process, which hinges on "making lead time". Since the RMG firms 
have to pay the third party auditors, it is to everyone's benefit to rush through 
compliance auditing and compliance remains "only on paper". The buyers do 
not double check auditor finings, and only in a handful of cases did buyers 
say that they insisted on factories being re-audited periodically. Lastly, the 
audit findings are not shared with the workers, lending an air of secrecy and 
mistrust over the whole compliance process. Overall, significant questions 
remain about the integrity of the audits in actually pushing forward ethical or 
green production in Bangladeshi RMG firms.
Weak auditing of subcontracting firms -  Since subcontracting happens only 
under tough time constraints, compliance auditing can get overlooked in 
these cases. Interviewed brand name buyers explicitly said that they do not 
allow subcontracting, but many other buyers do, allowing many of the small 
factories to run purely on subcontracts. However, the assertion that buyers do 
a compliance check (which would take at least a few working days) before 
subcontracting factories get approval to go into production, is questionable.
c. Structural Barriers:
The weak state -  Bangladeshi environmental institutions, laws, and 
environmental management practices are quite new and facing problems that 
new institutions and policy making practices have to overcome in any case. 
The DoE, as well as other government agencies that are in charge of 
regulating working environment standards (as part of ethical trade), lack 
trained personnel and face financial constraints. However, these are not 
difficult to overcome when there is the scope for donor driven environmental 
projects that have funding for capacity building and skills training; but what 
they cannot build up easily is political bargaining power for the ethical trade
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agenda in front of other government agencies. The economic rationality for 
national economic development is a powerful one, and it is one that is shared 
by not only the powerful government ministries, but also by those 
bureaucrats in charge of agencies with lower political saliency and bargaining 
power. As a result, the strategy employed by the weak DoE has been to accept 
its marginalised mandate and remain passive, as seen in Chapter Seven. This 
fits into the broader culture of resignation and acceptance of regulatory 
failures: RMG firms have repeatedly said this was part of the cultural norm of 
doing business in Bangladesh.
Civil society—The role of civil society in EM powerful. Civil society can 
mobilise local support for ethical production, form alliances with 
international NGOs, and gather information for stakeholders, activists, as well 
as project designers. The state is meant to be open to such participation by the 
NGOs and environmental groups, and is meant to jointly promote 
environmental awareness campaigns etc. However, the role of civil society in 
EM in developing countries is problematic. For example, Frijns, Phuong and 
Mol (2000), found that the NGOs in Vietnam are hardly supported by 
environmental authorities. Compared to their western counterparts they are 
resource poor in terms of funding, manpower, knowledge and information. 
Environmental awareness is also less widespread among larger segments of 
the population and environmental protest is uncommon. There is also the 
problem of the absence of domestic environmental NGOs. However, 
Sonnenfeld (2000) found NGOs to be more proactive in neighbouring 
countries of Indonesia and Thailand. Even though in all three countries the 
ultimate EM outcomes were different, the in- country dynamics there were 
similar to that of Bangladesh -  at the core of the EM network, there was a 
landmark environmental accident that alerted the media and NGO attention 
to the problem (similar to the 2006 riots regarding RMG compliance), which 
led to the establishment of new standards and regulations, regulatory 
pressure to adopt cleaner technologies and processes, and the implementation
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of cleaner production. However, in the Bangladeshi case, there were no 
environmental accidents to jump start dialogue, and even on broader social 
compliance issues, civil society participation was constrained by political 
bargaining and powerful trade associations actively kept NGOs out. The 
palpable mistrust and exclusion of NGOs would most likely continue had 
they been protesting green issues.
Changing attitudes and motivations -  EMTs material and technological 
objectives have to be realised in the background of the unique social and 
cultural histories, but not enough attention has been given to the " softer" 
objectives of greening behaviour in empirical EMT research in LDCs. This 
thesis tries to address that.
The hierarchical and change resistant attitudes in the EM network in 
Bangladesh is also due to how compliance issues have been perceived over 
time: during the Phase One and Two (child labour, wage riots, etc.) 
government agency and trade association staff have publicly denied 
compliance failure, denied responsibility as governing agency, and even 
made press statements about foreign conspiracies behind the wage riots. 
During Phase Three (the SCF), the BGMEA described the Jo-In Code as a 
"pain in the neck" (Financial Express 2006). This can act as an incentive for the 
average RMG factory to treat compliance as something to be avoided and 
resisted. As it is, compliance had initial problems of gaining acceptance 
among the RMG factory management.
Secondly, ethical trade was never a long term threat to the health of the RMG 
sector. Its criticality spiked on and off, never gathering sustained momentum. 
RMG factories are used to start-stop measures and have gotten complacent 
about inaction and non-participation. Thirdly, ethical trade is not an 
important criteria for the buyers in placing orders in Bangladesh. The non- 
criticality of the issue helped bury it in the agendas of the RMG
313
managements' list of high priority tasks. Also, policy making and action in the 
more critical areas (action-based connections, such as lead time maintenance, 
raw material procurement, transport strikes, port work stoppage, government 
tax regulations, finance problems, etc.) were moving much faster and yielding 
more frequent outputs and solutions. The RMG firms were more directly 
involved in those policy issues. Fourthly, there is little trust of other actors 
involved in social compliance. The garment factories have misgivings about 
not only government agencies (where allegations of corruption and bribe 
giving are fairly common and publicly admitted to), but they are also 
sceptical of NGO participation and are mistrustful of trade union agendas 
(and it would be naive to assume all scepticism is unfounded). They are 
content with the BGMEA's leadership, despite allegations of non-commitment 
to compliance by the ILO. Fifthly, and perhaps because of these factors, the 
RMG firms have not been invited directly in the SCF talks, isolating them 
from compliance policy dialogue. The time constraints of the RMG factory 
management, and their past experiences of environmental upgrading failure 
are also factors in them not being interested in this issue (keeping in mind that 
in Bangladesh, perceptions of social equity and environmental quality are 
probably different than those in western industrial countries o begin with). 
This sets up a difficult situation for EM, since market pressure alone can only 
go so far, especially if the market pressure is coming from a society that is 
geographically and culturally very distant from the point of production.
Environmental learning -  EMT places a lot of importance on the role of 
science and technology, and it is reasonable to assume that science and 
technology should not simply stop in the hands of experts, but environmental 
learning will pass on to practitioners in the boardrooms and factory floors. 
However, mainstream EM interpretations do not theorise substantially on 
how this is to happen, and this thesis tries to address that.
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The problem of environmental learning among policymakers is hard to judge, 
given the paucity of eco-considerations in the compliance discussions. 
Greening continued to be absent from the ethical trade agenda in Bangladesh. 
At the level of firms, environmental learning problems were twofold: most 
top management sourced their information from buyers, in house skills and 
the trade association manuals. The nature of information is purely technical 
and does not explain environmental implications of inaction or the benefits of 
successful upgrading actions. Such contextual motivation would contribute 
positively to EM changes in attitudes and strategy making. Secondly, 
environmental learning among lower management and workers was 
problematic. The firms used a mixture of teaching methods including training 
of trainers (training is given by external experts to top management) and 
worker training seminars (training of workers by top/m id management who 
may or may not have been trained formally). Therefore larger and medium 
firms were faring better because of a more detectable presence of mid­
management. Unfortunately, staff and worker training was not done on an 
ongoing basis, regardless of the size of the firm, which is dangerous because 
of the high rates of worker turn over in the RMG sector which means that 
trained staff might be replaced by untrained staff, posing a risk of non 
compliance. However, the majority of firms said that they did not receive any 
comments from their workers after the training, meaning that the training 
was possibly in name only.
Low risk threshold -Value chain studies distinguish between shallow (arms 
length) collaboration and deep collaboration. My findings show that buyers 
are satisfied with an arms length approach when governing ethical trade, as 
opposed to adopting a closer relationship of tighter production monitoring 
when it comes to specifying other parameters -  such as design details, 
sourcing of raw materials, sample approval, shipping dates, etc. -  that have a 
more direct impact on profit levels for buyers and retailers.
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If risks from non-compliance with quality assurance measures is considerable 
for buyers (e.g. child labour banning case) then they initiate collaboration, 
resulting in more visible closeness in the supply chain. However, where the 
process already in-place for governing environmental standards and codes is 
accepted as being adequate to meet any legal claims, or prevent any loss of 
retailers' reputation due to non-compliant suppliers, then the pressures for 
closer governance is less. The system is not likely to include close 
collaboration (whether technical or financial) in the immediate future either: 
the RMG suppliers were unanimous in saying that it is not a possibility. The 
buyers broadly agreed. The buyers have never financially invested into their 
suppliers for any part of upgrading, and social compliance is no exception. 
Buyers said that they had enough suppliers to work with who already had the 
capacity they were looking for. They also mentioned that financial investment 
with suppliers would complicate their dealings with other suppliers, which is 
a transactions cost barrier. So unless the quasi hierarchical structure of the 
chain changes, we cannot expect to see EM oriented closer collaboration.
Compliance vs. lead time -  Another significant feature of a quasi hierarchy 
supply chain is the close governance for on time and reliable shipment of 
clothing. As a rule, shortening "lead time" is one of the biggest challenges in 
managing the supply chain, and environmental upgrading is sometimes puts 
a break on shipment progress. Adjustments are commonplace where the 
buyers and the auditors give "sign off", because otherwise lead times will be 
compromised. If lead time allows, then buyers wait for upgrading initiatives 
to materialise before allowing the opening of credit letters in banks. Given 
these deadlines, ethical trade and EM have a lot to compete against.
Brand name buyers vs. buying houses -  Earlier we have seen that there are 
different types of codes based on types of buyers. Brand name buyers are 
more concerned about the compliance behaviour of their suppliers in LDCs 
and tend to be more hands on and demanding with their chosen suppliers
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(mostly these deal with expensive orders, although brand buyers also source 
"cheap bulk items" from Bangladesh). Buying houses (that operate a large 
share of the total RMG business), are fairly anonymous to the end consumer, 
and have no public scrutiny or shareholder pressures making them consider 
ethical trade issues. These buying houses also tend to work with the smaller 
segment of RMG firms, who tend to be struggling with financial and 
compliance problems and are large in numbers. Greening of the supply chain 
cannot happen without the comprehensive coverage of all types of buyers, 
brand name or not.
Compliance vs. financial rewards -  Discernible financial benefits from 
environmental upgrading would go a long way in changing attitudes and 
green policy making, as espoused by EMT. However, most firms said that 
they could at best identify indirect competitive advantage from eco- 
compliance investment, and while this may be due to them using non-RBV 
skills and strategies, RMG firms are also not getting financial benefits because 
of the "rules of the game": during the buying process, the price of the order is 
set during the initial assessment made by the buyer (which is based on 
product quality, product price offered by the supplier, factory set up and 
managerial capability), the satisfaction of which is followed by any social 
compliance negotiations. This leaves the supplier with no room to bargain for 
financial benefits from agreed compliance measures, and they have to wait for 
future negotiations.
Buyers however, were unequivocal that higher prices will need to correspond 
to better quality of products and not anything else. However, if the nature of 
the order-at-hand is such that there is no chance of a sustained working 
relationship, then the supplier might not want to invest substantially into 
current requirements for environmental upgrading. Interviewed buyers said 
that greening has to happen not because of directly identifiable financial cost 
benefits, but due to the managements' own personal preference for
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environmental responsibility (and the need to adhere to national laws), which 
will be accompanied by good management skills. Therefore, while the RMG 
firms would prefer to see direct results of the "win-win" proposition of 
greening their business, the RMG buyers are content to provide long-term 
indirect benefits.
Weak green signals -  The problems with the buyer codes has already been 
discussed above, but the codes are acting as a barrier to EM in other 
important ways: buyer codes have not been able to influence RMG firm 
behaviour (unlike the child labour case) because of a disconnect between 
green consumerism and retailers' need to sustain profitability by shifting 
higher volumes of clothes. Firstly, consumer preference for ethically produced 
clothing remains a niche market compared to the total apparel retail market. 
However, green consumer signals are not translating to profits in the same 
way for all retailers. Brand name buyers were divided about green 
consumerism as being enough to change the way the supply chain selects 
suppliers or rewards eco-friendliness. Most importantly, buyers were more 
sceptical of green consumerism as a driving force behind compliance in 
Bangladesh, because so much of the total exports are made up of "basic bulk 
items" which are outside of the niche markets. This is an important break 
with the EM principle that greening is backed up by strong and consistent 
emphasis on green issues at the level of buyer policies. Secondly, the green 
signal is weak because there are many buyers who simply do not ask for 
social or environmental upgrading. The inconsistent and weak greening 
pressure needs to be addressed before EM can be adequately implemented in 
a supply chain.
8.4 Conclusion:
The problems that hampered ethical trade/CSR/EM initiatives might leave 
one reasonably sceptical of whether there can be a meaningful marriage
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between ethically (i.e. environmentally and socially) compliant exports and 
market profits for LDC firms. The problems along the network 
(hierarchisation and structuring tendencies, the priority given to activity- 
based connections, the agenda seeking strategies to maximise control over 
power and resources tat leaves little space for CSR type initiatives) seem to 
have sealed the fate of EM.
Yet, now is perhaps the worst time to give up hope for EM in the apparel 
supply chain. International and national policy making on withdrawing 
Chinese export quotas in 2008 has been preparing Chinese apparel exporters 
to build up capacity for a era of apparel exports into the US and EU unlike 
any other time (Saha 2006). Chinese exporters are already well known for 
being vertically integrated producers of high value added apparels produced 
at highly competitive labour rates. Such a situation is not optimistic for 
Bangladesh, which has neither high RBV skills, high productivity rates, nor 
high bargaining power; on top of which they have crippling problems within 
the economic infrastructure and political instability. As it stands, production 
costs have increased by 15% in 2006-07, and per unit garment prices have 
fallen by 1.5% for the same period (MFB 2007), and competition has not 
lessened for Bangladeshi factories. Giving up on ethical trade/EM/CSR at 
this juncture would leave the road open for significant risks to worker rights 
and ecological well being.
EM is set to face tougher challenges as international trade regimes change. For 
ethical trade to work under these circumstances it needs to work with a 
changing quasi hierarchy: the apparel value chain is about to restructure as 
lead competitors change (with China perhaps being the overall winner, 
according to French 2007 and 2008) and the impacts will fall on price 
bargaining and supplier behaviour. Bangladeshi factory managers will be 
under harder time and price pressures; ethical sourcing managers will have to 
bargain more against activity-based connections. Western consumptive
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patterns also have to be rethought in line with ethical trade, since it is the 
West's high demand for on-trend "bulk and basic" clothing that is keeping 
lead times short and compliance compromised.
As Chinese labour costs rise, Chinese investors are thinking of shifting 
production facilities to cheaper countries, like Bangladesh, as part of their 
China+1 strategy (French 2007). While Bangladesh no doubt welcomes this 
opportunity, this might mean that the sector is going to stay in the "low value 
added" segment of the value chain. Based on my findings, I would like to 
argue that as long as that happens, ethical trade imperatives are not going to 
translate to cost benefits that will cause attitudinal and motivational changes 
in factories, buyers or policy makers. Recent press reports (e.g. Saha 2007) 
have reported that the Bangladeshi RMG factories are going back to their old 
habit of employing children in factories, despite having made milestone 
progress in the mid 1990s with the ILO backed IPEC, that was internationally 
applauded (ILO 2005, ILO-IPEC-BGMEA 2004). Therefore, given the 
overwhelming imperative to continue with business as usual while reducing 
production costs even further, we can expect two things: the buyers will keep 
their arms length distance since many buyers might not source from 
Bangladesh anymore (preferring China) making it worthless to invest into 
close collaboration till they pull out after China's restrictions are withdrawn; 
and buyer pressure for greening/compliance will get even more diluted since 
Bangladesh will increasingly produce cheap bulk items, which is solidly 
outside of the ethical trade niche market.
Ethical trade might be an uphill task in these circumstances, but buyers 
boycotting Bangladeshi suppliers on ethical grounds (e.g. child labour) is not 
the answer since it jeopardises the livelihoods of the workers. The 
Bangladeshi factory owners and workers have the right to export earnings 
and a better life, and perhaps the onus has to be on the actors who are leading 
the supply chain in profit and power: the DC retailers and buyers. The
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problem is obvious to ethical trade proponents, but less obvious to buyers. 
Buyers need to ask themselves: what are the goals of their codes? Is 
responsible sourcing an integrated part of their business strategy? How is 
compliance monitoring established within the purchasing operations? Are the 
current relationships enough? Should the compliant suppliers be rewarded in 
some way (e.g. a tier system of rewards for larger sized orders and or higher 
profits)? The buyers need to view their relationships with suppliers as 
something expendable and fast changing: buyers need to start collaborating 
on long term relationship building.
Instead of withdrawing from countries that have unethically operating 
factories, I would argue that it is perhaps more responsible to stay the course 
by working with what I would call a "coalition of the willing", as opposed to 
the whole EM network (which was reluctant, at best). Trade unions and 
NGOs (environmental, social, labour etc.) should become better organised 
within themselves and encourage the leading suppliers to work together on 
remediation strategies, that can be replicated on a larger scale by trade 
associations. Public-private partnerships might provide valuable learning 
spaces through EM compliance demonstration projects. Learning from peers 
might be the way forward for suppliers (especially SMEs), instead of being 
given buyer codes that do not provide contextual guides for implementation.
Local solutions and remedies (based on local cultural contexts) have a better 
chance of succeeding than codes that are seen as "non-Bangladeshi". This 
may be lower in stringency than DC buyer codes, but it is important to set 
ethical trade goals that are achievable, so that a platform is made for further 
growth, instead of setting up targets that either do not make sense culturally 
or are too complex to be met. Setting the stage for failure is not the best basis 
for ethical trade to function within a system where governance of reward and 
punishment is already weak. Buyers also tend to terminate contracts with
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smaller factories for non-compliance, which does not set the stage for wider 
changes in the supplier networks.
Of course, this does not mean that suppliers can become complacent: RMG 
firms7 current corporate cultures are not open to EM thinking, but the current 
modes of apathy and complacency will not withstand the challenges of ethical 
trade, if Bangladesh is to move out of the "cheap and basic" segment of 
apparel manufacturing. A reputation for non-compliance is damaging for 
everyone involved in the supply chain. It seems obvious that Bangladeshi 
suppliers, buyers and workers stand to gain if the factories start becoming 
more compliant through more long term collaboration with actors in the EM 
network.
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Chapter Nine: Ecological Modernisation Theory Conclusions
9.1 Introduction:
EMT has broadened its geographical base considerably since the early days, 
and EM scholars have been studying Asian developing countries, especially 
China, India, Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines and Papua New Guinea. Evidence from 
these Asian countries suggests that great economic vibrancy paired with 
considerable environmental threats has led to remarkable efforts in 
environmental reform, but tremendous challenges remain (Memon, Imura 
and Shirakawa (2006), D'Sa and Murthy (2006), Hirsch (2006), Mayer (2006), 
Burke (2006) and Sonnenfeld and Mol (2006)). Researchers have shown a 
number of common themes (e.g. a great diversity of states, economies, 
cultures, and environments in Asia; the importance of multi level approaches; 
complementarities and conflicts between local, national and international 
goals and reform processes; and the unique character of environmental 
problems, management strategies, and reforms) but the EM outcome has 
always been influenced by national characteristics, and local contexts. None of 
these studies have looked at EM in supply chains (although some of the 
sectors studied were export based), but most researchers concluded that 
whether or not EM succeeds or fails depends not only on the EM assumptions 
being met, but on the contextual factors unique to each 
country/environmental problem, which determined whether the EM 
prescriptions were fulfilled or not. This broad conclusion is also supported by 
my thesis.
The aim of this thesis was to test the applicability of EMT in the Bangladeshi 
RMG apparel supply chain. EMT was used as a prescriptive theory as well as 
a descriptive and analytical framework. EMT assumptions (e.g. "win win" 
gains from ecologising the economy; politically mature nation-state; green
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signals in the market; supportive civil society) and EM's prescriptions (e.g. 
changing roles of the state, market actors and science/ technology) were tested 
empirically in the Bangladeshi EM network (Chapters Five, Six and Seven). In 
the last chapter we saw how EM has had limited success in explaining 
environmental upgrading in the apparel value chain. Not only was there 
scant ecologising in reality (weak green signals and confusing code content, 
not to mention almost non existent actual regulatory oversight), the "win 
win" gains were indirect if not absent totally for most firms. The nation-state 
was weaker than EM assumed, the market relationships were fragmented and 
distant, and civil society was either pushed into the periphery or simply 
disinterested in participating in greening. So if the EM assumptions were not 
met, and the EM prescriptions were not fulfilled, is the lack of environmental 
upgrading success in Bangladeshi RMG a failure for EMT? Perhaps not. 
However, Bangladesh's failure to ecologise as per EM predictions certainly 
added to our knowledge about greening problems along buyer driven supply 
chains -  the greening claims of ethical trade in apparels vs. Bangladeshi 
reality; supply chain gaps in communication and bargaining; buyer 
perceptions of non-compliance risks to their reputation and on time delivery, 
etc. We have also learnt much about Bangladeshi environmental policy 
making for industries -  how easily the DoE accepts its institutional agenda 
being marginalised over national goes of industrial growth and economic 
empowerment; how easily "green issues" are marginalised even among other 
non-price "social issues"; not to mention the problems of institutionalised 
inefficiency, poor capacity and corruption. The policymaking surrounding 
social and environmental compliance was also uniquely revealing of how 
non-price factors are conceptualised and dealt with by actors who are 
adamant about maintaining economic competitiveness using non-RBV skills. 
Lastly, this thesis has added to our knowledge of how EM prescriptions fail 
on a LDC factory floor -  how corporate cultures in sectors that do not see 
themselves as polluters, are closed to EM thinking; how environmental
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learning is easily hampered and set aside; not to mention the problems of 
CSR, and the lack of financial incentives.
EM might work in non-Westem countries, but Bangladesh is not one of those 
cases (table 9.1). The reasons are a mixture of national characteristics, supply 
chain structural factors, and a practice of weak EM. The general lessons from 
this thesis are important in taking forward EMT. If EMT is to be used as a 
useful theoretical framework to outline a feasible path of environmental 
change in the LDCs, it has to conceptualise greening imperatives and actions 
that are more complex and heterogeneous than is currently envisioned. EMT 
needs to be more precise about its prescriptions, eespecially involving 
structural and technological changes (in line with Christoffs (1996) criticisms 
of weak EM) and to better theorise how "change" and "learning" has to 
happen in geographies of different political and cultural locationalities. EMT 
also needs to address the role of the nation state within weak regulatory 
systems in LDCs; and to consider cases where "win win" gains do not 
happen. Based on my findings, EM is fundamentally at odds with traditional 
industry views of green gains, (which does not seriously pay attention to new 
types of green technologies or greening modes of production without 
immediate cost benefits) and is out of sync with supply chains where the 
pressure for greening is neither uniform or sustained beyond its focus on 
short-term efficiency. Therefore I would like to argue that EM without 
sustainable technological and structural change does not bring about 
meaningful environmental change; and that perhaps EMT should consider 
proactive economic actors taking the lead in chain greening in weak LDCs, 
while state actors build regulatory capacity. This chapter discusses these EMT 
implications in detail.
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Table 9.1: EM in Bangladesh
Research Question: Why are export based ready made garments (RMG) suppliers in Bangladesh failing to 
undertake environmental management?
First Hypothesis
EM Prerequisites: Changing role of science, 
technology, information and knowledge in order 
to change firm behaviour and attitudes about 
environmental upgrading.
Relevant networks analysed: The firms' 
management networks: corporate culture, 
organisational change, and environmental 
learning.
Relevant hypothesis: Poor environmental 
upgrading in firms will be associated with factors 
internal to the firms, such as corporate culture, 
slow changing behaviour, problems with learning 
environmental information and will be linked to 
poor competitive advantage gains.
Thesis conclusions: RMG firms were not 
convinced of greening because they did not see 
the RMG sector as polluting, and did not see 
direct financial benefits from undertaking 
environmental upgrading. The biggest upgrading 
barriers are lack of financial resources, 
management commitment, and slow 
environmental learning. Their greening strategy 
making is a mix of reactive and proactive, and the 
reactive strategy yields certain indirect 
competitive advantage since it is a entry barrier to 
peers due to high cost.
Second Hypothesis
EM Prerequisites: Changing role of markets, 
market actors and private sector initiatives in 
order to create market pressure and market 
opportunities for environmental upgrading.
Relevant networks analysed: The economic 
network: the buying process in the global supply 
chain, environmental compliance auditing.
Relevant hypothesis: The most powerful demand 
for environmental management on Bangladeshi 
RMG firms is originating from their buyers in 
global supply chains. However, opportunities for 
collaboration or assistance from buyers 
demanding these environmental upgrading 
initiatives may be low.
Thesis conclusions: Environmental management 
of the apparel supply chain happens within the 
larger buying process. Due to the nature of the 
buying process and supply chain governance 
characteristics, compliance on paper and 
compliance on the floor are two different things. 
Green consumerism does not apply to this 
segment of the supply chain, and buyers are not 
sending out a strong message for greening 
production.
Third Hypothesis
EM Prerequisites: Changing role of the state (away 
from command-and-control style to a 
decentralised flexible consensual proactive style), 
as well as changing social and political attitudes at 
the level of policymakers and stakeholders
Relevant networks analysed: The policy network: 
weak regulatory power, and non-participation of 
state and non state actors
Relevant hypothesis: The regulators (state and non 
state) are not convinced of the benefits of 
compliance and do not have the capacity to 
design, implement and monitor better compliance. 
The exclusion of the DoE and the RMG firms in 
this policy network is likely to lead to poorly 
designed outcomes.
Thesis conclusions: The regulators are 
institutionally weak. State agencies are reluctant to 
change away from strict command and control 
strategies, to embrace greener technologies or use 
economic instruments. The non-state actors have 
the opportunity to participate in the policymaking 
core, but it is by invitation only and the policy 
network remains beyond the reach of the 
periphery. Many important non-state stakeholders 
do not wish to participate. Many non-state actors 
lead the policymaking agenda in the absence of 
state leadership. All of this impacts the current 
policy discussions and the future of outputs.
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9.2 Criticisms and Implications for EMT:
In Chapter One, we have seen the neo-Marxist and radical criticisms of EM, 
and at several points in the empirical chapters the validity of those criticisms 
was easily recognisable. In particular, what was striking was that EM as a 
discourse and practice followed what could be termed as weaker than weak 
EM. According to Christoff (1996), weak EM discourse emphasise efficiency 
gains of industrial development and resource management gains: in the 
Bangladeshi case, the EM discourse was not even sophisticated enough to 
identify the linkages between resource/input minimisation (refinement of 
production) and cost savings. The same applies for the buyer codes content.
Christoffs other criticisms of weak EM, however, held true for Bangladesh: 
the system of compliance regulation by dated command and control 
regulatory tools and buyer codes had a narrow vision, was hegemonistic, 
technology fix driven, and can be identified as a co-optation of the ecological 
movement in Bangladesh. The neo-Marxist criticism of EM speaking the 
language of business lobby and silencing more radical criticisms also held 
true: before the SCF, the DoE led certification drives on TV were stopped by 
the request of the trade association, not to mention the "MNC friendly" 
language of greening in the buyer codes which mostly transfer eco- 
responsibility to national legislation. Dobson (1990) and Yearly (1994) have 
criticised EM for ignoring the broader cultural needs and non-anthropocentric 
values: this is broadly true in the Bangladeshi case and will be discussed in 
detail later. Postmodern criticisms of EM ignoring social and distributive 
justice were also visible in this case. Pepper's (1998) criticism that the EM 
discourse is contradictory because it does not suggest a reduction in 
consumption (only a refinement) also found an echo in this thesis' criticism of 
the DC consumers who are the end beneficiaries of the apparel value chain. 
Below I discuss these criticisms in context specific detail.
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An alternate growth trajectory for LDCs -  One of EM's key ideas is that 
modern institutions will change in terms of the network resources, network 
actions and network actor-configurations. However, empirical evidence from 
this thesis as well as Asian and Latin American countries has shown that 
these changes have not happened as deeply and simultaneously as the 
theorists would like (cf. Sonnenfeld and Mol 2006, Mol and van Buuren 2003, 
Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000). In the case of LDCs, EMT has to recognise that 
these changes will come about using a different growth trajectory that is 
perhaps slower for a few reasons: economic development priorities that 
triumph over environmental policy, low environmental awareness, a different 
culture of environmental protests or activism and a dependency on 
bureaucratic closed policymaking.
"Win-win" gains -  Perhaps the biggest appeal of EM discourse and practice 
is that it is predicated on the notion that green business makes business sense, 
and perhaps that is why EM is silent about cases (or industrial sectors) where 
the green profits are not so pronounced: such as in the case of the apparel 
value chain segment that sources clothes from Bangladesh that are "cheap 
and basic" and do not face much green consumer demands. EMT needs to 
look critically at the claim that financial benefits are the main incentives in 
supply chains, and that scientific evidence and green technology (that deliver 
cost savings) are sufficient arguments. EM should not ignore cases in LDCs 
where there might not be sufficient green market pressure.
The lead of the state -In cases where there is demonstratable deficiencies in 
state capacity (poor funding, poor power in front of other ministries, poor 
knowledge, poor policymaking capacity, excessive dependencies on donors 
for policy making leads, old style closed policymaking preference, absence of
N
capacity for implementation and monitoring, etc.) then EMT needs to go 
critically examine what it means for greening reform when such actors are put 
in the lead. Of course the role of the weak-state is not be discarded; the state
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must concentrate on building capacity for better policy making, 
implementation and monitoring. However, this is not a short-term goal, so 
perhaps EMT can make room for proactive economic actors (e.g. brand name 
buyers) to lead greening, while the state becomes stronger and more able to 
lead. The proactive economic actors are ideally placed to at as eco-hegemons 
while governments provide legislative backing (which can act as legal 
sanctions for buyer actions). Local economic leaders in South Asia (e.g. Indian 
Tata, Birla, etc.) have taken the lead when it comes to CSR, and if more 
entrepreneurs and their foreign counterparts (e.g. brand buyers) agree to get 
involved, then they could lead green management programmes for weaker 
peers and SMEs. The private sector could also liaise with the government 
agencies, donors and NGOs on building capacity at different levels for eco- 
management training, implementing, monitoring and auditing. The proactive 
economic actors have much to contribute by leading supply chain greening in 
the short term, and until the state is strong in capacity, EMT could gain by 
making room for that possibility.
Reconceptualisation of relationships and reality- EM theories lack a realistic 
notion of change barriers within the relationships between the many actors in 
supply chains, which is an important institution of modernity. Supply chains 
contain several governance styles, each with its weaknesses and strengths. 
However, not all the strengths are harnessed for ecological gains and many 
weaknesses affect greening- a fact that EM ignores. The relationships 
between buyers, RMG factories and their environmental regulators were a 
complex combination of opposing tendencies. Each set of relationships 
wanted to maximise their own agendas or access to resources, but they each 
chose to do that by trying to increase their control of resources, and were not 
open to collaborating or strengthening relationships to achieve greening, 
perhaps because they did not perceive greening to be a mutually beneficial 
goal. EMT also ignores the war of the resources: tangible and non-tangible 
resources have competing uses, and environmental investments were not
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pursued because of lower probability of returns, when compared to other 
areas of potential investment. Furthermore, this tendency of non-cooperation 
over ethical trade issues became reinforced because the actors have a marked 
preference for structuring network changes and hierarchisation over resource 
control. This reinforces the old "rules of the game" and preserves the old 
"pecking order", which is reinforced by the fact that the larger global supply 
chain structure has not changed in the apparel industry. Therefore, while it 
was not that the network did not change to facilitate greening of the supply 
chain, the actors did it in a way that did not require them to change the 
structure too much, or get in the way of the main raison d'etre -  profit making 
by using the cheapest possible inputs. EMT underestimate the stabilising 
tendencies of the "rules of the game", greatly compromising its usefulness as 
a descriptive tool. EMT also naively assumes that given the appropriate tools, 
change will happen, and ignores factors such as inter-temporal conflict, 
mistrust, outright apathy or even an expressed reluctance among stakeholders 
to participate in EM policymaking and regulation.
Homogenous actors -  EMT critics have variously pointed out that that EM 
propagates a Western notion of modern industrial nation-state, and ignores 
differences in state capacity, especially in LDCs. I would like to suggest that 
EMT does the same with economic market actors. EM homogenises all actors 
as having the same benign agenda and capability: EM does not adequately 
theorise the capacity differences between large brand name buyers and 
buying houses (which is perhaps a reflection of the fact that EMT is out of 
touch with contemporary global market structures) and that they pass on 
green competitive advantage in different ways. EMT also does not say 
anything about the arms length collaboration between buyers and suppliers, 
which is a significant barrier for ethical trade, and instead assumes that it is 
enough for buyers to provide greening incentives and nothing further. In my 
empirical findings we have seen how buyers were keeping an arms length 
approach to greening; this needs to change and EMT has to address closer
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collaboration more directly. Perhaps EMT needs to cultivate more 
relationships with GVC theories to emerge stronger. EMT also needs to look 
at CSR and EMS evidence that distinguishes between economic actors who 
have to make the greening changes. EMT does not theorise on how SMEs are 
supposed to achieve EM, given that they are typically weak in funding and 
human resources. Often they have upgrading barriers that cost more than for 
larger firms: many Bangladeshi RMG SMEs are situated in rented 
supermarket spaces, which makes it impossible for them to carryout 
infrastructure alterations for greening. EMT does not make any suggestions 
for how SMEs are going to overcome structural barriers.
EM tools -  In the last chapter I have discussed how EM tools were barriers for 
ecologisation. EMT in fact, does not qualify exactly what tools are appropriate 
in which conditions, which is an important shortcoming in the context of 
global supply chains. Buyer codes are often culturally insensitive (e.g. use of 
toilet paper among predominantly Muslim factory workers), voluntary 
management tools are easily rendered useless (e.g. homemade EMSs), and 
literature on misdesigned economic instruments is plentiful. EM critics judge 
the theory for assuming that the tools will automatically be enough, perhaps 
EMT also needs to theorise on tool appropriateness and applicability in 
different geographical contexts (i.e. political and cultural differences). EMT 
also needs to address the "soft" sides of human resource skills that are needed 
to gainfully learn scientific information and or properly use the technological 
tools (e.g. availability of information in accessible and understandable forms, 
given that LDCs have low literacy levels).
Skills and strategies -  EMT does not say anything specifically about the kind 
of skills that are needed for the translation of the green promise into green 
profits. EM indirectly suggests that proactive skills and strategy making will 
be enough to realise competitive gains and costs savings, but that is a 
simplistic view. EM skills do not mention the ability to find loopholes in the
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system that can be exploited to hamper EM. EM also simplifies all firm 
behaviour as proactive or reactive when in reality firms use a mixture: RMG 
firms continued to find ways to exploit the legislation loopholes; and only 
made proactive changes when three conditions were met -  demand for 
changes driven by buyer codes (showing disregard for government 
regulations, which is a behavioural trait that cannot be easily changed); 
necessary costs were low; and changes were all inside the factory. Their 
proactiveness was in part thanks to their skills and competencies, but their 
skills and strategy making regarding compliance did not get them direct 
financial benefits, because the skills used were not unique to them (as also 
predicted by the RBV).
Consumption and consumer behaviour -  Without green consumer pressure 
it would be short sighted to expect any greening to happen, no matter who 
took the lead. EMT conditionalities need to be extended that we need green 
consumer pressure to occur for all lines of products, so that cheap low value 
added product lines are not exempt from the need for greening. If this 
happens, then the pro-greening structural changes within supply chains will 
become easier. For buyers, environmental risks of non-shipment will increase, 
forcing them to abandon the current arms-length governance style when it 
comes to CSR, and the problems mentioned earlier in the empirical chapters 
about conflicting code requirements, integrity of auditing and compliance 
monitoring will be reduced. Last but not the least, a uniform increase in buyer 
pressure will also hasten the reform process within government and civil 
society for capacity building.
9.3 Conclusion:
We have come to the end of the discussion about what compliance failings in 
the supply chain can mean for EMT and the many points that EM theorists 
need to consider. At this point it is reasonable to ask whether it is useful to
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design future environmental reforms according to EMT. Is there any hope for 
a more receptive institutional development in Bangladesh that could 
successfully green the economic growth that is a crucial part of Bangladesh's 
poverty reduction strategy? Can we hope for the EM requirements to be met 
in the near future, in the context of the little change that is occurring in the 
way environmental problems are regulated?
I conclude that although Bangladesh's environmental policy system is 
currently incapable of detailed monitoring for lack of financial and human 
resources, and has failed to develop and implement environmental 
technologies for the RMG sector, it may still do so if the incentive arises from 
the public and the globed markets. In fact, some recent developments suggest 
the start of environmental reform in Bangladesh. First of all, although not 
acknowledged explicitly in these terms, the polluter pays principle is used all 
through the national environmental laws, especially in the EIA Guidelines for 
Industries. This creates the space for introduction of newer instruments based 
on market incentives. Secondly, as the Bangladesh economy opens up and the 
RMG sector becomes better integrated into the global apparel supply base 
(and hopefully escape the trap of being confined to making low value added 
clothes, as discussed in the last chapter), the transition may lead to a change 
in the lines of EM. Thirdly, the existing policy of allowing foreign owned 
RMG firms to operate n Bangladesh can help increase the number of factories 
that are more eco-friendly since the parent corporations already have much 
experience in running factories compliant with stringent international 
standards of environmental quality. This may lead to local firms learning 
from their peers. As the local firms have to compete with these foreign owned 
firms, they may become more willing to take up bigger environmental 
challenges. Fourthly, the growing media and international NGO attention that 
became focused on the Bangladeshi RMG sectors' social-environmental 
compliance performance as a result of the tragic accidents in 2006 may result 
in a stronger system of continued third party monitoring and pressure that
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will keep the factories from becoming complacent. Fifthly, greater awareness 
among the ordinary citizens about the poor social-environmental conditions 
that the workers have been pressured into living with has tremendous 
potential to influence and redirect the social-environmental performance of 
the RMG industry, especially since media coverage of the policy level 
negotiations are getting more column inches in the newspapers after the 
tragic accidents. Finally, going by the trend of the SCF led policymaking; 
there is some preference from the policymaking core (and periphery) that 
national laws on factory conditions (although not the DoE's environmental 
regulation for industries, which is separate from the Factories Act) need to be 
updated with special regard for the RMG sector. Therefore there is some 
chance that environmental considerations that are in built in the Factories Act 
will be updated and likely lead to better environmental conditions within the 
factories, even though overall, the outdated requirements for ETPs look set to 
remain.
Bangladesh is a slowly developing economy, and environmental priorities of 
Bangladeshis are very different from what is valued in industrialised 
prosperous countries. As Bangladesh's industrialisation increases and poverty 
levels are reduced, and political stability returns to the country through a 
democratically elected government, EMT may gain relevance for Bangladesh, 
particularly as a prescriptive policy perspective. In order for that to happen, 
Bangladesh will need the governance of the supply chain and the governance 
of environmental problems to change. The first set of relationships will have 
to change from an arms length approach to a collaborative approach that 
facilitates higher value addition production and backward-linkage 
integration. The second set of relationships will be no less significant -  policy 
making and policy implementation will have to become more inclusive and 
include a new set of instruments, based on a review of existing laws more in 
line with the needs of staying competitive in a international economy, that is 
governed by international standards that are often different from those in use
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in Bangladesh. If these changes happen -  and there is likelihood that it will -  
EMT then might become more applicable in designing mechanisms for 
environmental reform in Bangladesh. However, it would be a mistake to 
forget that Bangladesh, like other poor countries, will always mirror their 
own specific cultural conditions and institutional rules of the game. This calls 
for some caution in transferring EMT to societies that are very different from 
industrialised nations where EMT was first developed. The interlinked EM 
networks of relationships, actors and outputs that this thesis analysed, 
captured the institutional and behavioural transformations that show signs of 
greening the RMG supply chain according to Bangladesh's own identity. 
These were the prospects of EM in Bangladesh, in resemblance to the 
environmental developments made in industrialised countries, but having its 
own unique characteristics. The challenge now is for EM theorists to design a 
version of the theory that takes into account the geographical and cultural 
variations that are part of environmental policymaking, and the complex 
governance structures of international supply chains.
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Annex 1.1
Ecological modernisation policymaking for international trade and the developed 
country responses:
EM ideas began to be expressed in international policy making at the supra national 
levels in the 1980's. According to Hajer (1995), they may be identified in the 
discussions surrounding ex post facto lawmaking for environmental accidents, 
international conferences on environmental quality, and the publication of major 
international strategy papers on ecological balance, such as the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference and the IUCN's World Conservation Strategy report in 1980. The 1972 
Stockholm Conference was a significant milestone in incorporating environmental 
considerations into industrial and trade issues, not only by recognising the links 
between industrial activity and environmental degradation, but also by extending 
the actor network around this issue, which was achieved through the formation of 
the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), a supra national body with an 
internationally binding mandate for greening trade.138
Conferences, publications and birth of new institutions such as these were the early 
markers of efforts being made to look at the problem of industrial pollution in a 
holistic manner, and gradually brought in discourse about the responsibility of the 
economic actors in conservation, as well as implications on North South economic 
relations (Hajer 1995).139 Together, there was a sense that the responsibility for future 
ecological health rested in the hands of policymakers, economic actors and 
individual citizens, and even though concerns were shared by the LDCs as well, 
early greening policy action was seen in western industrialised countries. A good 
example of EM ideas being reflected in developed country action can be seen in the 
formation of the OECD's Environment Committee (OECD EC), under which, 
member countries worked to enhance aspects of eco-friendly trade. In particular, the
138 Source: http://wAvw.earthsummit2002.org/Es2002.pdf. accessed July 17, 2008.
139 In the EU, environmental policymaking impacting industries started before the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference, in the late 1960’s with the first directive in 1967 on classification, packaging and labelling 
of dangerous substances. The 1970’s saw the signing of the Helsinki Convention (1974) for regulating 
industrial run off pollution of the Baltic coastal area. The idea of regulation of transboundary pollution 
by economic activity through a unified charter gained ground due to the 1976 accidental release of 
dioxins in Seveso, Italy, which led to the Seveso Directive I (1982) and II (1996), designed to prevent 
major accidents involving dangerous substances.
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OECD EC included in the environmental agenda the use of the Polluter Pays 
Principle (first adopted by the OECD in 1972), Environmental Performance Reviews, 
as well as work on the "precautionary approach".140 The work of the Environment 
Committee led to the publication of the 1984 Brundtland Report, Our Common Future, 
which coined the phrase "sustainable development" as a goal for governments and 
citizens, and defined it as "a form of development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" 
(WCED 1987:7), which gave concrete meaning to a new vision of development141 that 
had much in common with EM principles- it emphasised continued economic 
growth, but in a more sustainable way. It strategically placed the linkage between 
environment and development at the top of the global agenda, and the following 
decades saw sustainable development becoming a standard for formulating 
development objectives in both developed countries and LDCs.
The 1990s saw a decade of trade related environmental policymaking unlike ever 
before. Sustainable development continued its prominence in development 
discourse, easily identifiable in the underlying global, supranational, national, 
regional and local environmental policy strategies,142 private sector environmental 
management measures (albeit prominent in western MNCs) and also in the 
expansion of the policy area actors, which included many environmental groups 
from the North and South (Khan 2002). In 1992, the UN Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED/Rio Earth Summit) brought together the North and 
South over trade development agendas.143 The significant aspect of the Rio action 
plan negotiations was that the distributive justice of greening production became a 
highly contested and politicised part of 1990s environmental discourse (Khan 2002).
140 Source: http://www.oecd.Org/about/0.3347.en 2649 34305 1 1 1 1 1.00.html. accessed July 17, 
2008.
141 The politics and history behind sustainable development discourse, and its subsequent evolution as a 
development paradigm has been well documented, and will not be repeated here (see Meadowcroft 
1997 for example). However, for the purposes of this thesis, it is pertinent enough to acknowledge that 
discourse about sustainable development dramatically changed thinking about the social, economic and 
environmental consequences of development paths that have dominated the world economy.
142 For example Bangladesh’s National Environmental Action Plan in 1995, which reflected the 
government's strategic recognition of the inseparable links between environmental degradation and 
poverty.
143 The participants adopted the Agenda 21, a comprehensive action plan for sustainable development; 
the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) and the Statement o f Forest Principles; and the Rio principles: 20/25 guidelines to promote 
sustainability.
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North and South agendas and conflicts were brought to the discussion table with the 
South demanding that the North should pay for the environmentally benign 
economic growth that the South is critically pursuing. At the 2002 Johannesburg 
summit, the shared responsibility of shouldering environmental costs of economic 
growth and poverty reduction were at the heart of discussions. The means of 
implementation of the Johannesburg Plan of Action included most of the prescriptive 
means of EM theory: increased trade, finance, technology transfer, role of the 
scientific community, education, capacity building, and information for decision 
making at the levels of government and citizens.144 Environmental impacts of 
international trade were addressed by setting specific goals for heavily polluting 
industries.145
Elements of EM policy making and economic action were also noticeably present at 
the EU level. 1996 saw two EU Directives -  the first on ambient air quality 
assessment and management, and the second on integrated pollution prevention and 
control (IPPC) to minimise pollution from industrial sources.146 The holistic approach 
of the IPPC147 is also reflected in EU policy initiatives such as the 2003 Integrated 
Product Policy (IPP), which addresses the whole life-cycle of a product, and expands 
the idea of environmental responsibility all along the supply chain - involving actors 
such as designers, industry, marketing, retailers and consumers.148 The IPP also 
recognises the heterogeneous and complex nature of supply chain management, and 
instead of taking the "one policy fits all" approach, IPP uses a variety of tools - both 
voluntary and mandatory - that include economic instruments, substance bans, 
voluntary agreements, environmental labelling and product design guidelines. The 
way EM elements are woven into western country polices becomes increasingly 
important for international supply chains, as these policies not only influence 
environmental policy making in the member states, but since they are supranational 
policymaking bodies, their policy goals, directions and rhetoric also has important
144Source: http://www.environment.gov.au/commitments/uncsd/index.html. accessed July 17, 2008.
145Source: httn://www,earthsurnmit2002.org/Es2002.pdf. accessed July 17.2008.
146 Source: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ippc/index.htm. accessed July 17, 2008.
147 The IPPC Directive was very important in driving ecological modernisation, since it not only made 
it mandatory for industrial units to get environmental permits from EU authorities, but it was also 
emphasised an integrated approach to industrial pollution (similar to the circular materials balance 
model), using Best Available Techniques (BAT), allowing certification authorities in member countries 
to be flexible in licensing requirements reflecting local needs and capacities, and the use of public 
participation in permit processing.
48 Source: http://ec.eurona.eu/environment/ipp/. accessed July 17, 2008.
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significance for the global environmental agenda, not least for the economic actors 
that are supplying to their markets.
Developed country states as importers -  EM theory relies heavily on political 
programmes for "economising the ecology" and asks for innovative policymaking 
and implementation arrangements to push these changes through. The responses 
that were made to EM trends in the developed countries as importers of goods 
manufactured in LDCs can explain the source of pressure on developing country 
exporters for supply chain greening.
The role of the state has been significant in this case, as we have seen above. Critics of 
EM theory have questioned the under theorised role of the state, since EM theory 
does not say sufficiently how state institutional structures ought to change despite 
the entrenched power relations and how the state should lead in the changes (Berger 
et al 2001). They have also argued that the broadening of the EM network to a more 
consensual and open governance style has allowed ecological ideologies to become 
"sell outs" to multinational corporations that it once challenged (Smith 2007). Other 
critics criticise EM governance for not changing enough, and point to the entrenched 
power resource hierarchies in modem industrial nations, and suggest that 
sustainable and meaningful EM has failed to occur without a radical shift in 
governance and institutions (Harvey 1996).
The way governments have responded can be criticised along these lines, since 
studies show that much of the policy and economic network interactions remain 
hierarchical and closed, resulting in the mixed success of EM in developed countries, 
(for example, see Janicke et al. 2002) but at the same time one cannot deny the 
progress that has been made towards protecting the environment. Developed 
country governments have addressed EM's requirements as important policymakers 
at the national and international levels, and have also created special institutional 
sets ups for implementing and monitoring the EM goals by pursuing "governance 
lite" style of regulation that relies much more on economic instruments and the 
economic actors, rather than traditional purely standard setting and monitoring 
models. These dual changes are reflected in the states' consensual relationship with 
the regulated and the broadening of the EM network to include economic actors who
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have more bargaining leverage than before. Another perceivable feature of the EM 
governance network is the shift towards using economic incentives and flexible 
regulatory arrangements (for example, the EU IPPC Directive). Economic 
instruments (such as emissions trading, taxes, subsidies and charges) have been 
added to the mix of traditional command and control tools (such as permits and 
emissions level standards) when those had the potential to lower costs of public 
spending and lessen monitoring burden (please see OECD 2007a and OECD 2007b 
for case studies of mixed instruments regulation of point and non point source 
pollution). Use of these economic incentives also resulted in environmental trade 
regulations that impacted the exports from certain developing countries, in the form 
of trade permits for eco-friendly goods. By the mid to late 1990s the value of flexible 
economic incentives for regulating industrial pollution became apparent to even the 
hard-line green political fronts (Andersen 2002), but that is not to say that the 
industry lobby did not have any influence on delaying the use of the more ambitious 
or stringent eco taxes or on negotiating exemptions to their benefit (Kronsell 2002). It 
can be argued that this shift towards EM has improved the relationship between the 
regulatory bodies and the private corporations, making their relationship less 
confrontational and more collaborative. The opening up of policy networks to a more 
inclusive and consultative structure was also recommend in strategy papers by supra 
national bodies (such as the UNCED), think tanks and was adopted by governments 
in Europe starting from the late 1980s (Hajer 1995). The pressure to become more 
inclusive has continued throughout the 1990s with the rise of green political parties, 
industrial lobby groups and trade unions (Rihoux 2002, Kronsell 2002). At the same 
time, the state held on to its leading role by creating new institutions (or rearranging 
established institutional arrangements) and forging new Raisons chiefly by invitation 
(Rawcliffe 2002). In addition they were actively working with corporate bodies and 
trade associations, who were now increasingly more interested in research into the 
technological barrier aspect of greening production (Young 2002).
Developed country environmental movements— EM along the supply chains also 
owes much to the growth and evolution of the developed country environmental 
movements. Many NGOs moved away from their earlier confrontational strategy 
towards more pragmatic ways of trying to influence policy. The green NGOs and 
organisations have been developing into more complex and increasingly corporate­
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like structured organisations (characterised by ever more sophisticated 
administrative, marketing, legal, media, fundraising and government lobbying 
sections) with a dramatic increase in membership numbers (specially visible around 
the time when issues like the ozone layer depletion was high on the policy agenda) 
and increased professionalisation of green bargaining. Simultaneously, there has 
been a spread in the active cells of the radical direct-actions groups in both sides of 
the Atlantic. As the national groups have grown and matured, the nature of their 
campaigns and policy work has changed to a shifting balance between conflict and 
more consensual styles. As Rawcliffe (2002) suggests, this is in part because of the 
governments and industrial bodies becoming more receptive to environmental 
voices, but also to do with the coincidental resource increases and organisational 
developments within the green NGOs. As Hajer (1995) says, the environmental 
NGOs began to subscribe to the appealing discourse of EM and got invited into the 
broader rhetoric of green-policymaking. There are, of course, numerous cases of 
social movements emerging, taking on an organisational form, becoming 
institutionalised and changing or disappearing if they were unsuccessful in affecting 
political and social processes. Over the past 25 years, environmental NGOs in the 
west have gained power from increased memberships and ranges of activities and 
better representation at the level of supranational policymaking (such as the EU, 
where, according to Kronsell 2002, the most powerful lobbies continue to be from 
business and agricultural lobbies), however, despite direct participation in policy 
dialogue, environmental movement organisations were only able to inspire and 
influence EU policymaking in an indirect way through the network of policymaking 
participants (for example, please see the discussion of EU Fifth Environmental Action 
Programme in Kronsell 2002). So the overall there is a trend of opening up policy 
making, but not at the cost of politics. As Young (2002) puts it, one of EMs big 
attractions for western governments was that it allowed them to buy time -  by 
addressing environmental issues without making the fundamental structural 
changes that were called for by the stronger strains of EM (for example, see Janicke et 
al 2002 for the limited progress made by developed countries in integrating 
ecological sensitivity into the broader cross sectoral industrial policy). But this very 
utilitarian and pragmatic aspect of EM is what enabled it to not threaten late 20th 
century capitalism, because it made possible to arrive at consensus with the greens, 
avoid damaging political disputes, avoid the alienation of industrial funding, and
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delay making the changes that EM theory does call for. This very feature of "buying 
time" has helped give the discourse its wide appeal across the EM network, and has 
drawn in actors from the state, industries, trade unions, NGOs and civil society 
(Hajer 1995, Young 2002).
Developed country businesses - EM first became attractive to the private sector in 
developed countries because of increasing regulatory pressure. While that is broadly 
true, their underlying reasons for participating in eco-modemisation networks were 
not so simple: they were attracted to the positive attitude of eco-modemisation 
theorists towards theorising ecological issues, especially when contrasted to the so 
far prevailing negative growth messages (e.g. "de-industrialisation" and "de- 
modemisation") sent out towards industries in particular. Plenty empirical cases 
clearly demonstrated that industries' were indeed profiting from EM since it was 
making business sense (Berger et al 2001), especially in terms of saved resources, 
reduced wastages, green subsidies, marketing opportunities, buttressing company 
stock prices, gain new customers, improve customer relations, etc. Some businesses 
were reaping market benefits from developing green technology and the mantra of 
green consumerism was now an important part of business strategy making geared 
towards catching the niche markets for premium priced eco-friendly products 
(Porter and van der Linde 1995). There is also plentiful literature existing on how 
companies gradually became interested in the environmental impact of their actions 
(through the rise of CSR practices) and took responsibility of the environmental well 
being of their staff, stakeholders, customers and communities (for example see Halila 
2007,Welford 2007, CSR Asia 2007and Hahn and Scheermesser 2006 for summaries). 
There are also companies specialising in delivering EM technologies, say, through 
industrial waste recycling and management (for example, the European Tyre 
Recycling Association (ETRA) which operates in 25 EU member countries) that 
deliver on the promise of eco friendly cost savings. Industry leaders came to 
understand that it was in their economic interests to act on EM principles, and as 
Young (2002) points out, it would be wrong to assume that industrial leaders were 
doing this for altruistic reasons: their main concern continues to be economic self- 
interest (although it cannot be denied that many companies genuinely value their 
ecological footprint higher than others). Businesses responded to the greening 
challenge by collaborating more closely than before with government policymakers,
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as we have discussed before, and established increased contact, both formal and 
informal, with the stronger trade unions (Rihoux 2002). The private sector also began 
to become better organised in terms of forming more professional lobby groups who 
would represent their ideas for setting environmental targets and pursue 
opportunities for funding of environmental institutions. For example, in Belgium, a 
large specialised agency called Fost Plus was established financed jointly by industry 
and the distribution sector, in order to develop a countrywide waste recycling and 
treatment scheme (Rihoux 2002). The business lobby groups have proved 
significantly powerful and environmental policy entrepreneurs, often over the green 
movement in Europe. Critics point to many long stories of moves made away from 
actual implementation of eco taxes on a significant scale in EU member countries, as 
powerful business lobbies representing producers of batteries, disposable razors and 
cameras managed to reduce eco-tax rates, or even negotiate a total exemption 
(Rihoux 2002, Rawcliffe 2002, Kronsell 2002).
Industrial groups also came up with a way of dealing with the costs of continuing 
environmental action (in line with the principles of voluntary initiatives such as 
EMAS or IS014000 series certification) -  they shared the cost and responsibility of 
minimising environmental risks across new coalitions within the economic network - 
such as trade associations (for example the plastics industry, European Chemical 
Industry Council (CEFIC) and Canada's Ontario Multi Material Recycling Inc.) Part 
of this strategy has been to spread the responsibility down the supply chain, to 
involve their suppliers as well (Welford 2007).
Developed country consumers -  Consumers in the developed markets have been a 
crucial driver of EM initiatives in LDC countries that export to these consumers, and 
a study of greening supply chains would be incomplete without understanding the 
contextual background that was provided by the civil society in these countries. Civil 
society in developed countries has acted as consumers, shareholders, and voters who 
measurably acted to show their preference for eco friendly goods and environmental 
quality of life. The rise in eco-friendly preferences is, of course, in tune with the rise 
in membership numbers of the green NGOs, as we discussed before. This is based on 
evidence of the emergence of post materialist values in human society that makes 
people take a holistic approach to nature and human beings -  they see human beings
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in a complex relationship with ecological systems where environmental degradation 
directly compromises the quality of human life.149 Issues like the Chernobyl disaster, 
Exxon Valdez, etc. received high profile media attention during the mid to late 1980s 
and early 1990s. In the same period, international summits on sustainable 
development were also in the news. Environmental consciousness has influenced 
western citizens to question their lifestyles and become more aware of their power as 
consumers of goods that have environmental impacts. In fact, an example of this is 
the spontaneous consumers' boycott of Shell petrol stations in Germany after the 
Brent Spar accident and the increased green votes in Belgium after food scares in 
1999. If we look at the rise in the range of "ethically sourced" goods for sale in the 
supermarkets in the UK we can get a sense of consumer power and greening. 
Kronsell (2002) contends that there has been a shift in social values in the west 
whereby the economic decision-making and political support has to go beyond 
logical monetary values, and it has had such an impact on western societies, that it 
would be very difficult for policymakers to ignore it today. Apart from their 
purchasing habits as consumers of consumables, people in developed countries were 
also taking environmentally conscious decisions as property buyers, shareholders, 
parents and holidaymakers. In this age of hyper-connectivity and easy information 
availability, this concern for environmental quality has reached higher than before 
and now extends to include the developing country factory floors where these goods 
are produced (Welford and Frost 2006, Frost and Ho 2006).
149 Inglehart (199S) suggested that “post-materialist” values achieved after a reasonable degree of material security, can predict environmental 
concern as a significant priority in people. However, there is considerable controversy regarding the empirical support for this argument at either 
the individual or the national level (e.g. Stern et al. 1999, York et al. 2003).
Annex 2.1
Choosing Conceptual Frameworks for Studying Bangladeshi RMG Sector:
Conceptually framing the problem of Bangladeshi industrial greening is challenging 
for two reasons. Firstly, choosing conceptual variables that would yield insight into 
economically vulnerable firms' behaviour is still problematic, given the existing body 
of literature on firms that have been undertaken in either developed countries, or in 
newly industrialised countries (NICs such as Malaysia, Indonesia, China, the 
Philippines, etc.). No studies have been done on the internal firm capacities in LDCs 
like Bangladesh. The problems of poor internal firm capabilities and resource 
constraints may or may not differ significantly between firms in countries like 
Bangladesh and Malaysia, but the way in which the firms are able to overcome these 
barriers may be different, therefore for this thesis, it makes sense to learn from the 
theoretical frameworks and variables that existing researchers have used while 
studying developed countries and NICs, but with a special view on how those 
aspects respond in less mature industrial systems with weak product innovation, 
bureaucratic change resistant organisational set ups, low investment and weak 
human resource skills.
Secondly, existing literature does not provide any useful starting points in framing 
the study of Bangladeshi industrial eco-management. Academic literature or policy 
publications on the environmental management of Bangladeshi firms is almost non­
existent. There are no public disclosure programmes for industrial environmental 
performance in Bangladesh and the government does not publish any related 
information. Let alone any studies done on their environmental management 
performance or management capacity barriers, there are no sector wise data from 
any source on how Bangladeshi industries fare on meeting minimum mandatory 
environmental regulations. Few sector wise studies have been done on the highly 
polluting sectors that contain data on their effluent characteristics etc., but there have 
been no studies on the environmental management of those sectors either, except as 
viability studies for common effluent treatment plants. Policy level publications are 
limited to EIA guidelines focusing on selected highly polluting sectors. Therefore, 
given the near vacuum of knowledge of environmental practices in industries in one
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of the poorest, most crowded and most polluted cities in the world, Dhaka, an 
approach similar to that used by industrial greening capacity researchers mentioned 
above seemed like a sensible starting point. The chosen conceptual variables look at 
the kind of ecological imperatives these firms are facing, then go on to studying the 
kinds of capacities they have for environmental action and the kinds of actions they 
take and why. I wanted to go beyond "green idealism", and take into account the 
way firms are structured to get a sense of where the strengths and weaknesses of 
these firms lie — whether the firms have strategic resources for environmental 
management, whether they are heavily bureaucratic or organic, whether they are 
culturally sensitive to environmental issues, whether they have the enabling 
structure to deal with environmental information, whether they are able to learn and 
implement changes, are all important factors in explaining the weak environmental 
strategies they make.
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Annex 2.2
Firms' Internal Management Networks And Greening
The business firm is defined by Robbins and Coulter (2003) as a deliberate 
arrangement of people to accomplish some specific purpose, distinctly characterised 
by the possession of a deliberate structure to attain those goals. Therefore the actors 
in a firm are arranged in units with well-defined relationships. Organisational theory 
suggests that working relationships at each level of actors (or employee units) are 
distinguished by managerial authority over different areas of control. Analysis of 
how a firm functions strategically, then, has to begin with mapping where these 
employee units are located and how they are regulated formally and informally 
through existing networks of power structures.
Robbins and Coulter (2003) highlight the three areas of control in management 
networks -  first line managers (lowest line managers, overseeing non managerial 
staff); middle managers (managing first line managers); and top managers 
(undertaking organisation wide decisions, establishing plans and goals effecting 
entire firm). Higher-level managers focus more on external relationships and are 
most likely the first point of contact for feeling market pressure for environmental 
upgrading. They are responsible for decisions regarding resource allocation and 
business strategies, both of which are crucial drivers for environmental management 
to succeed. At lower managerial levels, the focus is on internal responsibilities 
mainly concerned with supervising staff from the operating core and overseeing 
daily operating work flows and maintenance work (Mintzberg (1980), Pavett and 
Lau (1983)). Undertaking environmental management involves the whole firm and 
responsibility for managing aspects of it depends on the "span of control" at each 
level. The way a firm is "controlled" determines the degree of centralisation and 
decentralisation in firms. In centralised bureaucracies, top managers make all the 
decisions and lower-level employees are not consulted. Change is slow and path 
dependent (Mintzberg 1983, Robbins and Coulter 2004). In organic firms, decision­
making is more decentralised and the firm is quicker to change. Centralised decisions 
are common in conditions where decisions to be taken are significant for the firm or 
the firm is facing a crisis, while low risk decisions can be made in more organic styles
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(Robbins and Coulter 2004). Therefore, the organisational theorists argue that each 
firm has different degrees of centralisation and decentralisation operating within 
different pockets of the power structures within the firm. These power hierarchies 
will explain different decision-making styles effecting the use of resources and 
management of actor-capabilities depending on the decision type itself. While, the 
mixture of centralisation and organic decision-making styles is a crucial factor 
behind a firm's unique ability for successful (i.e. rent seeking) business strategy 
formulation, (that may include innovations such as environmental upgrading), I 
argue further that only organisational structure is insufficient in understanding why 
environmental upgrading may be too much of a challenge, given other factors such 
as strategic resource shortages, weak management capability and cultural factors. 
These additional complexities of resources and capabilities, which can determine 
whether a firm succeeds or fails at innovative responses to market pressure, are 
examined in the chapter, according to the resource based view (RBV).
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Annex 2.3
Background to Economic Networks and Greening
Traditionally, market systems have been studied as consisting of interacting agents 
who continuously pursue advantageous opportunities to maximise profits 
(Wilkinson, Wiley and Lin 2001, Kosfeld 2003), based on assumptions of rational 
actors who are utility or profit-maximising, who operate within economies of scale 
and diminishing returns (Robertson and Langlois 1994, Porter 1990). However, 
recent years have seen the evolution of a more dynamic conceptual framework to 
describe how an economy might get from one state to another.150 Economic networks 
or value chains (versus markets or hierarchies) have emerged as valuable conceptual 
frameworks for describing business relationships between firms, especially in the 
context of growing global supply chains where cooperation and coordination 
networks are becoming analytically complex due to dispersed actors and cultural 
variables (Wilkinson, Wiley and Lin 2001, Cottica and Ponti 2004).
The economic networks approach is based on complex adaptive systems theory, 
which stresses the mutually adaptive relationships that form between actors when 
they enter trade relationships as buyers and sellers. According to Vriend (1995: 205), 
"A 'complex system' is a system consisting of many agents that interact with each 
other in various ways. Such a system is 'adaptive' if these agents change their actions 
as a result of the events in the process of interaction." Therefore, this view looks at 
market interactions in terms of adaptability of actors - as in, interacting firms who 
self organise in response to market pressure, into pursuing actions that are the most 
advantageous (Vriend 1995). As with all complex adaptive systems, order emerges in 
a bottom up fashion through the interaction of many dispersed actors acting 
simultaneously (Wilkinson, Wiley and Lin 2001). Over time, these interactions set the
150 This reflects the debates that began in the 1980's surrounding industrial policy studies on 
the growth of large vertically integrated firms w hich had economies of scale (typical in the 
USA, UK and Japan) vis a vis the cluster formation of networked smaller more flexible firms 
(typical in Italy's industrial districts). For more on this debate, see Robertson and Langlois 
(1994). Analysis of new  factors promoting international market competitiveness brought 
attention to the need for stable dom estic/regional production networks (Porter 1990), while  
on the other hand, some proponents argued in favour of stable, large, vertically integrated 
production systems (Lazonick 1991).
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rules of the game and operating norms within the supply chain (Johanson and 
Mattson 1992, Hakansson and Snehota 1995, Welch and Wilkinson 2000).
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Annex 2.4
Triadic Buyer Seller Relationships and Environmental Upgrading in Global Value 
Chains
Hakansson and Johanson (1992) explain industrial relations in trade networks by 
looking at three basic variables: actors, activities and resources. Actors are defined as 
those who control activities or resources through networked relationships.151 Actors 
may be identified at different organisational levels (e.g. a firm, a trade body, a 
financial institution, etc.). They can be operational at the local, national and global 
levels (e.g. multinationals with local offices, or local firms involved in international 
supply chains, etc.). For the purposes of this thesis, the primary actors in the supply 
chain are the buyers/retailers (buyers and buying houses) and the RMG suppliers 
(large, medium, small sized firms); the secondary actors are auditors, trade unions, 
trade associations and raw materials suppliers. They create network pressures by 
deciding on the selection of activities, their coupling and resource usage. Their main 
objective is to maximise resources through strategic and rational management of 
these relationships, which is done through accumulated power and bargaining. 
There is constant bargaining and struggle between actors to increase own control 
over resources at the expense of others' decrease in control, resulting in a zero sum 
game. Distribution of resources determines the power that the actors have over 
future activities (Hakansson and Johanson 1992). Therefore, these three variables 
exist within knowledge gaps and uncertainty and are influenced by their history, in 
terms of its institutionalised learning, memory, routines, embeddedness and inertia, 
which happens in a fashion similar to the "bottom up ordering" concept of 
Wilkinson, Wiley and Lin 2001 (See also, Uzzi 2000 for discussion on network 
embeddedness). As bottom up ordering occurs, certain actors become more
151 The end goal of networking is attaining maximum control over resources. Control 
determines the activities in a network and can be of 2 types; direct control, which is 
established by ownership of the resources and indirect control, which is based on  
relationships w ith other actors and the associated dependence relations w ith those actors. 
Due to the multi-level existence of the actors, it is always unclear which actors control which  
resources and to which extent. The aim is to increase own direct control and reduce indirect 
control of other actors over their resources. Complementary goals can be shared between 
actors, making them work together towards decreasing the control of a third actor to attain 
their mutual goal. Therefore network action is a mixture of competing and complementary 
goals. (Hakansson and Johanson 1992).
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powerful than others, which is an interesting phenomenon for this thesis, since I aim 
to analyse the exercise of power between buyers-sellers and its expression by way of 
supplier RMG firms trying to adopt environmental management practices, under 
pressure from buyers.
Source of Buyer Power - Smith and Laage-Hellman (1992) talk about two kinds of 
triadic relationships that explain where buyers and suppliers in a network source 
their power and their span of influence. The first is the Customer-Supplier-Supplier 
(C-S-S) triad, which involves one buyer and two suppliers,152 a situation that 
immediately lays bargaining power with the customer/buyers because the financial 
benefit of the multiple suppliers rests upon the non-relationship between the buyers 
and competing suppliers. Corominas-Bosch (1999) refers to buyers' bargaining 
power as a numbers game. Bargaining power depends on whether the network type 
is "uneven" (when buyers or sellers outnumber each other), or "even" (when the 
number of buyers and sellers are the approximately same). Kranton and Mineheart 
(2001) suggest that if the network is uneven (where suppliers outnumber the buyers 
such as in the C-S-S triad), then the market is becoming competitive and the buyers 
hold the most power because they are the price setters in a buyers market. Buyers 
purchase from sellers in an ascending bid auction, which determines the price.153 
Empirical work by Chamess et al (2003) shows that actor behaviour follows the 
theoretical prediction that in competitive network structures, the stronger party takes 
advantage during bargaining. As a result, the nature of the links (even vs. uneven) 
between actors is influential in determining the power structures and bargaining 
outcomes over time. This also holds true in supply chains made up of smaller 
subnetworks. If even structured subnetworks are linked to competitive subnetworks 
so that the large network becomes competitive, then bargaining power shifts 
(Kranton and Mineheart 2001). This aspect of buyer power, as expressed in setting 
prices in an ascending bid auction, has important implications for firms hying for
152 If the suppliers are offering the same resource to the customer, then they are competing 
and are in a negative relationship because either's relationship w ith the customer is 
contingent upon the customer's non-relationship with the other supplier. If suppliers are 
providing complementary goods or services then they are in a positive relationship, for one 
supplier's relationship w ith the customer is dependent on the relationship w ith the first 
supplier. (Smith and Laage-Hellman 1992)
153 Buyers drop out of the bidding if the price exceeds their valuation and eventually the 
bidding process stops w hen demand equals supply. Important elements in their m odel are 
the reasons for emergence and competition among the actors. (Kranton and Mineheart 2001)
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competitive advantage gains as a result of environmental upgrading, since if the 
market is too competitive, the chances of firms gaining financial advantages due to 
greening investments is going to be less.
Source of Supplier Power - International supply chains are as much defined by the 
relationships suppliers have with their competitors as they do with their buyers. 
Easton and Araujo (1992) expand on this idea, and emphasise the latter part of the C- 
S-S triad by identifying suppliers' relationships with their competing firms using 5 
dimensions — competition, conflict, co existence, cooperation and collusion.154 These 
responses are determined by the suppliers' goal conflicts with competitors, their 
individual competitive strategies and degree of suppliers' "bargaining power" for 
optimum prices, since powerful suppliers can create bargaining space for themselves 
and become a barrier for competitors' upgrading efforts (Easton and Araujo 1992). 
This aspect of supplier behaviour has important implications for firms looking to get 
higher prices through EM by making greening-strategies that change the 
relationships between suppliers in many ways -  such as increasing competition (e.g. 
buying expensive rare green technology), increasing cooperation (e.g. entering into 
waste recycling schemes) or collusion (e.g. sharing the expense of green technology 
imports to create a barrier for other firms). The motivation for creating barriers and 
alliances to achieve competitive advantage is an important strategic resource, as 
suggested by the resource based view discussed earlier. Bargaining space and 
competitive fields are also important weapons in suppliers strategy for gaining 
market share, and is something that can be reasonably transferred to the case of 
greening firms, that might bargain with their buyers to get higher prices for greener 
products even though the rest of the suppliers are not enjoying the same prices. 
Bargaining spaces are not geographically bound in international networks, according 
to Easton and Araujo (1992). For example, in the Bangladeshi RMG sector, a
154 Competition occurs w hen there are two suppliers competing ("parallel striving") for the 
same buyer and the suppliers' goals are in conflict. Conflict arises when the goals of two  
actors are mutually exclusive and the aim is to destroy the competitor. Coexistence occurs 
when goals are mutually independent. This can occur due to inadequate information or their 
contentment with maintaining current market niche. The fourth form of co-relationships is 
cooperation, which is w hen actors' goals are mutually dependent. Cooperation may be formal 
or informal. Formal cooperation m ay be dyadic, joint or third party. Formal cooperation may 
be related to people (social capital), information flow s and social norms. The fifth kind of co 
relationship is collusion, when tw o or more actors join forces to injure the third competitor to 
gain greater market share (Easton and Araujo 1992).
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supplier's power may be high at the national level (e.g. competition between firms of 
a similar size within Bangladesh) but low at the international level (e.g. firms 
specialising in certain product lines competing for specific orders with firms from 
other countries) and therefore bargaining power can differ as per venue.
Smith and Laage-Hellman's second triad, the Supplier-Customer-Customer (S-C-C) 
triad looks at actor adaptability in terms of how a supplier reacts to its relationships 
with multiple buyers. In a market such as apparel, one supplying factory may be 
expected to work for several buyers at the same time, hence any strategy making 
decision they make has to be mindful of its impacts on the firm's terms of trade with 
multiple buyers. It is reasonable to assume that during environmental upgrading, 
similar considerations will have to be made. In this case, source of supplier power 
depends on the nature of dependency between the supplier and its multiple buyers. 
Smith and Laage-Hellman distinguish between exchange concentration (frequency of 
transactions between suppliers and core buyers) and competence as factors 
determining supplier power. Another way suppliers increase their bargaining 
power is through making strategies in accordance with buyers' wishes. This 
phenomenon of "upgrading" own production skills, process or product has been 
widely recorded as a means of not only competitive advantage gaining, but also of 
gaining network power (cf. Porter, Easton and Araujo 1992, Russo and Fouts 1997, 
Hart 1995, etc.). Upgrading is a positive relationship, since this increases the capacity 
of the supplier and adds value to its products.
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Annex 2.5
Policy Making Theories and Cycles
There is a general consensus that there is no one definition of what public policy is or 
ought to be (Birkland 2001). However, it is important to remember that policy 
making by governments entails a set of laws, plans and actions, arrived at through 
an ambiguous and politically charged process. According to Dye (1978: 3), public 
policy is "anything a government chooses to do or not to do." This emphasises that 
although there may be highly influential policy stakeholders in the policy process, 
the government is the ultimate legal authority and agent for making public policy, 
and therefore, their policy decisions and non-decisions (which is also a deliberate 
policy choice) are worth examining to understand policy outcomes (Brooks and 
Miljan 2003). Jenkins (1978) define public policy as "set of interrelated decisions 
taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the 
means of achieving them within a specified situation where those decisions should, 
in principle, be within the power of those actors to achieve." This is a broader 
definition than Dye's, since it emphasises the fact that a policy is a set of inter related 
decisions, some made inadvertently and that policy making is done by a group of 
actors inside and outside government, who are networked to attain certain policy 
goals (i.e. policy development). Also, the ability/capacity of policy actors to 
implement the decisions is a crucial element in producing policy decisions and 
points to the role of institutions in providing support to the regulated. Perception of 
policy problems and associated uncertainty Eire highlighted by James Anderson's 
definition of policymaking as "a purposive course of action followed by an actor or 
set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern." (Anderson 1984: 3). 
Policy analysis has traditionally been done keeping these factors in mind.
Policy analysis must begin with identifying the stages of the "policy process". The 
idea of a cyclical policy process has been very influential in policy analysis (cf. 
Lipsky 1980) because it identifies the particular stages of policymaking,155 and helps 
isolate whole process into discrete phases and enables analysis of inter linkages and
155 Originating with H. Lasswell's "Stages Heuristics Approach" (Howlett and Ramesh 1995)
356
succession. Howlett and Ramesh (1995) present a simplified model of the policy 
cycle. This is shown briefly in the table below.
Table: The Ideal Type Policy Cycle
Stages In Policy Cycle Phases Of Applied Problem Solving
1. Agenda setting Problem recognition
2. Policy formulation Proposal of solutions
3. Decision making Choice of solutions
4. Policy implementation Putting solution into effect
5. Policy evaluation Monitoring results
Based on Howlett and Ramesh 1995:12
The model explains how policymaking is done in overlapping steps, by a changing 
cast of actors (public and private actors; individuals and organised groups; networks 
of mutual benefit), using policy instruments (compulsory, voluntary, mixed tools, 
etc.), and within given institutional contexts (formal and informal nature of 
institutions).
The policy process begins with agenda setting, which may be fraught with opposing 
public and private agendas, and both parties have the power to bring an issue to the 
table. Depending on the amount of public support for the issue/ problem at hand, the 
agenda may be set by non-state actors by means of political bargaining. In the next 
phase, policy formulation is done, where ideally, policy goals are defined and policy 
alternatives are discussed. This may proceed without clear definition of the problem, 
often in a disorderly, nebulous and contested manner156. Policy decision-making 
phase involves narrowing down policy options to the ones that are ultimately 
chosen. This is the most political stage of policymaking (Brewer and DeLeon 1983) as 
political bargaining powers of various actors determine selection of appropriate 
instruments such as market instruments, direct regulation, voluntary instruments or 
mixed instruments, depending on complexity of the regulated and the regulator, 
state capacity, and institutional considerations (such as resources availability,
156 This phase is never neutral, since power and resource imbalances will create winners and 
losers. At this stage those policy options are eliminated that are deemed impossible or 
unacceptable to those with greater bargaining power.
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precision of targeting the area to be regulated, political risk, and constraints on state 
activity).
Policy implementation has received much attention in policy analysis. In particular, 
implementation theory examines the link between institutional obstacles and the 
regulation outcomes. Authors such as Pressman and Wildavsky, (1984), Bardach 
(1977) call it "mutual adjustment". Long and Franklin (2004) present 3 theoretical 
perspectives on implementation styles — centralised, decentralised and mixed 
approaches. In centralised systems (the "top down" approach), agency leaders have 
maximum control (Sabatier 1986, Wildavsky 1979). However, the top-down model 
does not fully explain policy distortion at the hands of the practitioners. In 
decentralised systems there is more input by lower level public servants, whom 
Lipsky (1980) calls the "street level bureaucrats", whose decision making powers 
limits the circumscription by the policy makers at the top.157 Long and Franklin 
(2004) also talk about a mixed approach where constraints on implementation are 
imposed at the top and implementing actors interpret policy so that implementation 
is congruent with their preferences (Goggin 1990). Bardach presents policy 
implementation through a framework of "games" with "players, what they read as 
the stakes, their strategies and tactics, their resources for playing, the rules of play, 
the rules of "fair play", the nature of the communications among the players and the 
degrees of uncertainty surrounding the possible outcomes." (Bardach 1977: 56).158 
The list of factors that can result in weak policy implementation and low regulatory 
pressure is a long one, but Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) and Bardach (1977) 
highlight faulty policy design and institutional characteristics of agents involved.159
157 Lipsky argues that the decisions, routines, and devices they invent to cope with  
uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out. From 
this w e can infer that street level bureaucrats w ill pursue or distort policies to suit their 
commitments or preferences and that this w ould leave room for agency capture, if the 
opportunity arises (Smith 1997).
158 The relevance and applicability of their work in studying current policy implementation is 
immense because the gap between policy conception and implementation raises questions 
about how  challenges and obstacles are to be dealt w ith during policy games to ensure that 
policy meets its goals. Past literature has shown how  initial policy intentions are unclear, 
policy assumptions about probable outcomes are incorrect, compromises cause goal diffusion 
and disillusion. (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984, Sabatier and Mazmanian 1978, Long and 
Franklin 2004).
159 Bardach (1977:10) lists as influencing factors: intergovernmental relations, interagency 
relations, relations between government and private contractors, professional participation as 
providers and overseers, inter-professional rivalries, regulatory as well as service-delivery
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Lipsky (1980) also analyses the nature of bureaucracy as an institutional factor.160 
Goggin (1990) highlights ambiguity and conflict. Ripley and Franklin (1982) identify 
the number and the nature of the actors involved, nature of conflicts in the particular 
policy and the expectations concerning the policy goals. Mazmanian and Sabatier 
(1983) point to the tractability of the problem and the ability of the state to structure 
adequate implementation solutions.
Policy evaluation occurs after policy implementation has ended or is ongoing. It 
may be done by stakeholders inside and outside government and is conducted at 
different levels, such as administrative evaluation (to see if state efficiency, 
managerial performance and process design was adequate), judicial evaluation (to 
evaluate possible conflicts between administrative conduct and individual rights), 
political evaluation (undertaken by general voting/protesting public/ private sector 
policy actors/ the regulated), (Howlett and Ramesh 1995). While policy evaluation is 
done to measure whether it has met its goal or not, in actuality it does not proceed in 
a rationalistic manner and is a highly politicised affair. Often polices do not have 
clear goals that can be measured easily and developing objective and rational 
standards for such measurement is difficult (Ingram and Mann 1980).
The role of stakeholders161 during the policy process is interesting for this thesis, not 
only because actors internal and external to the government can have powerful input 
towards initiating new policy or strengthening existing policy, but also because they 
may be relegated to the periphery due to power struggles and other participation 
boundaries (Long and Franklin 2004).162 Current literature raises questions on how to 
better understand and predict the behaviour of stakeholders including business
activities, intra-bureaucratic politicking, important interface programmes with other policy 
areas, and continuing legislative oversight and intervention.
160 According to Lipsky (1980), each bureaucratic agency undertakes implementation in a 
specialised way, reflecting particular intellectual and institutional traditions, holding certain 
values, which help shape a particular institutional perspective, thought which each policy 
negotiation is understood and judged. These preconceptions over time become embedded  
and create precedents and generates "lessons learnt". In a cyclical way, implementation 
becomes a way of modifying the original policy.
161The term 'stakeholder' is often associated with the 'stakeholder approach' from the 
corporate management literature. See Freeman (1984) for details.
162 Much empirical evidence points to a disconnect between stakeholder dialogue and 
policymaking and policy implementation. Power struggles over issue definition, participation 
boundaries and the identification of the relevant stakeholders contribute to this (Long and 
Franklin, 2004)
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firms, civic society, lobby groups, etc., in environmental policy making; how to 
understand what motivates them to join, affiliate with or form a new group.163 What 
is important for policy analysis is to acknowledge that all stakeholders in a policy 
process do not necessarily share the same values and have conflicts with the 
dominant actors, often who are from within the government (Cordano, Frieze and 
Ellis 2004).164
163 A network perspective has been suggested to understand how  and w hy stakeholders 
respond to institutions and other stakeholders (Grimble, et al., 1995).
164 However, defining stakeholders has been problematic in this kind o f analysis (Driscoll and Starik 
2004, Jones and Wicks 1999, Mitchell et al 1997) and definitions vary depending on the field of 
inquiry (e.g. corporate management vs. natural resource conflicts) and scope of variables. The 
normative view (by Mitchell et al 1997) defines stakeholders based on their legitimacy, risk, property 
rights and moral claims. However, Driscoll and Starik (2004) argue for a broader criteria based on 
stakeholder ability to influence, legitimacy o f relationship and urgency o f claims.
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Annex 3.1
The Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA) and the Apparel GVC
The supply chain of the apparel trade has shifted a few times since the early 1950's 
when the sector was almost exclusively located in the developed industrialised 
countries. It first shifted from North America and Western Europe towards Japan in 
the late 1950's. Japanese apparel exports rose sharply until another shift towards 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Republic of Korea. This new exporting block dominated 
till the early 1980's. Around mid to late eighties, the third migration occurred from 
the "Asian Big Three" -  Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea - to other developing Asian 
economies, such as mainland China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka. In the 
1990's Bangladesh and some Latin American Countries also joined as suppliers 
(Gereffi and Memedovic 2003).
Europe and America have long been the largest importers of textiles and clothing 
and continue to produce apparel for their domestic market, which is in some 
competition from overseas labour and raw materials, which are cheaper. 
Consequently, apparel import policy of the US and Europeans countries have been 
designed with two over arching goals - to reap the benefits of lowest cost labour 
through internationally competitive apparel sourcing, and to provide protection to 
their domestic apparel manufacturers. This was clearly reflected in their adoption of 
quota based apparel import policies that allowed developed country buyers to 
source clothing based on least cost principles, but each exporting country would be 
under restriction to stay within imposed quota amounts. In 1959 India, Pakistan and 
Hong Kong entered a voluntary restriction with the UK. The USA was trying to 
negotiate with Hong Kong into entering a voluntary restriction but failed, leading to 
pressures on the GATT, pleading for a "global solution" to the problem of "economic 
disruption" that imports from lower cost countries was wrecking on the US domestic 
apparel industry (Cai 1997). GATT adopted a definition of market disruption as 
safeguards to developed country domestic industry, exempting these new restrictive 
rules from normal GATT principles. This resulted in the Short Term Arrangement on 
Cotton Textiles (STA) in 1961. The Long Term Arrangement Regarding International
361
Trade in Cotton Textiles (LTA) then replaced this in 1962.165 In 1973, in order to win 
support of the apparel lobby for the 1974 Trade Act, USA proposed the MFA under 
GATT (Trela and Whalley 1990).
The MFA was intended to provide temporary protection to the domestic T&C 
producers in developed countries as well as to give time to LDC firms to make 
suitable arrangements to enter the developed country markets. However, the MFA 
was renewed 4 times - MFA I (1974-77), MFA II (1977-81), MFA III (1982-86) and 
MFA IV (1986-94). The coverage of developing countries also grew. At the end of 
1994, there were 40 countries involved in MFA, including some non-GATT countries 
such as China (Cai 1997). At its inception, the MFA's objective was stated as 
achieving the expansion of trade through the reduction of barriers and the 
progressive liberalisation of trade terms in textile products (Trela and Whalley 1990). 
It allowed for 6% annual growth for quotas and various provisions to make quotas 
more flexible166. While the debate around the net benefits of the MFA and its welfare 
distribution has been contentious, policy outcomes indicate that the long term 
benefits accrued to the more powerful bargainers, who were the importing country 
governments. Critics were concerned with the discrepancy between the policy 
objectives and policy instruments chosen under the MFA through successive 
renegotiations. Policy instruments were designed to extend protection of developed 
country apparel manufacturers instead of liberalising the trade terms. Annual 
growth rates under quota have been below 6%, and fibre coverage has increased to 
include silk blends and vegetable fibres. Additionally, anti surge mechanisms were 
introduced to protect against full utilisation of previously unused quotas by 
suppliers (Trela and Whalley 1990).167
However, total apparel export during the MFA doubled between 1993 and 2003, 
rising from about $90 billion to $180 billion. Low and middle income countries
165 The LTA allowed for a 5% growth limits on imports. The LTA was extended twice and lasted for 10 
years. (Trela and Whalley 1990).
166 Such as the provision to allow a developing exporting country to transfer a quota between product 
categories in the same year; or the allowance for countries to carry over up to 10% of their unused 
quotas; or carry forward up to 5% of their quotas and use them up in advance. (Trela and Whalley 
1990).
167 This had been happening within the wider context of other product specific trade restrictions used 
by developed countries against developed countries in the 1970’s to 1990’s (Erzan, Goto and Holmes 
1990).
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showed most growth, their apparel exports rising from $53 billion to $123 billion, 
ending with a 70% share of global exports. While countries like China and India were 
restrained, some countries (such as Bangladesh) benefited from the quota system as 
well as preferential access granted to many LDCs by various regional and 
preferential trade agreements (e.g. by EU under GSP and Everything but Arms, and, 
recently, by USA under AGO A) (World Bank 2005).
Hierarchies of Membership, Integration, Resource and Power:
The MFA quota restrictions were key in the establishment of power hierarchies at 
various levels of policy networks. As we have seen earlier in this chapter, MFA 
negotiations were led and dominated by developed country governments and lobby 
groups - a power base that continues to this day and is very influential for 
understanding the policy networks relevant for this thesis. Another set of developed 
country actors maintained their position of power and influence in the policy 
network through their dominance of the supply chain. These are the retailers and 
buyers, who continue to lead the apparel GVC, since during the MFA, the quota 
restrictions meant that more suppliers were chasing fewer orders. Additionally, 
global retailing became dominated by large multinationals focusing on greater 
specialisation of products, creating constant pressure along the value chain with high 
volume orders. Retailers eventually developed strong ties with individual suppliers 
who have remained favoured trade partners as the GVC changed over time (Gereffi 
and Memedovic 2003).
The MFA has also created a lasting power hierarchy within LDC actors at national 
and international levels. At the national level, the number of RMG firms grew 
quickly (since RMG is a labour intensive sector and entrepreneurs learnt quickly 
from each other). Over time, older leading firms moved up the hierarchy by adopting 
modem technologies (technical upgrading) and getting accredited for quality 
management (process upgrading),168 resulting in increased bargaining power in front
168 This includes steps like computerised colour matching, dyeing and printing optimisation, recycling 
o f print paste remnants, adoption of energy saving dyeing technologies, etc. Adoption of computer- 
aided design/computer-aided manufacturing (CAD/CAM) technologies by proactive suppliers has 
allowed them to maintain production flexibility, reduce delivery times and enhance the designing 
capabilities leading to production upgrading. These technologies reduce waste from cutting, improve
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of buyers (Gereffi and Memedovic 2003). At the international level, such successful 
quality upgrading and value addition by the leading firms resulted in increased sales 
volumes for the supplying country within the confines of quantitative quotas, 
therefore elevating the status of country within international policy making 169. As 
countries neared quota exhaustion, exporters rapidly diversified into new products 
and fibres to exploit unrestricted categories,170 leading to new growth avenues, which 
led to the rapid growth of the apparel sectors in countries such as India, Bangladesh 
and Sri Lanka. This phenomenon, of course, has strengthened the bargaining 
position of the leading suppliers, to the detriment of smaller, less competitive firms 
(Gereffi and Memedovic 2003).
The MFA also created a power hierarchy among the supplying countries. While the 
quotas provided certainty of market access up to agreed limits, newer entrants had 
limited access compared to the more established exporters, which in turn was 
reflected in the different bargaining powers within the supplier-supplier-customer 
(S-S-C) triads. New entrants had low capacity for product upgrading, leaving the 
opportunity for product upgrading and value addition to the older, more established 
supplying countries. While the MFA enabled countries into diversifying, the ability 
of apparel suppliers for such diversification depended on the role of apparel as a 
country's first steps in a sequence of stages towards industrialisation (Trela and 
Whalley 1990). Differences in suppliers' abilities underlined the importance of 
enabling policy networks, including the administrative capacity for effective 
utilisation of quotas and an enabling infrastructure base. Increasing labour costs and 
consequent shift in comparative advantages also impacted LDC apparel suppliers'
the fit o f apparel, allow the suppliers to make accurate pre-costing of ordered products and reduce 
delivery times.
169 A good example of such quota manipulation comes from Hong Kong, which initially manufactured 
garments using raw materials supplied by their customers. Customers provided the design and the 
fabrics and strongly supervised the firms (quasi hierarchy). Over time, Hong Kong manufacturers 
started to add local services value added by providing fabric development services and also product 
sourcing and designing. (Cai 1997) A similar example can be cited of Bangladesh, which saw a 
tremendous growth in investment, even within quota controlled categories, designed to improve 
physical productivity, design and quality. Local backward linkage has also flourished supplying fabric, 
buttons, cardboard stiffeners, fasteners, etc. India is another example of quality improvement, although 
it is always not clear whether this was solely due to quota restrictions than natural evolution (CPD 
2003).
170 For example, when India reached full quota for cotton garments they diversified into synthetic fibre 
items (US ITC 2004)
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responses to competition from older apparel suppliers (Erzan, Goto and Holmes 
1990).
Different abilities among supplying countries led to the rapid increase in the 
numbers and geographical locations of suppliers through "quota hopping" (Cai 1997, 
US ITC 2004, CPD 2003). Older exporters who were nearing quota exhaustion in 
their own countries began to invest in production capacity building in countries that 
were not under MFA quota. Taiwan and Korea became prominent in investing in 
China, Indonesia, Pakistan and Hong Kong. The Bangladesh RMG industry got 
started up due to a Korean firm subcontracting outside.171 (GTO & PPMA 2002).
The MFA Phase Out and the New Apparel GVC:
Given that the MFA was a departure from the basic GATT rules, and particularly the 
principle of non-discrimination in trade,172 the calls for MFA withdrawals began in 
1994. In the Uruguay Round of discussions, MFA IV was subsumed under the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) on January 1,1995, when the ATC came 
into force, under the control of the WTO.173 The MFA finally expired 10 years later, 
on January 1, 2005.
Consensus among policy actors regarding the benefits of the phase out and the 
mechanisms of implementation with least disruption to the suppliers (specially the 
millions of apparel workers) was difficult to achieve (see for example, Cai 1997, Trela 
and Whalley 1990, Oxfam 2004). Some exporters wanted the MFA to be abolished,
171 Two interesting things occurred in this instance. Some quota-hopping countries invested in 
developed countries themselves, as a “back route” access, which was the cost effective option. 
Secondly, some established exporters actually invested in the importing countries themselves by 
moving offshore and centrally controlling the production, design and marketing, assuming the role that 
was hitherto fulfilled by the developed country customers (Cai 1997).
172 See WTO press briefing at http://www.wto.org/English/thewto e/minist e/min96 e/textiles.htm. 
accessed on June 30, 2006.
173 The ATC was a transitional arrangement, with a finite lifespan of 10 years, to expire on 1 January 
2005. The ATC phase provided for the progressive phasing out of the MFA and other non-MFA 
restrictions through a four-stage integration of the T&C sector into the normal rules of GATT, starting 
from January 1, 1995. It was a liberalising process to aid gradual enlargement of existing quotas by 
increasing annual growth rates every year. It applied to all WTO members, regardless of their previous 
quota agreements under the MFA. Under the ATC, the WTO members were required to provide 
improved market access for T&C through tariff reductions or through the removal of non tariff barriers 
(such as environmental and quality standards). The rules regarding anti-dumping practices, subsidies 
and countervailing measures, and the protection of intellectual property rights had to be strengthened 
(Gereffi and Memedovic 2003).
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while older apparel supplying countries, such as Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan, 
who had the largest share of export quotas, were against it. Suppliers such as 
Bangladesh who entered the supply chain because of MFA quotas were also 
reluctant (CPD 2003, GTO&PPMA 2003). MFA quotas gave guaranteed market 
access and competitive advantage to many supplying countries, especially countries 
like Bangladesh. Post MFA market share can now only be gained or maintained 
through international competitiveness, of which price-factors is a critical element. 
Supplying firms and governments have to understand their comparative strengths 
along the supply chain, redesign the way the firms operate, remove policy level 
bottlenecks, and anticipate new buyer requirements. Therefore, while most LDCs 
could, in theory, gain from MFA elimination the degree to which MFA quotas are 
binding, effects of inter-developing country trade flows and quality upgrading 
complicates the overall picture of winners and losers. After the phase out, importers 
are likely go back to the oldest exporters such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, further 
weakening the bargaining power of countries like Bangladesh (Trela and Whalley 
1990).
The need for changing supplier strategies, however, is not only due to the MFA 
phase out. Changes in consumer demands, entirely outside the influences of the 
MFA, have resulted in retailers rationalising their sourcing practices, in order to 
better position themselves in a fast changing market. This major restructuring will 
have an additional impact on the way apparel is sourced, eventually effecting the 
supplying firms and the policy makers responsible for providing them an enabling 
economic infrastructure (Gereffi and Memedovic 2003, World Bank 2005).
Post MFA apparel GVC will retain its domination by large companies in the USA 
and EU, which will continue developing greater product and price specialisation174. 
Retailers (such as Wal Mart, Nike and Adidas) welcome the MFA phase out since 
they will benefit enormously from sourcing freely from more profitable locations. 
Governments and firms in exporting countries will invest more to attract buyers, but
174 Gereffi and Memedovic (2003) predict this trend based on the rise o f specialised stores selling only 
one item, such as clothes, shoes or office supplies and the growth of high-volume, low-cost discount 
chains.
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the rents from this will go to these overseas companies (Gressner 2004)175. Recent 
studies on sourcing practices of international buyers finds that major apparel buyers 
are increasingly adopting sourcing strategies that seek to minimise their total costs 
throughout the supply chain rather than minimising the cost of procurement from 
the RMG factories who are the lowest down in the supply chain (World Bank 2005). 
Countries that are most dependent on apparel exports (like Bangladesh) are therefore 
going to be the most vulnerable to shocks to the supply chain structure (Gereffi and 
Memedovic 2003) and therefore, need to be most proactive in setting priorities in 
order to survive.
According to a study by the World Bank on the impacts of the MFA phase out for 
Asian suppliers (World Bank 2005), this relentless drive for total cost minimisation 
by overseas buyers poses tough challenges: (i) price competitiveness, (ii) quality, (iii) 
social and environmental compliance, and (iv) lead time. Below I discuss some of the 
predicted changes that directly impact the way demands for social and 
environmental upgrading will translate along a post MFA supply chain.
Changing Prices:
US clothing import prices under MFA have fallen continuously since 1996, similar to 
Europe and Japan. In an oversupplied, liberalised post MFA market, this trend is 
likely to continue, potentially bringing about deterioration in developing countries' 
terms of trade. This will be felt the most in the low value added basic products, 
where the profit margins were low to begin with (Baden 2002). This will mean that 
suppliers will have to rethink their operating costs while prioritising social and 
environmental investments in the context of declining profits.
175 At the level o f the developed country consumers, studies by the US International Trade Commission 
(ITC) project sharp falls in clothing prices due to the abolishment o f the MFA quotas. The Gressner 
(2004) paper, published on behalf o f a coalition of US importing and retailing associations175, examines 
the impact o f the MFA on the US consumers and is enthusiastic about the MFA phase out from a 
consumer benefit perspective. The ATC is termed as the most pro-poor and pro-middle class trade 
reforms in T&C in modem US trade history. US families will save billions of dollars a year175 and 
enjoy permanent net gains in both GDP and employment.
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Changing Value Chains:
As buyers rationalise and consolidate the post MFA supply chain, they are favouring 
suppliers who can provide a "full package" delivery. Previously East Asian 
suppliers have fulfilled these criteria, starting from product development, fabric 
sourcing, cutting, sewing, packaging, quality control, trade financing, logistical 
arrangements, reputation for reliability and good working relationships with 
individual buyers. Post MFA, this trend will increase sharply, leading suppliers to 
invest in vertical integration (US ITC 2004).
Some retailers are increasing the frequency of mid season orders and the "non 
replenishment" approach has resulted in smaller batches requiring flexibility among 
suppliers. This has meant that price, quality and short lead times will remain top 
priority areas for upgrading for the RMG suppliers (Baden 2002).
Gaining bargaining power as a first tier GVC member has never been more 
important for suppliers. Major EU retailers have reduced the number of their 
suppliers worldwide based on supplier performance rating through various 
Preferred Supplier Programmes. This trend is likely to continue post-MFA, where 
first tier or large-scale suppliers will be retained, who will be then subcontracting 
from a wider base of smaller RMG suppliers (Baden 2002). This implies that social- 
environmental compliance will potentially become more important for suppliers to 
maintain their position in the GVC, despite declining profits or prices.
Buyers are focusing on factors such as good human rights records, minimum wages, 
no child labour and good working conditions while making sourcing considerations. 
Presence of basic infrastructure (roads, railways, ports, airports etc.) supporting the 
buying process is also important. These include presence of international quality 
controllers and standardisation testing centres for establishing social-environmental 
compliance. (US ITC 2004).
Changing Non Tariff Barriers (NTBs):
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While significant progress has been made in reducing tariff barriers, overall this has 
been counterbalanced by non-tariff barriers (NTBs) that persist and may even be on 
the increase in new and possibly more discrete forms (Fliess and Lejarraga 2005). A 
review of the notification process established under WTO's Negotiating Group on 
Market Access for Non Agricultural Products (NAMA) suggests that technical 
regulations (TBTs) such as social and environmental quality certification, price 
control measures and certain other measures are particularly frequently subject to 
concerns voiced about access to developed-country markets.176 While recognizing 
that technical measures may serve legitimate purposes, LDC governments point out 
that they can be important obstacles to exports to developed countries whose 
technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures may 
effectively serve as border-protection instruments (Fliess and Lejarraga 2005).
There is concern among analysts that, for LDC firms struggling after the MFA phase 
out, access to developed markets will be further significantly reduced due to use of 
social-environmental conditionalites as a NTB, as consumer preference for eco 
labelled garments as well as lobbying by protectionist domestic industries rise in 
importing countries. Overall, the LDC producers are shoring up to face eco-labels 
and social compliance certifications as a new market access barrier (GTO&PPMA 
2002). Codes of Conduct (CoC) for suppliers have been gaining ground. The highest 
uptake has been for branded manufacturers (Gap, Nike, Adidas etc.); while 
merchandisers, high street multiples, specialist chains and supermarket chains are 
slowly catching on. The US brand name retailers have taken the lead while discount 
retailers are far behind (Baden 2002). There is no denying the fact that social and 
environmental compliance will be another priority area in the post-MFA survival 
strategies developed by LDC suppliers. The complex agenda of environmental and 
social compliance is further unpacked in chapter 3, where I examined the specific 
ethical trade issues confronting the Bangladeshi RMG industry.
176 Reported NTBs most affecting apparel exports are essentially of three types, namely technical 
barriers to trade, customs and administrative procedures, and quantitative restrictions. Among TBTs, 
technical regulations and standards as well as testing and certification arrangements are the main 
problems, while customs valuation is another predominant problem (Fliess and Lejarraga 2005).
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Annex 3.2
Social- Environmental Compliance and Bangladesh in the Apparel GVC
Social compliance in the apparel sector refers to safeguard measures undertaken as a 
part of corporate social responsibility towards the factory workers, as per standards 
set by the national legislation for working conditions as well as buyers' Codes of 
Conduct (CoCs). Social compliance is designed to look after the workers by ensuring 
them a workplace free from forced labour, child labour, all forms of discrimination, 
and guaranteeing them the right to fare wages, regular pay, wage benefits, the right 
to bargain collectively and a healthy and safe working environment (SEDF 2001, 
Saifullah 2005a, Siddiqi 2003). Social compliance also includes the adherence to 
national laws pertaining to environmental pollution control.
Hierarchies of Membership, Integration, Resource and Power:
Initially, the policy agenda around socially conscious apparel trade was set by 
importing country governments, and international institutions like the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) and the WTO, who had formal claims to authority and 
secure access to political, institutional and fiscal resources (Osakwe 2003). The policy 
debate arena was always in formal settings, where interactions were regular, 
prescheduled and by invitation only (e.g. under the various WTO trade talks). The 
first non-tariff social issue to be attached to apparel trade negotiations was labour 
rights and standards, as embodied in the International Fair Labour Standards (IFLS), 
from the Tokyo round of GATT (1973-79). Significant progress in ethical trade 
occurred in 1984, when the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)177 was amended 
to require LDC apparel exports to meet internationally recognised worker rights,178 
to be considered eligible under GSP. The industrialised countries were asking for a 
phased approach, which would begin with a declaration of intent on protecting 
workers rights, rather than a strict enforcement of legislative provisions. While the
177 Please see Bhattachariya 1996 for a discussion o f the GSP evolution and Bangladesh RMG’s high 
dependence on EU GSP.
178 These workers rights included freedom of association, right to organise and bargain collectively, 
prohibition of forced labour, minimum age for child labour, acceptable work conditions with regards to 
working hours, minimum wages, safety and health (Bhattachariya 1996).
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policy goals were agreed upon, consensus around policy alternatives was hard to 
find. At the Preparatory Committee of GATT Uruguay Round (1986), the US raised 
the question of workers rights, but the issue was not included in the agenda for 
negotiation (Erzan et al 1990). Over time, the range of NTBs and policy instruments 
increased, and labour conditionalities were firmly a part of RMG trade by the time 
the protracted Uruguay Round (1986-94) trade negotiations concluded (Cai 1997, 
Cable 1990, Bhattachariya 1996). Eventually the policy network opened up to include 
more non state actors — such as NGOs and trade unions -  and although these societal 
groups became important in policymaking, the implementation was within the state 
agenda of maximising export share -  overall giving the policy network a pluralistic 
character (Howlett and Ramesh 1995). Below I examine the actors most important to 
the Bangladeshi social-environmental compliance networks.
International Labour Organisation:
A significant actor in social compliance is the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO). The ILO fulfils the crucial role of standardising labour requirements in an 
international context. Their bargaining power and institutional reach is unparalleled 
in the area of labour rights. Given their range of expertise in social issues in 
international supply chains, and their tripartite institutional set up, they were agenda 
leaders from early on in state directed negotiations (ILO 2004). The early conventions 
established the principles of the minimum age and the link to schooling. The 
Minimum Age Convention, No. 138 (and Recommendation 146) adopted in 1973 
consolidated the provisions of the earlier conventions, including the education link, 
through, inter alia, its definition that "the minimum age of entry into employment 
should not be less than the age of completion of compulsory schooling". Elimination 
of child labour was adopted as a core labour standard with Convention No. 138 as 
one of the seven core conventions in 1996, and subsequently incorporated into the 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work adopted in 1998. 
Recognizing that the elimination of child labour is a long-term process, but certain 
forms of child labour require urgent and immediate action, the ILO adopted 
Convention No. 182 (and Recommendation No. 190) in 1999 on the Prohibition and 
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour.
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Convention No. 182 became the eighth core labour convention associated with the 
Declaration (ILO-IPEC 2004, US DoL ILAB1996).
The ILO Definition of Child Labour:
Broadly, the ILO define "child labour" as any economic activity performed by a 
person under the age of 15, employment that prevents effective school attendance, 
and which is often performed under conditions hazardous to the physical and 
mental health of the child. ILO Convention 138 emphasises the Minimum Age for 
Employment, a terminology adopted in 1973, which is defined as that age which is 
not less than the age of compulsory schooling and shall not be less than 15 years. The 
ILO allows for exceptions based on the conditions of work in poorer countries whose 
educational facilities are under developed. In these cases, minimum age is specified 
as 14 years and the minimum age for light work is reduced from 13 years to 12 years. 
Generally, child labour does not refer to performing "light work", which is work 
undertaken after school. It also does not include young people being involved in 
family businesses or farms. However, the ILO Convention 138 is particular in 
defining "light work" as work that is not likely to harm the child's health or 
development, or disrupt school attendance. It disallows any young person less than 
18 years of age from undertaking dangerous work that is likely to endanger their 
health and safety or affect their moral development (US DoL ILAB 1996).
The adoption and implementation of international labour standards remains the 
ILO's main programme focus against child labour. In 1992, ILO started unifying its 
approach under one technical assistance programme, called the InFocus Programme 
on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) in 1999, and focused on supporting 
advocacy and providing technical assistance for strengthening the capacity of 
countries in application of the child labour convention(s).179 The design of IPEC 
recognised the need for policy network building: IPEC partnerships sought to 
address and create national, regional, and eventually global networks of technically 
competent and committed institutions. It also highlighted the weaknesses of the 
existing networks by funding research and acting as an information clearinghouse. It
179 Source: “About IPEC” website at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/about/implementation/ipec.htrn. accessed on July 12, 
2006
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also targeted the problem of fragmented conceptualisations and low issue ownership 
across different stakeholders, by focusing on capacity building and empowerment 
through joint project planning and implementation among network actors. IPEC also 
created an important policy space for tripartite policy consultations and action, 
which opened up the social compliance network wider than ever before.180
National and International NGOs:
The global debate on apparel trade labour rights grew to encompass voices of new 
network actors -  the millions of factory workers, whose livelihood depended on 
outcomes of negotiations where they previously had no real access (Hewett and 
Amin 2000). They were represented through the international NGOs such as the 
Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), Fair Wear, Ethical Trade Initiative UK, Oxfam 
International, Sweatshopwatch, etc. Broadly, they are powerful advocacy actors in 
intersecting networks, involved in drawing up policy guidelines on important NTB 
issues for labourers in the apparel sector and coordinating the activities of networked 
affiliates, disseminating information of relevance to the daily work of NGOs in the 
sector, undertaking solidarity action in support of workers whose rights are being 
denied, and lobbying intergovernmental organisations and institutions to further the 
interests of workers through in decisions made at international levels. However, the 
reach of these non-state actors in LDCs is only as strong as their relationships with 
powerful local NGOs. This is especially true in the case of labour rights in the 
Bangladeshi RMG sector (Paul-Majumder and Begum 2006, Buckland 2003).
Trade Unions:
Trade unions are another powerful driver of social issues with their unique set up of 
bringing together the workers and the formal policymakers (Roberts 2002b). The US 
based International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' Federation (ITGLWF) has 
been active in building a policy network of CSR across apparel retailers and their 
suppliers as well as LDC governments and smaller trade unions. For example, 
ITGLWF is affiliated with a number retailers who source in Bangladesh, who they
180 Source: “IPEC Networking” website at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/networking/index.htrn. accessed on July 12, 2006.
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have networked with a number of Bangladeshi trade unions, such as Bangladesh 
Homeworkers' Women Association (BHWA), Bangladesh Independent Garment 
Workers Union Federation (BIGUF), Bangladesh Jute Textile Workers Federation and 
Bangladesh Textile and Garments Workers League (BTGWL).181 The ITGLWF also 
works with the developed country retailers in translating labour concerns into 
practicable action through private sector initiatives. For example, as a result of 
ITGLWF's involvement, the Clothing Manufacturers' Association of the United States 
of America (representing RMG MNCs as employers) and the Amalgamated Clothing 
Textiles Workers' Union (representing American workers) signed a national branch 
collective agreement in 1996, which included a code of conduct applicable to 
enterprises within the US and their subcontractors in LDCs, which established 
minimum standards regarding the initial list of issues, which included wages, hours 
of work, forced labour, child labour, freedom of association, non-discrimination, 
occupational safety and health. (US DoL ILAB1996).
Apparel Suppliers and State Actors:
In the initial stages of social compliance policymaking, governments were active only 
while formulating, negotiating and enacting international level legislation and trade 
remedies with LDC governments and NGOs, but the social compliance policy 
network was changing with new policy alternatives initiated by these governments 
emphasising accountability along the supply chain for labour rights. The US 
Department of Labor (US DoL) was a pioneer in opening the policy network to 
include LDC suppliers. The DoL, with the help of various American apparel 
producers' coalitions took numerous steps to "clean up" the sector at home and 
abroad. It stepped up its inspections along the international supply chain, which 
opened up the network to enable the western media to monitor progress and 
influence decisions at the policy level (US DoL ILAB 1996).
LDC governments remained important policy actors, and by and large they reacted 
unfavourably to developed country concern for labour rights, when repeated 
unsuccessful attempts were being made by LDCs at negotiating quota benefits and
181 Source: ITGLWF website at http://www.itglwf.org/pdfy05-ll-08%20- 
%20ITGLWF%20Affiliates%202.pdf. accessed July 7, 2006
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duty free access; failures that contributed much to the financial hardship of workers 
- the very group the labour lobby were trying to protect. The LDC governments saw 
social compliance as "an unequal contest of strength with the developing countries" 
(Bhattacharya 1996: 28). The motivations behind the proposed social compliance 
remedies were examined with suspicion among Bangladeshi policymakers, who 
shared the views expressed at the conference of Labour Ministers of the Non Aligned 
Movement (NAM) in 1995.182 Development agencies also cautioned against the 
uniform and mandatory nature of labour demands. The 1995 World Development 
Report suggested that linking trade with labour issues raises two very important 
points - the distinction between "basic standards" vs. "historical standards", and the 
cost implications of these linkages for the supplying countries and the labourers.183 
While the LDCs could understand sanctions on violations of basic labour standards, 
they argued that interpreting evidence of such infractions opens up the possibility of 
miscarriage of justice due to cultural differences and the lack of clear evidence 
(Bhattachariya 1996).
182 Deep concern was expressed at the gap in issue perception among the powerful importers and the 
affected supplier countries. They felt that labour policies should be practiced by each country as 
considered appropriate to its own socio economic conditions, and that such coercive bargaining went 
contrary to the voluntary nature of the ILO Conventions. They expressed fears that such pressure will 
negate the benefits which trade liberalisation is designed to bring about. (NAM 1995). While the poorer 
countries recognised that disparate labour standards affect terms of trade and inhibit fair competition, 
they argued that different labour endowments (availability o f unskilled labour forces) form the very 
basis of international comparative advantage in RMG. Furthermore, developing countries argued that 
NTBs to alleviate labour conditions may result in unwarranted consequences on the precarious 
employment conditions in LDCs. As a result, insistence by importers on suppliers meeting minimum 
labour standards to ensure continued participation in global value chains was met with scepticism 
among LDC policymakers and trade analysts as a new form of trade protectionism and value chain 
domination.(Bhattachariya 1996).
183 The first category o f labour standards is associated with globally acknowledged human rights, such 
as elimination of forced labour, gender discrimination, etc., while the latter set is more problematic, it 
has to do with wage and non-wage benefits that are propelled by national development levels
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Annex 3.3
Factory Fires And Stampede Related Deaths And Injuries In Bangladeshi RMG
The problem caught the attention of international media and activist groups in the 
late 1990's. The Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) started an action petition in 2000,184 
which focused on the Chowdhury Knitwear factory fire in Narsingdi, where the 
death toll eventually rose to 53.185 The CCC petition stated,
"This was obviously not the first time in Bangladesh. As was communicated to us, 
in the last 10 years there were more than hundred fires in factories in Bangladesh. 
More them 5000 workers were injured in these fires and 246 workers were killed."
In August 2001, 24 garment workers died in a factory fire, which brought the total to 
82 deaths in 2001.186 According to the ITGLWF press release following the incident,
"The latest tragedy comes nine months after the Chowdhury factory fire which 
claimed 48 lives, and less than a year after the fire at Globe Knitting which left 12 
dead."
In May 2004, an electronic transformer exploded in an alley behind the Misco 
Supermarket Complex in Dhaka, which illegally housed garment factories in the 
upper stories of a supermarket. A fire broke out outside the supermarket and a false 
fire alarm was raised, leading the workers to panic and throng the narrow 
emergency exits and the main exit of the supermarket. The main supermarket exit 
was locked, which resulted in 9 women dying and over 50 injured in the stampede.187 
The reason for the main exits being closed highlighted three new issues -  that 
factories had inadequate fire exits (often these were metal staircases added externally 
to the main building since original buildings did not have provisions for fire exits.
184 Source: Clean Clothes Campaign at http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/00-12-00.htm. accessed on 
March 16, 2006.
185 There is a discrepancy in the numbers reported for the workers who died.
186 Source: ITGLWF press release at http://www.cleanclothes.Org/news/01 -08-17.htm. accessed on 
March 16, 2006.
187 Source: Clean Clothes Campaign at http://www.cleanclothes.org/urgent/04-06-30.php. 
accessed on March 16, 2006.
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The metal structures were not steady enough to withstand the weight of workers and 
tend to shake. During a fire evacuation, workers prefer to use the main exits, which 
are the original staircases of the building); factories do not adequately train their 
employees on safe fire evacuation (the stampedes could have been avoided if 
workers had been trained); and that main exits were kept locked even when the 
factories were running because of security issues.
In April 2005, an accident in the Spectrum garment factory in Savar, Dhaka, led to 
factory compliance being addressed in a comprehensive manner for the first time in 
Bangladesh by policy makers. The nine-storied garment factory collapsed killing 62 
workers and injuring hundreds. The collapse was significant not only because of the 
number of casualties, but also since Spectrum was a well reputed medium sized 
factory, who were making clothes for the European hypermarket giant Carrefour at 
the time of the accident. Spectrum was operating in their purpose built premises, 
and was apparently in full compliance with buyer codes. Investigations following the 
accident revealed that the 3 year old building was structurally unsound, and was 
constructed using materials not suited for a nine-storey building. RAJUK (Rajhdhani 
Unyan Kartripokkho, the statutory body responsible for ensuring all buildings meet 
legal safety requirements)188 officials further said to Reuter's news service that the 
building was erected on marshland without RAJUK permission. The Spectrum 
accident changed the conceptualisation of "compliance defaulters" at the national 
and international levels. First of all, it revealed to the public and the policymakers 
that the non-compliance problem rein much deeper than the small sized and 
financially weak segment of the RMG industry that was usually thought to be non 
compliant with buyer standards -  and that non compliance with national laws and 
buyer codes can occur regardless of factory size or reputation.189 Secondly, since 
Carrefour was involved, the Spectrum accident caught the attention of European and 
American buyers unlike after previous accidents, and energised buyers operating in 
Bangladesh into becoming interested in dialogue with each other as well as with
188 Source: Banglapedia at http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT7R 0087.htm. accessed on March 17, 
2006
189 Source: Daily Star at http://www.thedailvstar.net/magazine/2006/03/03/cover.htm. accessed on 
March 15, 2006
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state actors on finding a solution.190 As we will see later in the chapter, the Spectrum 
accident was an important catalyst that gave birth to the new phase of the social- 
environmental compliance policy network in 2006.
2006 was particularly tragic for garment workers. Two large-scale disasters struck in 
February 2006. The first was on February 23, when a fire at KTS Textile Industries, 
Chittagong, left 61 dead, and approximately 100 injured. The deaths occurred due to 
a stampede following an electrical short circuit inside the building, and similar to the 
Misco Supermarket incident, the main exit was locked at the time, preventing the 
workers from evacuating.191 Similar to Spectrum, KTS is a reputable company, 
producing for large US companies and were in full compliance with buyer codes, as 
claimed by their representatives. Interestingly, media investigations into the KTS fire 
was more in depth than in previous accidents, reflecting a more maturing press 
rhetoric surrounding non-compliance, and this broadened the kinds of issues that 
were associated with non-compliance in the public sphere. According to the 
newspapers, KTS was not only providing inadequate fire exits, but they were in 
violation of numerous additional labour laws such as forced overtime, seven-day 
work weeks, payment of below subsistence level wages, denial of legal maternity 
rights, etc.192
The second tragedy in early 2006 struck a few days later; on February 25 the five- 
storied Phoenix Building collapsed in Dhaka, killing 22 garment workers and 
injuring more than 50. The building housed Phoenix Garments and was similar to 
Spectrum, in that it was a well-reputed firm, who had illegally constructed floor 
extensions, in violation of the factory laws.193
The loss of so many lives within one week and resultant buyers' concern about 
inappropriate conduct meant that the factory owners and the trade associations were 
faced with fresh prospects of losing market shares in a post MFA supply chain, as
190 See, for example, the coverage by the Clean Clothes Campaign at 
http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/05-04-12.htm. accessed on March 17, 2006
191 Source: the Daily Star at http://www.thedailvstar.net/2006/02/25/d60225060163.htm. accessed 
March 18, 2006
192 Source: the Daily Star at http://www.thedailvstar.net/2006/02/25/d60225060163.htm. accessed 
March 18,2006
193 Source: Daily Star at http://www.thedailvstar.net/magazine/2006/03/03/cover.htm. accessed March 
15,2006
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well as facing compliance pressure from new sources. Trade Unions, national and 
international NGOs, local and international news media and industry members 
renewed the much-repeated calls for fully complying with Bangladeshi laws on 
factory safety, which were a part of buyer CoCs. Observers noted that the need for 
being socially compliant were reiterated only after accidents claimed lives, and 
accused the government of lacking serious commitment to the issue, which allowed 
this situation to prevail.194
In March 2006, the Bangladeshi representatives of the Make Trade Fair Alliance 
(MTFA) and their member trade unions held a mass hearing under the banner 
"Women Labour in the Context of Occupational Hazard and Safety and Security", 
for the garments workers.195 The representative legal activists made the statement 
that while penal codes, criminal acts and factory laws were in place to ensure a safe 
working environment, the main accountability for these deaths lies with the 
regulatory bodies, specially the Chief Inspector of Factories (Ministry of Labour) for 
not auditing factory sites as per laws; and RAJUK for allowing the construction and 
extension of illegal buildings that house garment factories. The BGMEA and BKMEA 
were deemed responsible for not penalising economically powerful factory owners 
who were in open breach of local laws regarding building planning permission. The 
trade associations were also reprimanded for failing to ensure the workers and 
factory management were up to date on the laws and the rights of the workers.
194 Source: NewAge at: http://www.newagebd.coni/2006/mar/04/busi.html#2. accessed July 21,2006
195 Source: Bangladesh Observer at
http://\vww.bangladeshobserveronline.com/new/2006/03/08/economic.htm. accessed on March 19, 
2006.
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Annex 3.4
Wage Disputes in the Bangladeshi RMG sector in 2006:
On May 20th 2006, a garment worker died in the wage protests, police fired on 
agitating workers, and 200 workers were reported as injured.196 On May 22nd another 
worker died, two factories were set ablaze by rioters, over 100 factories were looted, 
12 buses that were parked near some factories being looted were burnt, many 
demonstrators were injured and arrested.197 The next day, another factory worker 
was killed in police fire, workers looted 250 new factories, activists damaged over 
200 vehicles on the roads, and many people were arrested. Dhaka city came to a 
standstill and the situation got worse. May 23rd was especially tragic and was later 
termed as "Black Tuesday" by the press. According to the media reports, large 
contingents of police, including paramilitary units from the Rapid Action Battalion 
(RAB), used rubber bullets, baton charges and tear gas in an effort to break up 
determined protests by thousands of workers, who threw up barricades and blocked 
roads. The BGMEA as well as affected factory owners expressed their dissatisfaction 
at how quickly worker dissatisfaction with wages had turned into mass factory 
lynching, instead of peaceful dialogue or non-violent protests.198 On May 23rd, factory 
owners took to the streets to protest against their employees being beaten and raw 
materials worth millions being looted, resulting in heavy losses that would lead to 
bankruptcy for some RMG firms.199
To divert the anger of workers, the trade union leaders issued an ultimatum to 
employers for a minimum monthly wage of 3,000 taka ($US 43). Protests erupted 
again on June 1-2 as workers demanded a 3,000-taka minimum wage as well as 
mandatory holidays on Fridays, transport allowances, overtime facilities and an end 
to night work for women workers. As many as 70,000 workers from the Dhaka
196 Source: the Daily Star at http://www.thedailvstar.net/2006/05/21 /d6052101044.htm. accessed  
M ay 30, 2006.
197 Source: the Daily Star at http://www.thedailvstar.net/2006/05/23/d6052301011 .htm. accessed  
M ay 30, 2006.
198 Source: the Daily Star at http://www.thedailvstar.net/2006/05/23/d6052301033.htm. accessed  
M ay 29, 2006.
199 Source: the Daily Star at http://www.thedailvstar.net/2006/05/24/d6052401033.htm. accessed  
M ay 29, 2006.
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Export Processing Zone (DEPZ) took to the streets on June 2nd, and clashed with 
police armed with batons and tear gas. Street protests, property damage, factory 
closures and police action continued all of June 2006.
The understanding of social compliance problems by stakeholders had grown from 
the days of news coverage about garment factory fires that was typically followed by 
BGMEA and BKMEA reinstating their programme of conducting fire drills for all 
factories. However, at the official levels, the narrative now turned towards denial of 
responsibility and blaming outsiders. The government, RMG employers and the 
media denounced the unrest as the product of a foreign conspiracy. Mr. Mannan 
Bhuiyan, the then Minister for Rural Development and Cooperatives and the 
Secretary General of the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), said those 
involved in arson were "enemies of the country" and accused "outsiders" of staging 
the violence. BGMEA and other employer groups blamed a "conspiracy by a 
neighbouring country". Many government ministers said that there were only few 
workers involved in the agitations, inferring the involvement by the then opposition 
party, the Awami League, as a part of planned opposition agitation before the next 
general elections to be held in early 2007.200 There was further speculation about the 
origin of such unrest, with some policy makers directly blaming India and the US for 
wanting to cripple the Bangladeshi RMG sector.201
The riots were an expression of long running dissatisfaction with the working 
conditions faced by 1.8 million garment workers. The minimum monthly wage of 
Tk. 930, which was fixed in 1994, was yet to be implemented in many factories.202 
According to an ITGLWF press briefing in May 2006203 the Bangladeshi factories are 
characterised by
200 Source New Age website at http://www.newagebd.com/2006/mav/25/index.html. accessed July 24, 
2006
201 Source Holiday website at http://www.weeklvholidav.net/2006/260506/front.html. accessed July 27, 
2006
202 Source New Age website at http://www.new,agebd.com/2006/mav/25/index.html. accessed July 24, 
2006
203 Source ITGLWF website at
http://www.itglwT.org/list.asp?OrgTvpe=Docs&Language=&Tvpe=Press&Ordcr=Date&start=0&finish 
=19. accessed July 17, 2006
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"...excessive long working hours, low rates of basic earnings, abuses in piece rate 
payments, late payment of wages, child labour, issues of structural and fire safety, 
corrupt police practices of charging workers on the flimsiest of evidence, the 
practice of supervisors acting as labour contractors who illegally rake off a 
percentage of workers' wages, the practice of using hired goons to terrorise and 
intimidate workers."
The policy arena was divided into two neat halves - the workers on one hand 
demanded better and regular pay, and the RMG employers who said that RMG 
wages were not inadequate, but agreed that non payment of wages has to end. This 
difference in views arises from different rationalities behind framing arguments. Low 
wages in RMG can be explained with the argument that, in the presence of an excess 
supply of labour, wages will be low irrespective of the productivity level. Therefore, 
even if some factories achieve very high labour productivity and make high profits, 
wages would still not be high in those factories, which explains why regardless of 
factory size, RMG employers across the board had a common wage scale. 
Additionally, the wage rate has been low because the legal minimum wage for this 
sector has not increased during the past 10 years or so. It is often argued by BGMEA 
in press statements that despite the unchanged legal wage rate, the actual minimum 
wage in the sector has increased in response to the adjustment with the increased 
standard of living and inflation. However, full inflation adjustment is never 
undertaken, as maintained by the trade unionists. From a certain point of view trade 
association members legitimately argued that employers were already providing 
wage rates higher than the market-clearing ones, and as such the industry is 
characterised by efficiency wages. However, the trade union activists approached the 
problem from a different angle; they asked if efficiency wage is a fair wage. The 
answer to this depends on the concept of decent work, which encompasses the 
quality of work and social values along with the wages provided.
From this discussion it is clear that once again, the stakeholders were divided over 
the severity of social compliance violations and their own accountability, as 
happened in the child labour banning case. The BGMEA and the RMG employers
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agree that certain factories have deprived workers for years,204 and have been acting 
on solving it on an ad hoc basis, but overall they disagree with the trade unions 
regarding the severity of the problem. Following the May-July protests, ITGLWF 
general secretary Mr. Neil Kearney expressed his dissatisfaction with the current 
cognition of issues by the BGMEA. He said in a press release:205
"We have repeatedly warned of the growing frustration at the payment of 
starvation wages, the excessive hours of work, the cheating on piece work and the 
falsifying of overtime rates, the abusive treatment and the appalling health and 
safety conditions. But the BGMEA has brushed aside the notion that the violence 
is the result of low wages and poor conditions, claiming that workers were 'well 
paid and enjoyed good conditions' Unfortunately, this sort of head-in-the-sand 
attitude is undermining the huge efforts that have been made to try to stabilise 
and grow the industry in the post-MFA climate."
Given this atmosphere of mistrust and conspiracy theories, the policymaking 
network for social compliance was, perhaps, at its most volatile in Bangladesh.
While factory fire safety was mainly handled by state level actors and trade 
associations, the new social compliance hot topics such as irregular wage payment, 
illegal overtime and maternity benefits, were taken up as projects by stakeholders 
from a wider range, such as trade unions, international NGOs, BGMEA, BKMEA, 
buyers and suppliers - albeit without an integrated institutionalised framework. 
Interactions were project based, and as a result, effective policy momentum had not 
built up and many opportunities remained unaddressed in this loose policy network, 
which resembles an issue network according to the Rhodes and Marsh typolgy. 
However, specific interventions were being designed to overcome the 
communication gaps within the overall policymaking network. Development 
partners such as UK government's Department for International Development 
(DfID) and the German Federal Government's GTZ were initiating changes to an
204 Source: New Age at: http://www.newagebd.eom/2006/mav/25/front.html#e2. accessed July 23, 
2006.
205 Source: Daily Star at http://www.thedailvstar.net/2006/05/28/d6052801106.htm. accessed July 23, 
2006
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existing scattered network, by newly focusing on supporting a wider range of non­
government institutions that can variously act as intermediaries, advocates, and 
technical advisers in their field of RMG compliance. Recently they are getting 
involved in supporting progressive institutions that share CSR values such as the 
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI), which is focusing on collaboration, 
replication of good practice and providing peer pressure to enable RMG sector wide 
pro-CSR changes through their CSR Roundtable Discussions. DfID is also supporting 
the NGO, Phulki, for providing ongoing cr&che facilities in RMG factories for 
children between 6 weeks and 2 years, giving lactating mothers access to their infants 
during working hours as a part of maternity benefits requirements in buyer codes. 
The NGO works together with factory owners, workers, buyers, trade associations 
and the GoB. The initiative has been hugely successful and led to the widespread 
establishment of day care centres in garment factories in Dhaka.206 DfID has also 
jointly sponsored Phulki with WaterAid, which works explicitly with the children of 
garment workers, using child-to-child approaches for hygiene promotion.207
The multi donor organisation, SouthAsia Enterprise Development Facility (SEDF) 
is working as the secretariat of the Bangladesh Garments Buyer's Forum (SEDF 
2001). Part of its responsibility as coordinator is research on social compliance issues 
with the objective of facilitating a common understanding of issues. Consequently, 
the SEDF has signed a MoU with the BGMEA on a social compliance crash 
programme in July 2006.208 BGMEA will organise four workshops and seminars 
under this agreement focusing on child labour monitoring, safety training and fire- 
drill and updating of the workplace improvement plans (WIP).209
Buyers have also become more active in promoting social compliance ever since the 
Spectrum accident outside of their CoC requirements. Certain European buyers such
206 Source: Local Consultative Group of Donors Meeting website at:
http://www.lcgbanffladcsh.org/HealthandPopulation/reports/Final%20report.doc. accessed July 23,
2006
207 Source: UK House of Commons Website at:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo040510/text/40510wl6.htm. 
accessed July 20, 2006
208 Source: BangladesherDak at:
http://www.ban gladesherdak.net/modules.php?op=modload&name:=News&file=article&sid=6848. 
accessed July 19,2006
209 Source: Financial Express at: http://www.fmancialexpress-
bd.com/index3.asp?cnd=7/9/2006&section id=7&newsid=30456&spcl=::no. accessed July 20, 2006
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as Carrefour and Karstadt Quelle have begun liasing with the Clean Qothes 
Campaign in starting an enquiry into the causes of the accident. Most of the large 
buyers have indirectly increased the span of the compliance network by encouraging 
their RMG suppliers to getting third party certified (such as SA8000 and WRAP, 
along with IS09000), thereby creating a relationship between several international 
certifying agencies and RMG firms. Karstadt Quelle has also partnered with the 
Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies (BCAS) in promoting social compliance in 
22 firms supplying to them.210 While new relationships are being made, old ones are 
changing. Various Bangladeshi trade unions have also started awareness campaigns 
along with projects providing legal advice to workers. Their work programme is 
often affiliated with NGOs and international trade unions.211 Other than BGMEA's 
involvement with NGOs in providing health care for workers, BKMEA and Nari 
Uddog Kendro (NUK) have started a project promoting social compliance for 100 
selected factories in 2005. This is in addition to the awareness raising seminar series 
for BKMEA members regarding the costs and benefits of CSR.212
After the riots in May-June 2006, the minimum wage aspect of RMG compliance 
came to the forefront of national level policymaking. A multi stakeholder "Minimum 
Wage Board" was formed in early June immediately after the first round of street 
riots, headed by the Ministry of Labour and Employment, to deal exclusively with 
wage issues in the RMG industry by reviewing current legislation and updating 
minimum wage scales.213 A 10-point MoU was signed soon after, at a tripartite 
meeting on June 12th' where the BGMEA, BKMEA, and the government affiliated 
trade union Sromik Karmachari Oikko Parishad (SKOP) were present.214 On June 
22nd, a more extensive 16-point MoU was signed by BGMEA, BKMEA, and 16 trade 
unions. The new MoU was signed with the workers organisations that are directly 
related to the garment industry. According to the MoU, garment workers will receive 
appointment letters and identity cards, they will be allowed to form trade unions at 
garment factories, workers will enjoy one-day weekly holiday and other public
210 Source: BCAS at: http://bcas.net/ProiectBrief7Qngoing.htm. accessed July 28, 2006.
211 Source: Bangladesh Garment Workers Federation website: http://www.bgw- 
info.net/tu dir/trade union.nhp?page=4ist. accessed July 22, 2006.
212 Source: BKMEA at: http:/Avww.bkmea.com/soeial comnliance.php. accessed July 20, 2006
213 Source: New Age at: http://www.newagebd.eom/2006/mav/25/front.html#e2. accessed July 27,
2006.
214 Source: New Nation at: http://nation.ittefaq.eom/artman/exec/view.cgi/51/28465. accessed July 28, 
2006
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holidays, regular workers will get overtime allowance if they work after eight hours, 
female workers will get maternity leave with their monthly salary, and a wage board 
will be formed to fix the wages for garment workers within three months.215
At this point, a divide between the trade unions operating in the RMG factories 
became evident. At the national level, trade unions were unhappy with their 
representation in the wage commission and threatened fresh street agitation. This 
threat led to the Labour Minister calling an emergency meeting with the labour 
leaders on July 6th, where it was explained that the wage board had already met 11 
times and was on the verge of finalising the new wage structure, therefore a change 
of membership would delay a much needed resolution. The 16 member trade unions 
then agreed to submit a proposal of wage categories.216 However, agitations 
continued outside of formal dialogue, over extended wage issues between individual 
factory management and their workers. For example, on July 10th, several thousand 
workers inside and outside Dhaka Export Processing Zone (DEPZ) were on strike for 
realisation of demands including higher overtime bill, timely payment of salary and 
the cancellation of termination of 35 workers. According to the DEPZ officials, such 
termination is lawful since workers can be dismissed without notice with full 
termination benefits. On the same day, workers of Universe Sweaters Ltd., a factory 
outside the DEPZ, refrained from work demanding rise in their overtime rates. 
Terming the existing rate of overtime payment that ranges from Tk 11 to 12 an hour 
as inadequate, workers warned of not resuming duties until the overtime benefit is 
raised. Workers of Intraco Sweaters Ltd., a factory adjacent to the DEPZ, also 
observed strike protesting management decision to change salary payment date. 
Earlier on July 8th, workers of the factory had physically injured 5 middle managers, 
protesting the decision.217 Given these agitations at individual factories, the labour 
leaders who were drafting a wage category draft, did not wait for the realisation of 
the MoUs that they were signatories to and supported the street level agitation 
instead, and this type of agitation became the norm in July 2006, regardless of the 
formal policy process of revaluating the wage structure laws. This suggests the
215 Source: Daily Star at: http://www.thedailystar.net/2006/06/23/d60623012013.htm. accessed July 28, 
2006.
216 Source: Bangladesh Garments Workers website: http://www.bgw-
info.net/news/news .php?page=de tai ls&news=148. accessed July 28, 2006.
217 Source: Daily Star at: http://www.thedailvstar.net/2006/07/l 1 /d60711012817.htm. accessed July 28, 
2006.
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participants at the fringes of the policy network lack faith in formal dialogue and 
have a preference for piecemeal justice. This adds to the system-noise and makes 
policymaking in a time bound scenario particularly hard to achieve.
387
Annex 4.1
Questionnaire for Donors -  DfID
As a donor participant in the recent MFA Forum, what kind of demands were 
articulated requiring donor assistance?
What gaps do you thinks donors can target in achieving social compliance for the 
RMG sector?
What do you think should be done to help the small RMG firms?
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Annex 4.2
Questionnaire for Social Compliance Auditor:
What kind of RMG firms in Bangladesh are eager to become compliant?
What is your opinion of the corporate culture in Bangladeshi garment factories in 
general? Are they open to Social-Environmental issues? Do they think its a barrier to 
trade? Both?
What kind of skills do you think a company needs to succeed in compliance? Is this 
related to firm's size/age/upper management vision? Upper management 
commitment?
Why do you think small sick RMG firms in Bangladesh are struggling with non 
compliance?
How big a barrier do you think "cost of compliance" is for the small/medium/large 
RMG firms?
What are some other the barriers firms face while becoming compliant? 
Understanding/ Learning/ Changing?
What do you think is the driving force behind RMG firms becoming compliant?
What do you think the BGMEA/Ministry of Labour/Ministry of 
Commerce/Ministry of Environment can do to help firms become compliant?
389
Annex 4.3
Questionnaire for RMG Firms that have undertaken environmental actions
A. BASIC QUESTIONS ON ENVIRONMENTAL UPGRADING EFFORTS:
1. What actions have you taken?
1-DOE CLEARANCE
2-buyers CODE OF CONDUCT GUIDELINES)
3- ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
4-ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PLAN
5-ISO 14000 CERTIFICATION
6-ETP
2. Do you think it will have any positive environmental effects?
1-Yes/
2-no
3. benefited financially from environmental upgrading?
1-Yes, through increased order quantities
2-Yes, through better prices
3-Yes, we have used it to attract new buyers
4-Yes, we have saved money
5-No but we have better working relationships with buyers
6-No, but might do in future
7-No, did not think of it in terms of financial gain
8-No, we do not see any clear and direct financial benefits from these efforts
B.BUYER GUIDEBOOK/Code of Conduct;
1. What are the typical measures that buyer guidebooks suggest for environmental 
upgrading?
1-implement an EMS
2-have your own environmental policy about factory air/water quality
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3-get ISO 14000 certification
4-get DoE certification
5-other :_______________
C.ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IEMS):
1. Who helped to do this?
1- Outside consultant/
2- somebody from buyer's office/
3-own top management/
4- own middle management/
5- other___
2. Are you facing problems maintaining your EMS? Yes/no 
If yes—
1-cannot cope with the task of implementing due to complicated processes
2-too costly
3-too difficult to monitor
4-too difficult to make time for staff
5-other issues are more important
6-staff have problems understanding components
3. If you have stopped your EMS, then was it because of the following:
1-we started working for buyers who did not want EMSs
2-we realised that getting a DoE clearance was enough
3-it was not worth it financially
4-the buyers do not ask for it after the first time
4. If you have an EMS, but have not gotten ISO 14000/ other Standard Social 
Responsibility Certification:
1-Would you consider getting it?
2-If yes, why?______________
3-If not, why not? Too expensive/ not enough information,/benefits unclear
4-have your buyers suggested getting certified?
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5-have you received any information regarding the benefits to your business?
5. Do you advertise your EMS?
1-Yes/
2-No
6. To your knowledge, are your competitors thinking of doing EMSs?
1-Yes/
2- no/
3- some
7. Do you know of any other firms who have done EMSs? Are they
1-small/
2-medium/
3-large sized firms
D. DoE CERT1FCATION:
1. If you have DoE certification, what was your main motivation:
1-buyers request
2-needed it to get gas connection
3-threat of DoE audit
2. What kind of problems did you face while getting certified?
1-No problems, the DoE were helpful
2-DoE was not helpful
3-they wanted bribes
4-they created bottlenecks/bureaucracy and paperwork was too much
5-they did not provide any guidance on how to do IEEs or do EMPs or technicalities 
of ETPs
3. In order to get a DoE clearance did you have to furnish them with the following—
1-IEE?
2-EMP?
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3-ETP?
4. What was the amount of fees that you had to give for the DoE certificate? 1- 
T k .____________
5. Did they ever inspect your premises before granting the Certificate?
1-Yes/
2-no
6. Have you applied for a renewal?
1—Yes
2—No, it wasn't needed
3—No, but we will do so
7. Do you advertise your DoE Certification?
1-Yes/
2-no
8. To your knowledge, are your competitors thinking of getting DoE certified? 1- 
Yes/
2-no
3-some
9. Do you know of any other firms who have gotten DoE certification? Are they
1-small/
2-medium/
3-large sized firms
E ISO 14000/ OTHER STANDARD SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
CERTIFICATION;
1 If you have an ISO 14000/other Standard Social Responsibility Certification 
(outside of a DoE certification), did you think it would be financially worthwhile to 
get certified?
1-Yes/
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2-no
2. How much did it cost to get ISO 14000/ other Standard Social Responsibility 
Certification?
1-ISO 14000 cost Tk._______
2-Standard Social responsibility Certification cost Tk._______
3. Now that you have ISO 14000/ other Standard Social Responsibility Certification, 
do you advertise it?
1-Yes/
2-no
4. To your knowledge, are your competitors thinking of getting ISO 14000/ other 
Standard Social Responsibility Certification?
1-Yes/
2-no
3-some
5. Do you know of any other firms who have gotten ISO 14000/ other Standard 
Social Responsibility Certification? Who? Are they
1-small/
2-medium/
3-large sized firms
6. What benefits has your firm gotten from doing this?________
7. ISO 14001 does not offer guidance on ensuring compliance with regulatory and 
legal compliance requirements. Did your firm face problems with getting certified 
due to interpretations made by the certification bodies, which were more 
restrictive than expected by your firm?
1-Yes/
2-no
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F EFFLUENT TREATMENT PLANTS (ETPs):
1. If your firm has an ETP:
How long was your firm in operation before the ETP was installed?
 years
2. What were your main motivation?
1-buyer pressure
2-DoE pressure
3-market competitiveness
4-othe r _________
3. Where did you find the information on chemical wash waste water treatment?
1-DoE
2-engineering consultant
3-buyers7 guidebook
4-othe r __________
4. To your knowledge, are your competitors thinking of installing ETPs?
1-Yes/
2-no
3-some
5. Do you know of any other firms who have installed ETPs? Are they
1-small/
2-medium/
3-large sized firms
6. What benefits has your firm gotten from doing this?_________
7. How expensive was it? Tk______________
8. Did your buyers guarantee you orders if you installed the ETP?
1-Yes/
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2-no
Testing Hypothesis 1: Environmental Upgrading in Firms 
Theoretical Base: Resource Based View and Organisational Theory
G CORPORATE CULTURE QUESTIONS:
1. How critical do you think environmental pollution from industries is in the 
Bangladeshi context?
1-very critical
2-moderate importance
3-not important at all
2. As you may know, buyers are pressuring some RMG firms to get environmental 
clearances. Do you think these pressures are fair or unfair?_______________
If you think it's fair, please tick the statement(s) that represents your opinion the 
most closely:
1-1 think it's fair; Bangladesh is not being unfairly persecuted
2-1 think it's fair; because we need to remain competitive in a global arena of RMG 
suppliers
3-1 think it's fair, because these social-environmental problems cited here are 
important in Bangladesh, and we can make a real difference
4-1 think it's fair, because the buyers do/will give us more profits if we meet these 
demands
3. If you think it's unfair, please tick the statement(s) that represents your opinion 
the most closely:
1-1 think it's unfair; Bangladesh is being unfairly persecuted
2-1 think it's unfair; it is part of international trade conspiracy to hurt Bangladeshi 
trade
3-1 think it's unfair, because these social-environmental problems cited here are not 
so important in Bangladesh
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4-1 think it's unfair, because our firms are already under so much stress
5-1 think it's unfair, because the buyers are setting these standards without any real 
knowledge of Bangladeshi conditions
6-1 think it's unfair, because the buyers are not giving us more profits if we meet 
these demands
4. As an individual, how much do you think your actions can make a difference to 
improve the environmental pollution generated by your firm?
1-a lot
2-some amount
3-not so much, even if I personally want to do something, the rest of my colleagues 
may not share my views
5. As an individual, how much do you think your attitude about this is influenced 
by society at large?
1-a lot
2-some amount
3-not so much
H ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE QUESTIONS:
1 Who made the decisions about changes to be made?
1-Top management/
2-lower management/
3-workers
2. Was top management in your firm convinced of the costs/benefits of making 
these changes?
1-Yes/
2-no
3. What kind of changes did you face?
1—changes made to the way the firm functions in each of the sections (process 
changes)
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2~changes made to the way wastes are disposed of (end of pipe changes)
4. Did the employees complain to the top management about some initial problems 
with implementing environmental measures?
1-yes
2-no
5. What were some of your initial problems:
1-lack of financial resources
2-lack of sufficient understanding of the importance of environmental upgrading by 
employees
3-lack of management capabilities in this new area
4-othe r ____________
6. How did the employees react to the proposed changes?
7. Was there one person in the firm who adopted the challenge of making these 
changes happen as a matter of personal responsibility? (eco leadership)
1-yes
2-no
I LEARNING QUESTIONS:
1. How did you get hold of the information that you needed to make these changes?
1-buyers' provided the information
2-other sources, such as BGMEA, chambers of commerce, other firms, hired 
consultants
3-in house knowledge
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2. After you got the information about what changes have to be made, was it easy to 
calculate the costs, procedural changes needed and the time frame of 
implementation?
1--yes, the instructions were clear
2—no, instructions were unclear /incorrect/out of date/insufficient
3. Was "uncertainty" a hindering factor in making a strategy for environmental 
upgrading? How so? What did you do to overcome it?
4. How were the employees informed of the changes that needed to be done?
1-organised seminars/meetings for employees
2-hung notices on notice board explaining what we were trying to do
3- Educated selected employees so they can act as trainers for other employees
5. What problems did you face while explaining changes to employees?
6. Do you think that the low literacy levels among workers was a hindrance? 1-yes
2-no
7. Were the employees made aware of how important it is for the company 
to get a certificate, regarding the customer focus, the money saved and the 
money earned?
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1-yes
2-no
8. The process of implementation and maintaining the EMS/ISO 14000 has to be 
looked at as an on-going process of prevention and improvement. Did all the 
employees understand and accept this?
1-yes
2-no
I Testing Hypothesis 2: Environmental Upgrading in Economic Networks 
Theoretical Base: Industrial Relations and Global Value Chain Theory
1. What kind of buyers make non tariff demands?
1-Large/
2-medium/
3-small
4-Well established/
5-New entrants
6-Bulk orders/
7-small order
8-Higher profit giving buyers/
9-Lower profit giving buyers
10-Buyers from the US/
11-EU
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2. In your experience, are buyers eager to invest in RMG firms to build capacity?
1-yes
2-no
3. Do you believe that buyers are getting more demanding generally about socio- 
environmental causes?
1-yes
2-no
4. Do you believe that these social-environmental pressures/demands will increase 
in the future?
1-yes
2-no
5. Do your buyers have their own company specific environmental standards?
1-yes
2-no
3-If yes, what is it called?_____
4-If yes, what are some of its features?______
6. Did the buyers make environmental conditions separate from other 
conditionalities?
1-yes
2-no
7. Were you able to negotiate the clauses of environmental demands made by your 
pressures? Under what circumstances was that? What was the outcome?
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8. What kinds of factors strengthened or weakened your bargaining position?
K Testing Hypothesis 3: Environmental Upgrading in Policy Networks 
Theoretical Base: Policy Networks Theory
1. How efficient was the DoE while getting DoE certification/ ISO 14000/ other 
Standard Social Responsibility Certification?
1-very helpful
2-helpful
3-not helpful
4-they wanted bribes
6-they created bottlenecks
2. Do you think that the DoE should be more cooperative with RMG firms in
meeting environmental upgrading pressures, specially the recent reinforcements of 
the ETP installation requirement?
1-If yes, how?_____________________________________
2-If no, why not?
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3. Do you feel that the RMG sector should have a dialogue with the environmental 
policy makers regarding getting more help from the DoE?
1-yes
2-no
3-If yes, then what issues would you like to be addressed?
4-If no, why?
4. What do you think of the following statements: (strongly agree/ agree/ don't 
know/ disagree/ strongly disagree.)
1-the government should give us tax breaks for meeting these standards
2-the government should give us easy term loans for making investments to meet 
these standards
3-the buyers should grant us "preferred business partner" status for meeting these 
standards
4-the buyers should invest in our firms directly that so that we can afford to make 
these arrangements
5-the buyers should back up these orders with higher profit orders
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5. What kind of policy level changes would you like to see?
1-1 would like to see the GoB become more active
2-1 would like to see the GoB agencies become more competent about what these 
demands entail
3-1 would like to receive free information about how to meet these requirements
4-1 would like to receive guidance (about hiring consultants, guideline specifications, 
etc.)
5-1 would like the BGMEA give us certificates of "ethical trading partnerships"
6-1 would like to be promoted as a factory that meets all these requirements
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Annex 4.4
Questionnaire Cover Sheet for all RMG firms 
Please fill out the following:
Name of Factory:_________________________ Code:____________
Person Interviewed:_______________________
Date of Interview:________________________
Wish to remain anonymous?_______________________
Kind of product made: knitwear/woven
Years of being in production:_______________years
Ownership: Bangladeshi/ Joint venture with foreigners/ 100% foreign investment
Size of factory: small/medium/large
What kind of orders do you take: 
subcontracts from other firms 
large orders to retailers' own buyers 
smaller orders to buying houses
Majority of your goods are sold in: EU/USA/Other
What kind of production process do you have? Please tick 
-dry process - we do not do our own washing (type A firm)
-wet process -  we do our own washing but only detergent wash (type B firm)
-wet process - we do our own washing, detergent and chemical wash (type C firm)
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What kind of non tariff pressures have you complied with: please tick 
Child labour/ worker health and safety/ social/ environmental/labour unions
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Annex 4.5
Questionnaire for Certifier in Bangladesh:
What kind of RMG firms become compliant?
What is your opinion of the corporate culture in Bangladeshi garment factories in
general? Are they open to Social-Environmental issues? Do they think its a barrier to 
trade? Both?
What kind of skills do you think a company needs to succeed in compliance? Is this
related to firm's size/age/upper management vision? Upper management
commitment?
Why do you think small sick RMG firms are struggling with non compliance?
How big a barrier do you think "cost of compliance" is for the small/medium/large 
RMG firms?
What are some other the barriers firms face while becoming compliant?
Understanding/ Learning/ Changing?
What do you think is the driving force behind RMG firms becoming compliant?
What do you think the BGMEA/Ministry of Labour/Ministry of
Commerce/Ministry of Environment can do to help firms become compliant?
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Annex 4.6
Questionnaire for Director, Department of Environment (DoE)
PART ONE: National Committee formed on Eco-Compliance of RMG firms
Establishing ETPs in each factory and arranging for low interest financing for 
RMG factories towards buying and installing the ETPs.
How were these policy goals arrived at? Who is leading this initiative?
What is the institutional arrangement for this project? The role of the 
DoE/BKMEA/BGMEA etc.? Implementation schedule?
PART Two: Understanding DoE certification for the RMG sector:
What are the main environmental aspects checked during RMG visits? Workplace 
environment? Waste disposal? Health and safety?
Does the DoE provide any guidance/ assistance to factories wishing to do ETPs?
What do you think is hampering more garment factories from becoming socially- 
environmentally compliant? What's the solution?
Is the DoE involved in the recent BGMEA drive for compliance (fire safety)?
PART THREE: Understanding Cognition Problems/Strategic Uncertainty:
As a comparatively new government agency, the DoE has been putting in 
considerable efforts in strengthening its institutional capacity. How would you rate 
budgetary constraints, small size and young age as a problem in fulfilling the DoE 
mandate of regulation?
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Do you think that a more shared perception about environmental pollution among 
the public and the parliament is needed in pushing forwards the DoE agenda?
For an organisation like the DoE, the staff members would require considerable 
training in environmental issues as well as environmental management. Do you 
think your staff receives training that is adequate?
Understanding at the level of the RMG firms: Do you find that the average RMG 
company understands/easily accepts what is involved in maintaining an EC?
PART THREE: Determinants of state and non-state actor participation in policy 
areas:
Is there any cross-ministerial working group for environmental policymaking?
How helpful are the donors in environmental policymaking?
How would you rate private sector participation in environmental policymaking? 
Do they only contribute in implementation? Does the DoE give them 
training/awareness building?
What is the role of civil society (NGOs/BCAS/etc.) in policy making and 
implementation for garments sector?
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Annex 4.7
Questionnaire for Ministry of Commerce
RMG firms have been increasingly coming under pressures to become socially 
responsible producers of apparel. In January 2006 the Social Compliance Forum was 
formed.
—Under phase one of the project, the Jo-In code was supposed to have been finalised. 
Have the Jo-In compliance issues been changed through discussion?
--Which organisations are members of the two Task Forces?
How was the Task Force's Worker Safety and Labour Standards written and 
finalised?
How far have the Task Forces gone towards implementing their Work Plans? Would 
you say that the work progress has been fast or slow?
--What are the main lessons learnt so far from the Labour Standards Task Force?
—What are the main lessons learnt so far from the Health and Safety Task Force?
--What problems did the SCF face, so far? Were there institutional barriers? Were 
there budget and time shortages that hampered smooth implementation? Lack of 
staff who are trained in social compliance?
-- In the past, BGMEA, ILO, Ministry of Labour etc., have done a lot in areas of social 
compliance, but never before have we seen a united effort as this time. What are the 
strong points of the SCF that will help it succeed?
—The policy agenda for social compliance seems to have been bom with foreign 
donors (UNDP and the MFA Forum). How does your office negotiate and bargain
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with them regarding setting policy goals and implementation mechanisms better 
suited to the Bangladeshi local situation?
—Do you feel that at present, your office has sufficient support from other ministries 
to carry out its work on compliance? If not, why not?
—In the post MFA market, Bangladeshi garment factories are struggling to keep 
afloat. How important do you think social compliance is, in this context?
—Do you feel that "social compliance" is seen as a barrier to economic growth by 
garment factories/trade associations?
—Do you find that the average small garment factory understands what costs and 
benefits is involved in becoming compliant?
—How important do you think "lack of understanding" has been as a barrier to social 
compliance? Do you think that the complexity of social compliance challenges facing 
garment factories is stopping them from becoming proactive in policy dialogue?
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Annex 4.8
Questionnaire for RMG Buyers
PART ONE: Identifying the basics:
Name of Company:________________________
Name of Interviewee:_______________________
Date of Interview:_________________________
Anonymous?_____________________________
Does your company represent:
■ branded clothes (which brand?_______________ )
■ retailer
■ supermarket
■ department store
■ discount chain
■ mail order catalogue
■ importer for a retailer or retailers
■ large retailer
■ medium retailer
■ small retailer
■ non specialist
■ specialist
Where do your sourced clothes go? (EU or USA or both)
How many Bangladeshi RMG firms supply to you? (approx)
Are most of your regular suppliers - 
—vertically integrated with backward linkage 
—stand alone factories
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Do you have fixed Bangladeshi RMG firms that you work with constantly?
Yes/no
If yes, then how many years have you been working with them?____
PART TWO: Identifying Environmental Upgrading Demands:
Do you have any ethical buying policies? Yes/ no 
If not, why not?__________________________
Are you aware of the Bangladesh Government's Environment Regulations applicable 
to garment factories?
Yes/no
If yes, then does your company ask RMG firms to be Environmental
Clearance/Certified? Yes/No
If not, why not?__________________________
If your company has ethical buying policies, then what areas do they cover?
-child labour 
-discrimination 
-forced labour 
-wages and hours
-working conditions (-worker health and safety)
-freedom of association 
-gender issues 
-environmental legislation
Out of these, which ones are zero tolerance issues?
-child labour 
-discrimination 
-forced labour
413
-wages and hours
-working conditions (-worker health and safety)
-freedom of association 
-gender issues 
-environmental legislation
How do you think sourcing from compliant suppliers impact your company's image 
and profit levels?
PART FOUR: Identifying the Compliance and Audit Mechanism:
What factors do you check before you work with a new supplier? (Price and Non 
Price.)
What is the auditing process? Do you have foreign audit teams or local?
How is re-auditing done? Is it unannounced?
How often do RMG firms pass these inspections?
Often/ very often/ not often/ rarely
How long do you give suppliers to make changes for compliance?
Do you discontinue working with a supplier because of compliance failure? Over 
what kinds of clauses do you terminate orders?
Do you check to see if they are compliant with other buyer codes? Yes/ no 
Do you ask them to become third-party certified? (e.g. SA8000/IS014000/WRAP) 
Does it help a supplier if they are already compliant with other buyer codes? Yes/no 
Do you have rules about your suppliers subcontracting your orders?
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If a firm achieves standards above those required by your company, are they 
rewarded? More orders? Better priced orders? Continued working relationship?
PART FIVE: Management Network Skills within Firms:
Do you think good compliance performance is related to firm size? Firm age? Firm 
structure?
What sort of skills do you think helps a Bangladeshi firm in succeeding in becoming 
compliant? What about corporate culture? Ability to be flexible and learn new 
tasks?
How important do you think barriers such as COST, UNCERTINTY of outcomes, 
and CONFUSION are while complying?
What sort of problems do you see within Bangladeshi firms in general that is 
holding them back in becoming compliant?
Are RMG suppliers in neighbouring India/Sri Lanka more compliant?
PART SIX: ECONOMIC NETWORKS AND COMPLIANCE DEMANDS
Do you feel your firm might be getting more stringent in the future about 
environmental issues? Yes/ no 
If yes, why?
Important to differentiate our product from that of our competitors/ to 
satisfy customers/ to capture niche markets
Other reasons_______
If not, why not?
Current requirements are enough for the foreseeable future/ it is not cost 
effective to get more stringent 
Other reasons________
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Do you see your retail customers becoming more ethically conscious? Yes/ no
In the post MFA scenario, how important do you think compliance is for Bangladeshi 
garment suppliers?
How do you feel about the discrepancy between different buyer codes of conduct 
creating confusion among suppliers?
Would you support a uniform code of conduct?
Many buyers are less demanding than others in compliance issues, why do you think 
that is?
PART SDC: buyer opportunities/barriers for collaboration
See also: buyer's response to cooperation with suppliers during becoming compliant.
What kinds of efforts do you make to help suppliers become compliant more easily?
Do your suppliers ever ask for help in becoming compliant? Monetary, technical 
information?
If you have invested in collaboration, then what qualities did you look for in the 
RMG supplier before selecting them for such investment?
Have you ever invested in a supplier -  financially or technically - for any reason?
PART SEVEN: POLICY NETWORKS ISSUES IN COMPLIANCE
What do you think of the role played by BGMEA/BKMEA in helping RMG firms in 
adjusting to ethical trade demands?
What do you think the role of the Government should be in this case?
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What role for NGOs?
How do you think the compliance problems of smaller RMG suppliers should be 
addressed by buyers/ the government/BGMEA/BKMEA/ILO etc.?
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Annex 4.9
Questions for Anonymised Interviewee, Sromik Nirapotta Forum (trade union)
RMG firms have been increasingly coming under pressures to become socially 
responsible producers of apparel. Various trade associations and government 
ministries have previously attempted to address issues under labour rights and 
health and safety, as laid out in local laws and ILO Conventions. Why does policy 
making on these issues always happen as a reaction to a disaster? Why are we not 
proactive about rigorous enforcement?
The government has recently established the Social Compliance Forum, headed by 
the Ministry of Commerce. The forum was a result of a multi stakeholder policy 
discussion between state and non-state actors, convened by foreign donors. One 
major policy recommendation has been the unification of codes of conducts, which 
are demands that are made by foreign donors. Why is CSR such a foreign driven 
agenda?
How do you think workers rights and occupational health and safety are perceived 
by the garments firms, trade associations and government agencies?
How much of a barrier are institutional weaknesses vis-a-vis intuitional corruption in 
the case of our CSR failures?
How difficult do you think it is for non state actors, such as NGOs and trade unions, 
to gain access to policy level decisions, such as adoption of safety standards, 
standards implementation arrangements, etc.?
What changes would you recommend in the way CSR policymaking is done today?
What do you think should be done to make government agencies and trade 
associations more transparent in their dealings with regards to CSR?
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What role would you recommend for the small garments factories regarding their 
compliance with labour rights and labour safety issues?
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Annex 4.10
Questionnaire for BGMEA (trade association)
Part One: Introductory Questions:
The BGMEA started working on social issues when the child labour case was 
brought against Bangladeshi garment factories. It has been along journey since then. 
What kind of lessons do you think BGMEA has learnt about making policies for 
social causes?
Part Two: Eco Compliance Initiatives for garment firms (ETPs):
In August 2005, newspapers reported that BGMEA is a member of a national 
committee on ensuring eco-compliance among RMG factories, headed by the DG of 
DOE. What were the main motivations behind making RMG factories compliant with 
ecological standards?
The working committee's initial policy suggestions were: establish effluent 
treatment plants (ETPs) in each factory and arrange for low interest financing for
RMG factories towards buying and installing the ETPs. How were these policy goals 
arrived at? Have these goals been discussed with RMG firms, financial institutions 
and MoEF any further? Have these goals been changed?
What is the institutional arrangement/set up for carrying out the tasks of the 
committee? Which organisation is taking the lead? Which organisations are 
involved? Who is doing the implementation and monitoring?
What kind of policy dialogue has BGMEA had with the factory owners regarding 
ETP problems?
Part Three: Social Compliance Forum (SCF) for garment firms:
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RMG firms have been increasingly coming under pressures to become socially 
responsible producers of apparel. In January 2006 the Social Compliance Forum 
(SCF) was formed. Under phase one of the project, the Jo-In code was supposed to 
have been finalised. What is the progress on this?
There are 2 task forces set up under the SCF. How were the Task Force's Worker 
Safety and Labour Standards written and finalised?
What are the main lessons learnt so far from the Labour Standards Task Force?
What are the main lessons learnt so far from the Health and Safety Task Force?
Part Four: Policy Networks/Institutional arrangement questions:
What institutional problems did the SCF face, so far? Were there budget and time 
shortages that hampered smooth implementation? Lack of technically qualified staff?
The policy agenda for social compliance seems to have been bom with foreign 
donors (UNDP and the MFA Forum). How does your office negotiate and bargain 
with them regarding setting policy goals and implementation mechanisms better 
suited to the Bangladeshi local situation?
Do you feel that at present, your office has sufficient support from other ministries to 
carry out its work on compliance? If not, why?
In the past, BGMEA, ILO, Ministry of Labour etc., have done a lot in areas of social 
compliance, but never before have we seen a united effort as this time. What are the 
strong points of the SCF that will help it succeed?
What difficulties did you face while getting trade unions to participate?
Is there any particular organisation/authority that is pushing ahead for making 
factories socially compliant?
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Part Five: Problems/issues at the level of firms;
In the post MFA market, Bangladeshi garment factories are struggling to keep afloat. 
How important do you think social compliance is, in this context?
What helps and hinders factories from becoming compliant? How important is firm 
age/size/structure/top management education levels/corporate culture/learning 
problems/ability to change, etc.?
What kind of firms are most proactive, in your experience?
How do you think the small firms can become more compliant?
The smaller buyers do not make many social compliance demands. How is this gap 
being addressed by the Social Compliance Forum?
What kind of support do you think garment firms need from the bigger buyers on 
this issue?
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Annex 4.11
Questions for Anonymised Interviewee, Bangladesh Center for Workers Solidarity 
(trade union)
POLICY MAKING: Govt, Donors, BGMEA and ILO:
RMG firms have been increasingly coming under pressures to become socially 
responsible producers of apparel. Why does policy making on these issues always 
happen as a reaction to a disaster? Why are we not proactive about rigorous 
enforcement?
The government has recently established the Social Compliance Forum, headed by 
the Ministry of Commerce. The forum was a result of a multi stakeholder policy 
discussion between state and non-state actors, convened by foreign donors. One 
major policy recommendation has been the unification of codes of conducts, which 
are demands that are made by foreign donors. Why is CSR such a foreign driven 
agenda?
How much of a barrier are institutional weaknesses vis-^-vis intuitional corruption in 
the case of our CSR failures?
How difficult do you think it is for non state actors, such as NGOs and trade unions, 
to gain access to policy level decisions, such as adoption of safety standards, 
standards implementation arrangements, etc.?
What changes would you recommend in the way CSR policymaking is done today?
What do you think should be done to make government agencies and trade 
associations more transparent in their dealings with regards to CSR?
FACTORIES and BUYERS:
How do you think the garments firms perceive "social compliance"?
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What do you think are the weaknesses of the firms that are holding them back from 
becoming compliant? Skills? Age? Structure? Lack of money?
What do you think of the current arrangements for buyers' audits?
Do trade unions ever have any dialogue with the buyers about what needs to be 
corrected?
What role would you recommend for the small garments factories regarding their 
compliance with labour rights and labour safety issues?
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Annex 5.1
Selected Descriptive Data for all 53 Factories
Serial
number
Knit/Woven Years of 
production
Small/ 
Med/ Large
Subcontract 
/  direct?
EU
/USA
Type
A,B,C
1. K 26 M D USA A
2. W 16 M D EU C
3. W 10 L BOTH USA A
4. K 1 M BOTH USA B
5. W 7 M D USA A
6. W 9 M D USA A
7. W 6 M D USA A
8. W 6 M D USA A
9. W 4 M D USA A
10. W 9 M D USA A
11. K 13 M D USA A
12. W 11 M D EU C
13. W 5 M D EU C
14. W 8 L BOTH USA A
15. K 6 M BOTH USA B
16. K 4 M BOTH USA B
17. K 2 M BOTH USA B
18. K 3 M D EU C
19. W 23 M D USA A
20. W 14 M D USA A
21. W 17 M D USA A
22. W 10 M D USA A
23. W 8 M D USA A
24. W 6 L D USA A
25. W 9 L D USA A
26. W 10 L D USA A
27. W 14 L D USA A
28. W 21 L D USA A
29. W 18 L D USA A
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30. K 4 L D both B
31. K 4 L D both B
32. K 4 L D both B
33. K 16 S S EU A
34. K 10 S S EU A
35. K 7 M D both A
36. K 5 M D both A
37. K 7 L D both A
38. W 5 L D both A
39. W 18 M D both A
40. W 18 M D both A
41. W 7 L D both A
42. W 14 M D both C
43. W 14 M D both A
44. W 14 M D both A
45. W 14 M D both A
46. W 14 M D both A
47. W 14 M D both A
48. W 20 S BOTH USA A
49. W 10 S S USA A
50. W 10 S S EU A
51. W 21 S S USA A
52. W 22 S S both A
53. W 14 S S both A
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Annex 5.2
General Environmental Policy within the Codes
Generally, codes are not entirely insensitive to environmental problems; it is more a 
problem of issue definition. The majority codes reviewed have environmental 
considerations packed in with "health and safety" requirements. This typically 
focuses on occupational health and safety and aims to ensure fire safety, provision of 
health benefits and reduce health impacts rising from poor environmental quality 
within the factory confines. For example, the Liz Claiborne Workplace Code of 
Conduct states,
"Health and Safety: Employers shall provide a safe and healthy working environment 
to prevent accidents and injury to health arising out of linked with, or occurring in 
the course of work or as a result of the operation of employer facilities."
The Liz Claiborne example is typical of the CoCs reviewed. However, companies 
such as NIKE go further in ensuring occupational health by asking suppliers to 
comply with the US Department of Labour's (DoL) Occupational Health and Safety 
Administration (OSHA) standards. Generally, complying with "health and safety" 
requirements means going beyond fire safety and medical benefits provisions. 
According to OSHA standards, the most common indoor occupational standards that 
apparel suppliers are audited for include hazard communication, the control of 
hazardous energy (the "lockout/tagout" provisions that safeguard employees from 
the unexpected energisation or startup of machinery and equipment, or the release of 
hazardous energy during service or maintenance activities), wiring methods, 
maintenance of components and equipment for non-production use, maintenance of 
abrasive wheel machinery and mechanical power-transmission apparatus, and 
maintenance, safeguards, and operational features for exit routes (OSHA 2006b). 
Some buyers such as Van Heusen also insist upon the use of personal protective 
equipment (PPEs) such as dust masks as a means of protecting workers from indoor 
air pollution (arising from the use of "thinners" or airborne fibres in the cutting 
section), and maintaining a materials safety data sheet (MSDS) for the storage and 
handling of toxic chemicals. While this addresses the "indoor" pollution caused
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during the manufacturing process, it is only an implicit acknowledgement, so 
suppliers can seem compliant on this depending on the strength of compliance 
auditing.
Outside of packaging environmental issues along with health and safety, many 
buyers had "environmental statements" in their codes. Generally speaking, there is a 
wide spectrum in terms of emphasis given to environmental statements. Most of the 
CoCs reviewed made general statements, for example, Reebok simply states,
"Reebok will seek business partners that strive to assure employees a safe and 
healthy workplace and that do not expose workers to hazardous conditions"
US retailer Gear For Sports states a more holistic approach,
"Environment: We recognise the sacredness of all lands and waterways and 
are committed to preserving the environment. We commit to compliance with 
all national and local regulations regarding the protection of the 
environment."
However, certain manufacturers were more specific and had detailed requirements. 
Clear leaders in this respect are the UK based Marks & Spencer, and the US based 
NIKE, Adidas and Levis. Marks & Spencer has a very detailed environmental policy 
regarding suppliers, operations, and customers. Their Global Sourcing Principles 
include environmentally friendly clothing and they have adopted the ETI Base Code 
for social compliance. Levi Strauss has drafted and put in place a policy on 
"Environmental Philosophy and Guiding Principles" while Adidas- Salomon has a 
Guide to Environmental Practice. NIKE has worked with its Asian footwear 
contractors to implement management systems to allow them to achieve specific 
environmental, health and safety goals, beginning with its MESH (Management, 
Environment, Safety and Health) programme. Liz Claiborne and VF Corporation 
(who own Wrangler Jeans, among other brands) subscribe to standards made by
428
trade associations (the US Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP)218 and the American 
Apparel Manufacturers Association (AAMA).219 The AAMA signatory retailers are 
bound to the AAMA Statement of Responsibility, which includes preventing 
environmental damage in supplier countries. The brand name buyers who are 
signatory to trade association codes are responsible for ensuring that their suppliers 
in Bangladesh are audited by their internal teams. Suppliers working with these big 
name proactive brands are therefore subject to more stringent auditing and are more 
likely to be compliant with better-articulated environmental demands in the CoCs.
Emphasis on National Regulatory Standards:
The majority CoCs reviewed that mention environmental issues (whether bundled 
together with health and safety or by itself) tended to simply call for adherence to all 
national and local laws pertaining to a host of issues, including environment.220 For 
example, the Jones Apparel Group's Business Partners Standards document states,
"Our business partners must share our commitment to providing a safe and 
healthy workplace and to treating employees fairly and in compliance with 
local laws. While we recognize that cultural differences exist and standards 
may vary by country, we expect our partners to adhere to certain practices. 
Health, safety and other workplace standards must meet all local laws and 
safety regulations."
While compliance with national laws is a useful starting point, it is a minimum 
standard that the companies require for environmental issues. In contrast they have 
more detailed requirements (often better articulated in terms of detailed standards 
and implementation strategies) for child labour and worker benefits. This indicates a 
passive attitude to environmental issues by most retailers, but importantly, it creates 
an opportunity among suppliers to find loopholes in interpreting national legislation
218 For Liz Claiborne’s involvement with the AIP and the FLA, please see the Liz Claiborne webpage 
at http://www.lizclaibomeinc.com/rights/historv.htm. accessed on February 17, 2007.
219 For the VF Corporation’s involvement with the AAMA, please see the ITGLWF website: 
http://www.itglwf.org/docA/Fcorporation.doc. accessed on February 17, 2007
220 Studies by the World Bank Group (2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b) also draw a similar conclusion.
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on getting environmental clearances, sacrificing the proactive elements and keeping 
the reactive "quick fix" solutions. In a country like Bangladesh where institutional 
corruption and bribery is well documented, this can be the "permission slip" for false 
environmental compliance. In the next two sections I will examine the loopholes in 
more detail.
Timeframe for Becoming Compliant:
Providing a clear and phased timeframe to suppliers for adopting CoC demands is 
important in two ways - an agreed timeframe that allows for a phased 
implementation will encourage the RMG firms' environmental strategy makers to 
take steps that involve pollution preventative measures that involve each stage of 
production, whereas the absence of a phased timeframe will suggest to the firms that 
immediate actions are more appropriate, leading to reactive strategy making. 
Secondly, a phased timeframe will also encourage continued auditing and 
improvement, which is a key requirement in proactive strategy implementation.
None of the CoCs that were reviewed talk about remediation measures or taking a 
phased approach to becoming compliant, instead they frame the CoC in terms of 
"absolute acceptance by partner firms" before any orders can be placed. In a 
cutthroat competitive industry, this leads to a "race" to become compliant overnight, 
often missing the intent behind having social-environmental safeguards. However, 
there are exceptions. Marks & Spencer has published a self-help guide specifically 
tailored for its Bangladeshi apparel suppliers, which takes a phased approach. None 
of the other retail companies surveyed had done anything similar, although Karstadt 
Quelle has conducted seminars with their Bangladeshi suppliers on social 
compliance, which has taken a phased approach. Some SA8000 and WRAP auditing 
is done in phased methods as well.
Focus on Raw Materials Used:
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Although the CoCs reviewed do not set standards for sustainably farmed cotton, 
wool, etc., but there is a general philosophy to conduct business in a manner that 
utilises natural resources efficiently and seeks to reduce the use of such resources. 
H&M's code states that business should be conducted in a manner that utilises 
natural resources as efficiently as possible. Marks & Spencer's code states that where 
there is the potential to improve significant environmental impacts, it will use raw 
materials only from known sources. This set of considerations impacts only a small 
percentage of highly vertically integrated RMG firms in Bangladesh, since the 
majority of yams and wool are imported.
Focus on Hazardous Emissions:
How codes deal with the issue of suppliers' emissions is an important aspect where 
the buyer preference for preventative measures could have been clearly 
demonstrated. The review of codes shows that buyers mainly rely on reactive 
pollution control for emissions, which fits in with prevalent practice in Bangladesh.221 
They generally operate on the philosophy that pollution should be ideally prevented, 
but they said very little about prevention of emissions. None of the CoCs referred to 
particular emissions standards, and it would be reasonable to assume then that 
national law would take the lead in this case. However, brand name buyers like 
NIKE and Adidas-Salomon have adopted comprehensive policies for their 
Bangladeshi suppliers. This is perhaps not surprising, since footwear manufacturers 
use hazardous chemicals more systematically than apparel manufacturers. NIKE 
prohibits the use of CFCs, and calculates an annual baseline emission of greenhouse 
gases and establishes goals for the reduction of such gases. Adidas-Salomon also 
seeks to reduce VOCs in its footwear factories. Although NIKE and Adidas do not 
source footwear from Bangladesh, they do source clothing, and insist on their 
suppliers treating wastewater through Effluent Treatment Plants (ETPs), which is an 
important limiting factor behind choosing their RMG suppliers. Marks & Spencer 
says that where potentially hazardous substances are used, it will set performance 
standards to carefully control their use, and it amenable to phase out the use of 
particularly hazardous substances. Therefore, while most of the codes reviewed said
221 Ahmed et al (2002) draw a similar conclusion in their study o f water pollution abatement in 
Bangladesh.
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nothing about preventing emissions or even controlling emissions post-facto, some of 
the larger buyers preferred a reactive environmental solution. So perhaps the 
greening pressure is not as proactive as it could have been.
Focus on Waste Management:
With respect to waste management, there is some support for the general practice of 
"reduce, reuse and recycle" programs to limit waste, although none of the CoCs have 
established specific goals to implement or monitor such programs. An example from 
the small sample that mentioned recycling etc., would be, Gap Inc. who,
"...encourages [its] employees and business partners to reduce waste, recycle and 
close the recycling loop by purchasing products that contain high percentages of 
post-consumer recycled material."
Waste management is another area where a proactive environmental strategy is 
needed in implementing reduce-recycle-reuse schemes, and similar to the case of the 
emissions control, could have made significant differences in apparel manufacturing 
pollution impacts, but only few of the largest buyers are asking for any action on 
these issues, and even then they are leaning towards reactive strategies.
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Annex 5.3
Legal Environmental Requirements for RMG Firms 
The Factories Act and Factories Rules:
The Bangladesh Factories Act 1965 is responsible for regulating the appointment of 
workers, their wages and the working conditions in factories, including health and 
hygiene, safety, welfare, working hours, and penalties for non-compliance of the FA 
requirements. The Act is important also because it sets definitions of various terms 
from a legal perspective, such as: adolescent, adult, child, working day, explosive 
substance, factory, machinery, manufacturing process, occupier, working hour, 
wages, etc. It incorporates the provisions for obtaining factory plan and construction 
approvals, and specifies licensing fees and factory registration. The Act is most often 
cited among RMG firms because of the fire safety requirements that the sector has 
been struggling to comply with for the past decade. The Act requires that each 
factory must have adequate fire safety measures, which includes fire escapes and 
personal protection against dangerous and accident-prone parts of machinery, 
electric and mechanical devices, etc. Workers are to be given fire and work hazard 
training before they are working near these machines.222 The Factories Act 1965 
(specifically Section 12 to 21) contains provisions for the protection of worker health 
while they are in the factories. According to the FA, management is responsible for 
keeping the factory premises clean and free from effluvia arising from any drain or 
toilet facilities. The Act requires RMG managers to make sure there are provisions for 
wastes and effluents disposal, dust and fume prevention, and proper ventilation and 
maintenance of room temperature. The specific Factories Act 1965 provisions that are 
most often cited in ensuring good environmental health are as follows (i) Cleanliness 
(section 12), (ii) Disposal of wastes and effluents (section 13), (iii) Ventilation due to 
high temperature (section 14), (iv) Dust and fume (section 15), (v) Artificial 
humidification (section 16), (vi) Overcrowding (section 17), (vii) Lighting (section 18), 
(viii) Drinking water (section 19), (ix) Latrines and urinals (section 20), (x) Spittoon
222 For details on the Act contents pertinent to worker health and safety, please see: 
http://www.ilo.Org/dvn/natlex/docsAyEBTEXT/47346/65073/E65BGD01.htm#a012. accessed October 
1,2007.
433
(section 21). While these Sections include provisions for waste disposal, it must be 
pointed out that more up-to-date requirements are set about in the DoE's ECR (1997).
The Environmental Conservation Act and the Environmental Conservation Rules:
The Bangladesh Environmental Conservation Act (ECA) passed in 1995, and the 
accompanying 1997 Rules (ECR 1997), and the DoE's EIA Guidelines for Industries 
(1997) are arguably the most important legislative documents for environmental 
compliance of all industrial operations in Bangladesh, RMG included (Clemett 2003a 
and 2003b). The Act is dedicated to the "conservation, improvement of quality 
standards, and control through mitigation of pollution of the environment" 
(Environmental Conservation Act, 1995:3). The 1997 Environment Conservation 
Rules made in accordance with the 1995 Act provide additional guidance for specific 
components of the Act.223
Since the gazetting of the 1995 Act, all industrial units must obtain two documents — 
Location Clearance Certificate (LCC) and follow it up with an Environmental 
Clearance Certificate (ECC) — from the DoE before production can start. The DoE 
has classified all industrial units and projects into four categories depending on its 
environmental impact and location. The LCC-ECC granting process differs 
depending on which category the applicant falls into:
(a) Green;
(b) Orange - A;
(c) Orange - B; and
(d) Red.
The costs of getting and renewing the ECC are associated with the amount of capital 
invested into the factory, and not on the production type or amount of pollution 
generated. Once ECC has been granted it is valid for a period of 3 years for Green 
Category industries (the category for factories with least environmental impact and 
sited in a least sensitive area) and 1 year for all other Categories.
223 The Environmental Conservation Act, 1995 and the Environmental Court Act 2000, which supports 
the Environmental Conservation Act (1995) and the Environmental Conservation Rules (1997), were 
amended in 2002.
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According to ECA sub-rule (1) and ECR Schedule 1, all RMG firms are categorised as 
Orange B. In order to get an LCC, a new RMG firm needs to submit the following 
documents along with an application form to the Divisional office of the DoE:
(i) Report on the feasibility of the industrial unit or project (applicable only for 
proposed industrial unit or project);
(ii) Report on the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) of the industrial unit or 
project, and also the process flow diagram, Layout Plan (showing location of the 
proposed ETP), design of the ETP of the unit or project (these are applicable only for 
a proposed industrial unit or project);
(iii) No objection certificate from the local authority;
(iv) Emergency plans relating adverse environmental impact and plan for mitigation 
of the effect of pollution;
(v) Outline of the relocation, rehabilitation plan (where applicable);
For an existing RMG factory, instead of (ii), the factory applicant needs to submit a 
report on the Environmental Management Plan (EMP) for the industrial unit or 
project, and also the Process Flow Diagram, Layout Plan (showing location of ETP), 
design of the ETP and information about the effectiveness of the ETP of the unit or 
project.
It may be noted here that the ECR does not mention any provisions for mandatory 
site visits by DoE staff to check on the veracity of the IEE etc. before granting of an 
LCC. After getting the LCC, the RMG entrepreneur is free to undertake activities for 
land development and infrastructure development. Only after the machinery 
(including the mandatory ETP) has been installed, can the RMG entrepreneur apply 
for an ECC, without which it is legally impossible to get a gas connection or even 
start trial production. After installation of the machinery and the ETP, RMG units 
must apply to the DoE for an ECC, which they will be granted within 30 working 
days, or the application shall be rejected mentioning appropriate reasons (DoE 1997).
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Annex 7.1
Policy Making and Negotiations at the Social Compliance Forum:
The SCF is looking at compliance from a supply chain perspective as well. During 
the FFFI, the trade association representatives brought the issue of conflicting code 
confusion to the discussion agenda and in response it was agreed by the SCF that 
buyers need to work collaboratively to agree a common approach both to code 
content and implementation criteria, the SCF agreed that buying practices need to be 
reviewed ensure that a fair price is paid for sourced products from socially 
responsible firms, specifically due to unrealistic delivery schedules. Consequently, a 
"Buyers Group" has been set up to aid the formulation of a commonly agreed code 
of standards and to set up a process for monitoring and improving understanding 
about the link between compliance and purchasing practices (MFAF 2006h). This 
network included buyer representatives from Asda, Carrefour, The Co-op, Cotton 
Group, Gap Inc., H&M, Inditex, Karstadt Quelle, Levi's, Marks & Spencer, Nike, 
Tesco, and Wal-Mart. The ITGLWF, Oxfam International, Ethical Trading Initiative 
(ETI), Social Accountability International, and the Fair Labour Association are also 
part of this Working Group.
Possibly the most significant output of the SCF has been the formulation of the Joint 
Initiative on Corporate Accountability and Workers' Rights, in November 2005 
(called the Jo-In code) which is a common code to be adopted by the buyers placing 
their orders in Bangladesh. Under phase one of the proposed Jo-In implementation 
project, the minimum labour standards to be met by all RMG firms as well as 
timeframes for implementation are to be determined. The second phase is 
concentrating on establishing a method of implementation of these codes. In order to 
do that, it was decided that buyers would document the cases of non-compliance that 
arise during audits of four factories over the next two seasons to note the barriers to 
implementation and possible remediation approach to each non-compliance issue. 
This evaluation never came to be.
Despite the multi stakeholder inclusive design of the SCF, in practice the leading 
actors found it difficult to include all stakeholders. They could not shed
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institutionalised norms and rules of making policy only involving government 
representatives, affecting the acceptability of the code by stakeholders, such as trade 
unions (who became politically important after the riots in 2006) and NGOs (who are 
active in producing independent audits of compliance performance in liaison with 
international trade unions and NGOs, and command significant attention from non- 
Bangladeshi players in the supply chain). During the project negotiations in January 
2006, for example, it was revealed that the MoC led task forces had drafted worker 
safety and labour standards without any participation from the trade unions or civil 
society, even though the basis of the initiative was to achieve CSR goals through a 
cross dialogue involving non state actors who were previously not invited informal 
policy making networks. From the government side it was explained that civil 
society representation had not been resolved due to an absence of a unified self­
nominated trade union actors who would participate. Similar weaknesses were also 
alleged behind NGO participation being non-existent (MFAF January Meeting 
Minutes, 2006).224 Upon questioning, the task forces questioned the unbiased agendas 
of the trade unionists and NGOs. It may be mentioned here that after the 2006 riots, 
some trade unions and NGOs became affiliated with certain political parties, and 
hence the tendency to exclude some over the others (or even to leave a group out 
completely) had to do with local politics. Meanwhile, conflict regarding actor 
agendas and participation was gradually becoming deeper between the government 
agencies and the non-Bangladeshis as well. By the end of July 2006, the MoC called 
the first meeting of the SCF, where the MFAF was not invited but was able to 
participate only through lobbying by the BGMEA and UNDP. No trade unions or 
NGOs were invited (as noted in the MFAF August Meeting Minutes, 2006).
The problem of a restricted policy network was still being worked out when the 
MFAF met with BKMEA, NGOs, trade unions, BGMEA and the MoC in August 
2006. According to the MFAF August Meeting Minutes (2006):
"BKMEA also confirmed that they had jointly proposed along with BGMEA that
BIGUF be invited to the National Forum meeting to represent the Trade Unions,
although no consideration had been given to inviting an NGO."
224 Source: MFAF website at
http://www.accountabilitv.org.uk/rnfa forum/bangladesh/docs/mfaf dhaka visit summary ianuarv200 
6.pdf. accessed on March 25,2006
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Representatives from BIGUF, the trade union discussed in the meeting, contradicted 
BKMEA's statement that they had been invited to join the SCF meetings (as stated in 
the MFAF August Meeting Minutes, 2006).The NGOs, for their part, were willing to 
organise themselves to participate in the SCF. At the MFAF meeting in August, they 
intimated that they would elect their own representatives without any influence 
from the GoB. The trade unions also felt similarly excluded and wanted to elect their 
own representatives. Self selection of NGO and trade union representation was the 
only acceptable basis for the non Bangladeshi SCF members, although the BGMEA 
reluctantly accepted the suggestion.
By the August meetings of the SCF, much of the old behavioural norms were being 
displayed once again, such as BGMEA's reluctance to take responsibility for 
compliance and to blame foreign actors for agenda pushing. At the August 2006 SCF 
meeting, the BGMEA called for a level playing field when it came to non Bangladeshi 
demands for social compliance investment across the supply chain. An example of 
anti Bangladeshi bias was cited through the uneven attention given to the Spectrum 
accident versus the sacking of 500 Bangladeshi workers overnight by Taiwanese 
employers at DEPZ. In response, the MFAF stressed that buyers have to demonstrate 
their commitment more clearly by contributing their support and allowing for 
sufficient time for complying with such high standards. The main barriers in the 
short run were identified as the conflicted cooperation across the SCF network and 
the obsolete and vague national laws that relate to social compliance. It was 
concluded that both these factors were creating confusion in moving forwards 
(MFAF August Meeting Minutes, 2006).
The next MFAF meeting was held in September 2006, in London, as a part of the 
MFAF's biannual strategy meetings. The participants in the Bangladesh panel 
discussions included the joint secretary of the Ministry of Commerce, high-level 
representatives from the BGMEA, BKMEA, BEPZA, and labour leaders representing 
trade unions (INCIDIN, Awaj Foundation, the Bangladesh National Council of 
Textile Garments and Leather Workers, Kormojibi Nari, and Workers Safety Forum), 
as well as Mr. Neil Kearney, General Secretary of ITGLWF. The Bangladesh meetings 
were sponsored by DFID Bangladesh and GTZ. The UNDP was not present at this
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stage. The key agenda item was to present the plan for the implementation of the Jo­
in code. The complete content and implementation proposal was due to be presented 
to potential donors in early 2007. By the end of the round of closed door meetings in 
London, the Jo-In code concept paper was agreed in principle by all stakeholders, 
with the implementation to be negotiated in Dhaka. The concept note on planning 
focused on three key areas for policy making (please see box for the key areas) which 
represented a broadening focus of issues. Previously the SCF had only dealt with 
compliance monitoring (e.g. fire and safety issues through the CMC), however, in 
this round of discussions, social compliance was being thought of a part of greater 
quality improvement demands. The Jo-In code for Bangladeshi RMG was to be 
packaged within a broader focus than simple social compliance support, instead, the 
new focus was on actions required to sustain the Bangladesh RMG industry by 
making it not only compliant according to international compliance standards, but 
also improving production quality standards.
The concept paper led to a multi stakeholder Steering Committee being set up, 
comprising representatives from the buyers group, the government (represented by 
the Ministry of Commerce), local industry (BGMEA and BKMEA), donors (as 
represented by the donor Local Consultative Group on social compliance) and civil 
society (at this point, details of civil society participation was to be coordinated by 
the MFAF, since the NGOs proved unable to find a representative that they were 
satisfied with).
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Box : 3 year project model key areas of activity and outputs225
1. Compliance to International Codes of Conduct
-Re-affirming the commitment to the use of the Jo-In code among buyers at the international and local 
level.
-Identification of process and timeline for implementation of the Jo-In code throughout the RMG 
sector including sub-contractors.
-Collaborative work by all brands and retailers to instigate improvement programs across 
common suppliers.
-Identification of how monitoring of compliance and improvement programs will be taken 
forward, including auditing and alternative methods.
-Identification and acquisition of capital expenditure support (donor funding) needed to help 
meet compliance and improvement programs.
-Facilitate the development of a mature system of independent verification, including the 
development of a robust data base of suppliers and the degree of compliance to international 
standards.
Outputs: With these activities, a greater compliance to a common code and standards throughout 
the RMG sector including sub-contractors with a more robust system of ongoing monitoring and 
transparency.
2. Training and awareness raising
-Needs assessment for the development of training programs.
-Training programs developed and funding secured to support workers, supervisors and junior 
management covering;
• HR management.
• Technical support areas i.e. engineering, electrical etc.
• International human rights in the workplace.
• Industrial engineering and work study.
• Supply chain and inventory management.
• Quality management.
-Identify and contract supplier partners to deliver these programs.
Outputs: With these activities, workers and managers will be aware of their rights and will be 
able and willing to contribute to programs that will lead to compliance to international standards 
and improved productivity in the RMG sector.
3. Productivity improvements
Develop work based projects to incorporate the training delivered from activity 2.
Output: With this development, a sustainable RMG sector in Bangladesh that is competitive and 
progressively able to meet International standards of compliance will deliver improvements to 
workers rights, conditions of work and wages.
The steering committee was in charge of actual policy making for social and 
environmental compliance in the RMG sector. They were in charge of reviewing 
broader quality standards that would be applicable and acceptable for the RMG in 
Bangladesh keeping in mind local realities and foreign expectations; including 
performance, social and environmental standards. They were in charge of analysing 
the costs and benefits of different policy options, and for analysing the risks of 
failure. Even though the operations of the CMC (that is in charge of compliance 
monitoring and audits) ended up being limited in its suitability for even shallow EM,
225 Source MFAF website at:
http://www.accountabilitv21.net/mfa forum/bangladesh/docs/concept note developing 3vr plan.pdf. 
accessed January 30, 2007.
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one could have reasonably hoped that the steering committee in charge of the Jo-In 
code for Bangladesh RMG would provide a second chance for socially conscious 
green production of apparel. However, that was not to be. What is remarkable about 
the policy network at this stage, is the solidification of the policy making core, along 
old familiar lines. In the SCF, the core was once again made up of participants who 
were state actors (the ministries), task implementers (the trade associations), and 
project funders (donors).226 The actors in the periphery were also familiar. The 
London meeting had comparatively fewer trade union representatives than in the 
Dhaka meetings. The representation of trade unions in the Steering Committee also 
remains vague. Non state actors are not the only ones being left out - the number of 
state actors has also decreased, for example, anybody from the CMC or the task 
forces was not involved in the Steering Committee, even though there are some 
overlaps between the CMC's long term goals and the Jo-In code, and by that time the 
task faces had gained experience in auditing that could have been valuable in 
formulating the Jo-In code appropriate for Bangladesh.
Following the London meeting in September, the Steering Committee met for the 
first time in Dhaka on the 26th of September with the aim of formulating a plan for 
mobilising resources and institutionalising mandates behind the three key areas for 
social compliance. At this point, the agreed date for finalising the project plan for 
presentation to the donors was January 2007. The problems of unequal resource and 
power dependencies and wavering commitment to the issue begun to become 
apparent within the core-players that constituted the Steering Committee, very much 
like it had done when the same actors had interacted over the issue of compliance in 
a fragmented manner. The structure of the network and its communication paths 
were identified as causing barriers to network functioning at the core level by the 
SCF. Government agencies were not according a high enough priority to their SCF 
work after the initial agreement of the early days. They were not following up on 
their tasks, agreeing to release matching funds, or even showing up for meetings - 
collectively it may be taken to mean that social or environmental issues to do with 
RMG trade were not of high priority for the government agencies. In order to
226 Another noticeable change in the policy network was the change in the lead donors. The 
three month planning by the Steering Committee and the MFAF was funded by DfID Dhaka 
and GTZ PROGRESS.
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overcome policy bottlenecks and facilitate efficient decision making within the 
committee, it was stated by the Committee Chair that the member institutions should 
nominate representatives for the Committee who are high level enough to have the 
authority to take instant decisions on behalf of their constituents. Representation in 
the committee was proposed to include the Ministry of Labour, who were also in the 
SCF task forces. As belated as it was, the addition of the government agency was 
indubitably helpful in designing the fair wage component of the Jo-In code.
At this stage, the donors and the MFAF staff were unofficially leading the Steering 
Committee. They were scheduling the meetings and preparing the meeting agendas 
(e.g. compliance with international CoCs, training and awareness raising 
mechanisms, productivity improvements, etc.). Only the MFAF staff met with the 
buyers group; the Steering Committee members did not regularly meet or exchange 
input with the buyers. Among the Bangladeshi participants, this seemed like hidden 
steering by foreign actors, and it was seen as an extension of the hegemonic rule of 
foreign values and demands over Bangladeshi economic networks.
Once again, the issue of regularising buyer codes and reviewing the buying process 
was brought up in the Steering Committee meetings. As we saw in chapter 6, the 
buying process itself is extremely time pressured, which leads to the exploitation of 
several loopholes in compliance implementation and auditing. Interestingly enough, 
this aspect of policy making kept on being forgotten in the policy dialogue. 
Eventually, trade associations expressed the view to the Steering Committee that the 
concerns of the RMG factory owners regarding the changes they expect from the 
buyers were not being reflected in the plan. Mr. Fazlul Hoque from the BKMEA 
stated that these are problems related to the buying practices of the brands and the 
responsibilities of the workers and trade unions. Both the representatives from the 
BGMEA and the BKMEA stated that the suppliers' demands are not given adequate 
importance when defining the problems of the overall sector. Discussions reached a 
critical point when Mr. Hoque stated that if the suppliers' demands were not taken 
into consideration then the BGMEA and BKMEA would not be interested to 
participate in this initiative. Mr. Ghulam Hussain, from the Ministry of Commerce, 
emphasised that the forward and backward linkages related to the RMG industry
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should be focused on while designing compliance and there should be a special care 
package for the "sick" RMG firms.
The problems with the new policy network did not end with tension between the 
core and the periphery; the Bangladeshis and the non-Bangladeshis; and the state vs. 
non-state actors. Another important challenge for the policy core at this point was 
agreeing on how to implement the Jo-In code in Bangladesh. Core members, the 
BGMEA and the BKMEA, disagreed with most discussants regarding the 
applicability and acceptability of the Jo-In code for the Bangladeshi RMG sector. The 
input of trade unions was not taken until this point about the Jo-In issue. At that 
meeting, as an acknowledgement of the unacceptability of the Jo-In code by the trade 
associations, it was decided that the BGMEA would carry out a gap analysis between 
the new Bangladesh Labour Code 2006 and the Jo-In Code. Meanwhile, the Steering 
Committee decided to continue working on the identification of process and timeline 
for implementation of the Jo-In code throughout the RMG sector including sub­
contractors with specific reference to the issue of working hours and low wages.
The task of getting all the buyers -  large and small - to agree to become active in the 
policy core was continuing to be a challenge, even though collaborative work by all 
brands and retailers to instigate improvement programmes across common suppliers 
is an important part of the Steering Committee's mandate. To address this, the 
international Buyers Group under the MFAF had already sent letters to their local 
offices and suppliers stating that the implementation of the Jo-In Code should start, 
to be completed within 2 years.
Another crucial programme bottleneck was identified as the lack of information, as 
a baseline of compliance. Consequently, it was decided that in order to facilitate the 
development of a mature system of independent verification, including the 
development of a robust data base of suppliers and the degree of compliance to 
international standards. At this point, both the BGMEA and BKMEA expressed 
concern about stating the names of the non-compliant suppliers.
As a part of packaging social compliance with overall improvements in product 
quality, the Steering Committee suggested that a benchmarking exercise be
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conducted to confirm that overall productivity is indeed low and identify steps to 
improve the production processes. The benchmarking exercise was assigned to the 
buyers since they are in a suitable position to carry out the task.
The second steering committee meeting was in October 2006, and was attended by 
representatives of BKMEA, BGMEA, Ministry of Commerce and some international 
buyers. By this stage, the number of non core group participants had reduced even 
further. Trade unions were invited to this round of meetings, but did not participate, 
marking out the polarisation even further.
The second meeting heralded a major change in policy direction, brought about by 
the trade association concerns in the last meeting about the unacceptability of the Jo­
in code by the RMG factories. Consequently, the trade associations persuaded the 
Steering Committee members that the Jo-In code is, in fact regarded as the highest 
common denominator for social compliance standards by RMG factories. Therefore it 
was decided that the "Bangladeshi Labour Law", which is a legal binding code and 
has more acceptance, it will serve as the basis for the immediate programme, and 
will build towards the future attainment of the Jo-In code.
After the meeting in October 2006, not much has been done by way of formulating 
the plan of implementing the three year compliance programme for the RMG sector. 
The main reason for this is the political disruption that has made Bangladesh come to 
a standstill building up to the general elections. Bangladesh went under a Caretaker 
Government and a State of Emergency was declared in December 2006. As a result, 
all government ministries are headed by non-regular acting chiefs, and action 
regarding social compliance in the SCF has become slower. In fact, according to the 
GTZ PROGRESS team, the project proposal that was due to be submitted to the 
donors in early 2007 will now only be ready by May or June 2007, depending on the 
elections. It may be noted that as of April 28th 2008, the Caretaker Government of 
Bangladesh has not set any dates for the next general elections.
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